420 U.S. 636 (1975)
Stephen C. Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek married on November 15, 1970.1 Paula worked as a teacher both before and after the marriage, with maximum social security contributions deducted from her salary each year.2 Her earnings substantially exceeded Stephen's and constituted the couple's principal source of support, as shown by her 1970 earnings of $9,808 against his $3,100, her 1971 earnings of $10,686 against his $2,188, and her 1972 earnings of $6,836.35 before her death.3
On June 5, 1972, Paula died in childbirth, leaving Stephen with sole responsibility for their infant son, Jason Paul.4 Stephen applied at the Social Security office in New Brunswick, New Jersey, for survivors' benefits for himself and his son.5 His son received benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970 ed. and Supp. III), initially at $206.90 per month until September 1972 and then at $248.30 per month.6 Stephen was told he was ineligible for benefits on his own behalf because such benefits were available only to women.7
Stephen filed suit in February 1973 in the District of New Jersey on behalf of himself and all similarly situated widowers, seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional to the extent it treated men and women differently, an injunction against denial of benefits on the basis of sex, and payment of past benefits from June 1972.8 Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.9 A three-judge court determined it had jurisdiction and granted summary judgment in Stephen's favor, issuing an order providing the requested relief.10
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.11
Whether the gender-based distinction in § 402(g) of the Social Security Act, which provides survivors' benefits to widows but not to widowers caring for minor children, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?12
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits gender-based distinctions in the provision of Social Security survivors' benefits that rest on overbroad generalizations about the dependency of men and women.13
Yes. The gender-based distinction in § 402(g) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when measured against the established facts of this case.14 The statute withholds benefits from widowers like Stephen Wiesenfeld while granting them to widows, resting on the generalization that male workers' earnings are vital to family support whereas female wage earners' earnings are not.15 That generalization is refuted by the facts that Paula's earnings substantially exceeded Stephen's and formed the couple's principal source of support, with maximum contributions deducted from her salary each year.16
The classification therefore deprives the family of a female wage earner of the protection that would have been available had the wage earner been male, producing dissimilar treatment for similarly situated men and women.17
The gender-based distinction in § 402(g) of the Social Security Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Powell concurs in the judgment and generally in the opinion of the Court but would identify the impermissible discrimination effected by § 402(g) somewhat more narrowly than the Court does.19 Social Security is designed for the protection of the family and is a contributory system on which millions of wage earners depend to provide basic protection for their families in the event of death or disability.20 Many women are the principal wage earners for their families and participate in the Social Security system on exactly the same basis as men.21
When the mother is a principal wage earner, the family may suffer as great an economic deprivation upon her death as would occur upon the death of a father wage earner.22 The statutory scheme therefore impermissibly discriminates against a female wage earner because it provides her family less protection than it provides that of a male wage earner, even though the family needs may be identical.23 He finds no legitimate governmental interest that supports this gender classification.24
Justice Rehnquist concurs in the result.25 Part III-B of the Court's opinion contains a thorough examination of the legislative history and statutory context which define the role and purpose of § 402(g).26 That examination convincingly demonstrates that the only purpose of § 402(g) is to make it possible for children of deceased contributing workers to have the personal care and attention of a surviving parent.27 This applies should that parent desire to remain in the home with the child.28 The Government's proffered legislative purpose is so totally at odds with the context and history of § 402(g) that it cannot serve as a basis for judging whether the statutory distinction between men and women rationally serves a valid legislative objective.29
He sees no necessity for reaching the issue of whether the statute's purported discrimination against female workers violates the Fifth Amendment as applied in Frontiero v. Richardson.30 He would simply conclude that the restriction of § 402(g) benefits to surviving mothers does not rationally serve any valid legislative purpose.31 This is so because it is irrational to distinguish between mothers and fathers when the sole question is whether a child of a deceased contributing worker should have the opportunity to receive the full-time attention of the only parent remaining to it.32