Concept
Practical and Political Checks
Congressional power to define and limit
Practical and Political Checks
Article III gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."1 The limits on that power are uncertain at three points, definitional, structural, and external, and the uncertainty works as a check on both branches.2 If Congress clearly could strip the Court's appellate jurisdiction at will, the Court's authority would be severely undermined. If the Court clearly could defeat every exception Congress wrote, unrestrained judicial review might upset the balance between constitutional oversight and republican democracy. Neither branch can count on winning a confrontation, so each must exercise judgment, and conflicts in this sphere have been very few.3
The doctrine itself remains fluid. Many commentators argue for Article III-based limits on stripping, pointing to its tension with Marbury's endorsement of the federal courts' power to "say what the law is" and to the loss of uniformity when the Supreme Court cannot decide constitutional cases. The Court itself, however, has yet to recognize any such restriction in express terms. Its rulings on the lower federal courts seem to recognize a broad congressional power, although the case law is sparse and dated, and Ex parte McCardle seems at first glance to support an all-but-plenary power over the Court's own appellate jurisdiction. But McCardle admits a narrow reading, and the modern Court appears divided about what it holds. The scope of the stripping power therefore stays unresolved, and that helps Congress when it threatens jurisdictional retaliation for decisions it dislikes, since no one can say with confidence how far the power reaches.4
The restrictions Congress has enacted look different from the proposals that failed. Bills to eliminate the Court's appellate jurisdiction over busing, abortion, and school prayer died in the 1970s and 1980s.5 The enacted measures are narrower. The Prison Litigation Reform Act restricted the federal courts' remedial authority in prison-conditions litigation, and AEDPA cut back their authority over habeas petitions. Immigration reform legislation sought to curtail judicial review of deportation orders, and the Detainee Treatment Act restricted habeas petitions and other actions reviewing the confinement of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.6
The pardon proviso at the center of Klein shows what a sharper collision looks like. The proviso declared that pardons would not be considered by the Court on appeal, and it directed the Court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction any case in which a Court of Claims judgment rested on pardons without other proof of loyalty. The Court had already decided that it must consider pardons and treat them, in cases like that one, as equivalent to proof of loyalty.7 A provision that dictates how the Court must treat a matter it has already held decisive raises the structural question examined above, and provisions of that kind are the exception.
Stripping jurisdiction may also fail on its own terms, because observers disagree about what happens once the federal courts are closed. Some predict that state courts would reject the Supreme Court's precedent and develop their own constitutional doctrine. The sponsors would then have changed constitutional law by ordinary legislation instead of the more cumbersome amendment process. Others doubt that the law would change at all, since the precedents remain on the books and state courts may regard themselves as bound by them. On that view the strategy is self-defeating, because it forecloses the federal courts from reconsidering the very precedents the sponsors dislike.8 The first prediction carries its own cost. If state courts diverge and the Supreme Court cannot review them, the result is a cacophony of differing interpretations of key constitutional provisions, which undermines the goal of uniformity in interpreting national law. Critics add that stripping would leave adjudication to state judges who, unlike federal judges, almost universally serve limited terms and face some form of popular election.9
Congress turns to stripping partly because its other tools are weak. A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds vote of both houses and ratification by three-quarters of the states. Congress has considered over 11,000 amendments, has proposed only thirty-three, and has seen twenty-seven ratified. Almost half of those twenty-seven came in two extraordinary episodes: the Bill of Rights, which the First Congress added as part of a bargain to induce reluctant states to ratify the Constitution, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which the Reconstruction Congress imposed on the southern states as a condition of readmission.11 The other routes are no faster. The impeachment threat no longer seems viable against the authors of decisions that follow the forms of legal rhetoric, and a new statute will have little immediate effect on constitutional doctrine. New appointments may change doctrine eventually, which explains the contentiousness of confirmation hearings, but they give little comfort to a Congress that wants to change the law today. Jurisdiction-stripping legislation may therefore reflect legislative frustration at the lack of any alternative way to influence federal constitutional law.12
The Court has its own reasons for caution. Congressional control over federal jurisdiction gives judicial review a democratic underpinning, because so long as the Court can point to statutes that authorize its oversight, it can claim an ongoing popular mandate. That may explain why the Court prefers the doctrine of constitutional doubt, which lets it present itself as exercising jurisdiction Congress conferred, not jurisdiction inherent in the Constitution itself.13 The point has extra force because the Constitution does not explicitly grant the judicial review power asserted in Marbury. Marshall relied on general principles and inferences from constitutional text and structure, while Canada, India, Ireland, and Japan have expressly vested regular courts with interpretive power.14
On an exam, analyze a jurisdiction-stripping fact pattern under the definitional, structural, and external limits in turn, and state the open questions as open. Use the practical checks last, to explain why the doctrine stays unsettled even though conflicts are few.