Concept
An Independent Source of Power
Taxing power
The Taxing Power
An Independent Source of Power
The first clause of Article I, section 8 gives Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”1 The sentence has three working parts. The grant authorizes Congress to lay and collect taxes. The purpose phrase, which begins “to pay the Debts,” says what the revenue is for. The proviso requires that duties, imposts, and excises be uniform throughout the United States; it limits how the power may be used and is taken up later in this chapter. The power to regulate commerce appears in a separate, later clause, so Congress may invoke the taxing power without first showing that a measure regulates commerce.
The framers wrote the taxing power into the Constitution because the Articles of Confederation had left Congress without it. The Continental Congress relied solely on contributions from the states, and the arrangement was not a success.2 Congress could neither impose taxes nor regulate interstate commerce, and its authority to raise funds was so limited that, as one account puts it, it “had responsibility without power.”3 The states meanwhile acted much like independent countries, joined by an alliance that depended on their continuing goodwill.4 The clause was designed to end that dependence by giving the United States an independent source of revenue. With the power to collect taxes and impose tariffs, Congress would have the financial resources to exercise its other federal powers.5
How far the new power should reach was itself contested. Some delegates to the Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying conventions argued that it should extend no further than levies on imported goods. Nationally minded leaders defeated that limit by arguing that a broad and flexible taxing authority was key to effective national governance. In Federalist No. 30, Hamilton called a “general power of taxation, in one shape or another” critical to support raising troops, building and equipping fleets, and paying the national debts, and he argued that a power to tax only imports would not suffice.6
Even with the power secured, the precise reach of the clause remains controversial.7 One dispute asks whether Congress may use the taxing power to achieve goals other than raising revenue; a later section returns to it. The other asks whether the power to provide for the general welfare is a distinct enumerated power or merely lets Congress spend money in exercising such powers as the power to regulate interstate commerce.8 On its face, the clause grants a power to lay and collect taxes in order to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare. Whichever side of the dispute is right, what the clause supplies is a power over revenue and expenditure, and the Federal Government's influence in areas where it cannot directly regulate runs through that power.9
Spending that serves the general welfare falls within the authority granted by the power to tax and spend, and Congress may also spend money incident to its other powers without relying on the spending power at all.10 The Court has left the scope of “general welfare” to Congress, and its deference is so great that it has questioned whether “general welfare” is a judicially enforceable restriction at all.11 The phrase therefore does little work as a judicial check. The live questions lie elsewhere: whether an exaction is a genuine tax, and what limits the Constitution's text places on taxes. The following sections take them up.
The taxing power also stands apart from the commerce power, which Gibbons v. Ogden first elaborated. The Federal Government may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.12 A measure called a tax may nonetheless depend on a different power. In one decision, the Government itself took the position that the validity of an exaction did not rest on the taxing power but on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, so that the “tax” would fall along with the act's labor and price-fixing provisions if those provisions were not upheld.13 The Court agreed with that position and confined its consideration to the commerce power.14
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius shows the independence of the two powers at work. The Court ruled that this seemingly regulatory measure, the individual mandate, could not be upheld under the commerce power, and it then found that the “financial penalty . . . may reasonably be characterized as a tax.”15 In the Court's words, “Put simply, Congress may tax and spend. This grant gives the Federal Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate.”16
Whether a payment may reasonably be characterized as a tax is the whole question, however, and Congress's own label does not answer it. The Child Labor Tax carried the name “tax,” yet it was struck down as exceeding Congress's taxing power in Drexel Furniture, and the Court has recognized that a statutory “tax” label can be inaccurate.17 The next sections ask when an exaction is a genuine tax and when it is something else.