144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024)
A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), prohibits an individual who is subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm if the order includes certain findings. The question presented is whether that provision may be enforced against respondent Zackey Rahimi consistent with the Second Amendment.
Rahimi was the subject of a Texas state restraining order that, by consent, found he had committed family violence, that the violence was likely to occur again, and that he represented a credible threat to the physical safety of his intimate partner or her child. The order prohibited him from threatening or contacting the protected person and suspended his gun license for two years. After later criminal investigations, police executed a warrant at Rahimi's home and found firearms and ammunition there, along with a copy of the order. Rahimi was indicted under § 922(g)(8) and moved to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds; the District Court denied the motion, he pleaded guilty, and the Fifth Circuit ultimately reversed in light of Bruen.
We granted certiorari to resolve whether § 922(g)(8) is consistent with the Second Amendment.
Section 922(g)(8) allows a prosecution only where three statutory criteria are met: (A) the defendant received actual notice and an opportunity to be heard before the order was entered; (B) the order restrains the defendant from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child; and (C) the order either contains a finding that the defendant "represents a credible threat to the physical safety" of the protected person, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), or by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against that person, § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Rahimi's order satisfied these requirements.
The District Court denied Rahimi's facial challenge, he pleaded guilty, and the Fifth Circuit later, after our decision in Bruen, reversed, concluding the Government had not shown § 922(g)(8) fits within our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. We now consider the Government's showing under Bruen's historical-analogue framework.
The Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, but that right is not unlimited. Heller established that analysis begins with constitutional text and history, and Bruen clarified that when the Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Government must show the challenged regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. When a modern regulation does not precisely match a founding-era law, it may nonetheless be a permissible "historical analogue" if it is relevantly similar in both why and how it burdens the right.
Historical inquiry thus focuses on the principles that underlie the Nation's regulatory tradition and asks whether those principles have been faithfully applied to modern circumstances. Why and how a regulation burdens the right are therefore central to the Bruen analysis; a modern law need not be a "dead ringer" or "historical twin" of a single antecedent regulation, but there must be a relevantly similar historical practice reflecting comparable burdens and comparable justifications.
Rahimi mounted a facial challenge, which requires him to show there is no set of circumstances in which the statute would be constitutional. Salerno explains that a defendant bringing a facial challenge must establish that the statute is unconstitutional in all of its applications; thus the Government need only demonstrate the statute is constitutional in some applications. Here the Government has carried that burden as applied to Rahimi because his restraining order included a judicial finding that he posed a credible threat to the physical safety of another.
Turning to history, our Founding-era and post-Founding regulatory tradition contained systems designed to prevent and respond to threats of violence by particular individuals. The Court's preceding decisions and the historical record identify two relevant regimes: the surety laws and the so-called going-armed (affray) laws. Surety laws authorized magistrates to require suspected wrongdoers to post bonds—sureties of the peace—that they would not break the peace; failure to post a bond could result in jail, and breach of the bond led to monetary forfeiture. These preventive measures applied to a range of threatened misconduct, including threats of domestic abuse, and often included procedural protections and time limits.
The going-armed or affray laws addressed the public terror caused by persons going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons so as to terrify the people. These laws permitted forfeiture of arms and imprisonment and were directed at public conduct that threatened public order rather than at private interpersonal violence per se.
Considered together, surety and going-armed laws illustrate a historical principle: when an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the community and its magistrates historically had authority to take preventive or punitive measures, including measures that curtailed access to weapons. The Government has therefore identified a tradition of disarming or restricting arms for persons found to present a danger to others.
Section 922(g)(8) is not identical to those regimes, but it need not be. Like surety laws, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies only after a judicial determination that a particular individual presents a credible threat to another's physical safety. Like some surety practices, the statutory restriction is limited in duration: it lasts so long as the restraining order is in effect. And although the surety laws used financial penalties rather than immediate disarmament, the going-armed statutes could result in imprisonment, a penalty that historically accompanied loss of arms; thus temporary disarmament under judicial order is comparable in kind though not identical in form.
Heller and Bruen do not require the Government to produce a founding-era law identical to § 922(g)(8). Instead, they require that the modern regulation be consistent with the principles underlying the historical tradition. For an individual who has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to another's physical safety, our history shows that temporary measures restricting access to arms were an accepted method to reduce the risk of violence. For these reasons § 922(g)(8) is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition as applied to an individual like Rahimi.
We reject the Fifth Circuit's approach, which demanded a "historical twin" rather than a relevant analogue and improperly resolved Rahimi's facial challenge by focusing on hypotheticals where the provision might raise concerns instead of the statute's constitutionality in its likely and actual applications.
We also reject the Government's alternative theory that Congress may disarm people simply because they are not "responsible." That term, used in prior opinions to describe those who undoubtedly enjoy the right, is vague, undefined, and not a basis for categorical disarmament absent historical support.
We hold that an individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment, and that § 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to Rahimi. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
I join the Court's opinion upholding § 922(g)(8) under Bruen, though I have previously registered disagreement with Bruen itself. The Court correctly applies Bruen's history-and-tradition framework and properly recognizes that a challenged regulation need not have a precise historical analogue to survive; rather, courts should ask whether the modern law comports with the principles that underpinned permissible historical regulations.
Here the Government has shown that the historical surety and going-armed regimes support the conclusion that the Second Amendment allows temporary disarmament of individuals found by a court to pose a credible threat of physical violence. Those historical practices were designed to prevent violence before it occurred or to punish menacing public conduct; read together, they support the conclusion that, consistent with the Second Amendment, focused regulations aimed at particular dangerous individuals are permissible.
I write separately to emphasize that the Court's interpretation of Bruen is the useful one: it permits a calibrated historical inquiry that produces transferable principles applicable to modern problems, rather than an exacting demand for historic duplications that would make the inquiry largely unworkable. I remain concerned, however, that Bruen's exclusive reliance on history is myopic and does not allow the means-end analysis used in other contexts; under a means-end test § 922(g)(8) would be even more plainly constitutional. Nonetheless, because Bruen controls and because § 922(g)(8) satisfies the historical-analogue test as applied here, I join the Court's opinion.
I concur. Rahimi brings a facial challenge to A7 922(g)(8), and he has not shown that no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid. The Government need only demonstrate that the statute is constitutional in some applications, and it has done so here because Rahimi was the subject of a judicial finding that he presents a credible threat to another's physical safety.
Text and history govern our analysis. When the text covers the conduct, the Government must show the regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation. Here, through surety and going-armed practices, the historical record supports temporary disarmament of persons judged dangerous. Because the challenged statute is consistent with that historical tradition in at least some applications, the facial challenge fails and I join the Court's judgment.
I join the Court's opinion and write to emphasize the proper role of text, history, and precedent in constitutional interpretation. The Constitution's text controls; where the text is broadly worded or ambiguous, pre-ratification history, post-ratification practice, and precedent guide interpretation. That methodology underlies Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and today's decision.
The Court here faithfully applies that approach. It examines text and tradition and concludes that the Nation's historical tradition permits disarming individuals deemed a credible threat to others after judicial determinations. Traditions reflected in surety and going-armed laws. The approach respects the judicial role, relies on evidence rather than policy preference, and fosters predictability while leaving political choices to the people and their representatives.
Justice Barrett, concurring.
The Second Amendment codified a pre-existing right and the pre-existing limits on that right are part of its scope. Originalist methodology focuses on the meaning of the text at ratification, though postenactment tradition can be probative and under some circumstances controlling. Bruen required courts to look to the Nation's tradition of firearm regulation and to permit historical analogues rather than identical precursors.
Applying that framework here, §922(g)(8)(C)(i)'s application to individuals subject to judicial findings of a credible threat fits within the historical tradition embodied in surety and going-armed laws. Those regimes illustrate a historical principle that persons who present a distinct danger may be subject to restrictions; §922(g)(8) aligns with that principle and thus survives Rahimi's facial challenge as applied to the facts of his case.
I would have joined the dissent in Bruen, but Bruen is binding precedent. Today's decision applies Bruen reasonably and reaches a principled result: the Government identified sufficient historical evidence in the surety and going-armed traditions to justify temporary disarmament of individuals found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others.
That said, Bruen's history-only approach has produced confusion in lower courts. Bruen's demands for historic analogues and the level of generality at which courts should identify principles have left many practical questions unresolved. The Court should be mindful of how its standards operate in practice and strive for clarity where possible. Nonetheless, applying Bruen here yields a defensible outcome, and I join the Court's judgment.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
After Bruen, the Government must demonstrate that a firearm regulation is consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation when the Amendment's text covers the regulated conduct. § 922(g)(8) makes it a federal felony for a person subject to certain civil protective orders to possess firearms or ammunition. The majority upholds § 922(g)(8) as applied to Rahimi, but I would hold the statute unconstitutional.
Section 922(g)(8) is triggered by a civil restraining order and automatically bars possession of all firearms and ammunition without requiring a criminal conviction. It reaches possession in the home and elsewhere and carries severe penalties, including a felony conviction that can lead to permanent disarmament. The Government has not identified a single historical law that is a relevantly similar analogue—one that imposed a comparable burden and a comparable justification—to § 922(g)(8).
The historical practices the Government invokes are the surety laws and affray (going-armed) laws. Surety laws required a person suspected of wrongdoing to post a surety of the peace; they did not deprive a person of firearms, did not criminalize mere possession, and generally imposed lesser burdens (monetary forfeiture) than § 922(g)(8). Affray laws targeted public conduct that terrorized the community; they addressed public disturbances and often required proof of actual public harm. Those regimes were materially different in both justification and burden from § 922(g)(8), which reaches private interpersonal violence and strips the right to possess firearms rather than imposing narrowly tailored, temporary financial sureties or criminal penalties following conviction.
The majority's attempt to combine elements of the surety and affray traditions to find a historical analogue is inconsistent with Bruen's command that courts identify relevantly similar historical regulations. Courts may not cobble together multiple, distinct historical practices to validate a sweeping modern restriction that the historical record does not support. Because the Government has failed to meet its burden, I would hold § 922(g)(8) inconsistent with the Second Amendment and dissent.