Concept
The Jones Decision
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
The Jones Decision
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. holds that Congress, acting under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, may forbid private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property, because it may rationally treat that discrimination as a badge or incident of slavery. The legislation need not be aimed at the states. What had been called “an unserviceable antique” became the basis for broad congressional protection of civil rights without a “state action” limitation.1
In September 1965 Joseph Lee Jones and his wife tried to buy a home in the Paddock Woods subdivision of St. Louis County, Missouri, from the Alfred H. Mayer Company and one of its officers. The company refused to sell solely because the Joneses are Black.2 The facts isolated the question of private power. There was no state action: the developer itself provided the sewer service, garbage collection, and sidewalks, and no federal aid was involved that could have subjected it to executive orders or federal statutes barring discrimination in publicly financed projects. The only issue was private racial discrimination in refusing to sell housing.3
The Joneses sued in federal district court on September 2, 1965, seeking injunctive and other relief and relying in part on § 1982. The district court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that § 1982 applies only to state action and does not reach private refusals to sell. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.4
The opinion answers two questions in order, and the order matters. The first is statutory: does § 1982 reach a purely private refusal to sell? The second is constitutional: if it does, may Congress enact a statute with that reach under the Thirteenth Amendment? The second question arises only because the first was answered yes. A statute confined to state action would never have tested how far Section 2 extends over private conduct.
Section 1982 guarantees to “[a]ll citizens of the United States” “the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”5 Even the respondents conceded that if § 1982 “means what it says,” it must encompass every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent and cannot be confined to officially sanctioned segregation in housing. Their answer was that Congress cannot have intended a result so far-reaching.6
The history of the statute rejected that answer. To the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the right to buy and lease property could be infringed not only by “State or local law” but also by “custom, or prejudice.” When Congress provided in § 1 of that Act that Black and white citizens alike would enjoy the right equally throughout the United States, it plainly meant to secure the right against interference from any source whatever, governmental or private.7 The Court also looked to a later stage of Reconstruction. By then most, if not all, of the former Confederate States, under “reconstructed” legislatures, had formally repudiated racial discrimination, and congressional concern had shifted from hostile statutes to groups like the Ku Klux Klan, operating wholly outside the law.8 The Court therefore held that § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property.9
The second refusal falls outside the statute because § 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law. Beyond its limit to race, it does not refer specifically to services or facilities, advertising, financing arrangements, or brokerage, and it creates no federal administrative agency and no role for the Attorney General.10 The Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is a different kind of law. Its Title VIII contains comprehensive fair housing provisions that apply from January 1, 1969, to persons who, like the Joneses, try to buy houses from developers.11 The Court nevertheless held that the Fair Housing Title in no way impaired the sanction of § 1982.12
The constitutional step began from the Amendment itself. “Our starting point is the Thirteenth Amendment,” the Court said, “for it was pursuant to that constitutional provision that Congress originally enacted what is now § 1982.”13 Section 1 declares that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Section 2 adds that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Section 1 names no state actor, and Section 2 supplies the power. The Court held that Congress may rationally determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery and translate that determination into effective legislation, and that § 1982, as construed, is a valid exercise of that power.14 The enabling clause thus empowers Congress not only to outlaw forced labor but also to identify “badges of slavery” and pass legislation “necessary and proper” to eliminate them.15
The Court rested entirely on the Thirteenth Amendment and found it unnecessary to decide whether the refusal also violated the Equal Protection Clause, so the holding did not turn on state action.16 Why housing discrimination qualifies as a badge of slavery is the subject of the next two sections.
The decision drew a dissent. The dissent quoted the Civil Rights Cases’ description of the 1866 law as “clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings, and customs having the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified,” a description that cuts against reading the statute to reach purely private refusals.17 Its doubts about the Thirteenth Amendment ground drew on earlier decisions such as Corrigan v. Buckley and Hodges v. United States. The dissent also thought that the 1968 Act, an event after argument, so diminished the case’s public significance, in light of the difficulty of the questions presented, that the writ should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.18 The majority disagreed on both points, and the dissent’s doubts about how far the Amendment reaches foreshadow the limits discussed later in this chapter.