Concept
Long Criticized and Applied
The “adequate and independent state ground”
Long Criticized and Applied
Michigan v. Long still governs ambiguous state opinions. When the Court cannot tell whether a state judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds, it presumes that it has appellate jurisdiction.1 A state court avoids that presumption only by stating clearly and expressly that its judgment rests on independent state-law grounds. The rule has nonetheless drawn sharp criticism, and the Court has not treated it as automatic. This section takes up the charge that the presumption produces advisory opinions, the alternatives that Justices Stevens and Blackmun described in Long itself, and the later cases in which the Court either followed the presumption or asked the state court what it meant.
The Advisory Opinion Problem
Before 1983, the Court dealt with doubtful state opinions by asking. It vacated the judgment and remanded for clarification, and if the state court answered that an independent state ground supported the judgment, Supreme Court review ended.2 Long reversed that order. The Court now rules first, on the strength of a presumption meant to avoid the cumbersome alternatives of remanding to the state court or searching state law for signs of independence.3 The reversal carries a risk: a state court whose federal ruling is overturned may reinstate the same judgment on remand by making clear that independent state law supported it all along.
Critics call that risk an advisory opinion problem. A Supreme Court ruling that could have no effect on the rights or duties of the parties is an advisory opinion, and Article III, § 2 limits federal judicial power to actual cases and controversies.4 A state ground that fully sustains the result and violates no federal law makes any decision on the federal issue irrelevant to the outcome.5 The state court has the last word on the meaning of its own law, and states are free to give their people more rights than federal law provides.6
Long itself illustrates the risk. The Court asserted jurisdiction and overturned the Michigan court's decision on the Fourth Amendment issue, but on remand the state court adhered to its view that the search violated the state constitution.7 Long's conviction therefore stayed overturned, and the Court's Fourth Amendment ruling had no influence on the final disposition. Other state courts have taken the same path after reversal, as in Racing Association of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald and People v. P.J. Video, Inc.8 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Washington v. Recuenco, observed that the Washington Supreme Court could reinstate its judgment on remand simply by adhering, as a matter of state law, to its view.9
The Court now writes the possibility into its own opinions. After reversing the Florida Supreme Court on a federal question about a confession in Florida v. Powell, it added: “Nothing in our decision today, we emphasize, trenches on the Florida Supreme Court's authority to impose, based on the State's Constitution, any additional protections against coerced confessions it deems appropriate.”10 An invitation of that kind leaves the choice with the state court, and the two remands came out differently. The Michigan court in Long reinstated its result on state grounds. The Florida Supreme Court in Powell took up the invitation, reconsidered, and concluded that the Florida constitution gave no rights beyond those the federal Constitution provides.11 The federal ruling therefore controlled the final outcome in Powell and did not in Long, and the difference lay in what each state court chose to do with law that the Supreme Court has no power to define.
The defense of Long turns on the moment at which jurisdiction is judged. A ruling on a federal question that the Court has found fairly interwoven with state law, and potentially dispositive, is not advisory merely because of what happens in later litigation after remand.12 When the Court acted in Long, the opinion before it fairly appeared to rest on federal law, so correcting that federal view could have changed the judgment. What the state court did next was a new decision on its own law, which the Court could neither compel nor predict. If a later clarification could reach back and strip the earlier ruling of its character, the Court's jurisdiction would depend on events it cannot know when it decides. The objection identifies a real cost, but it does not establish that every ruling under Long is advisory.
The plain statement rule gives a state court a way to avoid that cost altogether. A court that says at the outset that its judgment rests on independent state grounds, or that its federal citations serve only as guidance, takes its case outside the presumption, and no federal ruling is left for a later clarification to moot. A court that omits the statement, as the Michigan court did in Long, accepts the risk that review will come before clarification.
Dissent and Concurrence
Justice Stevens's dissent in Michigan v. Long lays out the available choices more fully than the majority opinion does.14 He asked how the Court should decide whether an adequate state ground is independent of federal law, and he saw four answers: ask the state court directly; infer the answer from every available source of state law; presume that adequate state grounds are independent unless it clearly appears otherwise; or presume that they are not independent unless it clearly appears otherwise.15 The Court had used each of the first three on different occasions. Before Long, it had never even hinted at the fourth.16
His quarrel with the majority was narrow. He found the Court's decisions to reject the first two approaches defensible, and he objected only to choosing the fourth presumption over the third.17 The third was the traditional presumption, which the two intermediate approaches had weakened in several cases. With those approaches now rejected, he argued, stare decisis called for a return to historical principle, not for the conclusion that because some precedents were to be rejected, all of them must be overruled.18
Stevens found support for the third approach in an observation by Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting in National Tea, that he called unanswerable.19 Hughes wrote that similar or even identical state and federal provisions do not justify disturbing a judgment that “adequately rests upon its application of the provisions of its own constitution.” It makes no difference, he continued, that the state court may have been influenced by the reasoning of the Supreme Court's opinions, because the state court's judgment on its own constitution “remains a judgment which we are without jurisdiction to review.”20 On that view, a state court's reliance on federal precedent is irrelevant to jurisdiction, though it is the very circumstance that triggers the Long presumption when an opinion is unclear. The two approaches therefore part company on a case like Long. Under the majority's presumption, an opinion that rested on federal law without a plain statement of independent state grounds is reviewable. Under Stevens's third approach, an adequate state ground would be presumed independent, and the Court would decline review.
Stevens's second objection went to the purpose of review. He made the point with a hypothetical. If Finnish police arrested a Finnish citizen for possessing marijuana and Finnish courts turned him loose, no American would have standing to object. If they instead arrested and acquitted an American, the United States might be concerned about the arrest but could not complain about the acquittal, even if the Finnish court based its decision on its understanding of the United States Constitution, and even if a treaty required Finland to respect the constitutional rights of American citizens.21 Michigan stood where Finland stands in that example. It had arrested one of its own citizens, its supreme court had turned him loose, and because no one claimed the state had mistreated him, the outcome “offended no federal interest whatever.” Michigan had simply given its citizen more protection than another state might give, or than the Court might require throughout the country.22
The Court's primary role in reviewing state decisions, Stevens wrote, is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard. In Abie State Bank v. Bryan, the Nebraska Supreme Court had rejected a federal constitutional claim partly on the state-law doctrine of laches. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, held that the Court must ascertain for itself whether the asserted nonfederal ground independently and adequately supported the judgment, “in order that constitutional guaranties may appropriately be enforced.”23 The power to look behind a state ground thus exists to protect a litigant who lost a federal claim. A citizen who won, as Long did in Michigan, has no federal claim left unheard. Stevens added that overprotection in Michigan does not freeze the law or set a precedent for the nation; it restricts the police in one state in the interest of individual liberty.24
He also doubted that reversal shows respect for state courts. He was “thoroughly baffled” by the majority's suggestion that the Court must stretch its jurisdiction to show “respect for the independence of state courts,” and he asked whether the United States would show respect for Finland by convening a special sitting to declare that its release of an American citizen rested on a misunderstanding of American law.25 He saw a larger cost in the Court's docket. Fifteen years earlier, he wrote, the Court had not reviewed any case in which a state sought reversal of a judgment its own court had rendered for a citizen, although the requests had mounted to three; the docket was now swollen with such requests. He was confident that a future Court would recognize the error of that allocation of resources and would reconsider the expansion of jurisdiction.26
Justice Blackmun's separate opinion is shorter. He was satisfied that the Court had jurisdiction in Long itself, but he declined to join Part II of the majority opinion, which fashioned a new presumption of jurisdiction over cases from state courts. He agreed that uniformity in federal criminal law is desirable, yet he saw “little efficiency and an increased danger of advisory opinions in the Court's new approach.”27 The first doubt questions the majority's claim that the presumption avoids the cumbersome alternatives of remand and state-law inquiry.28 The second is the advisory-opinion objection, which Long's own remand illustrates.29
Defenders of Long reject Stevens's premise that overprotection is harmless. Expanding individual liberties may impede law-enforcement goals that many would support, and state courts may have incentives to issue fuzzy constitutional decisions that rely on federal law.30 The plain statement rule answers that incentive by requiring a state court that wants its judgment insulated from review to say plainly that state law supports it. The debate has not ended. Justice Sotomayor objected when the Court in Kansas v. Carr reversed a Kansas Supreme Court decision that had vacated death sentences the Kansas court viewed as tainted by procedural errors violating the Eighth Amendment.31
Long in Later Cases
Long sets the default for state opinions of doubtful independence: unless the opinion makes clear that the decision rests on an independent state ground, the Court presumes that the state ground is not independent of federal law and takes the case.33 The decisions since 1983 show a default, not a command. The Court has followed it to confirm jurisdiction, and it has also returned at times to the older practice of vacating and remanding for clarification.34 One decision from each category shows how the choice is made.
Foster v. Chatman, decided in 2016, shows the presumption confirming jurisdiction. A prisoner sentenced to death pressed a Batson claim, which charges that prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove prospective jurors because of race. Post-conviction discovery produced the prosecutor's file and revealed substantial race consciousness in jury selection. The prisoner tried to reopen the claim in state habeas proceedings, and the state answered that res judicata barred it. The lower state court analyzed the new evidence before concluding that it did not overcome the bar, and the Georgia Supreme Court then denied relief without elaboration.35 Because the state courts had weighed the Batson claim while deciding whether the bar applied, the independence of the res judicata ground was in doubt. With no clear statement establishing independence, the Court followed Long and confirmed its jurisdiction.
The Florida recount litigation that reached the Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board shows the other response. It is also a good test of the full analysis, because one state opinion raised both an adequacy question and an independence question. State law entitled the trailing candidate to a recount. He challenged the recount process, the secretary of state rejected each of his challenges and, after a partial recount, certified his opponent as the winner of Florida's popular vote, and he sued in state court. Florida's highest court ruled in his favor. It held that under state law the counties had an extended but limited time to submit recount returns, and it set the deadline so that Florida could still benefit from the federal “safe harbor” provision, 3 U.S.C. § 5, under which Congress would accept the state's designation of its presidential electors.36 The certified winner then sought review in the Supreme Court.
The Florida court framed its holding as a matter of state law. Such a holding escapes review only if its state grounds are both adequate and independent, and the certified winner attacked both. On adequacy, he argued that the ruling conflicted with federal law, citing among other provisions Article II, § 1, which assigns the manner of choosing electors to the state legislature, and 3 U.S.C. § 5. His arguments may look strained. Section 5 seems only to address when Congress will accept a state's designation of its electors, not when a designation is invalid as a matter of law. Yet each argument is such that, if the Court accepted it, the state ground would be contrary to federal law and hence inadequate, and the possibility of such a ruling is itself enough to defeat adequacy.37 Because the Court must ascertain for itself whether an asserted state ground adequately supports the judgment, the state court's own description of its ruling cannot answer that argument.38
Independence asks a different question: how the state court reached its answer. The ground is independent if the court based it solely on its interpretation of state law. It is not independent if the court's reading of state law was influenced by its understanding of what Florida needed to do to satisfy the federal safe harbor, because a misreading of the federal statute might then have affected the court's reading of state law.39 A deadline chosen so that Florida could still use the safe harbor gives that suspicion a factual hook. The two requirements thus fail for different reasons. Adequacy fails when the ground would conflict with federal law, and independence fails when the state court's reasoning drew on federal law. The Florida ground arguably failed the first test, and it was not clear that it satisfied the second.40
The Court's per curiam opinion identified both federal questions as possibly present, but it found the state opinion too unclear to say whether either was. The Florida court may have relied solely on state statutes and not on the state constitution, and § 5 appeared only in a footnote and may have played no role.41 Long would have allowed the Court to take the case on that uncertainty. Instead the Court vacated and remanded so that the Florida court could clarify the bases for its decision, explaining: “After reviewing the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, we find 'that there is considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision.' This is sufficient reason for us to decline at this time to review the federal questions asserted to be present.”42 A day after the Florida court clarified its decision, the Court held in Bush v. Gore that the recount procedure was unconstitutional.43
The two kinds of doubt differ. In Long the opinion rested on federal law and any state ground was hidden, so federal law plainly did the work. In the Florida case it was unclear whether the opinion drew on federal law at all, and a short answer from the Florida court could end the federal question by confirming reliance on state statutes alone, or sharpen it by confirming reliance on the state constitution or the safe harbor. In Foster the entanglement appeared on the face of the record, because the Georgia courts had visibly weighed the federal claim inside the res judicata ruling, and no statement dissolved it.
Long's regime invites a statement like that one, and the actual Florida opinion contained none. Its silence left the Court a choice between the presumption and a remand, and the Court chose the remand. On a bar answer, therefore, do not assume that every doubtful opinion ends with the Court deciding the federal question. Test adequacy and then independence, note that Long permits review where doubt remains, and recognize that the Court may instead ask the state court what it meant.