Concept
Applying the Doctrine
Commerce Clause
Applying the Doctrine
Every Commerce Clause challenge asks whether a federal statute traces to Congress’s power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” and the Necessary and Proper Clause adds only the means for carrying that power into execution.1 For roughly a century the Court tried to hold a line between interstate and intrastate commerce, separating the transportation of goods from their production and consumption. The New Deal abandoned that line; from 1937 until 1995 the Court sustained every commerce-power law but one; and in 1995 it began to impose limits.2 Three decisions since then have invalidated federal legislation on commerce grounds: Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB.3
A problem therefore begins with the category the government invokes, because each category carries its own proof. Lopez sorted federal commerce regulation into three: regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, including a ban on shipping a commodity through those channels; protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of things in it; and regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.4 Congress can regulate what crosses state lines even when the activity is not commercial, but it can reach a purely local commercial activity only if that activity has a close and substantial relationship to commerce, whether through economic relationships or through economic impact.5
The questions run from the cheapest proof to the costliest. Steps 3 through 5 are weighed together as one inquiry, and step 3 carries the most weight: when the regulated activity is not commercial, the Court gives Congress less deference, and a court should independently review whether a substantial effect exists.12 Step 6 cuts across the categories and is worth asking first whenever a statute orders people to buy something or to do something. The paired problems that follow show which changed fact moves each step.
The school-zone gun statute shows how a single drafting choice moves a statute from one step to another. Section 922(q) regulated neither the use of the channels of commerce nor the interstate transportation of a commodity, and it did not protect an instrumentality of commerce or a thing in commerce, so it had to be sustained, if at all, as a regulation of activity that substantially affects commerce.13 A version confined to guns that had moved in interstate commerce would move the statute toward the second category, which § 922(q) could not invoke as written. A different redraft would prohibit both the transfer and the possession of a firearm near a school. Congress may include a subclass of noneconomic activity within a larger regulated class if it has a rational basis for doing so, and a court could find one here, because a limit on transfers is easier to enforce when possession is also prohibited, and possession is much easier to detect than a transfer that takes only seconds.14 Each redraft changes what the statute regulates or what the government must prove, and so each changes the answer to one step.
A jurisdictional element requires the government to prove in each prosecution that the case is tied to commerce, as by showing that a stolen item crossed a state line. Not every valid statute needs one. The statutes on strip mining, on growing and consuming excess wheat, and on the local sale of controlled substances rested on a congressional presumption that the intrastate activity substantially affects commerce, and they required proof only that the defendant engaged in the regulated activity. That generic approach is constitutional so long as the standards of the Commerce Clause are satisfied, so those standards govern whether or not the statute contains an element.15
Even the label on a category can be contested. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Heart of Atlanta Motel, which upheld the federal ban on racial discrimination by motels and hotels, as a channels case, yet the Court in that case reasoned in terms of the effects of such discrimination on interstate commerce.16 A careful answer therefore states the category the government will invoke and prepares the effects analysis as a fallback.
Step 3 turns on what activity the statute is described as regulating, because the description can decide the case. Lopez explained Wickard in these terms: the regulation of home-grown wheat was an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, and that regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. Even if growing wheat for home use is viewed as noneconomic, Congress could reach it as an essential part of a larger scheme aimed at controlling interstate grain movements.17 That reading of Wickard in effect created an exception to the noneconomic-activity rule, and the Raich sections above show how it applies to home-grown marijuana. The facts to look for are an interstate market in a fungible commodity and a comprehensive scheme that exempting home-produced supply would leave with a gap.
Two cautions attach to this step. The economic-activity test looks at the nature of the activity Congress regulated, not at the effects of regulating it, so a list of economic costs answers the wrong question. That is why the Court in Morrison rejected the federal remedy for sex-based violence despite massive evidence that such violence profoundly harms commerce among the states.18 The characterization also resists splitting. Katzenbach v. McClung upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a local restaurant, although the Court might have said that race discrimination is not an economic activity even if running a business is, and the case suggests that regulated persons will meet obstacles when they ask judges to disaggregate unitary business- or work-related activities.19
When the activity is noneconomic and no larger scheme explains it, the cases leave two readings open. On one reading the economic-activity prong stands as a separate requirement and the statute fails at once. On the other, the nature of the activity and its relationship to commerce are two perspectives on the same “substantially affects” inquiry, so the absence of economic activity only suggests that the relationship is insubstantial; the court becomes much less deferential, and the showing is harder but not impossible.20 Lopez did not overrule any earlier case. It cited Perez with approval, a decision that upheld the federal crime of loan sharking although the crime crossed no state line, and the difference is that loan sharking is commercial and the Court will aggregate data when the data aggregated are commercial.21
Step 5 protects the division between state and federal power. A State may reach in its criminal code all behavior that threatens the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the public, while Congress may criminalize behavior only when the Constitution expressly provides or when doing so is necessary and proper to carry out an enumerated power, and the offense must relate to an operational function or to a regulatory authority such as the power to regulate commerce among the several States.22 A link between a local act and commerce that would erase that difference proves too much.
Step 6 applies the same logic to inaction. Almost every Commerce Clause case before NFIB involved legislation aimed at people already engaged in economic or commercial activity. NFIB asked whether the commerce power allows Congress to regulate those who have refrained from, or not yet engaged in, an activity, and the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate required people without employer or government health coverage to buy insurance from a private company.23 The size of the effect of inaction does not answer that question, because allowing Congress to justify regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless individual decisions within federal regulation, and so Congress must regulate “activity.”24 The Necessary and Proper Clause section above explains why that clause does not close the gap: it authorizes means for executing an enumerated power, and it cannot generate the commerce that the power presupposes.
Federal land use regulation puts steps 3 and 5 under strain. Constitutional challenges to such regulation have so far consistently failed, though Justices have used wetlands cases under the Clean Water Act to question how far Congress can go.25 The Endangered Species Act presents the characterization problem sharply. It is far from clear that an individual hiker’s picking of a rare flower is economic activity that Congress can outlaw, yet lower courts have upheld the Act as applied to persons whose prohibited actions occur in the course of commercial development, farming operations, and comparable business ventures.26 The fact that moves the answer is whether the conduct is part of a commercial enterprise.
Three questions that sound related sit outside this analysis. The Tenth Amendment precludes Congress from commanding state officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program, so a statute can satisfy the commerce power and still fail on that ground.28 The failure of a commerce argument also decides only the commerce question: the mandate in NFIB fell under the Commerce Clause but was upheld as a valid tax.29 And Lopez and Morrison have little force when the regulated activity is quintessentially economic, because the Court has firmly established Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic class of activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce.30
A complete answer therefore names the category the government invokes, runs the considerations that fit that category, and identifies the fact that decides the result: a tie to commerce written into the statute, a comprehensive market scheme that the local activity would undercut, or a command to people who are not in the market.