Concept
Immunity Beyond the Text
Does state sovereign immunity bar the suit?
Immunity Beyond the Text
The Eleventh Amendment names two kinds of plaintiffs. It withdraws the federal judicial power over any suit “in law or equity” against a State “by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”1 Within those terms the Court gave the Amendment full effect from the outset. Asked whether it ended suits already pending or only barred new ones, a unanimous Court held that no jurisdiction could be exercised “in any case, past or future,” in which a State was sued by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state.2
The harder cases involve plaintiffs the text never mentions: a State’s own citizen, a federal corporation, an Indian tribe, a foreign nation. The Court has held a nonconsenting State immune from each, because it locates the immunity not in the Amendment but in “the structure of the original Constitution itself.”3 The Amendment is evidence of that immunity, not its source. A suit against a State should therefore be tested against the States’ sovereign immunity, and not merely against the Amendment’s list of plaintiffs. The three parts below take up what the Amendment confirms, the foreign-state case that tests the principle, and the narrower reading the Court did not adopt.
What the Amendment Confirms
The textual argument failed in Hans. The plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, argued that the Amendment barred only suits by citizens of other States and of foreign states, so that it posed no obstacle to him. The Court answered, “It is true, the amendment does so read.” Without some other ground for dismissal, it added, the suit “might be maintainable,” and the result would be “anomalous”: a State could be sued in federal court on a federal claim by its own citizens, though not by citizens of other States or of a foreign state, and though it did not allow itself to be sued in its own courts.4 Unmoved by the textual argument, the Court held that sovereign immunity barred the suit.5
Later cases drew the general lesson. The Court treats the Amendment as evidence of “the broader concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exemplifying.”6 The sovereign immunity of the States, in the Court’s words, “neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”7
The Court reads the Amendment as a confirmation because of what provoked it. In Chisholm v. Georgia the Court held that Article III allowed the very suits that Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton had insisted it did not, and the Antifederalists’ fears were realized.8 The Amendment followed. As Seminole Tribe put it, the Court has consistently treated its adoption as conclusive evidence “that the decision in Chisholm was contrary to the well-understood meaning of the Constitution,” and has treated the views of Hamilton, Madison, Marshall, and Justice Iredell, who dissented in Chisholm, as reflecting the original understanding.9 In proposing the Amendment, Congress “acted not to change but to restore the original constitutional design.”10
A reading that made the Amendment’s words the whole of the immunity would also produce arbitrary results. A separate opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. saw no plausible reason to protect a State from a federal-law suit by a citizen of another State or country yet permit the same suit by the State’s own citizen. Unless some principle beyond the Amendment’s text confers immunity, it reasoned, even a suit between a State and a citizen of another State would escape the bar whenever a nondiversity ground of jurisdiction existed.11
The Court has applied the principle well beyond the Amendment’s words. Each of the following suits falls outside the Amendment’s list of plaintiffs or its “law or equity” language, and each is barred against a nonconsenting State:
- A federal-question suit by the State’s own citizen, as in Hans.12
- A suit by a federal corporation, as in Smith v. Reeves.13
- A suit by a foreign nation, as in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, examined below.14
- A suit by an Indian tribe, as in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak.15
- An admiralty suit, which is not a suit “in law or equity,” as in Ex parte New York.16
- A private party’s proceeding before a federal administrative agency, as in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority.17
- A private suit against a State in its own courts, as in Alden v. Maine, which a later section takes up.18
None of these cases turns on whether the plaintiff’s citizenship matches the Amendment’s list. Each asks whether the suit intrudes on the immunity the Constitution’s structure preserves, and the Amendment’s list is one application of that immunity.
Foreign States and the Limits of Consent
Monaco v. Mississippi tests the principle where the text is silent and Article III seems to point the other way. The Principality of Monaco sued Mississippi in the Supreme Court for payment on bonds the State had issued. On its face Article III would suggest that the suit could be entertained, and the Amendment’s terms do not address it.20 The Court nonetheless held that it lacked jurisdiction, relying on “precepts underlying but not explicit in” Article III and the Amendment.21 Chief Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court that a State could not be sued by a foreign state in federal court, despite Article III’s express grant of jurisdiction over suits “between a State . . . and foreign States” and despite the Amendment’s silence about sovereign immunity.22
The opinion rested on consent. The Court concluded that “the same principle applies to suits against a State by a foreign State,” so the States retain against a foreign state the immunity they enjoy against individuals, whether citizens of the United States or citizens or subjects of a foreign state.23 The consent each State gave by accepting the constitutional plan “runs to the other States who have likewise accepted that plan, and to the United States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates.” But “[t]he foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union,” and no waiver or consent has run in its favor.24 The principle cuts both ways: a foreign state enjoys a similar sovereign immunity and may not be sued by a State of the Union without its consent.25
The United States stands differently. One of the waivers implicit in the plan of the Convention covers suits by the United States itself. As a superior sovereign it must at times sue a State, and it would be ignominious and perhaps self-defeating to make it do so in the defendant State’s courts. The United States may therefore sue a State in federal court, for example for breach of contract or to enjoin a state tax that discriminates against the federal government.26 Alden makes the same point from the other side. The State there was shielded from a private suit to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, yet the Court noted that the United States could have enforced the Act against the State by a suit of its own.27 A later section returns to suits by the United States and by other States.
Suppose a State breaches a contract and is sued in federal court. If the plaintiff is a foreign government, the State may invoke its immunity, because no consent runs in the foreign state’s favor. If the plaintiff is the United States, the State has no immunity to invoke, because the consent inherent in the plan runs to the United States. The State, the claim, and the court are the same, and the plaintiff’s place in the constitutional structure decides the result.
On an exam, a foreign government as plaintiff invites the argument that the Amendment reaches only “Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State” and so does not apply. Monaco defeats that argument. The Amendment’s words do not exhaust the immunity, and the consent in the constitutional plan covers sister States and the United States but not a sovereign outside the Union.
The Competing View and the Court’s Answer
Commentators describe two rival accounts of the Amendment. On the diversity account, it operates narrowly and curtails only two sources of jurisdiction, suits brought by diverse citizens and by foreign nationals.29 On the profound-shock thesis, named for the Court’s articulation of it in Hans, the framers recoiled from state suability and meant to curtail virtually all federal judicial power to entertain suits against the states, even though the Amendment itself did not say so. The Court has made the profound-shock thesis the law of the land, with some exceptions.30
The diversity account would have let Hans proceed, since the plaintiff there was the State’s own citizen suing on a federal claim. Hans conceded that the text read that way and rejected the resulting anomaly.31
Alden v. Maine answered a challenge to the immunity’s constitutional stature. The Court acknowledged that state sovereign immunity “derives at least in part from the common-law tradition,” but held that “the structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design.” It found no persuasive evidence that the founding generation regarded the immunity as defeasible by federal statute. The dissent’s suggestion that Madison and Marshall held such a view found no support in their comments at the ratification conventions, which neither state nor imply it.32
Two consequences follow from that stature. First, Congress cannot use Article I to get around the limit: the Court has said the Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction.33 Second, courts treat the Amendment as conferring a personal immunity founded on sovereign immunity, and a personal immunity can be waived. That reasoning lets a State consent to suit in federal court even though the text speaks of the “judicial power,” although it sits uneasily with the text’s logic.34 Later sections take up congressional abrogation and consent in turn.