Concept
After Northern Pipeline
Organization and relationship of state and federal courts in a federal system
After Northern Pipeline
Northern Pipeline invalidated the jurisdiction that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 gave to bankruptcy judges, who lacked the tenure during good behavior and the undiminishable compensation that Article III guarantees to the judges of courts exercising the judicial power of the United States.1 The prevailing Justices were troubled that Congress had let those judges decide a wide range of private-rights questions, including rights that derive from state law, and many read the decision as a threat to administrative agencies as well as specialized courts.2
The threat did not materialize, because Congress has created tribunals outside Article III since the early Republic, among them courts-martial, territorial courts, and administrative agencies.3 Within four years the Court had upheld non-Article III adjudication of what looked like private disputes in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. and in CFTC v. Schor, both times by weighing factors instead of sorting cases into the plurality's categories.4
The decision therefore followed two paths. In bankruptcy, the Court cushioned its holding, Congress rebuilt the court system, and the new design produced a second round of litigation over what non-Article III judges may decide. Outside bankruptcy, the Court moved away from formalism and toward balancing. The two subsections below take the paths in that order.
Bankruptcy Court Restructuring
The jurisdictional grant that failed belonged to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the first comprehensive reform of federal bankruptcy law in forty years and the source of the Bankruptcy Code that governs today.5 The plurality in Northern Pipeline concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1471, which that Act added, had removed most, if not all, of “the essential attributes of the judicial power” from the Article III district court and vested them in a non-Article III adjunct, and it held that such a grant could not be sustained as an exercise of Congress's power to create adjuncts.6
A holding of invalidity raises two practical questions that the text of Article III cannot answer: what becomes of the orders the bankruptcy courts had already entered, and who will decide the cases pending before them? The Court answered the first question itself. Congress answered the second in 1984.
The Court made its holding prospective, which kept valid the actions that bankruptcy courts had taken under the Code up to that date.7 It reached that result through the three considerations of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson: whether the holding decided an issue of first impression that earlier cases had not clearly foreshadowed, whether retroactive operation would further or retard the holding, and whether retroactivity would produce substantial inequitable results in individual cases.8 All three pointed the same way. Congress's grant of broad judicial power to non-Article III bankruptcy judges presented an unprecedented question under Article III, undoing past orders would do nothing to advance the holding, and it would visit injustice and hardship on litigants who had relied on the Act's grant of jurisdiction.9 Reliance carries the argument. Parties who litigated under a statute that no earlier decision had marked invalid should not lose their judgments for following the law as Congress wrote it.
The Court then affirmed the district court's judgment but stayed it until October 4, 1982. The limited stay gave Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or adopt other valid means of adjudication without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws.10 The Court later extended the stay to December 24, 1982.11 The prospective ruling and the stay together spared the system a wholesale disaster and left Congress the task of fixing what the Court had broken.12
The resulting furor pushed Congress into speedy action, and it repaired the jurisdictional problem along with a separate labor problem. Other interests seized the occasion, for the consumer credit industry and special interest groups obtained changes in the Bankruptcy Code of their own.13 The product was the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, whose Title I, “Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and Procedure,” tried to fix the Northern Pipeline problem.14
Congress did not give bankruptcy judges Article III status. Instead, it made the bankruptcy court a part of the federal district court, conferred bankruptcy jurisdiction on the district court, and allocated judicial power in bankruptcy matters between the district judge and the bankruptcy judge.15 Criticizing that allocation is easy; operating it is what a lawyer must learn. The allocation turns on a statutory classification. In a core proceeding, a category the statute illustrates with a non-exhaustive list of examples, the bankruptcy judge may render a final judgment, and the district court hears the appeal. In a non-core matter, the bankruptcy judge hears the claim but only submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, which makes the final adjudication.16
Congress drew the core line by statute, and a statutory line cannot settle what Article III permits. Stern v. Marshall shows why. The Justices were unanimous that the counterclaim before them was a core proceeding, and the party who had asserted the defamation claim not only failed to object to adjudication in the bankruptcy court but affirmed that he was content to have it exercise jurisdiction.17 The Court nonetheless split five to four on the constitutional question. The majority ruled that the counterclaim fell within none of the three categories of cases that non-Article III judges may adjudicate, and it observed that the claim was not a public rights case “by any definition.”18
Those categories are the ones developed earlier in this chapter. They are territorial courts, whose jurisdiction Congress confers under its general powers over the territories rather than as part of the judicial power defined in Article III;19 courts-martial, which employ military members rather than life-tenured judges and which the Court has never suggested must satisfy Article III;20 and public-rights disputes. Because the counterclaim fit none of them, the bankruptcy provision apparently authorizing its adjudication was unconstitutional as applied.21 The dissent accused the majority of undermining the well-established law of Crowell v. Benson, but what really separated the Justices appeared to be method: the majority stayed with the Court's previous categorical approach, and the dissent preferred a more pragmatic one.22
Four years after Stern, the Court held in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif that a bankruptcy court may hear claims ordinarily triable by an Article III court when the parties' consent to the adjudication is knowing and voluntary, and it distinguished Stern on that basis.23 The contrast is instructive. In Stern, a party's failure to object and his statement of contentment did not save the adjudication, while in Wellness consent that is knowing and voluntary does. The permissible role of a non-Article III bankruptcy judge therefore depends on two things, the character of the claim and the consent of the parties.
An exam stem that recites the statutory list of core proceedings invites the inference that the bankruptcy judge may finally decide the claim. The checklist shows why the list is only the second step, since the character of the claim and the parties' consent still decide the outcome.
Balancing Beyond Bankruptcy
Article III vests “the judicial Power of the United States” in one Supreme Court and in the inferior courts Congress establishes, and an agency is not a court.26 Yet Congress has delegated adjudicatory power to agencies in a wide variety of contexts since 1789, and agencies stand among the legislative courts and Article I tribunals that date from the early Republic and often employ judges without Article III's tenure and salary protections.27 Two constitutional provisions thus seem to impose strict limits on the practice. The second is the Seventh Amendment, because at least some classes of agency adjudication arguably constitute “suits at common law,” and no agency assigns fact-finding to a jury.28 After Northern Pipeline, the Court resolved that tension by weighing factors.
The first retreat came in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., where a five-Justice majority rejected an Article III challenge to a system of binding arbitration that Congress had authorized.29 The majority noted that the views of the Northern Pipeline plurality had never won a majority, and it criticized them for needlessly casting doubt on many adjudicatory systems run by agencies and other non-Article III tribunals. It then described the public-rights disputes that Congress may assign to such tribunals in a way that suggested Congress can redesignate any class of previously private-rights disputes as public-rights disputes for pragmatic reasons.30
The arbitration scheme shows how far the two methods diverge on the same facts. Under the categorical test it fails, because the arbitrator is neither a territorial court nor a military court and, given the very limited scope of Article III review, cannot be considered an adjunct. Under the balancing test of Schor it may well be constitutional, because the right of compensation Congress created is closely related to a complex federal regulatory scheme, the intrusion on Article III values is limited by the arbitrator's narrow authority, and the need for an efficient and uniform approach was manifest.31
Schor carried the move further, because the claim there was a private right. The Court sustained the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between a commodities broker and his customer, including a counterclaim based on state law, and it emphasized that the private nature of the claims should not stop it from weighing a number of factors.32 A seven-Justice majority upheld the agency's rule while acknowledging that common-law counterclaims are private-rights disputes.33 The majority declined to adopt “formalistic and unbending rules,” because such rules might give the law greater coherence but could “unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.” It weighed instead “a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect” on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.34
Several features weighed for the agency in Schor. The CFTC dealt only with a “particularized area of law,” and its orders were enforceable only by order of a district court.37 The parties had voluntarily chosen to litigate before the agency rather than in court, traditional judicial review was available, and the agency's jurisdiction over private rights was strictly limited to what Congress believed necessary to make the regulatory scheme effective.38 The private character of the claim raised some Article III concerns, but the Court concluded that the overall scheme did not “create a substantial threat to the separation of powers.”39 The emphasis on judicial review echoes Crowell v. Benson, which upheld agency adjudication of a compensation dispute between private parties because courts could review questions of law even though agency factual findings were conclusive.40 The Northern Pipeline plurality, by contrast, had found that the 1978 Act removed most, if not all, of the essential attributes of judicial power from the district court and vested them in a non-Article III adjunct.41
The Schor majority also asserted that Schor had waived his Article III rights, but many scholars question how much that theory matters, partly because the Court had already upheld the arbitration regime in Thomas without any comparable argument.42 The safer way to present the case is to lead with the factors and to treat waiver as an additional argument whose weight is unsettled.
The tension with Northern Pipeline is one of method. The plurality took a formalistic approach, and the Schor majority rejected it for a pragmatic and functional one, under which a court upholds the allocation of a discrete and limited class of disputes to an agency if Congress has good reasons and includes safeguards roughly equivalent to those a party would have in a federal court.43 The functional approach typically results in rejection of separation-of-powers challenges, because delegated quasi-judicial authority is treated as executive in character, checked by the statutes that delegate it and by judicial review.44 Balancing has thus let the Court validate non-Article III jurisdiction over purely private disputes and common-law claims, deviating from both elements of the public rights exception.45 The balancing view that Justice White urged in dissent in Northern Pipeline came much closer to this later method than the plurality's categories did.
Formalism did not disappear. Northern Pipeline kept some force in bankruptcy: Stern held that a bankruptcy judge could not decide a counterclaim, and Granfinanciera held that a creditor had a right to jury trial in a bankruptcy trustee's suit to recover a fraudulent conveyance, and the Court regarded both cases as involving private rights, not public rights.46 The Stern majority stayed with the categorical approach while the dissent preferred a pragmatic one, and Wellness later permitted bankruptcy adjudication on knowing and voluntary consent.47 Outside bankruptcy the Justices remain divided over which approach governs, as the fractured reasoning in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group illustrates.48 Whether a litigant has a right to a jury in such a proceeding is a separate Seventh Amendment question, which Granfinanciera answered for the trustee's fraudulent-conveyance suit and which later cases, including SEC v. Jarkesy, pursue.49
The price of flexibility is predictability. A fixed list tells Congress in advance which tribunals will pass, while a weighing of factors gives an answer only after the factors are assessed, and because the functional approach typically rejects challenges, it protects Article III less than the categories did.50
An exam stem that places a dispute between private parties before an agency or a non-Article III judge invites the reflex answer that Northern Pipeline forbids it. A better answer identifies the tribunal, the origin of the right, the scope of Article III review, and whether the parties consented, runs both the categories and the Schor factors, and says which method the facts favor, since the Court has not chosen between them.