Concept
Collusive and Friendly Suits
Case or Controversy and Advisory Opinions
Collusive and Friendly Suits
A justiciable controversy exists only if the parties genuinely disagree about what the outcome of the lawsuit should be. Without that requirement, two people who wanted a court's view of a statute could obtain an advisory opinion simply by colluding to bring a lawsuit.1 A friendly suit and an advisory request lack the same thing: an actual dispute between adverse parties over their legal relations, so that any opinion would be a nonbinding recital of the court's views.2 The bar on friendly suits therefore finishes what the ban on advisory opinions starts, and like that ban it is one of the fundamental limits the case-or-controversy doctrines place on federal judicial power.3 In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Justice Brandeis described the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions, together with its related doctrines, as ensuring that constitutional issues affecting legislation "will not be determined in friendly, nonadversary proceedings."4
The doctrine has a core and a boundary. The core is the rule against suits in which the parties want the same thing. The boundary separates those suits from test cases and uncontested proceedings, which remain justiciable.
The Rule Against Friendly Suits
A court should deem a suit collusive when one party is financing and controlling both sides of the litigation. The same conclusion follows when both litigants desire precisely the same result, because then there is no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, and when one party refuses to take a position on the merits and merely asks that a matter be resolved.5 Friendly lawsuits or feigned cases, in which the litigants collude to desire the same result, present no constitutional case or controversy, a point supported by Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.6 The rule is not confined to constitutional questions, but courts apply it mainly in constitutional cases, because "it never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act."7
A landlord-and-tenant version of the same arrangement is the textbook setting of United States v. Johnson.
The rule follows from where the power of judicial review comes from. A court may declare a statute unconstitutional only as a consequence of its power to decide a case properly before it, and unless the statute is involved in a case properly susceptible of judicial determination, the court has no power to pronounce it unconstitutional.8 Marshall rested judicial review on the constitutional responsibility to decide cases or controversies, and the Court's proper role is to provide a remedy for individual harms: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."9 A suit staged to obtain a ruling reverses that order, because the ruling is the goal and the case is only the vehicle.
No one can supply adversity by arrangement. The Supreme Court decides only "flesh and blood" controversies, Article III courts cannot reach out to resolve even vital constitutional questions at the behest of Congress and the President, and Congress cannot make the United States a defendant unless the United States truly has an interest adverse to the plaintiff. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).10 The litigants fare no better than Congress. Because the case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power, their shared wish for a ruling cannot give a court power that Article III withholds.11
The limit is specific to the federal courts and is not inevitable. Some state supreme courts may issue advisory opinions, and the Massachusetts Constitution, for example, lets each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or council, require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court upon important questions and solemn occasions.12
Test Cases and Agreement
A suit that looks planned, cooperative, or uncontested is not for that reason collusive, and exam questions usually probe that boundary. In every variation the question is whether the parties want different results. Planning, provocation, and agreement about the law do not decide it.
A deliberately provoked test case remains a case or controversy.14 Some famous decisions have been test cases in which both opposing parties advocated a constitutional resolution in their own favor on a contentious and momentous issue of the day.15 The litigants in a friendly suit collude to desire the same result, while test-case litigants still want opposite ones. The Court has not applied the collusion rule rigidly, either: some of the most famous constitutional decisions came in what now seem to have been collusive cases.16
Delgado controlled both sides of its caption. Here the government stands across the courtroom wanting a different outcome, so Reyes's motive for being in court does not matter.
Parties may also stop contesting without destroying the court's power. A court has jurisdiction to render judgment by default or on a plea of guilty, and it may order the naturalization of an alien though no one challenges the petition.17 The two words in Article III do different work here. The term "case" embraces uncontested applications, while "controversy" appears to require genuine contestation between the adversaries Article III identifies, because contestation creates the controversy that grounds the jurisdiction of the federal courts.18 A collusive suit lacks that contestation by design, since one party controls both sides or both want the same result.
Agreement about the legal answer does not eliminate adversity either. Parties are adverse in the Article III sense, even if they agree on the correct answer to the question presented, so long as they disagree about what the result should be once the question is resolved.19
Because adversity turns on the parties' interests in the result, a suspicious suit can be screened with four questions.
Justices do not always agree that the adversity is real. In Orr v. Orr, a Justice writing separately objected that on the record it could not be said with assurance that the parties' interests were fully adversary, or that they were not seeking, for reasons undisclosed, a purely advisory opinion on a constitutional issue of considerable importance. That Justice would have remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Alabama instead of reaching the merits.20