Vodusekv.Bayliner Marine Corp.

Whether a jury may decide all issues in a case involving both admiralty and law claims?¹⁵

When claims at law and in admiralty arise out of the same accident and injuries, the pragmatic procedural rule from Fitzgerald applies.¹⁶ It requires that both the admiralty claim and the law claim be decided by the jury.¹⁷ Only one trier of fact is used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments.¹⁸

Yes. Shirley Vodusek sued Bayliner Marine Corp. at law under diversity jurisdiction and Stammer’s Marine Center, Inc. in admiralty because the explosion occurred on navigable waters.¹⁹ All claims arose from the same June 1989 boating accident in which Donald Vodusek fueled the boat, turned on the bilge pump, suffered severe burns, and later died.²⁰ The claims name different defendants alleged to have contributed through different conduct.²¹

Yet the underlying reasons motivating the Supreme Court’s decision in Fitzgerald counsel extending the rule here.²² Submitting both sets of claims to the jury better ensures that neither duplicative nor inadequate damages are awarded.²³ It also avoids substantial problems of applying principles of collateral estoppel when claims are tried separately, such as the need for complicating interrogatories if the jury decided against Vodusek on her law claims.²⁴

The district court properly submitted the entire case to the jury, rendering its independent admiralty decision superfluous.²⁵

Whether a district court may properly permit a jury to draw an adverse inference from a party’s spoliation of relevant evidence?²⁶

Under the spoliation of evidence rule, an adverse inference may be drawn against a party who destroys relevant evidence.²⁷ This may occur even without a showing of bad faith.²⁸ The party must have known the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and his willful conduct must have resulted in its loss or destruction.²⁹ The rule is one of evidence administered at the discretion of the trial court rather than an affirmative defense.³⁰

Yes. Douglas Halsey together with Vodusek’s two sons employed destructive methods including a chain saw and sledge hammer.³¹ These methods rendered many portions of the boat useless for examination by the defendants and their experts.³² The critical area was literally ripped apart and the structural integrity was violated.³³

As a result the defendants could not make a full and fair inspection or develop alternative theories.³⁴ Although Vodusek correctly notes there was no evidence of bad faith, she does not dispute that the portions were permanently destroyed as part of Halsey’s deliberate investigative efforts.³⁵ Halsey’s conclusion that the destroyed portions were not relevant ignored the possibility that others might have entertained different theories.³⁶ The district court therefore acted within its discretion in permitting the jury to draw an adverse inference if it found that Vodusek or her agents caused destruction or loss of relevant evidence. Rather than deciding the spoliation issue itself, the court provided the jury with appropriate guidelines for evaluating the evidence.³⁷

The district court properly submitted the spoliation of evidence question to the jury and permitted the adverse inference instruction.³⁸

Whether the district court abused its discretion in permitting cross-examination of an expert witness with deposition transcripts of non-testifying experts?³⁹

Once an expert testifies that he read and rejected other experts’ out-of-court opinions, the district court has discretion to permit cross-examination.⁴⁰ The cross-examination may explore the basis for that disagreement even if it reaches into what would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay.⁴¹

No. Douglas Halsey testified at trial that he had read all of the non-testifying experts’ depositions and disagreed with their conclusions that the fire started at the rear of the fuel tank.⁴² In light of that testimony, defendants’ counsel cross-examined Halsey as to why he rejected those opinions by referring to the deposition transcripts.⁴³ The district court acted within its discretion in permitting such cross-examination of Halsey and did not abuse that discretion.⁴⁴

The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the cross-examination of the expert witness.⁴⁵

Whether the district court erred in interpreting 33 C.F.R. § 183.554 as not covering fuel vent hoses?⁴⁶

Whether the district court correctly interpreted a regulation is irrelevant.⁴⁷ Any error is harmless when the jury never reached the issue to which the regulation might have pertained, as shown by the jury’s responses to special interrogatories.⁴⁸

No. The jury concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove that a leak in the fuel tank vent hose in the cabin was a proximate cause of the fire.⁴⁹ Because the jury’s responses to special interrogatories indicate that it never reached the negligent design issue to which the regulation might have pertained, Vodusek can demonstrate no harm from the court’s interpretation of 33 C.F.R. § 183.554 as not covering an uninterrupted run of vent hose.⁵⁰

Any error in the district court’s interpretation of the regulation was harmless.⁵¹