Concept
Legislative Power Vested in Congress
Other powers
Other Powers of Congress
Legislative Power Vested in Congress
Article I opens with a single sentence that frames this entire chapter: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."1 The sentence does two jobs. "Herein granted" limits Congress to the legislative powers the Constitution itself confers, and the vesting language places those powers in a body of two chambers.
Each job raises its own question. The first concerns authority: which provision of the text lets Congress legislate on this subject? The second concerns process: through what institution, and by what route, may Congress exercise the power? A statute can fail on either ground. A law on a subject outside every grant is invalid however it was enacted, and a measure on a subject within a grant is invalid if Congress adopted it by a route that skips the steps Article I prescribes. The two subsections below take the questions in that order.
Powers Herein Granted
The words "herein granted" tell a court that Congress holds only the legislative powers the Constitution confers.2 The federal government is accordingly one of limited, enumerated powers, and to act it needs a source of authority in the text, a constitutional "hook."3 The defender of an act of Congress must therefore name a specific grant, such as the power to establish Post Offices and post Roads or to regulate Commerce among the several States,4 and must also show that no constitutional prohibition forbids the act.
The defender of a state statute carries no comparable burden. The States hold a general power of governing, the police power, and they need no constitutional authorization to use it. They punish street crime, run public schools, and zone property even though the Constitution's text authorizes no government to do those things.5 A state statute need only respect independent limits the Constitution places on state governments, chiefly individual-rights protections and the supremacy of valid federal law over conflicting state law.6
The burdens differ because the two governments draw their authority from different sources. The people created the national government and gave it a list of powers: it "proceeds directly from the people," who were at perfect liberty to accept or reject the Constitution, and their act bound the state sovereignties.7 The question is therefore not what power the Federal Government ought to have but what powers the people in fact gave it.8 Marshall's observation in Gibbons v. Ogden states the logic in one line: "[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated." His opinion in McCulloch adds that the Federal Government "can exercise only the powers granted to it."9 A list of grants thus implies a remainder that Congress was never given.
This difference explains why a federal problem begins with power and not with rights. Prohibitions such as the individual-rights guarantees restrain what a government with authority may do, but a federal law that violates no prohibition still fails if no enumerated power supports it.10 The instinct to ask first whether a statute infringes someone's rights skips the threshold step. The Court has reminded us of the contrast by listing what the States do without any grant in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property.11
Federal criminal law shows the same discipline at work. Federal offenses that overlap state crimes typically contain an element tied to an enumerated power, such as use of the mails or travel in interstate commerce, and that element is what distinguishes the federal offense from the state one. Where an economic activity inherently affects interstate commerce, Congress may draft a criminal prohibition without such a "jurisdictional hook."12
The Framers chose a list over a general grant on purpose. The Virginia Plan proposed that the national legislature legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, and the Convention delegates twice voted for such general formulations. The specifically enumerated list of Article I, Section 8 originated in the Committee of Detail.13 The Framers likewise refused to give the federal government a general police power over the health, safety, and morals of the national community. They set out seventeen separate purposes in Section 8 instead, a "laundry list" approach, and the Tenth Amendment later reaffirmed that Congress could do very much but not everything it might wish.14
The list was not a timid one. Section 8 gave Congress more than the Articles of Confederation had, above all the powers to tax and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, whose absence was widely blamed for the Articles' failure.15 But the list also drew a boundary. The powers left with the States are, in Madison's words, "numerous and indefinite," and a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government "will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."16
Section 8 is the map for the rest of this chapter. It lists the powers to tax and spend, to borrow, to regulate commerce, to establish rules of naturalization and bankruptcy, to coin money and fix weights and measures, to punish counterfeiting, to establish post offices, to grant patents and copyrights, to constitute inferior tribunals, to punish piracies and offenses against the law of nations, to declare war, to raise armies and a navy and call forth the militia, and to legislate exclusively over the seat of government and federal enclaves.17 Two features of the list matter at the outset. A federal statute must fall within only one of Congress's powers to be valid, so its defender may offer several grants in the alternative.18 And the phrase about the common defence and general welfare qualifies the taxing power, because the view that it grants a free-standing power to provide for the general welfare has never been authoritatively accepted.19
Not every federal power appears in the list by name. Section 8 authorizes Congress to establish Post Offices, but no clause mentions postage stamps; the power to issue them, and to punish people who rob postal inspectors, is implied from the enumerated power.20 Likewise, Section 8 names a few specific crimes such as counterfeiting and piracy, yet no provision expressly gives Congress a general power to impose penalties for violating federal law or to create a national bank or charter federal corporations.21 The last clause of Section 8 supplies the bridge: Congress may make all laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."22 That clause sanctions the exercise of implied powers.23 A final cluster of powers, often called inherent, lacks a readily discernible attachment to any textual grant.24 Later sections take up the Necessary and Proper Clause, the remaining enumerated powers, the enforcement powers, and the inherent powers in turn.
Vested in Congress Alone
The second half of Section 1 vests the legislative powers "in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."26 Section 7 then supplies the route. A bill must pass both Houses and be presented to the President, who either signs it or returns it with his objections to the House where it originated. If two thirds of each House repass it, it becomes law over the veto, and a bill the President neither signs nor returns within ten days (Sundays excepted) becomes law unless Congress's adjournment prevents its return.27 Lawmaking is thus a power shared by both Houses and the President, and the limited veto rests on the Framers' profound conviction that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed.28
Section 7 also reaches every order, resolution, or vote that needs the concurrence of both Houses, except on a question of adjournment: it must be presented to the President and approved by him or repassed by two thirds of each House.29 James Madison feared that presentment could be evaded by calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill," and the third clause of Section 7 was added in response.30 Labels can always be changed, so courts look to effect. Whether an action by either House exercises legislative power depends not on its form but on whether it contains matter "properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect."31
The rule operated against Congress itself in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. A statute authorized one House to require the Attorney General to deport an alien whose deportation would otherwise be canceled, and the House invoked that authority against Chadha, purporting to exercise the power in Section 8 to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." The action was legislative in purpose and effect, because it altered the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the Legislative Branch, including the Attorney General, other Executive Branch officials, and Chadha.32 Yet it bypassed passage by the Senate and presentment to the President, and so it could not stand. Chadha also shows that the two questions in this section are independent. The House had a real grant, so Congress had the authority the previous subsection demands, and the defect lay entirely in the process.
The holding leaves Congress many ways to supervise the agencies it creates. Congress ultimately controls administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, and other means of control, such as durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within its constitutional power.33 Each House's powers over its own affairs and the impeachment process are taken up under Internal Powers of Congress, near the end of this chapter.
Section 1 binds the President as well as Congress. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court refused to sustain the President's seizure order on the strength of the constitutional provisions granting executive power. The President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is a lawmaker; the Constitution limits his function in the lawmaking process to recommending the laws he thinks wise and vetoing the laws he thinks bad, and it is "neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute."34
Sharing lawmaking work with another body is a different matter from bypassing Article I, because a delegating statute has itself been enacted through the Article I process. The Court has long allowed it. After invalidating two statutes in 1935 as excessive delegations, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court upheld, "again without deviation," Congress's ability to delegate power under broad standards.35 A delegating statute survives when it supplies standards that guide the delegate, which the cases call an intelligible principle. In Gundy v. United States, for example, the Court rejected the claim that Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it authorized the Attorney General to "specify the applicability" of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act's registration requirements to offenders convicted before the Act. The Court joined the consensus of every other court to consider the issue, including eleven Courts of Appeals, and affirmed.36 The principle behind the 1935 decisions is that Congress "is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested."37
Chadha and Gundy therefore ask different questions. Chadha asks whether Congress used the Article I route at all, and Gundy and the 1935 cases ask whether Congress, having used it, kept the policy choice for itself. The same logic closes a door in the other direction: if Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to one of its own components or agents, it could evade "the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution," a danger that is absent when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive or to an independent agency.38
How demanding the standards requirement should be remains contested. Justice Alito's brief concurrence in Gundy expressed a willingness to reconsider the law in this area, and in light of the dissent and Justice Kavanaugh's confirmation there might be a majority willing to do so.39 The separate treatment of the nondelegation doctrine covers the constitutional cases of 1935, the doctrine's later use as a canon of statutory construction, and the question of its revival.40