Concept
Generalized Grievances
Standing
Generalized Grievances
A citizen may sincerely believe that the CIA's budget should be public, or that a Member of Congress may not hold a commission in the military Reserves, and may be right about the Constitution. The belief does not make the citizen a plaintiff. A plaintiff who raises only a generally available grievance about government, such as an interest in having the government follow the law that every citizen shares in substantially equal measure, has not presented an Article III case or controversy. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife adds a companion rule: Congress cannot confer standing merely by authorizing citizen suits when the plaintiffs lack a concrete and particularized injury. The first proposition describes the interest that fails, and the second explains that a statute cannot rescue it.
The rule follows from what standing is for. At its core, standing law reflects the widely held notion that only parties with a concrete stake in the case can bring a dispute before the federal courts, and the common law writ system often supplied that stake automatically: a person who suffered a legal injury to person or property could sue for trespass, while a bystander could not.1 Constitutional questions generally arose in that familiar setting. In the nineteenth century, except in wartime, the federal government mainly collected tariffs, governed and sold public lands, and paid military pensions, and constitutional issues came up in criminal cases and in suits for trespass, breach of contract, or personal injury.2 Then the role of government shifted, and the cases in this part, from the Mellon decision of 1923 to Richardson and Schlesinger in 1974, all follow that shift. In each, the plaintiff challenged government action without claiming the kind of injury a trespass or contract suit presupposes.
The rule is the counterpart of the particularization requirement taught earlier in this chapter. Particularization asks whether the injury affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way, and a plaintiff who claims only a slice of an interest that the whole citizenry holds equally cannot say yes. The label is not a head count, though. A harm that millions share remains particularized when each person feels it individually, as when a ban on election-week speech silences each speaker or the denial of public information leaves each voter uninformed. The rule applies when the interest itself is undifferentiated and abstract, such as the interest in seeing the law obeyed, so that no one's stake differs from anyone else's.
The justification is the separation-of-powers concern that opened this chapter. If a citizen's interest in lawful government were enough to sue, anyone could bring a legislative or executive choice before a federal court whether or not the choice had touched that person's life, and the judiciary would supervise the other branches on demand. Requiring a plaintiff whose own interests are affected keeps the court resolving disputes over those interests and leaves the question whether government is behaving lawfully to the political process.
The first subsection below states the rule as the Court states it and marks its edge, so that you can tell a plaintiff with a shared but individual harm from one with only a shared principle. The second asks how far Congress can create standing by statute, the question that Lujan's citizen-suit holding raises. The third takes up taxpayers, the plaintiffs most often caught by the rule because each taxpayer's interest in how government raises and spends money matches every other taxpayer's.
The Rule and Its Limits
The Court states the rule most fully in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. A plaintiff who raises only a generally available grievance about government, claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in the proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that “no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large,” does not state an Article III case or controversy.3 The rule has two halves. The first asks what the plaintiff lost and finds only the interest every citizen holds equally in lawful government. The second asks what the court's order would accomplish and finds that it would help the plaintiff no more than it helps everyone else. A plaintiff who loses nothing personally and would gain nothing personally by winning has no stake that distinguishes the suit from a request that the court supervise another branch of government.
Lujan gathered a line of decisions that reaches back a century. In Fairchild v. Hughes the plaintiff asserted “only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted,” and the Court held that this general right does not entitle a private citizen to sue in federal court.4 In Massachusetts v. Mellon a taxpayer attacked federal expenditures. The Court required a showing of “some direct injury,” which a plaintiff who “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally” cannot make, and it added that deciding such a suit would mean assuming “a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department.”5 Ex parte Lévitt applied the same reasoning to a citizen who argued that Justice Black's appointment violated the Ineligibility Clause. To invoke the judicial power, the Court said, a private individual must show a direct injury, and “it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.”6
The modern decisions follow the pattern. In United States v. Richardson a taxpayer challenged the Government's failure to disclose the CIA's expenditures, in alleged violation of the Statement and Account Clause. The Court held that the suit rested on an impermissible “generalized grievance,” because the impact on the plaintiff was “plainly undifferentiated” and “common to all members of the public.”7 Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War dismissed, for the same reasons, a citizen-taxpayer suit contending that Members of Congress violated the Incompatibility Clause by holding commissions in the military Reserves, because the challenged action standing alone would affect only “the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.”8 In Lance v. Coffman citizens who challenged a state court's redistricting order under the Elections Clause alleged what the Court called an “undifferentiated generalized grievance about the conduct of government.”9
Each of these plaintiffs pointed to a real constitutional provision, and none could identify a harm apart from the violation itself. The Court has explained that asserting “a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently,” cannot alone satisfy Article III “without draining those requirements of meaning.”10 The reason lies in who can fix the problem. A grievance shared by virtually everyone has a political remedy, and a rule that let any citizen sue would turn the federal courts into “virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”11 A plaintiff whose only stake is a conviction about the law offers the court a debate over principle and no dispute of his own.
The rule has a consequence that surprises students. Some challenges may find no plaintiff at all, and the Court has not treated that as a reason to find standing; it has treated it as a sign that the question belongs to the political process.12 Sierra Club v. Morton shows the contrast. There the Court pointed to the kinds of factors that would support an individual's standing, so a group could overcome its own standing problem by acting for interested individuals or members. In the generalized-grievance cases the Court apparently recognized that no individual would have standing to challenge the CIA's budget or the military commissions held by Members of Congress, and one commentator concludes that the Court was foreclosing any judicial challenge to those practices, so that standing operated as a barrier to decision on the merits.13
The rule has a boundary that matters as much as the rule itself. Lujan distinguished the generalized grievance it rejected from cases in which many people have suffered concrete injury, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations.14 Federal Election Commission v. Akins sharpened the point: abstractness and wide sharing often go together but do not always, and where a harm is concrete though widely shared, the Court has found injury in fact.15 Two questions therefore need separate answers. How many people were hurt measures breadth. Whether anyone was hurt in a way a court can describe measures concreteness, and only that question bears on whether this plaintiff has a personal stake. A grievance is generalized when it is both widely shared and abstract, such as the harm every citizen feels when government departs from the law.16 Questions about generalized grievances arise most often in suits against the government, where the plaintiff asks a court to police compliance with law, and a suit between private parties that does not involve agency action rarely presents a standing problem at all.17 The next subsection shows, though, that the Court has carried the reasoning of Lujan into suits against private defendants.
The constitutional claim is identical in the two suits. What changes the result is a factual showing of perceptible harm to the plaintiff.18 Richardson and Akins show how narrow the line between a shared abstraction and a shared concrete harm can run. The Richardson plaintiff sought disclosure of CIA expenditures, and the Court found the impact on him “plainly undifferentiated.”19 The Akins voters sought information that a federal statute made public about a lobbying organization, and the Court held that an informational injury directly related to voting is concrete and specific enough that wide sharing did not matter.20 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented on the ground that the Akins plaintiffs, like Richardson, had only an undifferentiated grievance common to the public.21 An exam answer should treat the majority's concreteness analysis as controlling and be ready to argue that a claim resting only on a belief that the law was broken, with no particular information, loss, or burden attached, stays on Richardson's side of the line.
The bar on generalized grievances was traditionally listed among the prudential limits on standing. Prudential limits are judicially self-imposed, and Congress may overcome them, whereas Article III limits are fixed.22 Lujan, however, treats the bar as part of what a case or controversy requires, because Congress cannot confer standing by authorizing suit when the plaintiff lacks a concrete and particularized injury. And Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. recharacterized the former prudential requirements. The requirements that a plaintiff assert her own interests and fall within the relevant law's zone of interests now go to whether she has stated a claim, while the Court views the ban on generalized grievances, cases in which the plaintiff's interest is undifferentiated from that of the rest of the populace, as part of the case-or-controversy inquiry.23 Present the bar today as an Article III limit that a citizen-suit provision cannot displace, as the next subsection explains.
Steps one and three do the sorting. Strong conviction does not satisfy step one, and wide sharing does not fail step three.
Congress and Citizen Suits
Lujan answers the question the previous subsection leaves open: can a statute lift the bar? It cannot. Congress cannot confer standing merely by authorizing citizen suits when the plaintiffs lack a concrete and particularized injury. The Endangered Species Act's citizen-suit provision let any person sue to enjoin the United States or any other governmental agency alleged to be violating the Act.24 The court of appeals held the injury-in-fact requirement satisfied by Congress's conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental “right” to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law, and the Supreme Court rejected that view.25 However broadly a statute invites suit, a plaintiff whose only stake is every citizen's interest in the proper application of the law presents no case or controversy.
Congress retains real power, and the limit is easier to see once that power is clear. The injury Article III requires may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.26 The Court's own illustrations involved Congress elevating concrete, de facto injuries that the law had previously overlooked to the status of legally cognizable injuries: an individual's personal interest in living in a racially integrated community, and a company's interest in marketing its product free from competition.27 In each, a real person lost something real, and the statute made that loss a legal wrong. What Congress may not do is abandon the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury, because “[statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning” that requirement.28 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins repeated the rule in a suit against a private company: Congress “cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”29
The limit is structural. Vindicating the public interest, including the public's interest in government observance of the Constitution and laws, is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive, while the courts exist to decide the rights of individuals.30 A citizen-suit clause that lets anyone sue over any violation would move the enforcement choice into the judiciary, which would take from the President the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and would become a continuing monitor of executive action.31 The statute would pick the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs would bring no personal stake to confine the court to a dispute over their own interests. A right that Congress says every member of the public holds in the lawful administration of government is a public right under an individual label.32 Nor does it matter whether the asserted right comes from the Constitution or from a statute, because a court that ignored the concrete-injury requirement at Congress's invitation would discard the same principle it would discard on its own.33
The same logic reaches suits against private defendants. If Congress could freely authorize unharmed plaintiffs to sue violators, those plaintiffs and their attorneys, not the Executive Branch, would decide how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions, even though private plaintiffs are not accountable to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public interest in a defendant's general compliance with regulatory law.34 The post-Lujan Court sees private-defendant suits as a threat to the Executive Branch's Article II authority even though they do not raise the specific problem of turning courts into continuing monitors of executive action.35 The accountability rationale has critics. One dissent, in a case about initiative proponents defending an enacted initiative, observed that the charges that such litigants “are not elected” and “decide for themselves, with no review, what arguments to make and how to make them” could be leveled with equal or greater force at special prosecutors.36 The part on standing on appeal returns to that setting.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan, which Justice Souter joined, marks the outer edge of Congress's power. Congress has the “power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before,” but in exercising it Congress “must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”37 The Endangered Species Act's provision failed that minimum because it let any person enjoin any violation, yet did not of its own force establish that a violation injures any particular person.38 The concurrence adds that it does not matter how many people the challenged action injures, so long as the plaintiff is injured in a concrete and personal way, which assures that the plaintiff has an actual stake in the outcome and not merely a professed one.39
The first scene reproduces the defect in Lujan. The second reproduces the structure the Court accepted in two later decisions. A majority in Massachusetts v. EPA quoted Justice Kennedy's formulation and treated Congress's authorization of a challenge to agency action unlawfully withheld as of critical importance to the standing inquiry.40 The Court paired that statute with a concrete injury to the Commonwealth's coastal land, and it repeated that it would not entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws. The statute's contribution was a procedural right protecting a concrete interest. A litigant who holds such a right can assert it without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy, and has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider.41
Federal Election Commission v. Akins shows Congress succeeding because its statute did the identifying that the Endangered Species Act left undone. A group of voters asked the Commission to treat a lobbying organization as a political committee, so that it would have to disclose its donors and the candidates it supported. When the Commission refused, the voters sued under a provision authorizing review by any party aggrieved by the dismissal.42 The Court held that the voters' inability to obtain information the statute made public was a sufficient injury in fact, because an informational injury directly related to voting is concrete and specific, and wide sharing of the harm does not strip Congress of power to authorize its vindication in federal court.43 The authorization language in the two statutes was similarly broad. What differed was the content of the right: the election statute identified a specific loss, the denial of information useful to voters, and tied it to the class that could sue, while the species statute named no loss at all. Three Justices dissented, as noted above, on the ground that the voters held only an undifferentiated grievance. A careful answer treats the majority's concreteness analysis as controlling. It also remembers the second limit from the statutory-violations subsection: a bare procedural violation divorced from concrete harm is an injury in law and not an injury in fact, so an informational plaintiff must still show consequences from the withholding.
Congress has a few other tools, and each still depends on a real stake. Lujan itself noted the unusual case in which Congress creates a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government's benefit by offering a cash bounty to the victorious plaintiff.44 In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens the Court allowed a qui tam relator to sue under the False Claims Act because the relator sues as a partial assignee of the United States, whose own injury in fact the claim carries along.45 That reasoning rests on the government's proprietary injury, so it may leave little room for private suits that would vindicate only the public's general interest in enforcement.46 How much further Congress may go beyond these examples is unsettled, and the later decisions have narrowed the space, because Congress cannot erase the injury requirement by granting unharmed plaintiffs a right to sue.47
Step three does the real work. A student who stops at step one treats the clause as dispositive, and a student who treats every citizen-suit clause as ineffective overlooks that Congress may elevate concrete harms and create informational rights.
Taxpayer Standing
Taxpayer suits are the setting in which the bar on generalized grievances most often operates, and the Court's treatment begins with Frothingham v. Mellon. Mrs. Frothingham sued to stop Treasury payments to states participating in a program created by the Maternity Act of 1921, arguing that Congress had no power to appropriate money to reduce maternal and infant mortality and that the payments would increase her future taxes.48 The Court never reached the merits. A federal taxpayer's interest in the federal revenue is shared with millions of others and is comparatively minute and indeterminable, the effect of any single payment on future taxation is remote, fluctuating, and uncertain, and the Court was alarmed at the prospect that any federal taxpayer could challenge any federal expenditure.49 The standard from Mellon, quoted earlier, supplies the baseline: a plaintiff must show some direct injury from enforcement and not merely a suffering in some indefinite way in common with people generally.50
Each element taught earlier in this chapter breaks down for a plaintiff whose only stake is taxpayer status. On injury, it is often unclear that a challenged tax break or spending program will hurt taxpayers as a group at all, because the program may raise government revenue, as when a tax credit draws investment that would not otherwise have come, and because a government that loses revenue may cut other spending instead of raising taxes.51 On redressability, even a plaintiff who proves higher taxes has no assurance that a favorable judgment would lower them, since the government may spend the money elsewhere. The Court has therefore described the asserted injury as conjectural and has said that it is “pure speculation whether the lawsuit would result in any actual tax relief.”52 The same reasoning governs a state taxpayer who challenges state tax and spending measures.53 A state may let such a plaintiff sue in its own courts, because taxpayer status can suffice there, but a state taxpayer who cannot show a direct injury such as pecuniary loss has no standing in federal court.54
Beneath the element-by-element failure sits the separation-of-powers concern that drives this whole part of the chapter. If a taxpayer's contribution to the Treasury were enough, every taxpayer could raise the constitutional question about every federal expenditure, and the judiciary would have to approve each program the government funds.55 A grievance shared by virtually everyone can be corrected through the political process, whereas a taxpayer suit would make the federal courts monitors of how the other branches spend public money.56 The citizen who sues over the same subject fares no better, as Richardson shows: the Court dismissed a taxpayer suit over the CIA's undisclosed expenditures because the impact on the plaintiff was undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.57
The rule disables only the plaintiff whose sole connection to the measure is taxpayer status. A food processor who challenged a federal tax imposed only on food processors in United States v. Butler had ordinary standing, because the tax took the processor's own money, and a woman would likewise have standing to challenge a tax that fell only on women.58 The same processor, suing instead as one of millions who help fund a program it dislikes, would stand where Mrs. Frothingham stood, because the harm would then reach the processor only through the program's indirect effect on government revenue. A taxpayer who can show a particularized injury from the challenged action, such as damage to property or a curtailment of personal liberty, sues like anyone else, so the rule applies only when taxpayer status is the whole claim.59
For forty-five years Frothingham stood as what the Court later called an “impenetrable barrier” to taxpayer suits against Acts of Congress.61 That rigidity carried a cost: unconstitutional spending might never be stopped if no one with a personal injury existed to challenge it. The Court responded with one narrow exception.62 In Flast v. Cohen seven federal taxpayers sued to enjoin spending under Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, alleging that the funds paid for instruction and instructional materials in religious schools in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and the Court held that Article III contains no absolute bar to such a suit.63 Standing still requires a personal stake, so the Court asked when a taxpayer has one and answered that two links, or nexuses, must connect the taxpayer's status to the claim.64
The first nexus ties taxpayer status to the kind of law attacked. The challenge must target an exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power under Article I, section 8, and an incidental expenditure of tax funds in administering an essentially regulatory statute does not qualify.65 A challenge to a regulatory statute therefore does not become a taxpayer suit merely because the agency that enforces it draws a salary from the Treasury.66 The second nexus ties taxpayer status to the constitutional wrong. The taxpayer must show that the enactment exceeds “specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power,” and it is not enough to say that Congress lacked power to enact it at all.67 That second link keeps out the claim Mrs. Frothingham made, that Congress had no power to spend for the purpose, which attacks the breadth of federal authority and names no limit on spending itself.68 The Establishment Clause satisfies it because one historic purpose of the Clause was to prevent the use of government money for religion, so a taxpayer who challenges that use attacks the very thing the Clause forbids.69 In plain terms, the two links ask whether the measure is a spending measure and whether the claimed violation is a limit on spending.
The Court has applied the first nexus strictly. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. a federal department gave a former military hospital to a sectarian college under a statute letting a cabinet officer dispose of surplus property, and an organization devoted to separation of church and state, together with several of its employees, challenged the gift as aid to religion.70 The Court denied taxpayer standing because the transfer rested on Congress's Article IV power to dispose of federal property and not on the taxing and spending power, and it denied citizen standing because the plaintiffs identified no injury beyond “the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”71 The plaintiffs had attacked an agency's decision and not an act of Congress, which is why the first link was missing.72
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. confirmed the point. Taxpayers challenged conferences held under the President's Faith Based and Community Initiative, which were paid for from general executive-branch appropriations that no specific congressional enactment expressly authorized or mandated. A plurality held that the case fell outside the narrow exception because it did not attack an exercise of congressional power, and it warned that a contrary rule would make federal courts the continuous arbiters of the wisdom and soundness of executive action.73 Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but would have overruled Flast outright.74 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn carried the limit to tax credits. Arizona allowed a credit for contributions to organizations that award private-school tuition scholarships, some at religious schools. The plaintiffs invoked Flast, but the Court held 5 to 4 that the exception did not apply because no state revenue was transferred to any sectarian entity.75
Winn turned on a missing first nexus, and the reason is worth tracing. When the government declines to tax a dollar, the dollar never becomes the government's, and the decision to send it to a religious cause belongs to the private contributor. The net effect may resemble a tax followed by a grant, yet the Court treated the private decision as the critical difference.76 The Court added that causation and redressability were also absent, because the injury was traceable to the taxpayers who used the credit and not to any government action, and an injunction limiting the credit would not remedy it.77 After Valley Forge, Hein, and Winn, Flast survives, if at all, only for its original case: a challenge to a congressional appropriation that funds religion.78 An exam answer should open the Flast door only for a congressional spending measure attacked under the Establishment Clause and should close it quickly for executive action, property transfers, and tax credits.
Municipal taxpayers are treated differently. Frothingham itself acknowledged that the Court had entertained suits by municipal taxpayers, because a municipal taxpayer's relation to municipal taxes is more direct and immediate than a federal taxpayer's relation to the federal revenue.79 Each taxpayer holds a larger share of a city's tax base than of the national one, so the effect of a local expenditure on that taxpayer's own bill is less remote. The municipal taxpayer must show that the challenged activity will probably increase that taxpayer's taxes, directly or indirectly, or would in some other manner cause irreparable or great injury.80
Steps four and six produce most of the failures. A plaintiff who objects to a President's or an agency's decision has not shown the first nexus however plainly religion is involved, and a plaintiff who objects to a tax credit has not shown that the government spent anything.