Concept
Marbury and Judicial Review
Case or Controversy and Advisory Opinions
Marbury and Judicial Review
Marbury v. Madison belongs in a chapter on justiciability because of the road Chief Justice Marshall took to judicial review. He did not claim a power over Congress in the abstract; he grounded review in the courts’ duty to decide cases.1 Judges who apply rules to a particular case must expound and interpret them, and when two rules conflict, the courts must decide which governs. In Marshall’s words: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”2 Judicial review thus arrives as a consequence of resolving a dispute. A court may declare a statute unconstitutional only when the statute is involved in a case properly before it; without such a case, the court has no power to pronounce it invalid.3
In December 1801, William Marbury and three others asked the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus (a court order commanding an official to perform a duty) should not issue to deliver their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. Outgoing President John Adams had nominated them.4 Marshall did not open with the Constitution. He opened by asking whether Marbury had any legal right at all, because without one the Court would have no justiciable case in which to reach a constitutional question.5
The first question turned on removability. If an officer is removable at the President’s will, a new appointment may be made; if not, the rights acquired are protected by law, and the President cannot resume them. Whether a right has vested is a judicial question, to be tried by judicial authority.6 The second question separated political executive acts from acts the courts may examine. Heads of departments who act as mere organs of the Executive’s will in political matters are not subject to judicial control; but when the legislature assigns an officer a specific duty and individual rights depend on its performance, the injured individual may resort to the laws for a remedy.7 Marshall put the principle this way: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”8 The opinion concluded that the appropriate remedy for Marbury “exists in law.”9
The order of the questions was deliberate. Unless Marbury first showed a legal right, the proceeding would have been a moot cause, decided upon a hypothesis, and he would have had no legal right to demand an adjudication of the statute’s validity. A later opinion in Myers v. United States read Marbury this way: the Court would not decide an important and far-reaching constitutional question unless a litigant asserting a clear legal right susceptible of protection presented it in a properly justiciable cause.10 The reason is mechanical. A statute can be tested against the Constitution only if something in the dispute turns on which of the two governs, and a claimant with no right gives the court nothing to decide. Marbury’s own reasoning marks the boundary: had the office been one the President could remove at will, he could have made a new appointment, no right would have vested, and the inquiry would have ended at the first question.11
Only the third question brought a statute into the analysis. A provision of the First Judiciary Act purported to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to public officers.12 Marbury’s case fell within the judicial power of the United States but outside Article III’s definition of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. That definition gives the Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and in cases in which a state is a party; in the other enumerated cases, it has appellate jurisdiction.13 The Court rejected the argument that Congress may give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in other cases. If the Constitution had left the legislature to apportion the judicial power, the clauses defining the Court’s original jurisdiction would be mere surplusage. The words of the Constitution must be given effect, and the distribution they intend makes jurisdiction original and not appellate in some classes of cases, and appellate and not original in others.14
That left two laws that could not both govern the case: a statute authorizing the writ in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, and a Constitution withholding that jurisdiction. When a law opposes the Constitution and both apply to a case, the court must decide which of the conflicting rules governs.15 The Court applied the Constitution. It held the Judiciary Act void so far as it extended original jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution permits, concluded that it had no original jurisdiction to issue the writ, and declined to issue it. Marbury had a remedy in law, but the Supreme Court could not supply it in that form.16
The same reasoning limits Congress’s power over every federal court, not only the Supreme Court’s original docket. Six years after Marbury, in Hodgson v. Bowerbank, Marshall wrote for the Court: “Turn to the article of the Constitution of the United States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Constitution.” Because Article III does not authorize jurisdiction in every case to which an alien is a party, the statute could not extend it that far.17 The result followed a fortiori from Marbury: if Congress cannot distribute the judicial power among the federal courts except as the Constitution provides, it cannot give federal courts jurisdiction in cases outside the constitutional definition of that power.18
Both holdings rest on one premise, and the premise supports less than a casual reading suggests. When a statute and the Constitution both govern a case, the court must choose between them, and a statute that conflicts with the Constitution gives way. But the choice arises only inside a case, so the power does not reach a statute that no one has asked a court to apply to anyone’s rights. The courts’ reluctance to pass on constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary has produced a rigorous set of rules about what counts as a justiciable case or controversy.19
The Court has drawn the same line for requests that arrive before a statute operates at all. Ever since the Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal for members of the Supreme Court to render advice concerning pending legislation, it has been clear that analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction before it takes effect is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary, even when a suit of that kind presents a case or controversy sufficient for Article III. Younger v. Harris gave three reasons: the remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and, above all, the speculative and amorphous nature of a line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes.20
What would that reasoning permit if the request arrived before any dispute existed?
Marbury’s reasoning gives the Court nothing to decide. Marbury reached the statute through a vested right, a violation, and a remedy; the President’s request has none of the three, so no case exists in which the bill and the Constitution compete for application. The Convention declined to give the Justices an advising role over pending legislation, and an answer here would be exactly that: an opinion about a law’s validity, delivered without deciding anyone’s rights. The next section takes up that advisory opinion.