422 U.S. 749 (1975)
In May 1972, Grace Salfi married Londo L. Salfi, a fully insured wage earner under the Social Security Act.1
Despite his apparent good health at the time of the marriage, he suffered a heart attack less than a month later and died on November 21, 1972.2 Appellee Salfi filed applications for mother's insurance benefits for herself and child's insurance benefits for her daughter Doreen Kalnins by a previous marriage.3
These applications were denied by the Social Security Administration, both initially and on reconsideration, solely on the basis of the duration-of-relationship requirements.4 The named appellees then filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.5
They principally relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for jurisdiction and sought to represent the class of all widows and stepchildren denied benefits because the wage earner died within nine months of the marriage.6 The complaint alleged at least partial exhaustion of remedies with regard to their personal claims but made no similar allegations with regard to other class members.7
They sought declaratory relief against the challenged statute and injunctive relief restraining the Secretary from denying benefits on that basis.8 A three-judge District Court heard the case on cross-motions for summary judgment.9
The court granted substantially all of the relief prayed for by appellees, including a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional, certification of the class, an injunction against denying benefits, and an order to provide benefits from the time of original entitlement.10 The Secretary appealed from that judgment, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.11
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers jurisdiction over this action challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Social Security Act?12
The third sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) provides that no action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.13 Section 405(g) provides that any individual after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing may obtain review by civil action.14
No. The action seeks to recover Social Security benefits.15 It is the Social Security Act which provides both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation of appellees' constitutional contentions.16 The third sentence of § 405(h) therefore precludes resort to federal-question jurisdiction.17
The named appellees thus satisfy the requirements for § 405(g) judicial review, and we proceed to the merits of their claim. The Secretary determined that the reconsideration determination is final for purposes of this litigation.18
The District Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the action but had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the named appellees only.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
The Court is wrong about the intended reach of § 405(h).20 Section 405(h) merely codifies the usual requirements of administrative exhaustion.21 This action does not arise under Title II in the manner intended by § 405(h) because it challenges the constitutionality of the statute and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief rather than immediate recovery on a claim.22
The last sentence of § 405(h) is not sweeping in the way the majority reads it.23 The sentence does not say that no action of any kind shall be brought under § 1331.24 Instead, it says merely that no action shall be brought under § 1331 et seq. to recover on any claim arising under Title II.25
Whether the District Court properly certified a class action without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for all class members?26
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requires a final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing for judicial review. The class cannot satisfy the requirements for jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) because the complaint contains no allegations that class members have even filed an application.27
No. The class includes persons who have not filed applications with the Secretary, much less that he has rendered any decision, final or otherwise, review of which is sought.28 The complaint is deficient in that it contains no allegations that class members have even filed an application with the Secretary.29 The named plaintiffs cannot represent these groups.30
The District Court erred in certifying the class without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies for all class members.31
Whether the nine-month duration-of-relationship requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5) and (e)(2) violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?32
A statutory classification in the area of social welfare is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it is rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.33 The standard is whether the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.34
No. The duration-of-relationship requirement is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of preventing the use of marriages solely to obtain social security benefits.35 The requirement is part of a substantive definition of eligibility for benefits.36
The means chosen are not patently arbitrary because Congress could rationally conclude that the expense and difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.37 The requirement operates to lessen the likelihood of abuse through sham relationships entered in contemplation of imminent death and is supported by legislative history showing concern with exploitation of the fund.38
The duration-of-relationship requirement does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
The duration-of-relationship requirement creates an irrebuttable presumption that marriages lasting less than nine months are sham marriages entered into solely for the purpose of obtaining social security benefits.40 This presumption is not rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest asserted.41 The governmental interest in preventing fraud can be served by less drastic means such as individualized hearings to determine whether the marriage was entered into in good faith.42
The nine-month rule is arbitrary and cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.43
On the merits, the main problem with these legislatively created presumptions is that they frequently invade the right to a jury trial.44 The present law was designed to bar payment of certain Social Security benefits when the purpose of the marriage was to obtain such benefits.45 Whether this was the aim of a particular marriage is a question of fact, to be decided by the jury in an appropriate case.46
I would vacate and remand the case to give Mrs. Salfi the right to show that her marriage did not offend the statutory scheme.47