354 U.S. 416 (1957)
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., petitioner, and Patricia Vanderbilt, respondent, were married in 1948.1 They separated in 1952 while living in California.2 The wife moved to New York where she has resided since February 1953.3
In March of that year the husband filed suit for divorce in Nevada.4 This proceeding culminated, in June 1953, with a decree of final divorce which provided that both husband and wife were “freed and released from the bonds of matrimony and all the duties and obligations thereof. ...”5 The wife was not served with process in Nevada and did not appear before the divorce court.6
In April 1954, Mrs. Vanderbilt instituted an action in a New York court praying for separation from petitioner and for alimony.7 The New York court did not have personal jurisdiction over him.8 To satisfy any obligations he might owe Mrs. Vanderbilt, it sequestered his property within the State.9 He appeared specially and, among other defenses to the action, contended that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution compelled the New York court to treat the Nevada divorce as having ended the marriage and as having destroyed any duty of support which he owed the respondent.10
While the New York court found the Nevada decree valid and held that it had effectively dissolved the marriage, it nevertheless entered an order, under § 1170-b of the New York Civil Practice Act, directing petitioner to make designated support payments to respondent.11 The New York Court of Appeals upheld the support order.12 Petitioner then applied to this Court for certiorari contending that § 1170-b, as applied, is unconstitutional because it contravenes the Full Faith and Credit Clause.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires New York to recognize a Nevada divorce decree, obtained without personal jurisdiction over the wife, as terminating the husband's duty to provide her support?15
It has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.16 The Nevada divorce court therefore lacked power to cut off the wife’s support right.17 This is the same limitation that would apply if the wife had brought the divorce action and the husband had not been subject to the divorce court’s jurisdiction.18 Therefore, the Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife’s right to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New York to give it recognition.19
No. The rule requires personal jurisdiction over the defendant before a court may adjudicate personal obligations such as a duty of support.20 Applying the rule to the established facts, the wife moved to New York in February 1953 and was never served with process in the Nevada proceeding that culminated in the June 1953 decree.21 The Nevada court therefore lacked power to extinguish her New York support rights even though the decree purported to free both parties from all duties of matrimony.22 The New York court properly sequestered the husband’s property and entered a support order under section 1170-b after finding the marriage dissolved but the support obligation intact.23
This application confirms that the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes no obligation on New York to treat the ex parte Nevada decree as terminating support.24
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require New York to recognize a Nevada divorce decree, obtained without personal jurisdiction over the wife, as terminating the husband's duty to provide her support.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan dissented. He argued that the Court need not decide whether the Nevada decree was void under due process.26 Instead the initial question should be whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause compelled New York to respect the decree.27
If Mrs. Vanderbilt was a New York domiciliary at the time of the divorce, New York could apply its own policy that support rights survive an ex parte divorce.28 The interest of New York in protecting its domiciliaries justified applying local policy on the survival of support rights after an ex parte divorce obtained elsewhere.29 Harlan would remand the case to the state court for clarification on whether Mrs. Vanderbilt qualified as a New York domiciliary under state law at the time of the Nevada decree.30
Justice Frankfurter dissented. He maintained that Estin v. Estin did not control because the prior New York support order had been crucial to that decision, yet the Court now treated its absence as immaterial.31 He argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires New York to respect the entire Nevada judgment, including the denial of alimony.32
Pennoyer v. Neff should not be extended to prevent a domiciliary state from adjudicating alimony incidentally to an ex parte divorce.33 Frankfurter would hold that Nevada had jurisdiction to determine alimony and that New York must give full faith and credit to the whole Nevada judgment rather than only part of it.34
Whether the lack of a prior New York support judgment distinguishes this case from Estin v. Estin on the question of full faith and credit obligations toward an ex parte divorce decree?35
In Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, this Court decided that a Nevada divorce court, which had no personal jurisdiction over the wife, had no power to terminate a husband’s obligation to provide her support as required in a preexisting New York separation decree.36 The factor which distinguishes the present case from Estin is that here the wife’s right to support had not been reduced to judgment prior to the husband’s ex parte divorce.37 In our opinion this difference is not material on the question before us.38
No. The distinction based on the absence of a prior support judgment is not material because the key element remains the lack of personal jurisdiction over the wife in the divorce proceeding.39 Applying the rule to the established facts, no prior New York judgment existed here unlike in Estin, yet the Nevada court still could not terminate the support right that New York law afforded the wife.40 The New York court’s order under section 1170-b was upheld on appeal, demonstrating that full faith and credit obligations do not vary according to whether the support right had already been reduced to judgment.41 The same jurisdictional limitation therefore governs both the adjudicated and unadjudicated support contexts.42
The lack of a prior New York support judgment does not distinguish this case from Estin v. Estin on the question of full faith and credit obligations toward an ex parte divorce decree.43