Concept
Enumerated Powers and the Commerce Clause
Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause
Enumerated Powers and the Commerce Clause
Every challenge to a federal statute starts with one question: which enumerated power supports it? Article I vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted,” and § 8 lists what was granted.1 A statute that cannot be traced to a listed power fails at the threshold, however sensible its policy.
The Court treats that limit as a protection against tyranny. In United States v. Lopez, it compared the division of authority between the States and the federal government to the separation of the branches. Separating the branches keeps excessive power from accumulating in any one of them, and “a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”2
The States stand in a different position. As the Court put it in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the police power is controlled by fifty States rather than one national sovereign, so the parts of governing that touch citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.3 The Framers did this deliberately. Powers that, in Madison’s words in The Federalist No. 45, “in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people” were left with governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy, and the independent power of the States in turn checks the federal government.4 That asymmetry organizes the chapter. When a State punishes ordinary crime or runs its schools, it exercises a power it already controls and need not point to a clause. Congress has no general power of that kind and must find a grant in the text.5
The Commerce Clause is one of those grants. It lets Congress regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.6 Two of the three subjects are straightforward: federal power over foreign commerce and over commerce with the tribes is plenary, no comparable state power exists, and the Tenth Amendment does not qualify it.7 Nearly all the doctrine in this chapter therefore concerns the middle phrase, commerce among the several States, where the States also regulate and the question is how far into a State the federal power reaches. In its broadest statement, the power lets Congress regulate interstate commerce inside the States rather than only at their borders, and also intrastate commerce that affects interstate commerce.8
The clause exists because the Articles of Confederation gave the national government no commerce power, and the Court has called the clause the Framers’ response to that central problem.9 The poor condition of American commerce and the proliferating trade rivalries among the States were the immediate provocations for the Constitutional Convention. Hamilton warned in The Federalist No. 22 that the “interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States,” if not restrained by national control, would prove ever more serious sources of “animosity and discord.”10 A national commerce power, it was hoped, would end hostile state restrictions, retaliatory trade regulations, and protective tariffs on imports from other States, promoting a national market and curbing the balkanization of the economy.11 Placing that power in Congress rested on a political theory: the national legislature can be trusted to regulate in the interest of the whole nation, while state legislatures represent in-state interests against out-of-state interests.12
For the first century of our history, the clause’s primary use was negative: it precluded the kind of discriminatory state legislation that had once been permissible. Then, in response to rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy, Congress “ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power,” beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.13 The text goes further than barrier-removal. It describes a general power over commerce among the States, not merely an authority to rescind state barriers, and the Court has consistently read it to permit positive exercises of authority that advance an interstate economic agenda beyond the vision of a common market free from state-imposed restraints.14
That breadth is the source of the problem the rest of the chapter addresses. Much activity within the country, even within a single State, relates to economic issues, so absent some further restriction a loose reading of the clause could become the functional equivalent of a generalized police power.15 Such a reading would give the federal government sweeping power and would limit the States’ ability to adopt laws that burden the types of commerce committed to federal control.16 Taxing and spending is a separate grant. It gives Congress considerable influence even where it cannot directly regulate, and Congress may tax an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.17
The Court’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden supplies the clause’s working definition. “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.” It is the commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations in all its branches, regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.18 The next section develops that definition.
Two contrasting statutes show how the threshold question works.
Lopez presented a real statute with a similar gap. The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s authority to regulate commerce because it neither regulated a commercial activity nor required that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.19 The sections that follow show how the Court reached that result and where it has drawn the line since.
Clause 18, the Necessary and Proper Clause, is the commerce power’s companion. It authorizes Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested in the federal government.20 The clause serves the listed ends and creates none of its own. It lets Congress choose means for executing a granted power, but it does not supply a subject that Congress could not otherwise reach. Its practical effect appears in the Raich and NFIB sections.