483 F.2d 1222
In the summer of 1970, Charles Keitt drove with two companions to an alley behind Bennie L. Peterson's house in the District of Columbia to remove windshield wipers from Peterson's wrecked car parked there.1 Upon learning of Keitt's actions, Peterson emerged from his house into the backyard to object.2 After a verbal exchange, Peterson returned inside, retrieved a pistol, and came back out.3
He loaded the pistol and warned Keitt not to move or enter the yard, threatening to shoot or kill him.4 Keitt exited his car, retrieved a lug wrench, and advanced toward Peterson with it raised.5 Peterson shot Keitt in the face from approximately ten feet away, resulting in instantaneous death.6 Peterson then left the scene and was arrested about twenty blocks away.7
In a post-arrest statement to police, Peterson claimed he had previously warned Keitt against taking items from the car, that he armed himself after seeing Keitt reach for the wrench, and that he fired only to scare Keitt after becoming frightened.8 Peterson was indicted for second-degree murder.9 At trial, the district court denied Peterson's motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence.10 The jury convicted Peterson of manslaughter as a lesser included offense.11
Peterson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, raising challenges to the voir dire examination, the denial of acquittal, and two aspects of the jury instructions regarding self-defense.12 Prior to jury selection, Peterson's counsel requested three specific questions for the veniremen concerning inferences from the indictment, attitudes toward fatalities requiring someone to pay, and fears of firearms.13 The trial judge denied the request.14 The judge instructed the veniremen that the indictment was not evidence in the case but only the means by which Peterson was notified of the charge against him.15 The judge asked whether there was any reason why anyone would not be a fair and impartial juror.16
Whether the trial judge erroneously excluded three requested questions from the voir dire examination of prospective jurors?17
The trial judge retains broad discretion as to the questions which may be addressed on voir dire examination, subject to the essential demands of fairness.18 Exclusion of requested questions warrants reversal only if the judge's action exceeded the bounds of discretion to the defendant's prejudice.19
No. The trial judge denied Peterson's request for three specific questions on voir dire regarding inferences from the indictment, attitudes toward fatalities requiring someone to pay, and fears of firearms.20 Instead, the judge instructed the veniremen that the indictment was not evidence.21 The judge paraphrased the charge involving a fatality by firearm.22 The judge asked a broad question whether there was any reason why anyone would not be a fair and impartial juror.23
None of the proposed questions related to matters known to evoke strong community prejudices apt to interfere with impartial verdicts.24 Peterson laid no foundation showing likely prejudice or that the questions were calculated to discover actual prejudice.25 The general inquiry was sufficient to elicit any bias.26
The trial judge did not err in excluding the three requested questions from the voir dire examination.27
Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support a conviction of manslaughter?28
No. The evidence showed that Peterson retrieved and loaded a pistol.31 Peterson warned Keitt not to move or enter the yard.32 Peterson threatened to kill him.33 Peterson shot him as Keitt approached with a lug wrench after Keitt had indicated he was leaving.34
This presented factual issues as to whether Peterson was the aggressor by provoking the encounter.35 This presented factual issues as to whether his failure to retreat affected the justification for deadly force.36 The jury could find that Peterson's conduct was an invitation to the encounter, making self-defense unavailable.37
The evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction of manslaughter.38
Whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that it could consider whether Peterson was the aggressor in the altercation leading to the homicide?39
One who is the aggressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the right of self-defense unless he communicates his intent to withdraw and in good faith attempts to do so.40 An affirmative unlawful act reasonably calculated to produce an affray is an aggression which nullifies the right of homicidal self-defense.41
No. The evidence established that after the initial verbal exchange, Keitt was about to leave the scene.42 Peterson then reemerged from the house with a loaded pistol, paused in the yard to load it, and commanded Keitt not to move.43 He walked through the yard to the rear gate, displayed the pistol, dared Keitt to come in, and threatened to kill him if he did.44 This conduct presented a jury question as to whether Peterson provoked the fatal encounter.45
The conduct was consistent with precedents where arming and returning to the scene to stir trouble forfeited the self-defense claim.46
The trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the aggressor principle.47
Whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that Peterson's failure to retreat, if he could have done so safely, could be considered in determining whether the force used was justified?48
In the District of Columbia, the doctrine of retreat persists as part of the strict necessity requirement for self-defense, though there is no duty to retreat when it would be perilous or from an assault producing imminent danger of death or grievous bodily harm.49 The castle doctrine, allowing no duty to retreat in one's home or curtilage, is unavailable to one who is at fault in bringing on the conflict.50
No. Peterson was standing in his yard but was the aggressor by his provocative conduct after Keitt had withdrawn.51 The instruction properly stated that failure to retreat when it could have been done safely was a circumstance to consider in determining if the force was excessive.52 The castle exception did not apply because Peterson was not without fault.53 The charge incorporated the limitations that no retreat is required if perilous or in face of imminent deadly danger.54
The trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the retreat principle.55