Concept
Causation
Standing
Causation
Causation asks whether the defendant before the court is the source of the plaintiff’s injury. The plaintiff must show an injury “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,”1 and the showing fails when the injury is instead the “result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.”2 Standing doctrine exists to ensure that the plaintiff has enough interest in the outcome for the issues to be “presented in an adversary context and in a form viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process,”3 and traceability is the element that ties that interest to the particular defendant. A plaintiff who cannot make the tie lacks standing, and the court then lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss.4
Jean marks the easy end of the range. She was hurt in an accident, she sues the manufacturer she says caused it, and she seeks damages to compensate for her injuries, so every component of her claim runs straight to the defendant.5 The test is loose, and it is not especially onerous so long as the defendant’s conduct affects the plaintiff without any need to trace a causal chain through nonparty actors. It becomes difficult when the injury depends on the independent action of a third party.6
Traceability also presupposes an injury to trace, and the elements fail independently. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court acknowledged that the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is a cognizable interest, and it granted the plaintiffs the “questionable” assumption that the government-funded projects abroad would threaten endangered species. The plaintiffs still lost, because their affidavits expressed only “some day” intentions to return to the project sites and so showed no actual or imminent injury.7 That defect belongs to the first element, and the plaintiff must establish all three.8
The subsections below follow the difficulty as it grows. The first takes the plaintiff who is the object of the government’s action, the second the plaintiff whose injury runs through third parties, and the third the plaintiff who can show only a small contribution or a link that rests on speculation.
Regulating Someone Else
Whom the government acted against largely decides how hard causation is to show. When a claimant alleges injury from an agency’s exertion of coercive power against the claimant, causation is easily shown: a financial services firm that challenges a restriction on its services can trace its lost profit-making opportunities directly to the restriction.10 The teacher whom a public school fires for her religious beliefs stands in the same position, since her dismissal is the school’s own act and an actual abridgment of her First Amendment right.11
A party who challenges the government’s failure to honor its regulatory obligations has a “substantially more difficult” time establishing causation. The firm’s clients, for instance, may struggle to persuade a court that the government’s failure to police the firm caused them to lose money to fraud. The government can often contend that third-party actors, including the bad actors it failed to stop, severed the link between its inaction and the plaintiff’s injury in fact.12 These “regulatory beneficiary” cases can still clear the Article III bar, but they are more likely than their “regulated-party” counterparts to founder on causation.13
The split reflects a change in what federal courts decide. In the nineteenth century, constitutional issues generally arose in traditional litigation, such as criminal cases and cases of trespass, breach of contract, or personal injury, while the federal government collected tariffs, governed and sold public lands, and paid military pensions. In the twentieth century the role of government shifted.14 The older cases ask who hurt whom, and the beneficiary’s case asks whether the government’s treatment of someone else, or its failure to act against someone else, hurt the plaintiff.
A structural concern also sits close to these suits. Choosing how to prioritize, and how aggressively to pursue, legal actions against those who violate the law falls to the Executive Branch, because private plaintiffs “are not accountable to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a defendant’s general compliance with regulatory law.”15 A plaintiff who asks a court to force the government’s hand against someone else must therefore show a harm of her own that the government’s choice produced.
Department of Education v. Brown shows that the risk is real. Borrowers who challenged the procedures behind a student-loan forgiveness program were held to lack standing, because they could not show that the alleged procedural violations caused their exclusion from the program or that notice-and-comment procedures would redress it.
On an exam, therefore, ask first whether the plaintiff is the object of the challenged action. If so, causation ordinarily presents little difficulty and the analysis moves on to redressability. If not, the answer depends on what third parties do or will do, and that question occupies the rest of this section.
Third-Party Chains
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization shows a broken chain in its purest form. The plaintiffs described specific occasions on which hospitals refused them care solely because they could not pay. The Court accepted that as an injury in fact but held that an “injury at the hands of a hospital is insufficient by itself to establish a case or controversy in the context of this suit, for no hospital is a defendant.” The only defendants were Treasury officials, and the only illegal action charged to them was a revenue ruling that gave favorable tax treatment to nonprofit hospitals offering only emergency room service to indigents. The refusals, though perhaps encouraged by the IRS, were caused only by the nonparty hospitals.17
Warth v. Seldin extends the chain one step further out. Nonresidents who could find no affordable housing in the area challenged exclusionary zoning practices. The Court required two showings: but-for causation, proved by “specific, concrete facts” showing harm to the plaintiffs, and a possibility of redress through the Court’s intervention. The nonresidents offered inadequate proof that eliminating the exclusionary practices would lead to the construction of affordable housing.18 Whether anyone would build housing they could afford turned on decisions that builders, who were not before the court, had not yet made, and the plaintiffs could not supply those decisions by assumption.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. supplies the missing fact. A plaintiff whose claim rested on a particular project proved an injury in fact. Most exclusionary-zoning challenges involve no specific project, which is why, under Warth, standing in federal court is usually lacking in them.19
The pairing gives the exam pattern. When the facts supply a specific project or other concrete detail about what the third party will do, the chain can hold. When the facts ask the court to assume what builders, hospitals, or others will decide, the chain breaks however real the injury.
Small Contributions and Speculative Links
Speculation about what others will do defeats traceability even when no private third party stands in the middle. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the plaintiffs contended that their injury was fairly traceable to Section 1881(a) because there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications with foreign contacts would be intercepted under that section at some future time. Justice Alito, writing for a five-justice majority, rejected the contention and held that the injury was not fairly traceable to Section 1881(a). The injury was speculative, for example, because it was uncertain whether the Government would target their communications on an imminent basis.21
The cases on future injury show the same reluctance. To establish an actual controversy in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the plaintiff would have had to allege that he would meet the police again and also make the “incredible assertion” either that all Los Angeles officers always choke any citizen they encounter or that the City ordered or authorized officers to act that way.22 A chain of assumptions about other people’s future conduct, unsupported by facts, cannot carry the plaintiff’s burden.
Third parties’ decisions can still support causation when the link is concrete. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, residents challenged a federal statute limiting utilities’ liability for a nuclear accident, and the Court found causation because the nearby plants would not have been built without the statute.
Massachusetts v. EPA presents the opposite problem, a defendant whose contribution to the harm is real but small. The plaintiffs challenged the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles, and the agency’s reply was that the step they demanded was only a small increment. The Court called that an overstatement. The argument “rests on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum,” and accepting that premise “would doom most challenges to regulatory action,” because agencies, like legislatures, “do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”23 Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, read the same facts as too thin. According to one declaration, domestic motor vehicles contribute about 6 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and 4 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, and because § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act covers only new motor vehicles and engines, the standards the petitioners wanted might reduce only a fraction of that 4 percent.24 The majority’s rule is that smallness alone does not defeat traceability, and the dissent shows how contestable the line between a small contribution and a negligible one remains.
The plaintiff’s status also colored the case. The Court gave special solicitude to the injury in fact that Massachusetts asserted because it is a sovereign state suing in its parens patriae capacity.25 Whether states are more or less likely than individuals to have a concrete stake in such a case, and whether they should have greater latitude to drive the national regulatory agenda, are open questions.26 That is a reason not to assume an individual plaintiff would receive the same latitude.
Steps three and four do the real work. Treating any third-party involvement as fatal overlooks Arlington Heights and Duke Power, where concrete facts supplied the link. Assuming that a serious injury settles causation overlooks Simon, where the injury was conceded and the chain still failed.
The showing is also not a one-time event. An “actual controversy” must persist throughout all stages of litigation, so standing “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.”28 Standing must be satisfied in the federal district court and at the federal appellate levels alike.29
Class certification is a separate question from standing. Data breach lawsuits are often styled as class actions, and the class must be certified under Rule 23, which requires numerosity, commonality, fair and adequate representation, and typicality.30 Those requirements do not replace the three Article III elements, which the plaintiff must still satisfy.31