218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016)
OPINION and ORDER
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.
OPINION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Background...843
A. Reapportionment in Wisconsin...844
B. Drafting of Act 43...846
C. Prior Court Challenges to Act 43...853
II. Procedural History...854
A. Allegations of the Complaint...854
B. Motion to Dismiss...855
C. Motion for Summary Judgment...856
D. Witnesses Testifying at Trial...857
E. Post-Trial Briefing...862
III. The Legal Landscape...863
A. The Foundational Case Law...864
B. Present Supreme Court Precedent...867
IV. Elements of the Cause of Action...883
A. Discriminatory Intent or Purpose...884
B. Discriminatory Effect of Act 43...898
V. Justification...910
VI. Standing...927
VII. Order...930
A. Remedy...930
B. Evidentiary Matters...930
Appendices
The plaintiffs have brought this action alleging that Act 43, the redistricting plan enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature in 2011, constitutes an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Specifically, they maintain that the Republican-controlled legislature drafted and enacted a redistricting plan that systematically dilutes the voting strength of Democratic voters statewide. We find that Act 43 was intended to burden the representational rights of Democratic voters throughout the decennial period by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats. Moreover, as demonstrated by the results of the 2012 and 2014 elections, among other evidence, we conclude that Act 43 has had its intended effect. Finally, we find that the discriminatory effect is not explained by the political geography of Wisconsin nor is it justified by a legitimate state interest. Consequently, Act 43 constitutes an unconstitutional political gerrymander. This opinion constitutes our findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1).
BACKGROUND
We begin our consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims by examining Wisconsin’s statutory requirements for redistricting as well as its recent redistricting history.
A. Reapportionment in Wisconsin
Reapportionment of state legislative districts is a responsibility constitutionally vested in the state government. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 122 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1993) (citing U.S. Const. art I., § 2); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S. Ct. 751, 42 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1975). Although some states have chosen to avoid the problem of partisan gerrymandering by vesting this power in a neutral body designed specifically to perform that delicate function, see Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2661-62 & n.6, 192 L. Ed. 2d 704 (2015), the people of Wisconsin have so far chosen to rely on its legislature to reapportion its districts after the decennial census. They have vested responsibility in the bicameral legislature composed of the Wisconsin State Senate and the Wisconsin State Assembly. Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 1, 3. According to Wisconsin law, “[t]he state is divided into 33 senate districts, each composed of 3 assembly districts. Each senate district shall be entitled to elect one member of the senate. Each assembly district shall be entitled to elect one representative to the assembly.” Wis. Stat. § 4.001.
The Wisconsin Constitution directs the Wisconsin legislature, “[a]t its first session after each enumeration made by the authority of the United States,” to “apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of inhabitants.” Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3. The Wisconsin Constitution also imposes specific requirements for reapportionment plans. Assembly districts are “to be bounded by county, precinct, town or ward lines, to consist of contiguous territory and be in as compact form as practicable.” Id. § 4. With respect to political subdivisions, a prior federal district court observed that, “[a]lthough avoiding the division of counties is no longer an inviolable principle, respect for the prerogatives of the Wisconsin Constitution dictate that wards and municipalities be kept whole where possible.” Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Nos. 01-C-0121 & 02-C-0366, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002), amended by 2002 WL 34127473 (E.D. Wis. July 11, 2002). The Wisconsin Constitution further requires that “no assembly district shall be divided in the formation of a senate district.” Wis. Const. art. IV, § 5.
In addition to the state constitutional requirements, the Wisconsin legislature must comply with federal law when redistricting. In particular, state legislatures must ensure that districts are approximately equal in population, so that they do not violate the “one-person, one-vote” principle embedded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”); see also Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 77 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1983) (holding “that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10%” is presumptively constitutional, while a population deviation larger than 10% must be justified by the state); Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306-07, 194 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2016) (same). Further, states also must comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which focuses on preserving the voting power of minority groups. 52 U.S.C. § 10301; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 92 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1986).
Redistricting laws in Wisconsin are enacted, in large measure, in the same manner as other legislation, specifically, by way of bills originating in either house of the legislature, see Wis. Const. art. IV, § 19. Tad Ottman, aide to the Senate Majority Leader, explained in some detail this legislative process:
[Legislators will work either on their own or with drafters or with a small group of people to develop legislation. Usually it’s developed among members of your own party, if not just the individual legislator. They create a proposal with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Bureau. At that point, the bill is often, but not always, circulated among other legislators to see if anybody else would want to sign on ....
The bill is then circulated. At some point it is introduced.... And then once they are introduced, they are assigned to a committee. The committee chairman or chairwoman can choose to hold a public hearing on that piece of legislation. Most of the time a public hearing is held.... And then that legislation is forwarded to the full body, either the Senate or the Assembly, for debate and then it is passed over to the other House where a similar process occurs.
A bill must then “be presented to the governor,” who can sign or veto the bill. Wis. Const. art. V, § 10.
The caucus system plays a significant role in the legislative process. Caucus meetings are held in the morning prior to the legislative session to vet legislation internally before a vote on the floor. Professor William Whitford, a named plaintiff and retired professor of law from the University of Wisconsin, testified that important “debate and discussion,” as well as the “vote[] that matters,” occur within the caucus meetings. “Once the party caucuses come to a majority result, the other members of the party are expected to follow the party line ....” Thus, it is “extremely difficult” to pass legislation through a bipartisan coalition.
In the wake of the 1980 census, the plan that had been enacted in 1972 could no longer satisfy the constitutional requirement of “one-person one-vote.” See Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 631 (E.D. Wis. 1982). In response to these changes in population, a redistricting plan was drafted and enacted by the Wisconsin legislature, which had a Democratic majority, but it was vetoed by the Republican governor. Consequently, a federal district court was asked to devise a remedy. See id. at 632-33. Upon reviewing several plans submitted by legislators and interest groups, the court “reluctantly concluded” that it could “be more faithful to the goals of reapportionment” by drafting its own plan. Id. at 637. In doing so, the court focused on ensuring population equality, avoiding the dilution of racial minority voting strength, and keeping communities of interest together. Id. at 637-39. This “AFL-CIO Plan” remained in effect for one election in 1982. As a result of that election, the Democratic Party held control of both houses of the Wisconsin legislature and also gained the governor’s office. The legislature passed, and the governor signed, a new apportionment plan that lasted for the rest of the decennial period. See 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 633.
Following the 1990 election, the Wisconsin government again was divided between two political parties. See Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 862 (W.D. Wis. 1992). The Democratic Party controlled both houses of the Wisconsin legislature while the governor was a Republican. Id.
“For that or other reasons, no bill to reapportion the legislature had been enacted into law” by January 1992, leading several Republican legislators to challenge the existing apportionment plan “as unconstitutional and violative of the Voting Rights Act.” Id.
As a result, the federal court was asked to draft a new plan.
In an attempt to play a more limited role in the redistricting process, the court “asked the parties at the outset whether they had any objection ... to [the court’s] selecting the best of the submitted plans rather than trying to create [its] own plan.” Id. at 865 (emphasis removed). Upon receiving these submissions, however, the court determined that the plans bore “the marks of their partisan origins.” Id. at 865. It therefore used parts of one Republican plan and one Democratic plan. The court plan preserved the strengths of the partisan plans, “primarily population equality and contiguity and compactness,” while “avoiding their weaknesses.” Id. at 870. The plan remained in effect through the 2000 election.
Following the 2000 census, a divided Wisconsin legislature again was unable to agree upon a redistricting plan. Arrington v. Elections Bd., 173 F. Supp. 2d 856, 862 (E.D. Wis. 2001). In an ensuing law suit, the federal district court determined that “the existing Wisconsin Assembly and Senate districts,” which had not been redrawn since 1992, were “violative of the ‘one person, one vote’ standard.” Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *1. A new plan was therefore necessary. The court considered sixteen plans that had been submitted by legislators and other interest groups, but “found various unredeemable flaws” in all of them. Id. at *6. The court therefore drew a plan “in the most neutral way it could conceive—by taking the 1992 reapportionment plan as a template and adjusting it for population deviations.” Id. at *7. In making these changes, the court attempted to “maintain municipal boundaries and unit[e] communities of interest.” Id.
The “Baumgart Plan” was in effect from 2002 until 2010.
B. Drafting of Act 43
In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, the voters of Wisconsin elected a Republican majority in the Assembly, a Republican majority in the Senate, and a Republican Governor. This uniformity in control led the Republican leadership to conclude that a legislatively enacted redistricting plan was possible.
In January 2011, Scott Fitzgerald, Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader, and Jeff Fitzgerald, Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, retained attorney Eric McLeod and the law firm of Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, to assist with the reapportionment of the state legislative districts. The firm supervised the work of Tad Ottman, staff member to Senate Majority Leader Fitzgerald; Adam Foltz, staff member to Speaker Fitzgerald; and Joseph Handrick, a consultant with the law firm Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c., in planning, drafting, and negotiating the new districting plan. Ottman, Foltz, and later Handrick, worked in a room located in the offices of Michael Best & Friedrich, which they referred to as the “map room.”
Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick also received assistance from Professor Ronald Keith Gaddie, a professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma. Michael Best & Friedrich had retained Professor Gaddie “as an independent advisor on the appropriate racial and/or political make-up of legislative and congressional districts in Wisconsin.” Professor Gaddie described his job as “devis[ing] measures and consult[ing] ... about measures” of partisanship, compactness, “the integrity of counties, the integrity of city boundaries, the so-called good government principles of redistricting.” “Where [he] ... spent most of [his] time was trying to disentangle the performance of the majority/minority districts in Milwaukee County.”
A “significant part” of his work was “building a regression model to be able to test the partisan makeup and performance of districts as they might be configured in different ways.” As explained by one of the plaintiffs’ experts, Professor Kenneth Mayer, “[r]egression is a technique where we can seek to explain a dependent variable, the variable that we’re trying to account for.... [W]e attempt to explain the values that a dependent variable take[s] with what are called independent variables or underlying causal variables.” In this instance, Professor Gaddie’s dependent variable was the baseline partisanship of a unit of geography, which then could be aggregated into different configurations of Assembly districts. In this way, Professor Gaddie was able to assess the partisanship of the Assembly maps that the drafters passed on to him for analysis. Professor Mayer testified that “the political science literature is essentially unanimous” that the approach taken by Professor Gaddie is “the appropriate method,” and Professor Mayer used the same methodology to construct his Demonstration Plan.
Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick began drafting the map that would become Act 43 in April 2011, after they received census data from the Legislative Technology Services Bureau (“LTSB”). The LTSB also had provided them with computers loaded with the redistricting software, autoBound. Ottman described in detail how the software was used:
[Y]ou would open up a plan that you’d been working on or label a new plan and assign it the Assembly district that you wanted to work with and then you could also pick a color that you wanted that Assembly district to be. It’s sort of like a color-by-number exercise. ...
You also determine what other layers that you want to look at on the screen. There were a number of different overlays that you have, anywhere from existing Senate and Assembly districts, ... count[y] boundaries, municipal boundaries, ward boundaries all the way down to census block boundaries. As a practical matter what you tried to do is you would zoom in the region of your screen to the area that you’re looking at to the smallest amount that you could see and then have kind of the fewest layers displayed that you would need because the more information that you were requiring it to display slows down the computer speed a lot and makes it really slow to render.
And then what you would do is there were a couple different ways that you could add population to the district.
Ottman further explained that, in more populated areas, the drafters worked more at the ward level: “So you would have the wards displayed and you would literally draw a circle, click on it, and it would assign it to the map and fill it in.” “In other parts of the state ... you might do that at the county level because it’s so sparsely populated so you’d grab three or four counties at [a] time.”
When the drafters would increase the area size of the districts that they were drawing, autoBound provided demographic information for the area that the drafter had included, such as the number of people in the district, the deviation from the ideal population, voting-age population, and different minority group populations. It also allowed the user to include “customized ... demographic data.”
One piece of “customized demographic data” employed by the drafters was a composite partisan score. From the time that Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick received the census data from the LTSB, they worked to develop a composite partisan score that accurately reflected the political make-up of the population units. Having this measure was necessary so that, when they aggregated those units into new districts, they could assess the partisan make-up of the new district they had drawn. On April 19, 2011, they developed a composite of “all statewide races from [20]04 to 2010” that “seem[ed] to work well.” They sent this composite measure to Professor Gaddie, who tested it against his regression model. Professor Gaddie confirmed to Handrick that “the partisanship proxy you are using (all races) is an almost perfect proxy for the open seat vote, and the best proxy you’ll come up with.” Once Professor Gaddie confirmed the usefulness of their composite measure, Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick could “assess the partisan impact of the map[s] that [they] drew.”
Although Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick worked in the same room at Michael Best & Friedrich, they worked independently on their own maps. They drew several statewide maps, and even more regional maps from which the legislative leadership eventually would choose. As they drew the maps, they would ensure that the districts were “close-to-ideal population.” They did an “eyeball test” for “compactness and contiguousness.” They “looked at ... what the core of the existing district was compared to the new district,” “looked at municipalities that were split,” whether the new district had changed Senate districts, and “where incumbents lived.”
The drafters were attentive to traditional districting criteria like population equality, compactness, and municipal splits throughout the drafting process. When the drafters had created a statewide map with which they were satisfied, they would export the district-by-district partisanship scores from autoBound into a spreadsheet for that “finalized” “statewide” plan.
The drafters used their composite score to evaluate the statewide maps that they had drawn based on the level of partisan advantage that they provided to Republicans. In many instances, the names of the maps reflected the level of partisan advantage achieved by the districting plan; for instance, there are maps labeled “Assertive” and “Aggressive.” Foltz testified that “aggressive” in this context meant “probably that [the map] was a more aggressive map with regard to GOP leaning.”
The drafters created spreadsheets which collected the partisan scores, by district, for each of the statewide map alternatives. Each spreadsheet included a corresponding table comparing the partisan performance of the draft plan to the prior map drawn by the Baumgart court, which they called the “Current Map.” These performance comparisons were made on the following criteria: “Safe” Republican seats, “Lean” Republican seats, “Swing” seats, “Safe” Democratic seats, and “Lean” Democratic seats.
The process of drafting and evaluating these alternative district maps spanned several months. In early April 2011, the drafters produced a document comparing the partisan performance of the Current Map to two early draft maps: Joe’s Basemap Basic and Joe’s Basemap Assertive. Under the Current Map, the drafters anticipated that the Republicans would win 49 Assembly seats. This number increased to 52 under the Joe’s Basemap Basic map and to 56 under the Joe’s Basemap Assertive map. The number of safe and leaning Republican seats increased from 40 under the Current Map to 45 under the Joe’s Basemap Basic map and 49 under the Joe’s Basemap Assertive map; the number of swing seats decreased from 19 to 14 to 12. The number of safe and leaning Democratic seats, however, remained roughly the same under all three maps, hovering between 38 and 40.
The drafters prepared and evaluated the partisan performance of at least another six statewide alternative maps. Each of these maps improved upon the anticipated pro-Republican advantage generated in the initial two draft plans. The total number of safe and leaning Republican seats now ranged between 51 and 54, and the number of swing seats was decreased to between 6 and 11. The number of safe and leaning Democratic seats again remained about the same under each draft map, ranging between 37 and 39.
The drafters sent their completed draft maps to Professor Gaddie for further analysis. For each map, Professor Gaddie created an “S” curve—a “visual aide[ ] to demonstrate the partisan structure of Wisconsin politics.” These “S” curves show how each map would operate within an array of electoral outcomes.
The “S” curves give a visual depiction of how each party’s vote share (on the x axis), ranging from 40% to 60%, relates to the number of Assembly seats that party likely will secure (on the y axis). Democratic seats are depicted by shades of blue, and Republican seats by shades of red. To produce the “S” curves, Professor Gaddie first used his regression analysis to calculate the expected partisan vote shares for each new district. He then shifted the vote share of each district ten points in either direction, from 40% to 60%, and assigned a color to districts that “tend[ed]” towards, or were “safe” seats, for that party. The “S” curves—at least some of which were printed in large format and kept in the map room—allowed a non-statistician, by mere visual inspection, to assess the partisan performance of a particular map under all likely electoral scenarios. On one occasion, Senator Fitzgerald came to the map room, and Professor Gaddie showed him one of the large printouts of the “S” curves and “basically explain[ed] how to interpret” them.
Not long after Professor Gaddie had performed his analyses, the Republican legislative leadership contacted the drafters and indicated that they wanted to be prepared to act on a redistricting plan. Over several days in early June, the drafters presented a selection of regional maps drawn from their statewide drafts, approximately three to four per region, to the Republican leadership. Along with these regional alternatives, the leadership “saw the partisan scores for the maps that [the drafters] presented to them in those alternatives.” Foltz testified during his deposition that, although he could not recall a particular example, he was sure that he was asked by the leadership about the partisan performance of the various regional options.
Following this meeting, the drafters amalgamated the regional alternatives chosen by the leadership. Foltz testified that “the draft map called team map emerged as a result of the ... leadership’s choices at those meetings.” Under the Team Map, which was also referred to as the “Final Map,” the Republicans could expect to win 59 Assembly seats, with 38 safe Republican seats, 14 leaning Republican, 10 swing, 4 leaning Democratic, and 33 safe Democratic seats. In a document bearing the heading “Tale of the Tape,” the drafters, among other things, compared the partisan performance of the Team Map directly to the Current Map on each of these criteria. They highlighted specifically that under the Current Map, 49 seats are “50% or better” for Republicans, but under the Team Map, “59 Assembly seats are 50% or better.”
The Team Map underwent even more intense partisan scrutiny in a document identified as “summary.xlsx.” The drafters divided the new Team Map districts into six categories of partisan performance, listing beside each district its “new incumbent” and its Republican vote share under the Current Map and the Team Map. The drafters considered five districts to be “Statistical Pick Up[s],” meaning they were currently held by a Democratic incumbent but likely to become Republican; they grouped fourteen districts under the heading “GOP seats strengthened a lot”; they designated eleven districts “GOP seats strengthened a little”; they labeled three districts as “GOP seats weakened a little”; they considered another three GOP districts “likely lost”; and, finally, they identified four districts where the Democrats were “weakened.” The drafters also listed the twenty Republican Assembly members who, under the Team Map, could be considered “GOP Donors to the Team”: “Incumbents with numbers above 55% that donate[d] to the team.” These representatives stood in contrast to “GOP non-donors,” who were Republican incumbents with “over 55% who d[id] not donate points.”
The Team Map was then sent to Professor Gaddie, who conducted an “S” curve analysis. The Team Map demonstrated that Republicans would maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario; indeed, they would maintain a 54 seat majority while garnering only 48% of the statewide vote. The Democrats, by contrast, would need 54% of the statewide vote to capture a majority.
Once the map had been finalized, Foltz presented each Republican member of the Assembly with information on his or her new district. The memos prepared for the Assembly members informed them whether the district number had changed, whether adjustment to the district population was necessary based on the census numbers, and provided a “[c]omparison of [k]ey [r]aces” in the new district compared to the old. Specifically, the memorandum detailed what percentage of the population in the old and new districts voted for Republican candidates in representative statewide and national elections held since 2004. This information also was provided in terms of raw votes. The memoranda did not provide the individual legislators with any information about contiguity, compactness, or core population.
Ottman engaged in a similar process with Republican members of the State Senate. For each meeting, he created a talking-points memo that included information about population, where changes in the district’s population had occurred, and the geography of the new district. These also contained information on how the reconfigured district had voted in national and statewide elections.
Ottman also made a presentation to the Republican caucus. His notes for that meeting state: “The maps we pass will determine who’s here 10 years from now,” and “[w]e have an opportunity and an obligation to draw these maps that Republicans haven’t had in decades.”
On July 11, 2011, the redistricting plan was introduced by the Committee on Senate Organization. On July 13, 2011, a public hearing was held, during which Ottman and Foltz presented the plan and fielded questions. The Senate and Assembly passed the bill on July 19, 2011, and July 20, 2011, respectively. The Governor signed the bill, and it was published as Wisconsin Act 43 on August 23, 2011.
C. Prior Court Challenges to Act 43
Even before Act 43 was passed, two actions were brought challenging the plan on constitutional and statutory grounds, including under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Baldus v. Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846-47 (E.D. Wis. 2012). The court consolidated the actions for decision and concluded that the plan did not violate the “one-person, one-vote” principle, nor did it violate the Equal Protection Clause by “disenfranchise[ing]” voters who were moved to a new Senate district and were unable to vote for their state senator for another two years. Id. at 849-51, 852-53. However, the court did find that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief on their claim that Act 43 violated the Voting Rights Act by diluting the voting power of Latino voters in Milwaukee County, and it ordered the State to redraw these districts. Id. at 859. The remainder of Act 43, however, remained intact and governed the 2012 and 2014 Assembly elections.
In 2012, the Republican Party received 48.6% of the two-party statewide vote share for Assembly candidates and won 60 of the 99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly. In 2014, the Republican Party received 52% of the two-party statewide vote share and won 63 assembly seats.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Allegations of the Complaint
We now turn to the dispute before this court. Plaintiffs William Whitford, Roger Anclam, Emily Bunting, Mary Lynne Donohue, Helen Harris, Wayne Jensen, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet Mitchell, James Seaton, Allison Seaton, Jerome Wallace, and Don Winter are United States citizens registered to vote in Wisconsin. They reside in various counties and legislative districts throughout Wisconsin. All of them are “supporters of the Democratic party and of Democratic candidates and they almost always vote for Democratic candidates in Wisconsin elections.” Defendants are Beverly R. Gill, Julie M. Glancey, Ann S. Jacobs, Steve King, Don Millis, and Mark L. Thomsen, each in his or her official capacity as a member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission.
According to the plaintiffs, in drafting Act 43, the Republicans employed two gerrymandering techniques: “cracking”—“dividing a party’s supporters among multiple districts so that they fall short of a majority in each one”—and “packing”—“concentrating one party’s backers in a few districts that they win by overwhelming margins,” in order to dilute the votes of Democrats statewide. This “cracking and packing result[s] in ‘wasted’ votes: votes cast either for a losing candidate (in the case of cracking) or for a winning candidate but in excess of what he or she needs to prevail (in the case of packing).” They therefore urge the court to adopt a new measure for assessing the discriminatory effect of political gerrymanders—the efficiency gap (or “EG”). “The efficiency gap is the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the total number of votes cast.” When two parties waste votes at an identical rate, a plan’s EG is equal to zero. An EG in favor of one party, however, means that the party wasted votes at a lower rate than the opposing party. It is in this sense that the EG arguably is a measure of efficiency: Because the party with a favorable EG wasted fewer votes than its opponent, it was able to translate, with greater ease, its share of the total votes cast in the election into legislative seats. In short, the complaint alleges that Act 43 purposely distributed the predicted Republican vote share with greater efficiency so that it translated into a greater number of seats, while purposely distributing the Democratic vote share with less efficiency so that it would translate into fewer seats.
The plaintiffs’ complaint incorporated the EG into a proposed three-part test for partisan gerrymandering. First, plaintiffs would have to establish that a State had an intent to gerrymander for partisan advantage. Second, the plaintiffs would need to prove a partisan effect, by proving that the EG for a plan exceeds a certain numerical threshold (which the plaintiffs proposed, based on historical analysis, to be 7%). If a plan exceeds that threshold, the plaintiffs asserted that it should be presumptively unconstitutional. Third, and finally, the plaintiffs placed the burden on the defendants to rebut the presumption by showing that the plan “is the necessary result of a legitimate state policy, or inevitable given the state’s underlying political geography.” If the state is unable to rebut the presumption, then the plan is unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs alleged that they had satisfied all of these elements. According to the complaint, Act 43 “was drafted and enacted with the specific intent to maximize the electoral advantage of Republicans and harm Democrats to the greatest possible extent.” Additionally, Act 43 “produced a pro-Republican efficiency gap of 13% in 2012 and 10% in 2014.” They further claimed that this EG is unjustified because one of their experts, Professor Mayer, had crafted a “Demonstration Plan” with “an efficiency gap of just 2% in 2012,” which “perform[ed] at least as well as [Act 43] on every other relevant metric.”
For these reasons, plaintiffs claimed that Act 43 “treats voters unequally, diluting their voting power based on their political beliefs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection,” and “unreasonably burdens their First Amendment rights of association and free speech.” They requested a declaration that Act 43 is unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting further elections under the map, and the drawing of a new redistricting map.
B. Motion to Dismiss
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 18, 2015, which contended that the court could not grant relief for three primary reasons. First, the defendants argued that the EG was directly analogous to the proportional-representation standard rejected by the Supreme Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287-88, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2004). Second, the defendants argued that the EG failed to account for the impact of traditional districting criteria like, contiguity and compactness. Finally, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked the standing to challenge Act 43 on a statewide basis; and instead could only challenge their individual districts.
In an order dated December 17, 2015, we denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. We first noted that the claim was justiciable, and that, “[u]ntil a majority of the Supreme Court rules otherwise, lower courts must continue to search for a judicially manageable standard.” We acknowledged the defendants’ argument that the EG was analogous to a proportionality standard, but noted that the plaintiffs’ experts disagreed with the defendants’ contention and that factfinding therefore was needed. We concluded that “[a] determination whether plaintiffs’ proposed standard is judicially manageable relies at least in part on the validity of plaintiffs’ expert opinions” and that a more developed record would be necessary to resolve that question. Finally, we concluded that the plaintiffs had standing, explaining that “[b]ecause plaintiffs’ alleged injury in this case relates to their statewide representation, it follows that they should be permitted to bring a statewide claim.” We noted, however, that the defendants were “free to raise this issue again on a more developed record.”
C. Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, raising new challenges to the plaintiffs’ claims. In the motion, the defendants argued that the EG metric was overinclusive and captured several plans—including court-drawn plans in Wisconsin—that were not drawn with any partisan intent. Furthermore Democratic voters tended to live in cities, which created a “natural packing” effect and distorted the EG.
The defendants acknowledged the plaintiffs’ argument that a requirement of partisan intent could remedy this overinclusivity problem, but noted that the intent element was not sufficiently demanding. The defendants contended that “[a]s long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.” The intent element proposed by the plaintiffs was, therefore, “meaningless,” and the Supreme Court’s decision in Vieth already had ruled out the more demanding standard of “predominant intent.” See 541 U.S. at 284-86, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion); id. at 308, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The defendants levied two additional criticisms of the plaintiffs’ test. First, they noted that the plaintiffs’ “Demonstration Plan” was based on a counterfactual scenario and therefore failed to address concerns raised by some Justices about a standard which dealt with a “hypothetical state of affairs.” Second, they alleged that the EG is highly sensitive to “vote-switchers” in swing districts. Had voters in close (or competitive) elections voted for the other party, and had a few candidates of the other party won those seats, then the EG might be dramatically different. In their view, a plan that included such competitive districts could be found unconstitutional under the plaintiffs’ proposed standard.
We denied the motion for summary judgment. We explained that judgment “as a matter of law would be premature because there [we]re factual disputes regarding the validity of plaintiffs’ proposed measurement.” We also noted that there was conflicting evidence on the “natural packing” of Democrats in Wisconsin. We further observed that the defendants’ arguments might serve as “a suggestion to alter the threshold of the plaintiffs’ test and, perhaps, shift the burdens of production or proof.” In particular, we left open the question of the requisite level of intent and directed the plaintiffs to “be prepared to present the strongest evidence that they have on this issue ... in order to meet even the most demanding intent requirement.” We therefore set the case for trial.
D. Witnesses Testifying at Trial
During the four-day trial, from May 24, 2016, through May 28, 2016, the parties presented their cases through eight witnesses. Some of the testimony of the witnesses involved in the passage of Act 43 has been set forth above, so it is not necessary to summarize it again here. An overview of the remaining testimony is set forth below.
First to testify was William Whitford, one of the plaintiffs in this litigation and a resident of the 76th Assembly District. Professor Whitford testified to his longtime affiliation with the Democratic Party. He related that he consistently has voted for Democratic candidates, has made donations to Democratic Assembly candidates outside of his own district, has raised money on their behalf, and has donated to the Assembly Democratic Campaign Committee. According to Professor Whitford, given Wisconsin’s caucus system, “[t]he only practical way to accomplish [his] policy objectives is to get a majority of the Democrats in the Assembly and the Senate,” which is “virtually impossible under this apportionment [plan].”
Professor Gaddie was deposed by the plaintiffs on March 9, 2016, and a video of that deposition was admitted into evidence and played at trial. As explained in some detail above, Professor Gaddie testified that he was retained by Michael Best & Friedrich on April 11, 2011, to “serv[e] as an independent advisor on the appropriate racial and/or political make-up of legislative and congressional districts in Wisconsin.” In particular, Professor Gaddie took “the electoral data ... and constructed a regression analysis ... in order to create an estimate of the vote performance of every district.” He explained that this analysis “could be used to create a set of visual aids to demonstrate the partisan structure of Wisconsin politics.”
As noted above, Professor Gaddie’s regression analysis was employed to confirm the validity of the composite measure developed by Foltz, Ottman, and Handrick. Professor Gaddie also used his regression analysis to assess each of the drafters’ proposed maps and to create “S” curves to illustrate how the Republican seat share would change based on changes in the party’s statewide vote share. In Professor Gaddie’s words, the “S” curves were “designed to tease out a potential estimated vote for the legislator in the district and then allow you to also look at that and say, okay, what if the Democrats have a good year? What if the Republicans have a good year? How does it shift?” At least some of the “S” curves were printed and kept in the map room at Michael Best & Friedrich; in print form, the “S” curves were large enough to “cover half th[e] table.”
Foltz worked as a legislative aide for Speaker Fitzgerald and served as one of the primary drafters of Act 43. One additional aspect of Foltz’s testimony at trial, however, is worthy of note. His testimony revealed a shortcoming in the drafters’ composite partisan measure. Specifically, the composite score likely was skewed to show a greater Republican advantage because of an error in the data for the 2006 Governor’s race (one of the components of the composite score). As a result of this error, the partisan estimates in the drafters’ spreadsheets were distorted and differed from the estimates reached by Professor Gaddie in his “S” curves. Foltz testified that he had not noticed this discrepancy at the time of drafting. He explained that, at the time, he “didn’t spend a whole lot of time with” Professor Gaddie so he “[did]n’t really understand the nuts and bolts” of the “S” curves.
Ottman testified to his involvement in the drafting and passage of Act 43.
Kenneth Mayer, a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs. His ultimate goal was to design an alternative districting plan to Act 43 “that had an efficiency gap as low to zero as I could get it” while also complying with traditional districting criteria to the same extent as Act 43. He first created a regression model that estimated partisanship for each geographic area, so that he could compare his plan to Act 43. To ensure the model was accurate, Professor Mayer compared the predictions made by his regression model to the actual results in 2012. Once he was confident in his model, Professor Mayer “used a GIS redistricting program called Maptitude ... to ... complete the task of actually drawing the Assembly district map.”
Professor Mayer’s alternative “Demonstration Plan” yields a 2.2% EG in favor of the Republicans, compared to an 11.69% EG yielded by Act 43. According to Professor Mayer, “[o]n all constitutional requirements, the Demonstration Plan is comparable to Act 43.” On cross-examination, however, the defendants pointed out that Professor Mayer did not take account of incumbents when drawing the plan. As a result, his plan paired a greater number of incumbents than Act 43, including one pairing in a majority-minority district. Further, Professor Mayer had not drawn any Senate districts, and therefore had not taken account of disenfranchisement.
In addition to discussing the Demonstration Plan, Professor Mayer responded to points made by the defendants’ experts in their reports. Specifically, Professor Mayer testified that he had conducted a sensitivity analysis to address concerns about the effect of “wave” elections—elections that dramatically favor one party—on the EG calculations for both the Demonstration Plan and Act 43. He first looked over the last twenty years of elections in Wisconsin and found the greatest and smallest statewide vote shares for each party. Using these vote shares as the likely electoral spectrum, he performed a swing analysis where the Democrats received an additional 3% of the statewide vote (compared to their 2012 share) and the Republicans received an additional 5% of the statewide vote (again compared to their 2012 share) “to see what effect that would have on [his] efficiency gap calculations for the Demonstration Plan.” Professor Mayer’s analysis revealed that the Demonstration Plan’s EG remained below 4%, regardless of the swing. Act 43’s EG, however, increased during a Democratic swing but significantly decreased during a Republican swing. Professor Mayer noted that this is because “we’ve swung the Republican vote percentage up to 54 percent” but “[t]he number of [Republican] seats doesn’t change.” In Professor Mayer’s view, the result “is a confirmation that the bias in Act 43 is about the maximum that you can get.”
Simon Jackman, a professor of political science and statistics at Stanford University, also served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs. Professor Jackman primarily testified about the reliability and practicability of the EG. He conducted a survey of 786 state legislative elections (under 206 different districting plans) in the United States between 1972 and the present day, in order to ascertain whether there was a baseline EG which should “trigger scrutiny” and also to compare Act 43 to other redistricting plans.
Professor Jackman sought to determine how much the EG varied from election year to election year, and whether a districting plan had any impact on that EG. Professor Jackman presented a “scatterplot,” which graphed the relationship between the EG in the first election year of a redistricting plan (set forth on the x axis) and the average EG over the lifetime of the plan (set forth on the y axis). He found a “relatively strong predictive relationship,” meaning that a high EG in the first year of a redistricting plan likely means that the EG will remain high for the lifetime of the plan.
Based on his research, Professor Jackman proposed that an EG of 7% or higher should be legally significant:
I arrived at 7 percent because that seemed to be a reasonable threshold for saying yes, if the first election under a plan produces an efficiency gap score at least that big, then you can be confident now that you’ve seen not just a one-off, but something that’s going to persist over the life of the plan as a signal of—a reliable signal as to the set of efficiency gap scores and the average efficiency gap score you might see if the plan were allowed to run.
In other words, an EG of 7% in favor of one party in the first election year of a plan almost certainly means that the EG will favor that same party in each subsequent election year under that plan.
Professor Jackman noted that the EGs for the 2012 and 2014 races in Wisconsin—13% and 10%, respectively—were particularly high by historical levels. The EG in 2012 was, according to Professor Jackman, “among the largest scores we’ve seen anywhere” and “in the top 3 percent in terms of magnitude.” Act 43’s average EG ranked fifth out of the 206 plans that Professor Jackman surveyed. He testified that he was “virtually certain” that “Act 43 will exhibit a large and durable advantage in favor of Republicans over the rest of the decade.”
Sean Trende, Senior Elections Analyst for the website RealClearPolitics, served as an expert witness for the defendants. Mr. Trende primarily testified on the political geography of Wisconsin and its potential effect on the EG.
Mr. Trende explained that, as a general matter, political geography of the United States currently favors Republicans. In his view, the Democratic coalition has contracted geographically and is now concentrated heavily in urban areas. This concentration, in turn, has hurt the Democratic Party in congressional elections, which tend to favor parties with wider geographic reach.
Mr. Trende also testified to the political geography of Wisconsin itself, which he analyzed using a measure called the “partisan index” (“PI”). The purpose of the PI is “to determine the partisan lean of political units,” in order to “compare results across elections.” Mr. Trende explained that the county and ward PI values within Wisconsin have shifted such that the Democratic Party’s influence was strengthening in areas “that already leaned Democratic,” but was contracting geographically.
Mr. Trende then applied his PI analysis to Wisconsin’s wards in what he referred to as a “nearest neighbor” analysis, which assessed the median distance between heavily Democratic wards compared to the median distance between heavily Republican wards. From this analysis, Mr. Trende concluded that it has “become[] progressively harder to draw ... Democratic districts elsewhere in the state,” which in his view explained at least some of the EG. However, he did not determine exactly how much of the EG was attributable to geography.
Nicholas Goedert, a visiting professor of political science at Lafayette College, was retained by the defendants to offer opinions on using the EG to measure partisan gerrymandering.
Professor Goedert’s main objection to the EG was its perceived volatility. In Professor Goedert’s view, “wave elections are the norm,” meaning that “much more often than not one party wins by 5 percent or more” of the vote. Therefore, relying on an EG from one election year, which might have taken place during a close election, might not be reliable. Professor Goedert opined that, “at a very minimum, ... you need to have some sort of robust sensitivity testing that would be codified if you were going to use the efficiency gap in any way.”
Professor Goedert also raised a series of policy concerns. First, he pointed out that the EG measure arguably rests on a “2-to-1” vote-to-seats ratio and therefore a certain standard of proportionality. He also noted that there are “normatively good reasons why a state might cho[ose] to draw a map in a certain way and even under these normatively good reasons we could and actually do observe very high efficien[cy] gaps.” For example, Professor Goedert noted that some states may wish to create a more proportional system or encourage competitive elections. In his view, states might be discouraged from pursuing these policy goals if the court adopted the EG as the standard for partisan gerrymandering.
E. Post-Trial Briefing
Both parties filed post-trial briefs, which summarized their views of the case in light of the evidence presented at trial. The plaintiffs contended that they satisfied their proposed three-part test by proving discriminatory intent, discriminatory effect, and an absence of a justification for that effect. On intent, the plaintiffs focused in particular on the alternative maps that the drafters rejected, the “S” curves drawn by Professor Gaddie, and memos written by Foltz and Ottman. On effect, the plaintiffs stressed that the EG was not only likely to favor Republicans for the lifetime of the plan, but that it also was likely to stay relatively high. The plaintiffs also highlighted the sensitivity testing that had been conducted by Professors Jackman and Mayer. On justification, the plaintiffs pointed out that the previous Assembly maps in Wisconsin, the alternative plans drafted by the defendants, and Professor Mayer’s Demonstration Plan all exhibited lower EGs while arguably complying as well with traditional districting criteria.
In response, the defendants contended that “a plan that complies with all neutral districting criteria, and whose efficiency gap is consistent with prior court-drawn plans” cannot be unconstitutional. The defendants noted that Act 43’s districts were congruent, compact, and fairly equal in population. Further, much of the secrecy surrounding Act 43’s enactment was consistent with how bills typically are enacted in Wisconsin. The defendants also pointed to evidence that the political geography in Wisconsin favors Republicans, which they contend explains the trend in EGs towards that party over the past two decades. In the defendants’ view, this evidence also illustrates the unreliability of the EG. The defendants concluded that the plaintiffs had not presented enough of a reason for a court to intervene in the redistricting process.
We express our appreciation to both parties for their thorough and informative presentation, and now turn to the legal principles that must guide our analysis of the case.
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The plaintiffs’ claim is that Act 43 violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it discriminates against Democratic voters by diminishing the strength of their votes in comparison to their Republican counterparts.
We note, as a prefatory matter, that we have acknowledged, throughout this litigation, that the plaintiffs’ standing to maintain a cause of action is a threshold issue. See, e.g., Tierney v. Advocate Health and Hosps. Corp., 797 F.3d 449, 450 (7th Cir. 2015). Indeed, in our disposition of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, we addressed extensively standing and “conclude[d] that plaintiffs’ alleged injury [wa]s sufficiently concrete and particularized under current law to satisfy Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992),] with respect to a statewide challenge to the districting plan.” “We reach[ed] the same conclusion with respect to [Lujan’s] second and third elements of standing, which are causation and redressability.” We noted, though, that the “defendants [we]re free to raise this issue again on a more developed record.”
Lujan explains that, because the elements of standing “are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130. Our assessment of the evidence, as well as our elucidation of the political gerrymandering cause of action, therefore will inform our standing analysis. Consequently, we postpone a plenary discussion of standing until we fully have set forth the evidence as well as the constitutional standard. As a precursor, however, we conclude that the plaintiffs have established a concrete and particularized injury: “[a]s a result of the statewide partisan gerrymandering, Democrats do not have the same opportunity provided to Republicans to elect representatives of their choice to the Assembly. As a result, the electoral influence of plaintiffs and other Democratic voters statewide has been unfairly [and] disproportionately ... reduced” for the life of Act 43. Additionally, the plaintiffs have shown causation: Act 43 was designed with the purpose of solidifying Republican control of the legislature for the decennial period and, indeed, has had that effect. Finally, the plaintiffs have established that their injury is redressable: adopting a different statewide districting map would redress the constitutional violation by removing the state-imposed impediment on Democratic voters.
In resolving the plaintiffs’ claim, we face a significant analytical problem. Although the Supreme Court’s political gerrymandering cases establish that “an excessive injection of politics is unlawful,” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion) (emphasis removed), the Court has not come to rest on a single, judicially manageable or discernible test for determining when the line between “acceptable” and “excessive” has been crossed. Indeed, a signature feature of these cases is that no single opinion has garnered a majority of the Court.
But the absence of a well-trodden path does not relieve us of the obligation to render a decision. True, we cannot anticipate that the Court will alter course from the decisional law, however sparse, that currently exists. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S. Ct. 275, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1997) (noting that lower courts should apply outstanding precedent until explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court). Nor can we cobble together the opinions of the various Justices who have written on the matter and call the resulting amalgam binding precedent. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 104 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1989) (noting that lower courts should follow precedent despite expressed dissatisfaction by various members of the Court until the precedent is overruled explicitly). Nevertheless, understanding that we are in an area where the navigational signs are not yet well-placed, we must decide the case before us and satisfy our “duty ... to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), or at least what we believe it to be.
We begin by examining the cases that set forth the constitutional principles which later informed the Court’s political gerrymandering decisions.
A. The Foundational Case Law
Over half a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that the constitutionality of legislative apportionments is governed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964). Reynolds was not a political gerrymandering case, but addressed allegations that an outdated apportionment scheme resulted in “serious discrimination with respect to the allocation of legislative representation” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 540, 84 S. Ct. 1362. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court spoke to the importance and nature of the right to vote in terms that also inform our consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims.
The Court first observed that the right to vote “is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Id. at 561-62, 84 S. Ct. 1362. The Court explained that “[m]ost citizens” exercise their “inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political process” by voting for their elected representatives. Id. at 565, 84 S. Ct. 1362. “Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.” Id.
Moreover,
the concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where they live.
The Court explained, however, that the requirement of equal treatment was not limited to where a voter resided. Instead, “[a]ny suggested criteria for the differentiation of citizens are insufficient to justify any discrimination, as to the weight of their votes, unless relevant to the permissible purposes of legislative apportionment.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court therefore concluded that,
[s]ince the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, ... the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race or economic status.
Id. at 565-66, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (citations omitted).
Reynolds therefore establishes that, in electing state representatives, the votes of citizens must be weighted equally. If an apportionment scheme violates the principle of one-person, one-vote, it must be justified on the basis of other, permissible, legislative considerations.
The Court soon had the opportunity to apply the principles set forth in Reynolds to allegations of vote-dilution brought by racial minorities. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 85 S. Ct. 498, 13 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1965), the Court considered the constitutionality of an apportionment scheme which included traditional single-member districts and multimember districts, where citizens reside in a comparatively larger district and vote for multiple representatives. Voters alleged that these multimember districts were “defective because county-wide voting in multi-district counties could, as a matter of mathematics, result in the nullification of the unanimous choice of the voters of a district.” Id. at 437, 85 S. Ct. 498. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.
The Supreme Court disagreed that such districts were unconstitutional per se, and it declined to strike the plan. The Court acknowledged, however, that “[i]t might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Id. at 439, 85 S. Ct. 498 (emphasis added). The Court, therefore, remanded for factfinding to determine whether the plaintiffs could meet this burden.
Following Fortson, the Court has held that multimember districts violate the Constitution when the plaintiffs have produced evidence that an election was “not equally open to participation by the group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766, 93 S. Ct. 2332, 37 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1973).
Later cases refined the methodology by which courts evaluate claims of vote dilution. In Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1982), Burke County, Georgia, employed an at-large system of elections to determine its Board of Commissioners, rather than dividing the county into districts and allowing each district to choose a commissioner. Id. at 615, 102 S. Ct. 3272. African-American citizens in that county brought an action in which they alleged that the county’s system of at-large elections violated their First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment rights by diluting their voting power. The district court held that, although the at-large electoral system was neutral in origin, it was being maintained for invidious purposes and therefore ordered the county to be divided into districts for purposes of electing commissioners.
The Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that districts violate the Equal Protection Clause when “ ‘conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination’ by minimizing, cancelling out or diluting the voting strength of” minority populations. Id. at 617, 102 S. Ct. 3272. These cases “are thus subject to the standard of proof generally applicable to Equal Protection Clause cases,” specifically the “ ‘[a] determination that a law is discriminatory requires a showing of discriminatory purpose.’ ” Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976)). Discriminatory intent, however, “need not be proved by direct evidence,” but may be “ ‘inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.’ ” Id. at 618, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 242, 96 S. Ct. 2040).
Applying this standard, the Court “decline[d] to overturn the essential finding of the District Court ... that the at-large system ... ha[d] been maintained for the purpose of denying blacks equal access to the political processes in the county,” Id. at 627, 102 S. Ct. 3272. Evidence of discriminatory purpose included the fact that no African American ever had been elected despite “overwhelming evidence of bloc voting along racial lines.” Id. at 623-24, 102 S. Ct. 3272. There also was evidence of historical discrimination in the form of literacy tests, poll taxes, and school segregation, id. at 624-25, 102 S. Ct. 3272; of a disparity in socio-economic status that “result[ed] in part from the lingering effects of past discrimination,” id. at 626, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (internal quotation marks omitted); and of county elected officials’ unresponsiveness and insensitivity to African-American constituents, see id. at 625-26, 102 S. Ct. 3272.
Although focused on racially discriminatory apportionment schemes, Fortson and subsequent vote-dilution cases establish that Equal Protection concerns arise when apportionment plans “minimize or cancel out the voting strength” either of racial minorities or, as we have here, “political elements of the voting population.” 379 U.S. at 439, 85 S. Ct. 498 (emphasis added). Moreover, they instruct that vote-dilution cases are governed by the same standards as other equal-protection claims, namely the plaintiffs must establish both a discriminatory intent and a discriminatory effect.
B. Present Supreme Court Precedent
The Court drew heavily from the Fortson line of cases in resolving the political gerrymandering claim asserted in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 37 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1973). In Gaffney, the Connecticut Apportionment Board created a redistricting plan designed to yield Democratic and Republican seats in proportion to the statewide vote. A three-judge district court invalidated the plan on the ground that the deviations from equality of population in both houses were not “justified by any sufficient state interest,” “[m]ore particularly, ... that the policy of partisan political structuring ... cannot be approved as a legitimate reason for violating the requirement of numerical equality of population in districting.” Id. at 740, 93 S. Ct. 2321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court reversed. In its analysis, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[s]tate legislative districts may be equal or substantially equal in population and still be vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment”; it stated:
A districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously discriminatory because they are employed “to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” We must, therefore, respond to appellees’ claims in this case that even if acceptable populationwise, the Apportionment Board’s plan was invidiously discriminatory because a “political fairness principle” was followed in making up the districts in both the House and Senate.
Id. at 751-52, 93 S. Ct. 2321 (citations omitted).
The Court, however, was “unconvinced” that the plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 752, 93 S. Ct. 2321. The Court observed that Connecticut’s Apportionment Board had sought to “achieve a rough approximation of the statewide political strengths of the Democratic and Republican parties,” by implementing a “political fairness” plan. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court saw no constitutional impediment to the State’s considering partisan interests in this way. Id. at 752-53, 93 S. Ct. 2321.
The Court made clear, however, that the drawing of legislative districts along political lines “is not wholly exempt from judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 754, 93 S. Ct. 2321. Relying on its vote-dilution cases, it gave as an example “multimember districts [that] may be vulnerable” to constitutional challenges “if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized.” Id. “Beyond this,” the Court continued, it had “not ventured far or attempted the impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political processes of the sovereign States.” Id.
In closing, however, the Court was careful to distinguish the plan before it, which employed political classifications for benign—even salutary—purposes, with plans that did not have proportional representation as their aim:
[N]either we nor the district courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State.
Id. (emphasis added).
In sum, the Court reiterated that its concern was invidious discrimination by the State; absent the plaintiffs’ establishing an intent to dilute the strength of a particular group or party, the Equal Protection Clause was not offended.
The Court next addressed partisan gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 92 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1986). Because Bandemer was the first case in which a party directly raised, and the Court squarely addressed, a claim that a legislative redistricting plan invidiously discriminated against members of a political party, we treat it in some depth.
In Bandemer, Indiana Democrats challenged the 1981 state reapportionment plan passed by a Republican-controlled legislature. Specifically, they alleged that the plan was intended to disadvantage Democrats in electing representatives of their choosing, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. In November 1982, before the case went to trial, elections were held under the new plan. The district court had “sustained an equal protection challenge to Indiana’s 1981 state apportionment on the basis that the law unconstitutionally diluted the votes of Indiana Democrats,” id. at 113, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion), but the Supreme Court reversed. A majority of the Court first concluded that the issue before the Court, like those in the one-person, one-vote cases and in the vote-dilution cases, “is one of representation” and “decline[d] to hold that such claims [we]re never justiciable.” Id. at 124, 106 S. Ct. 2797. “As Gaffney demonstrates,” the Court continued, the fact that a “claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability.” Id. at 125, 106 S. Ct. 2797. That the complaining group does not share an “immutable” characteristic or otherwise “has not been subject to the same historical stigma may be relevant to the manner in which the case is adjudicated, but these differences do not justify a refusal to entertain such a case.” Id.
Turning to the standard to be applied, a majority of the Court agreed that the “plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.” Id. at 127, 106 S. Ct. 2797. A majority of the Court also believed that the first requirement—intentional discrimination against an identifiable group—had been met. See id. (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 64 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1980)). Indeed, it observed that, “[a]s long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.” Id. at 129, 106 S. Ct. 2797.
The plurality, however, rejected “the District Court’s legal and factual bases for concluding that the 1981 Act visited a sufficiently adverse effect on the appellees’ constitutionally protected rights to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 129, 106 S. Ct. 2797. It was not the case that “any apportionment scheme that purposely prevents proportional representation is unconstitutional.” Id. at 129-30, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (emphasis added). Indeed, the plurality noted that precedent “clearly foreclose[d] any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.” Id. at 130, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (first citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153, 91 S. Ct. 1858, 29 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1971); then citing White, 412 U.S. at 765-68, 93 S. Ct. 2332).
Moreover, the plurality held “that a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its choice” also did “not render that scheme constitutionally infirm.” Id. at 131, 106 S. Ct. 2797. In reaching this conclusion, it noted that the Court had refused to approve the use of multimember districts “[o]nly where there [wa]s evidence that excluded groups ha[d] ‘less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.’ ” Id. (quoting Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624, 102 S. Ct. 3272). It emphasized that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole”:
[A]n equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively. In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.
Id. at 132-33, 106 S. Ct. 2797.
Applying this standard to the facts before them, the plurality concluded that “this threshold condition” had not been met. Id. at 134, 106 S. Ct. 2797. It observed that the district court had relied “primarily on the results of the 1982 elections” in which Democratic candidates had garnered “51.9% of the votes cast statewide,” but secured only 43 seats. Id. Republicans, however, had received only “48.1% ... yet, of the 100 seats to be filled, Republican candidates won 57.” Id.
“Relying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination,” however, was “unsatisfactory.” Id. at 135, 106 S. Ct. 2797. The plurality specifically noted a lack of evidence that (1) the 1981 Act prevented the Democrats from “securing sufficient vote[s] to take control of the assembly”; (2) “the 1981 reapportionment would consign the Democrats to a minority status in the Assembly throughout the 1980’s”; or (3) “the Democrats would have no hope of doing any better in the reapportionment that would occur after the 1990 census.” Id. at 135-36, 106 S. Ct. 2797. “Without findings of this nature,” the plurality stated, “the District Court erred in concluding that the 1981 Act violated the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 136, 106 S. Ct. 2797.
Through a secretive and one-sided process, the state Republican leaders who controlled the legislature used the latest computer software and political consultants to draw up legislative district maps with the unashamedly partisan goal of winning as many seats as possible. The maps they drew gave short shrift to traditional districting principles, often producing districts with unusual and suspicious shapes. The governor, also a Republican, quickly signed the act. The Republicans’ efforts were rewarded when, in the very next election, they won more than twenty percent more seats in the legislature than their statewide vote totals would have suggested.
The state in question is Indiana, not Wisconsin. The procedure used to draw the map in Indiana is identical to what led up to the enactment of Wisconsin’s Act 43: in short, it was crafted in secret by Republicans who, at least in Indiana, conceded that naked political gain was their overwhelming purpose. It also allowed the Republicans to win far more seats than their statewide vote totals would warrant—in the Plaintiffs’ parlance, a historically-high efficiency gap of eleven percent. Thirty years ago, however, the Supreme Court upheld the districts drawn by Indiana Republicans, with a plurality of the Court concluding that the Democrats had not shown they were sufficiently injured. Despite these similarities, and despite the Court’s clear reluctance to intervene in what are essentially political cases, the Plaintiffs ask this court to find that Wisconsin’s Act 43 is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
In fact, Wisconsin’s Act 43 differs from Indiana’s upheld plan in one key fashion: unlike Indiana’s plan, Act 43 pays heed to all of the principles that have traditionally governed the districting process, such as contiguity, compactness and respect for political subdivisions like counties and cities. And unlike Indiana’s plan, there is no allegation that the Republicans drew any of the many kinds of unusually-shaped districts that are traditionally seen in gerrymandering cases. (The term “gerrymander” arises from a district shaped like a salamander that was drawn during the term of Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry.) Thus, although Wisconsin’s plan, like Indiana’s, was politically motivated, but unlike Indiana’s, complies with traditional redistricting principles, and though it has the same partisan impact as the plan upheld in Bandemer, the Plaintiffs nevertheless ask the court to intervene, claiming to have discovered the long sought-after “judicially discernable and manageable standard[]” for deciding such cases that a majority of the Court has thought might exist. 478 U.S. at 123, 106 S.Ct. 2797; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278-79, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (plurality opinion).
The Plaintiffs have made that standard—the efficiency gap—the center piece of their case and asked this court to adopt it as a matter of constitutional law. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ ¶ 5, 44-53.) Despite the central role the efficiency gap has played in the case from the beginning, however, the majority has declined the Plaintiffs’ invitation to adopt their standard and uses it only as confirming evidence of a constitutional violation it has found based on its own newly created test: whether the State’s redistricting plan had the intent and effect of entrenching the Republican party in power over the life of the plan. For the following reasons, I part ways with my colleagues.
First, I am unable to accept proof of intent to act for political purposes as a significant part of any test for whether a task constitutionally entrusted to the political branches of government is unconstitutional. If political motivation is improper, then the task of redistricting should be constitutionally assigned to some other body, a change in law we lack any authority to effect. Second, to the extent the majority’s “intent to entrench themselves in power” standard is intended to mean what those Justices who have used that language in previous cases intended, I am not convinced that the plaintiffs have met this standard. Third, of the small majority of Justices who would even entertain political gerrymandering cases, several of them would require plaintiffs to establish that the challenged plan failed to follow traditional principles of redistricting. Because the Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that Act 43 violates traditional redistricting principles, I would enter judgment in favor of the Defendants on that basis alone. Fourth, it is very likely that the Republicans would have won control of the legislature in 2012 and 2014 even without the alleged gerrymandering, and so this case presents a poor vehicle for the remedying of any grave injustice.
In addition, the efficiency gap concept that the Plaintiffs have offered as the “judicially discernable and manageable standard[] by which political gerrymander cases are to be decided,” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123, 106 S.Ct. 2797, appears to have substantial theoretical and practical limitations that render it unsuitable for the task at hand. First, the efficiency gap—or any measure that simply compares statewide votes to seats—is little more than an enshrinement of a phantom constitutional right, namely, the idea that voters for one party are entitled to some given level of representation proportional to how many votes that party’s candidates win in every assembly district throughout the state as a whole. Second, the efficiency gap simply measures each party’s ability to win more assembly seats, but winning more assembly seats does not usually translate into any significant additional power, and thus does not cause material political injury—unless of course it is the seat that turns over control of the legislature to the gerrymandering party. Third, the efficiency gap essentially begs the ultimate question of whether a partisan gerrymander occurred, and it fails to capture the essence of what it means to vote since it presupposes that voters are voting for a statewide party rather than simply for an individual candidate.
In addition to these theoretical problems, the efficiency gap suffers from practical issues as well. First, the Plaintiffs efficiency gap calculation, which is based on tallying “wasted” votes, appears to ignore a large number of wasted votes attributable to winning candidates, thereby undermining its reliability as a tool for measuring even what it purports to capture. Second, the test Plaintiffs propose does not adequately account for Wisconsin’s political geography, which naturally “packs” large numbers of Democrats into urban areas like Madison and Milwaukee, resulting in hundreds of thousands of “wasted” votes in inevitable landslide Democratic victories for assembly candidates. Finally, the efficiency gap is highly volatile and could easily trigger judicial intervention when no intervention is warranted. For all of these additional reasons, I would enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.
I. Partisan Intent and Effect
I begin with a point upon which I agree with my colleagues. It is almost beyond question that the Republican staff members who drew the Act 43 maps intended to benefit Republican candidates. They accumulated substantial historical knowledge about the political tendencies of every part of the state and consulted with Dr. Ronald Gaddie to confirm their predictions about voting patterns. Though they denied the suggestion that such information was used to project future voting tendencies, my colleagues rightly conclude that when political staffers compile historical voting information about potential districts, their claim that they did not intend to use that information to predict future voting patterns is hardly worthy of belief. After all, these individuals are not operating under even the pretense that they are nonpartisan: they are employed by Republicans in leadership and draft district maps at their direction. That they would resort to partisan considerations in drawing the maps is therefore anything but surprising.
This alone does not make it wrong, however. The majority cites Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982), for the proposition that “equal protection challenges to redistricting plans require a showing of discriminatory purpose or intent.” But Rogers is a race discrimination case challenging an electoral system on the ground that it was intended to dilute voting strength of the black population. The intent to weaken a racial group’s political power in drawing district lines is always and everywhere wrongful. The same is not true for political motivations. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged partisan considerations are inevitable when partisan politicians draw maps. “The Constitution clearly contemplates districting by political entities, see Article I, § 4, and unsurprisingly that turns out to be root-and-branch a matter of politics.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (“[R]edistricting in most cases will implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete for recognition ....”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 662, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (“[D]istricting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics .... ”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973) (“The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.”)). In other words, so long as it is deemed acceptable for politicians to draw district maps—and it is—we cannot pretend to be shocked that legislators so engaged will act like the politicians they are. As Justice Stevens put it, “Legislators are, after all, politicians.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 753, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). “[S]ome intent to gain political advantage is inescapable whenever political bodies devise a district plan, and some effect results from the intent.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 344, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting). “That courts can grant relief in districting cases where race is involved does not answer our need for fairness principles here. Those controversies implicate a different inquiry. They involve sorting permissible classifications in the redistricting context from impermissible ones. Race is an impermissible classification.... Politics is quite a different matter.” Id. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The majority opinion wrestles with the “how much intent is too much” question, a question that has bedeviled the courts for decades and caused several members of the Supreme Court to give up on finding an answer. But whose intent are we talking about and how does one go about measuring it? The Republican leadership clearly wanted a plan that would give them a majority of seats, but some of their members had to be talked into accepting less safe districts—the so-called donors—in the hope that they could still win their seat and the party would win a majority of seats as well. They more or less acquiesced. The more difficult question is how do you measure intent? A person either intends a result or he does not. Making gradations of intent a standard is a recipe for interminable litigation. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion) (“Moreover, the fact that partisan districting is a lawful and common practice means that there is almost always room for an election-impeding lawsuit contending that partisan advantage was the predominant motivation; not so for claims of racial gerrymandering.”).
My colleagues attempt to limit the potential for unending litigation such an intent element might encourage by holding that the level of partisanship may be deemed “too much” when the map-drawers intend to entrench their party in power for the life of the plan and achieves that effect. Slip Op. at 885-86, 896. Adding the qualification that the intent and effect be to entrench the party in power for the life of the plan, however, does not help. How is that intent different from intending to benefit the party? We are talking about redistricting plans, after all, not a bill to name the State mascot. Redistricting plans, by their very nature, affect future elections for the life of the plan. And what does “entrench their party in power” mean in this context?
The plurality in Bandemer sought to limit court intervention to cases where “a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process.” 478 U.S. at 132-33, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion). On the statewide level, the plurality said, “such finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.” Id. at 133, 106 S.Ct. 2797. The standard adopted by the majority in this case is equally opaque, but less demanding. Plaintiffs have challenged the redistricting plan for Assembly seats, but the Assembly, by itself, can do little more than hold things up. Every four years, Wisconsin voters elect a governor. If plaintiffs party is able to convince a majority of Wisconsin voters that their policies are better for the State, nothing the Republicans have done will prevent them from winning the governor’s office and not only stopping the Republicans from enacting their agenda at that point, but also denying them control over the next redistricting process. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 362, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a State has improperly gerrymandered legislative or congressional districts to the majority’s disadvantage, the majority should be able to elect officials in statewide races—particularly the Governor—who may help to undo the harm that districting has caused the majority’s party, in the next round of districting if not sooner.”).
Indeed, nothing will prevent a candidate from Plaintiffs’ party from convincing the voters in a district Republican staff members drew, believing it would elect a Republican candidate, from electing a Democrat instead. The assumption underlying Plaintiffs’ entire case is that party affiliation is a readily discernable characteristic in voters and that it matters above all else in an election. Voters are placed either in one party or the other based on their last vote. But party affiliation is not set in stone or in a voter’s genes:
[A] person’s politics is rarely as readily discernible—and never as permanently discernible—as a person’s race. Political affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from one election to the next; and even within a given election, not all voters follow the party line. We dare say (and hope) that the political party which puts forward an utterly incompetent candidate will lose even in its registration stronghold.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion) (citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). True, many voters, perhaps most, vote for the brand; but many make their decision based on the person and his or her position on the issues that matter most to them at the time. Moreover, candidates for state offices run on different issues than candidates for national offices, which presumably explains the difference in voter turn-out and results in the recent Wisconsin presidential and gubernatorial elections. For all the confidence political experts may have in their predictions of future election results, Vieth itself stands as a stark reminder that they can be wrong. The plaintiffs in that case alleged that the Pennsylvania congressional plan was “rigged to guarantee that thirteen of Pennsylvania’s nineteen congressional representatives will be Republican.” Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F.Supp.2d 532, 546 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Yet, as Professor Nicholas Goedert testified and pointed out in his report, Democrats won a majority of Pennsylvania’s congressional seats in the two elections following the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision, including twelve of nineteen in 2008. (ECF Nos. 50-1 at 13; 150 at 150:8-18.)
There are additional problems with the majority’s proposed standard. To the extent the term has been used by members of the Supreme Court, “entrenchment” has often referred to a minority party rigging the system so much that it could win a majority of seats even while consistently garnering only a minority of the statewide vote. For example, Justice Kennedy has noted that a plan “that entrenches an electoral minority” is more likely to be a vehicle for partisan discrimination. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC]. Justice Breyer’s Vieth opinion is more explicit: he explains that “[b]y entrenchment I mean a situation in which a party that enjoys only minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold, legislative power.” 541 U.S. at 360, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Justice Breyer’s view, “gerrymandering that leads to entrenchment amounts to an abuse that violates the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 362, 124 S.Ct. 1769. These Justices’ concerns about entrenchment thus appear to be focused on the problem whereby a majority of voters in a state are consistently deprived the opportunity to control a branch of government. In our case, however, the Republican Party is not a minority party in Wisconsin. In statewide elections, the state has elected a Republican governor in the last two general elections (plus a recall election, in 2012). In 2010 GOP members of the assembly received 53.5% of the statewide popular vote, while they obtained 52% of the vote in 2014. (ECF No. 125 at ¶ ¶ 286, 290.) Thus, in this case we are not dealing with a minority party entrenching itself in power, which means the majority of the citizens of Wisconsin are not consistently deprived of the right to control the legislature.
The notion that Republicans took drastic steps to entrench themselves in power in this sense is also undermined by recent history. When mapmakers sit down to redraw district maps, it is not as though they are drawing on a blank slate—the 99 districts then in existence will necessarily play a role in how the new districts will look. The majority opinion glosses over the fact that Republicans enjoyed very healthy efficiency gaps during the previous decade, despite the fact that the district maps then in effect were produced through plans created by federal courts, not a partisan legislature. As the Plaintiffs’ expert Simon Jackman concluded, the plan in effect during the previous decennial period favored Republicans with an average 7.6% efficiency gap, including a gap as large as 11.8% in 2006. (ECF No. 126 at ¶ ¶ 190, 192, 194, 242.) When one considers that the preexisting maps were already quite favorable to Republicans, it is hardly surprising that the maps they ultimately created increased their advantage somewhat.
In fact, under the Plaintiffs’ proposed test the Republicans were obligated not only to draw fairer maps, but to engage in heroic levels of nonpartisan statesmanship. The Plaintiffs are evidently of the view that the Republicans, having achieved the once-in-a-lifetime feat of controlling both branches of the legislature and the governorship during a redistricting year, should have used that unique opportunity not for self-advantage but instead to draw a map that was less favorable to them than even the court-drawn plan that governed the previous decade. Ironically, even if the Republicans had said to themselves, “let’s stick with a plan like the one drawn by the federal courts—it helps us enough already,” the Plaintiffs would still take umbrage at the resulting map and call it an impermissible partisan gerrymander, assuming the efficiency gaps continued to follow the pattern of the previous decade. Any test that requires heroic levels of nonpartisanship does not square with the courts’ recognition of the reality that legislators tasked with drawing maps will always seek to advantage their own party. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to credit the Plaintiffs’ assertions that the Republicans exhibited “too much” partisanship when they drew a map that was only somewhat more favorable to the GOP than maps drawn by a federal court the previous decade.
The Republicans’ control of the districting process appears to have been little different than the Republicans’ conduct in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986). There, the district court described the Republican-controlled process as “contrived,” after the Republicans enacted dummy bills and named Democratic “advisors” who in actuality had no input and “no access to the mapmaking process that ensued.” Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F.Supp. 1479, 1483 (S.D. Ind. 1984). The Republicans spent a quarter million dollars on a research firm, which used the latest computer equipment, while the Democrats had no such support. Id. at 1484. One Republican senator admitted that though the Democrats could offer their own map proposals, they would never be accepted. Id.
This “unashamedly partisan” process resulted in party-line approval of the plan in both houses of the legislature and the prompt signature by the Republican governor. Id. And yet the plan drawn in Indiana was upheld, despite a nearly identical partisan effect as the current plan.
None of this is to extol the process whereby the district maps were drawn, and neither do I intend to espouse the cynical conclusion that politics must always be one-sided and bare-knuckle. Indeed, the very accusation and at least the appearance of heavy-handed unfairness may itself be made a political issue and lead a significant number of less committed or independent voters to change their views about which party they wish to support. By the same token, I believe it is largely true that individuals who attempt to gain political advantage through map-drawing are not engaged in foul play or dirty tricks, but are merely using the power the voters have granted them to enact the policies they favor. They are not intending to “burden the representational rights of Democratic voters” by “impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats.” Majority op. at 843. These are legal concepts that do not translate easily into the world of politics. Imagine a congressman facing President Johnson’s demand that he vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or lose a key federal project in his district claiming that his constituents were deprived of their representational rights. The political process does not operate by the same rules that govern judges and courts. By and large, whether it is the Democrats or Republicans doing the gerrymandering, they try to create partisan majorities not to suppress opposing viewpoints but because they honestly believe they will then be able to enact the policies that in their view are best for the state, or nation.
In sum, partisan intent is not illegal, but is simply the consequence of assigning the task of redistricting to the political branches of government. The standard proposed by the majority offers no improvement over the tests that have already been rejected by the Supreme Court. Moreover, even if I accepted the majority’s standard, I am unconvinced that Republicans intended to or could entrench themselves in power in the sense understood by those members of the Court that have addressed it. Given the fact that Republicans already enjoyed significant advantages under court-drawn districting plans then in effect, it should hardly surprise anyone that, when afforded the rare opportunity to draw their own maps, they extended their electoral advantage somewhat. I am therefore unable to conclude that Act 43’s passage was anything other than the kind of “politics as usual” that courts have routinely either tolerated or acquiesced in.
II. A Gerrymander without Gerrymandering
Justices Souter and Ginsburg counseled in Vieth that statewide districting challenges are “a function of claims that individual districts are illegitimately drawn.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 347, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting). Therefore, it makes sense to “concentrate[] as much as possible on suspect characteristics of individual districts instead of statewide patterns.” Id.
Surprisingly, the Plaintiffs in this action did exactly the opposite. Instead of pointing to specific districts that had been gerrymandered, they relied on statewide data and calculations, as well as spreadsheets, metadata, graphs and charts, all without referring to any actual maps or lines drawn by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs purported to show the “DNA” of gerrymandering in a graph comparing wards to districts, but, like a prosecutor trying to prove a murder without a body, not once did they actually show any district maps demonstrating the gerrymander they alleged occurred.
This was not an oversight. The reason for the absence of any discussion of individual district lines is that Act 43 does not violate any of the redistricting principles that traditionally govern the districting process, including compactness, contiguity and respect for political boundaries like counties and cities. In other words, unlike every other gerrymandering case to come before the courts, the plaintiffs did not argue that Act 43 created any districts with unusual lines or shapes. Nor were there appreciable problems with contiguity, compactness, or regard for political boundaries. Act 43’s districts split more counties than previous plans, but the plan splits fewer municipalities than the 1990s map. The current plan’s compactness scores are comparable to previous plans, and there is no indication that any districts had problems with contiguity. At trial, it was undisputed that the drafting of the current plan placed the correct number of citizens into each district and also took into account other more practical (and legitimate) concerns, such as the number of voters who would be disenfranchised in upcoming senate elections, as well as the residences of the actual legislators whose district boundaries were changing—factors none of the theoretical plans considered. In short, although the Plaintiffs argued that their own demonstration map created similarly compact and contiguous districts with less partisan effect, they conceded that the districts drawn by Act 43 are sufficiently compact, contiguous and respectful of political boundaries.
Gerrymandering, as the term’s etymology suggests, has traditionally been understood as the drawing of unusually-shaped districts in order to achieve a political advantage. Gerrymandering is “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 164, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (emphasis added)); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 323, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting, noting “outlandish district shapes” in traditional gerrymanders). Without evidence of any distortion of otherwise legitimate district boundaries, there is no gerrymander, at least as the term is traditionally understood.
The Plaintiffs’ belief that gerrymandering can occur without distortions of district boundaries is not just a definitional novelty, it flies in the face of Vieth. In Vieth, four justices found political gerrymandering claims non-justiciable, meaning that they believed courts should not even get involved in such cases. Of the remaining five justices who would consider such claims, three of them (a majority) explicitly would require a failure to follow traditional redistricting principles as part of any gerrymandering test. Justice Stevens noted that “an uncouth or bizarre shape can easily identify a district designed for a single-minded, nonneutral purpose.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 321, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Citing Justice Powell’s Bandemer opinion, Justice Stevens noted that “configurations of the districts [and] the observance of political subdivision lines ... have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting.” Id. at 322, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 165, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Stevens observed that in Bandemer, Justice Powell had made the irregularity of district shapes part of his proposed test, remarking on the “strange shape of districts that conspicuously ignored traditional districting principles.” Id. Any test should “properly focus[] on whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate ends.... Under this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting.” Id. Justice Stevens noted that the Court had used Justice Powell’s test in racial gerrymandering cases, and he believed it appropriate to do so in a political gerrymandering context as well. Id.
Citing the Vieth complaint, Justice Stevens observed that one challenged district “looms like a dragon descending on Philadelphia from the west, splitting up towns and communities throughout Montgomery and Berks Counties.” Id. at 340, 124 S.Ct. 1769. The plan “is so irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort ... to advance the interests of one political party, without regard for traditional redistricting principles and without any legitimate or compelling justification.” Id.
Ultimately, under Justice Stevens’ proposed test, “if the only possible explanation for a district’s bizarre shape is a naked desire to increase partisan strength, then no rational basis exists to save the district from an equal protection challenge. Such a narrow test would cover only a few meritorious claims, but it would preclude extreme abuses ....” Id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769.
A “bizarre shape” was also a factor in the test proposed by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. As part of their proposed analysis, they would require a plaintiff “to show that the district of his residence ... paid little or no heed to those traditional districting principles whose disregard can be shown straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features like rivers and mountains.” Id. at 348, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting). Because courts are already experienced at applying these standards, they argued, “a test relying on these standards would fall within judicial competence.” Id.
Thus, of the bare majority of the Court that would even consider political gerrymandering claims, at least three members of the Vieth court would require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged plan or district failed to adhere to traditional districting principles.
The Plaintiffs suggest that any test relying on traditional districting principles is foreclosed by precedent. Strangely, for that premise they rely on the Vieth plurality, which, it is true, criticized any standard based on district shapes as being difficult to manage: “Justice SOUTER would require lower courts to assess whether mapmakers paid ‘little or no heed to ... traditional districting principles.’ What is a lower court to do when, as will often be the case, the district adheres to some traditional criteria but not others?” Id. at 296, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion). While it is true that the Vieth plurality criticized reliance on traditional criteria, that hardly helps the Plaintiffs’ cause, since the same plurality opinion would reject their claim altogether on justiciability grounds.
My point is not that all Justices would require unusually shaped districts before considering a partisan gerrymander; the point is that of the Justices who would even entertain a partisan gerrymandering claim, a majority would require adherence to traditional districting principles as part of any test. Here, it is clear that seven of the nine Justices in Vieth would have ruled against the Plaintiffs, either on justiciability grounds or because they have not identified any violation of traditional districting principles. No other conclusion can be drawn from the Justices’ separate opinions. And, as discussed earlier, Justice Breyer would not find an unconstitutional gerrymander here because this case does not involve a minority party “entrenching” itself in power.
That leaves Justice Kennedy, whose Vieth concurrence expressed a grudging willingness to consider political gerrymandering challenges, but did not give any indication as to whether respect for traditional districting principles would play a role in any test he might find appropriate. Even so, he remarked that a legal violation would only arise if the line-drawers acted in an “invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.” Id. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Since respecting political subdivisions and following standards of compactness and contiguity are “legitimate legislative objectives,” it would be impossible to say that Act 43, which actually achieved those objectives, was “unrelated to” those very objectives. Id.
That it achieved those objectives, as well as other legitimate objectives, including consideration of the residence of the legislators themselves and Voting Rights Act requirements, would seem to preclude the finding of any violation under whatever test Justice Kennedy might entertain. The fact that the map-drawers chose to adopt plans that were more “assertive” or “aggressive” than others (a mistake of nomenclature they surely will not repeat) does not mean the maps they drew were “unrelated to” legitimate traditional districting principles.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s view of the importance of traditional districting principles can be gleaned from Miller v. Johnson, a racial gerrymandering case, where his majority opinion found that “a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.” 515 U.S. 900, 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). Justice Kennedy went on to note the district court’s finding that it was “ ‘exceedingly obvious’ from the shape of the Eleventh District, together with the relevant racial demographics, that the drawing of narrow land bridges to incorporate within the district outlying appendages containing nearly 80% of the district’s total black population was a deliberate attempt to bring black populations into the district.” Id. at 917, 115 S.Ct. 2475. Given the centrality of traditional districting principles to racial gerrymandering cases, there is every reason to believe that any political gerrymandering test Justice Kennedy might adopt would include the plan’s adherence to such principles as part of its analysis.
The majority addresses these concerns by concluding that following traditional districting principles should provide no “safe harbor” for an Equal Protection violation. It is possible to see the argument in such a light if all one is concerned with is raw numbers, or translating votes into seats. In my view, however, the Defendants are not asking for a safe harbor, they are asking the court to conclude that the drawing of bizarrely shaped districts is part of the very definition of unconstitutional gerrymandering itself—to the extent such a claim exists. Looked at from the voter’s perspective, living in a district that looks like some type of amphibian is itself a component of any gerrymandering injury that voter might suffer. Thus, I do not view the following of traditional districting principles as a “safe harbor” that would whitewash any Equal Protection violation; instead it is evidence that the map-drawers were not committing a violation at all. Without gerrymandered districts, there is no unconstitutional gerrymander.
This conclusion is reinforced by Cox v. Larios, a one-person, one-vote case. There, Democratic mapmakers in Georgia drew maps designed to pit large numbers of Republican incumbents against each other, resulting in nearly half of the Republican delegation losing their seats. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the three-judge district court’s decision finding an Equal Protection violation. 542 U.S. at 947-50, 124 S.Ct. 2806. Key to the district court’s conclusion was its finding that, in drawing the maps that contained many “oddly shaped” districts, the Georgia legislators paid no heed to traditional districting principles like compactness or contiguity. Larios v. Cox, 300 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
[O]ne can easily discern [an absence of compactness] just by looking at the maps themselves .... Moreover, as we have noted, a more sophisticated analysis of district compactness, calculated by the perimeter-to-area measure or the smallest circle measure, also establishes that compactness was not a factor here. Indeed, quite a few of the districts have shapes that defy Euclidean geometry. The drafters of the House and Senate Plans made no effort to keep districts compact and certainly did not create deviations for the purpose of improving compactness.
Id. at 1350.
In concurring with the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance, Justices Stevens and Breyer wrote that Georgia’s
partisan gerrymander is visible to the judicial eye .... Drawing district lines that have no neutral justification in order to place two incumbents of the opposite party in the same district is probative of the same impermissible intent as the “uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” that defined the boundary of Tuskegee, Alabama, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), or the “dragon descending on Philadelphia from the west” that defined Pennsylvania’s District 6 in Vieth, 541 U.S. at 340, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cox, 542 U.S. at 950, 124 S.Ct. 2806 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Thus, contrary to the majority’s view, traditional districting criteria—the shape, size and other physical characteristics of a district—are part and parcel of an Equal Protection analysis because deviations from those norms are offensive wholly independent from any partisan effect they might occasion.
The Plaintiffs and the majority also suggest that advances in computer technology make it easy for map-drawers to produce pleasing-looking districts that stealthily mask a partisan purpose, and so merely following traditional principles and producing unsuspicious maps cannot be enough to pass muster. The idea of some kind of high-tech stealth gerrymander is nothing more than a bugaboo, however. Computer technology was advanced in 2004, when Vieth was decided. The Justices’ opinions cited above would all require a plaintiff to demonstrate districts with unusual shapes, without any apparent concern about computer technology. The Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that the technology that existed in 2011, when the Republicans drew the Act 43 maps, was somehow more sophisticated than what existed a mere seven years earlier when Vieth was decided.
It may be worth pointing out that the Justices’ desire for normal-looking district lines is not a purely aesthetic conceit, or a “beauty contest.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996). As stated above, living in a bizarrely-shaped district is part of the injury a voter suffers in an unconstitutional gerrymander. Geographic lines that everyone can understand lend legitimacy to a district, minimize voter confusion, and suggest that voters are being treated similarly based on where they live rather than how they have voted in the past. As Justices Stevens and Powell have noted, “[C]onfigurations of the districts [and] the observance of political subdivision lines ... have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 322, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 165, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). And, as one commentator has noted:
Disregard of compactness facilitates gerrymandering by making it easier to include reliable voters in a particular district and avoid those who might be unreliable. It also destroys some of the advantages of single-member districts, including a sense of community and an awareness of what areas a district includes. Disregard of compactness also substantially impairs the ability of potential candidates to organize on a grass-roots basis.... A district that is non-compact, such as the infamous 160 mile long “I-85” district in North Carolina, creates enormous difficulties in this situation.
Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Systems in the United States, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 1119, 1144-45 (1998).
Just as importantly, perhaps, part of the Justices’ interest in policing the redistricting process is not merely in detecting invidious gerrymandering after the fact, but in preventing it from happening in the first place. As demonstrated at trial, the individuals drawing the lines will not know what their map’s efficiency gap will be until after the first election—typically, more than a year later—making it impossible for legislators to know in advance whether their plan will pass muster. In contrast, the mapmakers (and their critics) will immediately be able to detect when their efforts have produced unusual and suspicious visual results—dragons in flight, salamanders, sick chickens, or any other of the flamboyantly monikered chimeras that creative cartographers have conjured up over the decades. Unlike most witnesses who testified at trial in this action, the line drawers will not require advanced graduate training in statistics, regression analysis, or political science, but merely a respect for traditional political boundaries and an affinity for relatively straight lines. Constitutional law need not become the province of a cottage industry of Ph.D.’s and statisticians.
Another benefit of reliance on traditional districting factors is that the public and other legislators, when presented with the proposed maps, will be able to identify unusual shapes, and litigation may commence immediately to prevent unlawful discrimination from affecting even a single election. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting, expressing hope that any test would “shorten the time period in which the pernicious effects of such a gerrymander are felt.”) As noted earlier, the Plaintiffs’ test will never even be triggered until after the first election under a new plan, which would allow legislators a free bite at what the Plaintiffs describe as the forbidden fruit. If a typical plan is only in force for five state assembly elections, a test that would guarantee that an entire election cycle must occur before any challenge would seem inadequate to the task of curbing the serious abuses the Plaintiffs allege. This is especially true in light of the incumbency effect. Allowing an election to take place under an unconstitutional gerrymander would allow political newcomers from the gerrymandering party to win an election on an unfair playing field, but then run as incumbents in the next election, thus preserving most or all of their ill-gotten gains even though the gerrymandered plan has ostensibly been fixed. This is exactly what happened in Texas, after a court-drawn plan remedied a pro-Democratic map: “in the 2002 congressional elections, however, Republicans were not able to capitalize on the advantage that the Balderas Plan had provided them. A number of Democratic incumbents were able to attract the votes of ticket-splitters ... and thus won elections in some districts that [now] favored Republicans. As a result, Republicans carried only 15 of the districts drawn by the Balderas court.” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 452, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
These are surely among the reasons that Justices Souter and Stevens both observed that constitutional violations should be easily detectible: Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) believed such violations “can be shown straightforwardly” when traditional districting principles are violated, 541 U.S. at 348, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting), while Justice Stevens noted that an offending plan would be “irregular on its face,” id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting)—so obviously a gerrymander that the plan’s invidious purpose would be immediately detectable. As noted above, this would alert the drawers themselves that their plan was suspect, and if they failed to correct the problem it would allow quicker litigation in order to prevent the offending plan from affecting an election. In addition, requiring a violation of traditional districting principles would serve as a check on court intervention into the inherently political process of map-drawing. As this court recognized in its summary judgment decision, no member of the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to involve the court in gerrymandering cases as a matter of course. Justice Stevens suggested that his “narrow test would cover only a few meritorious claims, but it would preclude extreme abuses,” such as those described in the California case of Badham v. Eu, 694 F.Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), which involved “a large number of districts with highly irregular shapes, all designed ... to dilute Republican voting strength throughout the State.” 541 U.S. at 339 n.34, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter suggested, courts are eminently capable of assessing traditional districting principles, Vieth, 541 U.S. at 348, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting), whereas it is not clear that they are equipped to undertake the complex statistical and political science inquiries the Plaintiffs press in this case.
In sum, this is hardly fertile ground for the kind of test Plaintiffs propose. Every Justice who has expressed an opinion on the subject would reject the Plaintiffs’ claim either because it is non-justiciable; because the challenged plan did not involve minority party entrenchment; or because the Plaintiffs failed to show that the Defendants violated traditional districting principles in some meaningful way. If this case were before the Vieth Justices, the Plaintiffs would likely lose 9-0.
III. The Republicans Would Control the Legislature Even Without a Gerrymander
Given courts’ historical reluctance to involve themselves in political gerrymandering cases, it would seem that this case presents a particularly poor candidate for court intervention. A key reason is that the Republicans would have won control of the legislature in both elections under Act 43 even without a gerrymander. In 2014, the most recent election, they won a majority of the statewide vote, and so naturally they would have won control of the chamber. And in 2012, the first election under Act 43, they won close to 49% of the statewide vote. Here, too, they would have retained control of the legislature. My colleagues and I are in agreement that, based on Wisconsin’s political geography and the large efficiency gaps that have existed even under neutrally-drawn plans, Republicans enjoy some degree of natural advantage. (I address geography below, but in a nutshell it comes down to Democratic voters’ tendency to live in closely compacted areas in Milwaukee and Madison, whereas Republicans are more efficiently dispersed.) In fact, even the Plaintiffs’ own demonstration map, when adjusted to include the effect of incumbency, produced an efficiency gap of nearly 4% in favor of Republicans—and recall that this was a map drafted by a political science professor, hired by the Democratic-voting Plaintiffs, whose entire goal was to try to produce the smallest efficiency gap possible. (ECF No. 149 at 65:3.) Accordingly, it is very likely that Republicans, despite receiving less than 49% of the statewide vote in 2012, would have won control of the legislature even without any gerrymandering whatsoever, because they would have enjoyed a substantial advantage even under a neutrally drawn plan.
This is a major obstacle to the Plaintiffs’ argument because their case, as explained below, is based solely on an injury they describe as an inability to convert statewide vote totals into seats in the legislature; in other words, they blame the Republican gerrymander for their inability to control that branch of government. The fact that their inability to control the legislature is due not to Republican gerrymandering but to Republican statewide strength combined with certain natural advantages means, at a minimum, that this case is hardly the kind of outrageous partisan iniquity the Plaintiffs portray it to be. Many of the Justices who would entertain political gerrymandering challenges have expressed only a grudging willingness to do so, leaving the door open for review of only those most egregious partisan injustices. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens’ narrow test “would cover only a few meritorious claims, but it would preclude extreme abuses.”). Here, it is difficult to perceive an extreme abuse when the gerrymandering party would have won control of the legislature even without gerrymandering.
IV. Theoretical Problems with the Efficiency Gap and other Votes/Seats Measures
In this court’s decision denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the panel observed that the justices had expressed some support for the concept of partisan symmetry, a doctrinal cousin of the efficiency gap. Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F.Supp.3d 918, 931 (W.D. Wis. 2015). However, the court correctly noted that Justice Kennedy’s support was “tepid, at best,” and at the time we could also have rightly observed that the support of the other Justices was hardly a ringing endorsement of the symmetry theory. Id. (citing LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419-20, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). Despite this faint praise, the court now is being asked to elevate the efficiency gap theory from the annals of a single, non-peer-reviewed law review article to the linchpin of constitutional elections jurisprudence. This request is made despite the efficiency gap’s significant, and likely insurmountable, limitations, as detailed below.
A. The Plaintiffs’ Case is Premised on a Right to Proportional Representation
The concepts of efficiency and waste are inherently normative ones, requiring us to consider the proper role of a vote, as opposed to a vote being “wasted.” If we say something is efficient, that implies knowledge of an ultimate purpose or goal: if a furnace is 90% efficient, that is a measure of how well it converts fuel into heat, with heat being the goal. According to the Plaintiffs, the goal of voting—voting’s only purpose, in fact—is to convert votes into additional seats in the assembly, and so one’s vote is only efficient insofar as it translates into more seats. Any other result is wasted and inefficient, like heat escaping from a leaky furnace.
Whether the argument is premised on the efficiency gap or on other measures comparing legislative seats to statewide votes, it is clear that the Plaintiffs’ case is really premised on a right to proportional representation, that is, the right to translate one party’s statewide vote totals into a given number of seats in the legislature. If Party A has a large statewide total of votes, say 60%, but has only received 51% of the seats, there is a large efficiency gap reflecting the disproportionality of that party’s representation: the number of seats they won was disproportionally small compared to their statewide vote totals. Any injury premised on such a comparison is an injury based on an absence of proportionality. As the parties have recognized, however, there is no constitutional requirement that groups of voters must enjoy political strength proportionate to their numbers. The Bandemer court recognized that “the mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm.” 478 U.S. at 131-32, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion). “Our cases ... clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.” Id. at 130, 106 S.Ct. 2797.
This principle was reiterated a decade later in Vieth:
Deny it as appellants may (and do), this standard rests upon the principle that groups (or at least political-action groups) have a right to proportional representation. But the Constitution contains no such principle. It guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in government to equivalently sized groups. It nowhere says that farmers or urban dwellers, Christian fundamentalists or Jews, Republicans or Democrats, must be accorded political strength proportionate to their numbers.
541 U.S. at 288, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 338, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Constitution does not, of course, require proportional representation of racial, ethnic, or political groups.”).
My colleagues concede, as they must, that there is no constitutional right to proportional representation. In their view, however, the fact that there is no right to proportional representation does not foreclose looking to disproportional representation as evidence of a discriminatory effect. Yet it is unclear to me how that statement differs in practical terms from establishing a covert right to proportional representation itself: if there is no constitutional right to something, then why look to the absence of that thing as evidence of constitutional injury? Saying that there is a right to not have disproportional representation is tantamount to saying there is a right to have proportional representation. Suppose a plaintiff incarcerated in prison claimed injury because his meals tasted bad; in particular, he complained that the prison refused to serve him filet mignon and lobster for dinner every night. Of course there is no constitutional right to have steak and lobster in prison, and so a court would summarily reject the claim on that basis and move on. No court in the land would say that, “although there is no right to eat steak in prison, we see no reason we can’t consider the absence of steak and lobster as evidence that the prison’s food is so poor that it violates the Eighth Amendment.” If something is not a constitutional right, then its absence cannot cause constitutional injury. Here, the majority appears to be saying in one breath that there is no right to proportional representation but then in the next that the absence of proportional representation may constitute the entire basis of a cause of action. Disproportionality cannot be viewed merely as evidence of a partisan effect—the absence of proportionality is the signature feature of the Plaintiffs entire case.
In denying that the Plaintiffs’ theory is based on a right to proportional representation, the majority also relies on an opinion of Justice Kennedy, who observed in LULAC that “a congressional plan that more closely reflects the distribution of state party power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan discrimination than one that entrenches an electoral minority.” 548 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 2594. From this, the majority appears to extrapolate the principle that when the number of seats a party wins deviates from how many we would “expect” it to receive, such a scenario could prove an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Again, however, the notion that we would “expect” a given number of seats requires imputing the normative judgment that a party’s seats won must be proportional to the party’s statewide vote totals. The fuller context of Justice Kennedy’s statement is as follows:
[C]ompared to the map challenged in Vieth, which led to a Republican majority in the congressional delegation despite a Democratic majority in the statewide vote, Plan 1374C can be seen as making the party balance more congruent to statewide party power. To be sure, there is no constitutional requirement of proportional representation, and equating a party’s statewide share of the vote with its portion of the congressional delegation is a rough measure at best. Nevertheless, a congressional plan that more closely reflects the distribution of state party power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan discrimination than one that entrenches an electoral minority.
Id.
My reading of the above paragraph is that Justice Kennedy would probably agree with Justice Breyer that a map that allowed a statewide minority party to consistently win a majority of seats would be constitutionally suspicious. Justice Kennedy notes that the map reviewed in LULAC did not do this, however, because Republican congressional candidates won 58% of the statewide vote in Texas and received a healthy majority of 21 of the 32 available seats. Id. at 413, 126 S.Ct. 2594. In other words, because the majority party received a majority of seats, LULAC was not a case where a plan “entrenches an electoral minority.” Id. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 2594. This observation, modest as it is, does not suggest that disproportionality might be injurious on its own; instead, it merely means that it could prove problematic when the disproportionality is what allows a minority party to win a majority of seats—the entrenched minorities also described by Justice Breyer. In short, from Justice Kennedy’s opinion I am unable to glean a principle that would treat disproportional representation per se as a constitutional injury. If anything, it suggests a more stringent threshold for plaintiffs, requiring them to show that an established minority party has managed to rig the system to entrench itself in power despite the evident will of a majority of voters.
The Plaintiffs also argue that they are not insisting on using exact proportional representation as their benchmark. For example, they do not say that winning 48% of the statewide vote entitles them to 48% of the seats. But no one in Bandemer, or in any other case brought to the court’s attention, had insisted on strict 1:1 proportionality either, and so when they rejected gerrymandering challenges on that basis the courts do not appear to have had “strict” proportional representation in mind; they were rejecting the concept of proportionality more broadly. This is clearest in Vieth, where the plaintiffs argued for a loose proportionality standard that would entitle a party who won a majority of the statewide vote “to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats.” 541 U.S. at 287, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion). The plaintiffs were not arguing their 51% of the statewide vote entitled them to 51% of the seats, but merely that a statewide victory entitled them to control of the legislature—any percentage greater than 50%. The court rejected that test on the ground that the Constitution does not require that political parties “must be accorded political strength proportionate to their numbers.” Id. at 288, 124 S.Ct. 1769. Thus, the court rejected that test not because a political party had no entitlement to a strict proportion of seats to votes; it rejected it because parties are not entitled to any proportion at all.
Here, the Plaintiffs’ claim is even more specific than the argument posited in Vieth: not only do the Plaintiffs insist on receiving a majority of seats for a majority of the vote (as in Vieth), they propose a linear 2:1 relationship between additional votes and seats. 51% of the statewide votes should garner 52% of the seats, while 54% of the votes would win 58% of the seats, and so on. Any significant deviation from that predetermined proportion must be justified in court. Such a scheme, of course, is the essence of proportionality.
At this point it might be worth exploring why proportional representation is not a constitutional right. A key reason is that each election in each district is a separate affair. Wisconsin’s constitution, like that of the nation, did not create a form of government in which the party, or coalition of parties, that wins the majority of the statewide vote is given all of the tools needed to enact and implement its legislative program. Instead, we elect our representatives on a district-by-district basis. Some candidates will win in landslides while others squeak out narrow victories. There is no inherent reason to draw statewide inferences about the number of seats a given party “should” win based on either scenario. “[O]ne implication of the districting system is that voters cast votes for candidates in their districts, not for a statewide slate of legislative candidates put forward by the parties. Consequently, efforts to determine party voting strength presuppose a norm that does not exist—statewide elections for representatives along party lines.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 159, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Particularly at the assembly level, candidates are close to their voters. Responsiveness and personalities matter. The Plaintiffs have provided no reason to assume that each vote for a given candidate should be transformed into a vote for a state-wide party, nor why the total votes received by a group of candidates in 99 different districts should play some kind of prescriptive role in determining how many districts that party “should” win.
Another reason proportionality is not a right is that disproportionality is built in, and in fact even assumed, in winner-take-all systems of voting. “District-based elections hardly ever produce a perfect fit between votes and representation.” Id. at 133, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion). On the federal level, the nationwide popular vote does not determine the presidency, and neither does it determine the House of Representatives or the Senate, both of which are voted on individual districts or separate states. If there is an anomaly in wasted votes between the parties, we do not rejigger the seats to grant one side more seats: wasted votes are just wasted votes. The same is true in any assembly district. A candidate could lose by a single vote, and yet none of the votes cast for him will translate into any additional power for his party. This is simply the nature of any system where the winner gets everything and the loser receives nothing. Early in our nation’s history, we experimented with a kind of proportional representation by allowing the second-place presidential candidate to become vice-president, giving something of a consolation prize to all of those voters whose votes would otherwise be “wasted.” But soon enough, after Thomas Jefferson became vice-president under President John Adams, that system was abandoned in favor of a winner-take-all paradigm.
Many other countries, including many of the countries in Western Europe, require some fashion of proportional representation, for example, by allowing voters to vote for a list of candidates. “If properly implemented, [proportional representation] allows all significant groups (political, racial, or otherwise) of the electorate to be represented in proportion to their population, it eliminates the evils of gerrymandering, and it eliminates the need to use race-conscious criteria in creating legislative districts.” McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Systems in the United States, supra at 1126. But that is not the system of government the people who drafted and ratified the constitutions for the State of Wisconsin and the nation chose.
The point is that proportional representation is one possible way of electing legislators, governors or presidents, but it is not the only way. When states opt for winner-take-all districts, disproportionality is simply a side-effect of that decision:
If all or most of the districts are competitive ... even a narrow statewide preference for either party would produce an overwhelming majority for the winning party in the state legislature. This consequence, however, is inherent in winner-take-all, district-based elections, and we cannot hold that such a reapportionment law would violate the Equal Protection Clause because the voters in the losing party do not have representation in the legislature in proportion to the statewide vote received by their party candidates.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion). This inherent disproportionality is more pronounced in states where the voters of one party are naturally clustered, or “packed” in relatively small geographic regions, like Wisconsin’s Democratic voters are in Milwaukee and Madison, as is explained by the majority opinion and below. In essence, adoption of the efficiency gap (or any other “gap” between statewide vote totals and seats) in such states would undermine the districting system itself. “If there is a constitutional preference for proportionality, the legitimacy of districting itself is called into question: the voting strength of less evenly distributed groups will invariably be diminished by districting as compared to at-large proportional systems for electing representatives.” Id. at 159, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
In fact, the only way to counter the adverse effect of the natural packing of one party’s voters in a few discrete geographic areas in pursuit of the goal of proportional representation is to “reverse” gerrymander districts in an attempt to more evenly distribute that party’s voters. Id. at 160, 106 S.Ct. 2797. That is precisely what the Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Mayer, did with his demonstration plan. It wasn’t that the Defendants considered partisan voting patterns in designing their plan and Dr. Mayer did not. Indeed, Dr. Mayer considered actual votes, an advantage Defendants’ map-drawers did not have, and assumed that each vote would be for the same party’s candidate even if voting in different districts with different candidates. Regardless of whether that assumption is a reasonable one, the larger point is that requiring some kind of statewide votes-to-seats proportionality in a system where elections are for representatives in winner-take-all districts does not eliminate partisan gerrymandering, if by partisan gerrymandering one means drawing districts based on past voting history. Instead, it would constitutionally mandate gerrymandering in order to offset the effects of natural packing.
It follows that the number of votes a party receives in an entire state should have no relevance to any gerrymandering injury alleged by a voter in a single district, because any reference to statewide strength is the essence of proportionality. Id. at 130, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion) (defining proportional representation as drawing district lines that are “in proportion to what their [party’s] anticipated statewide vote will be”). The premise of any test that merely compares statewide votes to seats is that there is something constitutionally wrong with disproportional representation. This is nothing short of a claim that voters of one party “must be accorded political strength proportionate to their numbers.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion). Because there is no such constitutional right, I would enter judgment for the Defendants.
B. The Efficiency Gap Incorrectly Treats Seats Won as a Measure of Political Power
It seems intuitive to consider a party’s number of assembly seats as an adequate measure of political power in the assembly. The efficiency gap merely measures each party’s ability to win more seats, and so the efficiency gap also has a basic intuitive appeal. But upon even a cursory examination, it becomes clear that a party’s number of seats is often a poor measure of political strength. For example, if the Republicans had 51 members to the Democrats’ 48, only a political neophyte might think the two parties enjoyed about equal strength. The reality, of course, is that the Republicans have tremendously more power simply by virtue of the few extra seats that give them the majority in the legislature. Conversely, compare a Republican majority of 60-39 to a majority of 70-29. In the 60-39 case, the Republicans have a 21-seat edge, or 54% more seats than the Democrats. In the 70-29 assembly, the Republicans enjoy a massive advantage with more than double the Democrats’ number of seats. And yet no one with any experience in politics would think there was much practical difference between the two majorities. Once a majority is comfortable (however defined), the party in control has the ability to pass whatever bills it wants, and therefore winning (or losing) additional seats will often provide no practical increase (or decrease) in a party’s political power. The point is that every seat gained (or lost) does not represent an equivalent increase (or decrease) in political power—what is crucial is usually only the seats necessary for one party to secure a comfortable majority.
In 2014, the Republicans won 52% of the statewide vote and took 63 seats. The Democrats won 48% of the vote and took the remaining 36 seats. This resulted in an efficiency gap of around 10% in favor of the Republicans. (ECF No. 125 at ¶ ¶ 258, 290.) If the efficiency gap were zero (the Plaintiffs’ ideal), the Republicans would have won only 54% of the assembly seats (53 or 54 seats), while the Democrats would have won 46% (45 or 46 seats). So, instead of enjoying a 54-45 majority, the purported gerrymander (allegedly) allows the Republicans to enjoy a more robust 63-36 majority. The problem is that the Plaintiffs never even attempted to identify a single practical difference in their political power between the actual 63-36 Republican majority and the “ideal” 54-45 majority that would exist under a zero efficiency gap. Whether the Republicans have a majority of 9, 15, or 27 is not likely to impact anyone in any material sense: either way, the Republicans are in charge (by a comfortable margin) and able to pass whatever bills they want to pass. Not surprisingly, the Plaintiffs have identified no legislation that passed only because the Republican majority was larger than it otherwise would have been. (Ironically, the most controversial of the Republicans’ bills, Act 10, was passed by the 2011 legislature, which was elected under a court-drawn district plan.)
This demonstrates at least three things. First, it is difficult to perceive any injury worthy of court intervention when a party that wins a majority of the statewide vote has merely increased its number of seats beyond what a zero efficiency gap would mandate.
A second obvious implication of the above is that any measure that treats all seats as being of equal value cannot be a reliable measurement of political harm. The efficiency gap is all about increasing seats, treating every seat as equal and the gaining of more seats as the only efficient use of a vote. But in many elections, including 2014, the additional seats the majority party gained, allegedly through their gerrymander, do not appear to have any discernible impact on their power. In fact, as long as the Republicans maintain statewide vote totals above 48 or 49 percent (as in 2012), we would expect (based on history and even the demonstration plan) that even under a neutrally-drawn plan they would enjoy comfortable control of the assembly. Thus, a measure that is based solely on the number of seats one party wins does not seem up to the task of measuring, or even identifying, the kinds of partisan gerrymanders that might cry out for court intervention. Because all seats are not alike, neither are all efficiency gaps alike. A 10% gap, as seen in 2014, will be of almost no practical import because it merely increased seats for a party that would have maintained comfortable control of the chamber even without gerrymandering. This gives the lie to the Plaintiffs’ hyperbolic claim that the instant case represents “one of the worst partisan gerrymanders in modern American history.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1.)
In sum, as a general principle, the efficiency gap oversimplifies political injury by assuming that any gain or loss of seats equates to a proportional gain or loss of political power, when in fact the raw number of seats is often irrelevant. By reducing political power to gaining seats—regardless of how many seats the gerrymandering party would otherwise have—the efficiency gap does not adequately measure, or even detect, political gerrymandering injuries. Accordingly, I would not rely on the efficiency gap, or any other measure comparing statewide votes to seats, to find a partisan gerrymander in this case.
C. Votes are Meaningful, even if “Inefficient”