Concept
Adequate State Grounds
The “adequate and independent state ground”
Adequate State Grounds
A state ground is adequate when it fully sustains the judgment and itself violates no provision of the Constitution or federal law.1 The definition matters because of what an adequate ground does to the federal question. If the state judgment would stand whatever the Court said about federal law, a ruling on that law would be “advisory”: it could not alter the result in the case.2
The Court decides adequacy for itself. A state court cannot shield a judgment by announcing that state law supports it. A state rule that conflicts with federal law cannot hold a judgment in place, and the Court has taken jurisdiction where the claimed state ground was so ad hoc, unreasonable, or otherwise unsupportable as to suggest a deliberate attempt to avoid Supreme Court review.3
State grounds come in two kinds, and the Court examines them differently.4 A substantive ground is a state-law rule that defines the parties’ rights, such as a state constitutional guarantee broader than the federal one; the question is whether that rule supports the result and squares with federal law. A procedural ground is a rule about when and how a claim must be raised. It can end a federal claim before any court reaches the merits, so the Court looks at the rule and at how the state applied it.
Adequacy is one of two requirements. Independence, the other, and the presumption of Michigan v. Long, which governs doubtful cases, come in the next sections. In brief, when a state decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with it, and the adequacy and independence of any state ground are unclear from the face of the opinion, the Court assumes the state court decided as it did because it thought federal law required that result. A state court can avoid the assumption by stating plainly that federal cases serve only as guidance and do not compel its result, and the Court will not review a decision that clearly and expressly rests alternatively on bona fide, separate, adequate, and independent state grounds.5
Substantive Adequacy
A substantive state ground is adequate if it fully supports the result and does not conflict with the Constitution, a federal statute, or a federal treaty.6 Each half of that definition guards against a different problem. Full support asks whether a federal ruling could change the judgment. No conflict asks whether the state rule itself takes away a federal right; if it does, the federal source controls and the ground cannot hold the judgment in place. One question covers both: if the Court ruled for the petitioner on the federal point, could the state court still reach the same judgment under state law? In death-penalty cases, the answer depends on the direction of the state court’s ruling.
The petition fails. Even if the Court were persuaded that the Eighth Amendment permits the sentence, the state constitution independently forbids it. The state supreme court has the last word on what its own constitution means, so the Court could undo that holding only by finding that it conflicts with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. It conflicts with none of them, because states may give people more rights under state law than they enjoy under federal law.7 The Eighth Amendment allows states to execute people under certain circumstances; it does not require them to.8 The ground fully sustains the result and conflicts with no federal law, so it is adequate. Had the same court held the death penalty absolutely barred by the Eighth Amendment and relied on nothing else, the Court could overturn the ruling as contrary to its interpretation of federal law.9
Cole’s case comes out the other way. The state court gave Cole nothing under its own law; its judgment stands only because it found no federal violation. If the Supreme Court concludes that the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence, the state’s permission to execute cannot override that conclusion, and the judgment must be reversed because the state ground cannot sustain it.10 Jurisdiction turns entirely on whether the Court’s decision of the federal question may affect the result below, and here it can.11
The two cases differ in one respect: the direction of the state ruling. In Jones, the state used its own law to give more than the Constitution demands, and that holding survives any federal ruling. In Cole, the state used its law only to withhold relief, and that ground gives way if the federal claim succeeds. A state may add to federal rights under its own law,12 but it may not use state law to take them away.13
Two variations also produce no review. A state court may invalidate a law under the state constitution and, in the alternative, under the federal Constitution. The Court has nothing to correct, because the state-law holding would stand whatever it said about the federal one.14 Similarly, a state court presented with a federal argument may decide that it need not reach that argument and invalidate the law on state grounds alone.15
These results follow from a division of roles. The Supreme Court’s reading of the federal Constitution sets a floor under individual rights, and state courts may raise the ceiling.16 Once the Court held that the First Amendment protects commercial speech, a state supreme court could not reinterpret the First Amendment or the state constitution to say it did not; that would lower the floor. After the Court held obscene material unprotected, however, a state court could still read its constitution’s rights of conscience to protect it; that raises the ceiling.17 State courts have used the same freedom to treat sex classifications as suspect, to require equal financing of state schools, to review economic classifications actively, and to require recognition of same-sex marriages, none of which the Supreme Court required.18 Jones raised the ceiling. Cole’s judgment, if the Eighth Amendment applied, would have sat beneath the floor.
Procedural Adequacy
A procedural ground is the more dangerous kind of state ground. A rule that bars a claim for lateness, such as a requirement of timely objection, can extinguish a federal right without any court deciding whether the right exists.20 The Court has long watched for states that use their own law to defeat federal rights. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story examined the antecedent state-law question closely to be sure Virginia was not using state law to defeat a federal right, and the modern Court takes a similarly close look at state procedural grounds to prevent the frustration of federal rights. On Wechsler’s account, treating that scrutiny as an adequacy question better justifies the more active review of procedural defaults.21 The inquiry turns on whether insisting on the state rule serves a legitimate state interest, the question the Court asked of a contemporaneous-objection default in Henry v. Mississippi.
Each question answers a different way a state might misuse procedure, and a worked problem shows all three at once.
The first question goes against Charles, because a rule requiring defendants to request the instructions they want violates no constitutional provision.22 The second favors him: a good argument exists that no legitimate state interest is served by insisting that the request use specific magic words.23 The third may help him too. If other judges have given the desired instruction when a defendant asked only for an “admonition,” the state has applied its rule inconsistently.24 He could also argue good cause, since the difference between an “admonition” and an “instruction” is highly ambiguous and hard to comply with. If the Court also found that the missing instruction prejudiced him, the decision would not rest on an adequate procedural ground.25 James v. Kentucky supports that conclusion.26
Most defaults fail the other way. Some are so trivial or contrived as to be inadequate, such as the dismissal of a complaint alleging a federal constitutional claim because it contained two misspelled words. The Court is nonetheless likely to uphold a procedural forfeiture unless the state court has seized on a pretext to avoid the merits of the federal claim.27 In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a noncitizen defendant failed to make a timely objection to a violation of his rights under a treaty ratified by the United States, and the Court upheld the state forfeiture as adequate.28 Charles asked for what he wanted and lost over a label; the defendant in Sanchez-Llamas did not object in time. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson shows the Court rejecting a state ground on the adequacy theory: it held that the Alabama Supreme Court had relied on an inadequate state-law ground in refusing to adjudicate the NAACP’s First Amendment challenge to a contempt citation.29
Even a rule that passes all three questions can be overcome by showing cause and prejudice: a good reason for failing to follow the procedure and a resulting harm.30 As applied, this is a difficult standard to satisfy.31 The federal habeas cases state the two routes plainly. A procedural default does not bar habeas review if either the rule was applied so unevenly that it is not an adequate ground, or the default is excused under cause and prejudice. A petitioner who substantially complied with the essential requirements of the rule, where nothing would be gained by demanding more exact adherence, may also obtain review.32 The state must also show that the court’s reason was independent, meaning based on state rather than federal law, a requirement taken up in the next section.33