Concept
Conditional Spending Before Dole
Spending power
Conditional Spending Before Dole
Article I, § 8, cl. 1 confers on Congress a power to tax and spend, so every exercise of the power must take the form of a tax or an expenditure.1 That form raises the question this section follows: when Congress spends, how far may the terms attached to the money reach? United States v. Butler put the question in its sharpest form. It asked whether Congress may use the taxing power to raise money for purchasing a compliance that Congress is powerless to command.2
The government answered that the Agricultural Adjustment Act worked by voluntary cooperation, and the majority gave two replies. First, the plan was not in fact voluntary. A farmer could refuse, but the price of refusing was the loss of benefits, and the amount offered was meant to be large enough to pressure him into agreeing. The Court called the asserted power of choice illusory and described the plan as one to keep a non-cooperating minority in line.3 Second, a purely voluntary plan would stand no better, because at best it was a scheme for purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the states.4 Both replies rest on a worry about leverage, which the majority put in one sentence: “The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy.”5
The majority also met the argument from education grants. The Court was pointed to appropriations in aid of education, with the observation that no one has doubted Congress’s power to stipulate the sort of education for which the money is expended. It replied that an appropriation to an educational institution, available only if the beneficiary contracts to teach doctrines subversive of the Constitution, is “clearly bad.” Affirming a power to condition in that way, the Court said, would “tend to nullify all constitutional limitations upon legislative power.”6 The example shows why a limit has to exist. A power to condition without limit would dissolve the limits on every other legislative power.
Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, dissented. He answered the fear of abuse bluntly: the suggestion that the spending power must be curtailed by judicial fiat because it may be abused “hardly rises to the dignity of argument.” The majority was unmoved.7 Stone also defended conditions on their own terms. The spending power, he wrote, is in addition to the legislative power and not subordinate to it, and its exercise presupposes freedom to choose among ends and “the capacity to impose such conditions as will render the choice effective.” It is a contradiction in terms, he said, to claim power to spend for the national welfare while denying any power to impose conditions reasonably adapted to the end that alone justifies the expenditure.8 His example was the Morrill Act. Congress may not command that agriculture be taught in state universities, but if it aids that teaching by grants to state institutions, it is appropriate, if not necessary, that the grant be conditioned on its use for the intended purpose.9 Stone did not claim the power was boundless. The purpose must be truly national, the power may not be used to coerce action left to state control, and the conscience and patriotism of Congress and the Executive remain a further check.10
Read together, the opinions agree on more than their result suggests. Both assumed that some limit separates a genuine condition from regulation bought with money. The majority drew it through its coercion analysis, and Stone through his warning against coercing action left to state control. They split over which side of the limit the Act fell on. In the Morrill Act grant, the condition ties the money to the purpose Congress is funding. In Butler, as the majority saw it, the money was the price of submission to regulation, offered in an amount meant to pressure the holdout.11
Butler therefore carries two layers, and later law has treated them differently. The durable layer is the principle that Congress may not use money to purchase regulation it could not command. The time-bound layer is the premise that regulating agriculture lay beyond Congress’s reach. Justice O’Connor’s dissent in South Dakota v. Dole separated them. The error in Butler, she wrote, was not the Court’s conclusion that the Act was essentially regulatory, but its “crabbed view” of the commerce power, since the Act was regulation that today would likely be considered within that power.12 A student who dismisses Butler as wholly discredited loses the principle. One who relies on it to bar a modern farm regulation relies on the premise that has aged.
A different strand of authority treats temptation as something short of coercion. In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, the Court observed that every rebate from a tax, when conditioned on conduct, is in some measure a temptation. To hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion, it said, “is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.”13 Dole later relied on that passage.14
In Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission (1947), the federal power to attach conditions met a state’s claim of sovereignty. The Hatch Act had been applied to a member of the Oklahoma State Highway Commission who was employed in an activity financed in part by federal loans and grants.15 The Court found that the United States has no power to regulate the local political activities of state officials as such, yet it “does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.” It found no violation of the State’s sovereignty because the State could, and did, adopt the “simple expedient” of not yielding, and it added that an offer of benefits dependent on state cooperation with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual.16 The Court dismissed the complaint about federal intervention without mentioning Butler.17 Dole read the decision to mean that a perceived Tenth Amendment limit on congressional regulation of state affairs does not limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.18
Butler and Oklahoma treat the right to refuse differently. Butler found the farmer’s choice illusory because the benefit was sized to pressure him, while Oklahoma found the state’s freedom to decline sufficient.19 Reconciling the two requires a way to tell pressure that coerces from temptation that does not. It also requires a way to tell a true condition from regulation bought with money. Justice O’Connor’s Dole dissent offers one test: ask whether the requirement specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so that Congress’s intent in making the grant is effectuated. A requirement that goes further is a regulation, valid only if one of Congress’s delegated regulatory powers supports it. She viewed the Hatch Act condition in Oklahoma as a condition relating to how federal moneys were to be expended.20 The cases themselves fix no outer boundary. One opinion sustaining a federal scheme said that wherever the line may be, the statute before it was within it.21 The four Dole limits and the anti-coercion principle, taken up next, address what these cases left open.