599 U.S. 670 (2023)
In January 2021, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum setting enforcement priorities for the detention and removal of noncitizens found in the country illegally.1
In February 2021, Immigration and Customs Enforcement issued a second memorandum that modified the priorities and generally required pre-approval for enforcement actions against persons outside the priority groups.2
A new Secretary of Homeland Security later issued a Final Memorandum.3 It directed personnel to consider non-statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.4 It also stated that personnel should not rely on the fact of a qualifying conviction when exercising prosecutorial discretion.5
Texas and Louisiana sued the Department of Homeland Security and other federal officials and agencies in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.6 The States claimed that the Guidelines contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and § 1231(a)(2) by failing to arrest more criminal noncitizens pending their removal.7 The States asserted that the Department's failure to comply with those statutory mandates imposes costs on the States.8 Such costs include continued incarceration or supply of social services including healthcare and education to noncitizens who should be arrested by the Federal Government.9
After a two-day bench trial, the District Court found that the States would incur additional costs as a result of the Guidelines.10 The court made detailed findings on the detainer system.11 It noted that ICE had rescinded 141 detainers in Texas in the first month after the policy change.12 The court also found that ICE continued to rescind detainers after the Final Memorandum.13 It identified 15 specific cases.14 The court found that the Government persistently underutilized existing detention facilities.15 The average daily detained population in April 2022 was less than 40 percent of the three-year high in August 2019.16
The court identified four categories of costs to Texas.17 These included dollars-and-cents costs for supervising criminal aliens released in violation of the statutes.18 They also included costs associated with criminal recidivism.19 Additional costs were for juvenile offenders attending public schools.20 There were also increased healthcare costs.21
The District Court determined that the States had standing based on those costs.22 It ruled that the Guidelines are unlawful and vacated the Guidelines.23 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court's judgment.24 This Court granted certiorari before judgment.25
Whether the States of Texas and Louisiana have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security's 2021 Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law?26
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and judicially cognizable.27 The injury must be caused by the defendant and redressable by a favorable court order.28 The injury must be of a type traditionally thought capable of resolution through the judicial process.29 Federal courts have not traditionally entertained suits by parties seeking to compel the Executive Branch to alter its arrest or prosecution policies so as to make more arrests or prosecutions.30 A plaintiff lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.31
No.32 Although the District Court found that the States would incur additional costs due to the Guidelines' effect on immigration enforcement, these monetary injuries are not legally and judicially cognizable under Article III.33 The Supreme Court has long held that a party lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.34 This principle was established in Linda R. S. v. Richard D.35 The States cite no precedent or historical practice supporting standing to compel the Executive to make more arrests.36 Moreover, such suits implicate the Executive's Article II authority to decide how to prioritize enforcement actions.37 They also lack meaningful judicial standards for review given inevitable resource constraints.38
The District Court's findings that Texas incurred costs from rescinded detainers and underutilized facilities establish concrete financial harm.39 Yet these harms arise from the Executive's exercise of enforcement discretion over third parties rather than any direct coercion against the States.40 Historical practice confirms that federal courts do not order the Executive to change arrest policies in this manner.41 The States' claims fall squarely within the principle that enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions is not subject to judicial redirection through lawsuits of this kind.42
The States of Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines.43
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Thomas And Barrett, Jj.
Justice Gorsuch concurs in the judgment but diagnoses the jurisdictional defect as a lack of redressability rather than the absence of a judicially cognizable injury.44 He notes that the district court found the Guidelines caused the States to spend more on law enforcement, incarceration, and social services.45 Yet 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) bars lower courts from enjoining or restraining the operation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and § 1231(a)(2).46 Even a vacatur order under the APA would not redress the injuries.47 It would leave federal officials with the same underlying prosecutorial discretion intact.48 It would not compel any change in enforcement priorities.49
Gorsuch further questions whether the APA authorizes vacatur at all.50 He observes that the statute's direction to set aside agency action more naturally instructs courts to disregard unlawful action in deciding cases rather than to nullify rules with respect to nonparties worldwide.51
Justice Alito dissents, arguing that Texas easily satisfies the traditional three-part test for Article III standing.52 The district court's detailed factual findings after trial established concrete, particularized injuries.53 These took the form of supervision costs, recidivism costs, education costs, and healthcare costs.54 The injuries were directly traceable to the Final Memorandum's rescission of detainers.55 These injuries are redressable by vacatur of the memorandum.56 Vacatur would likely cause DHS personnel to retain more detainers.57
Alito criticizes the majority for brushing aside controlling precedent such as Massachusetts v. EPA.58 He also criticizes the majority for transforming merits issues like Heckler v. Chaney into standing rules.59 Finally, he criticizes the majority for adopting a novel and capacious view of executive enforcement discretion that upsets the constitutional balance between Congress and the Executive.60