Concept
DeFunis v. Odegaard
Mootness
DeFunis v. Odegaard
DeFunis v. Odegaard is the classic example of a case that was fully alive when filed and had lost its controversy by the time the Supreme Court could decide it. The per curiam opinion starts from the familiar proposition that federal courts cannot decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants before them, and it ties that limit to Article III.1 A case is moot when intervening events remove the live dispute, so that no decision could change anything for the parties. The history of this case shows that rule working step by step, and each step does some work in the holding.
Marco DeFunis, Jr., applied in 1971 to the University of Washington Law School, a state institution with about 1,600 applicants for 150 places.2 The school rejected him, and he sued in a Washington trial court for himself alone, claiming that its admissions procedures discriminated against him because of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.3 He asked for one remedy, a mandatory injunction ordering the school to admit him to the class entering in September 1971. The trial court granted it, and DeFunis began his studies that fall.4 The Washington Supreme Court later reversed and held that the admissions policy did not violate the Constitution, by which time DeFunis was in his second year.5
DeFunis petitioned for certiorari, and Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, stayed the state court's judgment until the Supreme Court disposed of the case, which kept DeFunis enrolled.6 When the Court first considered the petition in the fall of 1973, DeFunis was in the first term of his third and final year, and the Court asked the parties to address mootness. Both answered that the case was live: if the state court's judgment stood, DeFunis could finish the term but would need the faculty's permission to register for another.7 A ruling for the school could therefore still have ended his enrollment, so the controversy was real. The Court granted certiorari and heard argument. There DeFunis's counsel reported that he had registered for his final quarter, and the school's counsel made clear that the school would not try to undo that registration, which put the mootness question back before the Court with a firm representation about his last term to weigh.8
The Court held the case moot because DeFunis would finish law school whatever it decided. The school's counsel, the state Attorney General, had professionally represented that in no event would DeFunis's status be affected by any view the Court expressed, and DeFunis would complete his studies at the end of the term for which he had registered.9 The shape of the suit left nothing for a decree to do. DeFunis had sued for himself alone and asked only to be admitted, and he already held that relief in its strongest form, a secure place in the last quarter of his last year. The controversy had therefore ceased to be “definite and concrete” and no longer touched the legal relations of parties with adverse legal interests.10 This is the effective relief test from the preceding section at work. With the only requested remedy already delivered, an opinion on the equal protection question would have declared the law on facts that no longer affected the plaintiff, and that is an advisory opinion. The Court vacated the Washington Supreme Court's judgment and remanded without deciding the constitutional question.11
Two objections come naturally. The first concerns the school's role, since the result partly stemmed from its own policy decision. The Court found that immaterial: it accepted the Attorney General's representation and noted its settled practice of accepting representations of that kind as parameters for decision.12 A court asking whether its decree could matter must take account of what the parties before it have said they will do.
The second objection concerns state law. As a matter of Washington law, the case appears to have been saved from mootness by the great public interest in the continuing issues. The Court held that this did not control, because even in cases arising in state courts, mootness is a federal question that a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction.13 The Article III limit binds the federal court being asked to act, whatever the court below would have done, and a later section on state courts returns to that difference.
The dissenters' strongest argument was that the school's assurance was a voluntary cessation that left the case alive, and the Court's answer is the most useful part of the opinion for exam purposes. Under the voluntary-cessation doctrine, a defendant's mere voluntary end to allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; otherwise the defendant would be free to return to its old ways, and the public interest in having the legality of the practices settled would go unserved.14 But mootness here, the Court said, depended “not at all” on a voluntary cessation of the admissions practices that were the subject of the litigation. It depended on the simple fact that DeFunis was in the final quarter of his final year, and on the school's settled and unchallenged policy of letting him finish the term.15
On an exam, ask which side of the dispute moved. If the defendant's challenged practice moved, the voluntary-cessation doctrine tests whether the defendant could move it back. If the plaintiff's own stake ran out, the defendant's freedom to use the same practice on other applicants does not revive the plaintiff's claim. Students often label any concession by a defendant as voluntary cessation, but the doctrine applies only when the defendant has changed the conduct under attack.
The Court also refused to treat the case as one “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”16 That exception failed on two grounds. As to DeFunis himself, he would never again go through the school's admissions process, so the question could not recur for him. And the fact that his case reached the Court only on the eve of his graduation did not show that the issue would evade review generally: if the admissions procedures remained unchanged, a later challenge should reach the Court with relative speed now that the Washington Supreme Court had spoken.17 Cases where the exception does apply show the contrast. Pregnancy can come again to the same woman, so a case like Roe v. Wade is capable of repetition, and an economic-strike dispute such as the one in Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle can return with the next strike.18 Later sections return to both exceptions in full. Here the Court tested voluntary cessation by asking whether the defendant had changed the challenged conduct, and it tested repetition by asking whether this plaintiff would face the problem again.
Four Justices dissented from the mootness holding.19 Their first point was that the school's assurance was narrower than the majority treated it: the school had promised only that DeFunis could finish the term then underway, and any further term would depend on a discretionary decision by the university. Their second point was that unexpected events such as illness, economic necessity, or academic failure might block his graduation that term, in which case he would again face the admissions policy. On that view a ruling for DeFunis could still matter to his studies. Their third point was that the school had conceded nothing about the lawfulness of its policy, so the case was one of voluntary cessation in which the school had not carried its heavy burden of showing that DeFunis would not face the policy again.20
The dissent then turned to the public interest. It observed that the issues touched vast numbers of people, organizations, and universities, as twenty-six amicus briefs showed, that they were certain to return to the federal courts, and that avoiding repetitious litigation serves the public interest. It warned that the principles of avoiding constitutional decisions should not become devices for sidestepping difficult cases, and it saw no want of adversariness, since the case had been fully litigated before DeFunis registered for his last quarter.21 The majority's reply follows from the premise it stated at the outset. A federal court may decide only questions that can affect the litigants before it, and Washington's own public-interest exception did not change that.
Critics have attacked the voluntary-cessation analysis. They argue that the decision does not reflect a fair application of the exception but rests instead on the Court's own wish to avoid the merits of the affirmative action controversy.22 A broader observation about mootness points the same way: one treatise notes that many of the Court's mootness decisions suggest the doctrine is being used tactically, as a refuge from controversial constitutional questions on which no point of view has captured a majority of the Justices.23 The avoided issue did not go away. It roiled in the lower courts for three decades before percolating up again for decision.24 On an exam, state the majority's reasoning as the law of the case, and use the criticism only if the question asks whether the doctrine is applied neutrally.