657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011)
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-10494
D. C. Docket No. 04-60001 CR-MGC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Cross-Appellant,
versus
KIFAH WAEL JAYYOUSI,
a.k.a. Abu Mohamed,
ADHAM AMIN HASSOUN,
Defendants-Appellants,
JOSE PADILLA,
a.k.a. Ibrahim,
a.k.a. Abu Abdullah Al Mujahir,
a.k.a. Abu Abu Abdullah the Puerto Rican,
Defendant-Appellant,
Cross-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
(September 19, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
DUBINA, Chief Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted Appellants
Adham Hassoun, Kifah Jayyousi, and Jose Padilla (referred to individually by
name or collectively as “defendants”), along with Mohammed Youssef and
Kassem Daher, for offenses relating to their support for Islamist violence
overseas.1 Count 1 charged defendants with conspiring in the United States to
murder, kidnap, or maim persons overseas. 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1).2 Count 2
charged defendants with conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to commit the
substantive 18 U.S.C. § 2339A offense of “provid[ing] material support or
resources or conceal[ing] or disguis[ing] the nature, [or] source . . . of material
support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation
for, or in carrying out, a violation of [§ 956(a)(1), i.e., a conspiracy to murder,
kidnap or maim overseas].” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Count 3 charged defendants with
a substantive § 2339A material support offense based upon an underlying §
956(a)(1) conspiracy. The charged conduct began in October of 1993 and
continued until November 1, 2001. Before trial, this court reversed the district
court’s order dismissing the most serious count, Count 1, for multiplicity. *United
States v. Hassoun*, 476 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2007).
Trial commenced on April 16, 2007, and four months later, the jury returned
a special verdict convicting defendants on all counts. The jury expressly found
each of the three objects of the Count 1 conspiracy (the murder of persons outside
the United States, the kidnapping of persons outside the United States, and the
maiming of persons outside the United States) and found that Padilla’s and
Hassoun’s offenses continued beyond October 26, 2001, but Jayyousi’s offense
did not. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for judgment of
acquittal and new trial. On Count 1, the district court sentenced Padilla to 208
months, Hassoun to 188 months, and Jayyousi to 152 months’ imprisonment. On
Count 2, the district court sentenced each defendant to the maximum 60 months’
imprisonment. On Count 3, the district court sentenced Padilla and Hassoun to the
maximum of 180 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Jayyousi to the maximum
of 120 months’ imprisonment. The district court made all sentences run
concurrently and imposed a 20-year period of supervised release for each
defendant. The defendants appeal, and the government cross-appeals Padilla’s
sentence.
II. ISSUES
John Kavanaugh.
all counts and Jayyousi’s conviction on Count 3, the substantive material support
offense.
Rohan Gunaratna.
Jayyousi portions of a television interview with Osama bin Laden.
statements he made during an interview with FBI agents.
indictment based on alleged outrageous government conduct.
innocent intent.3
severance.
defendants’ sentences.
substantively in sentencing Padilla.
III. TRIAL EVIDENCE
The government’s theory at trial was that the defendants formed a support
cell linked to radical Islamists worldwide and conspired to send money, recruits
and equipment overseas to groups that the defendants knew used violence in their
efforts to establish Islamic states. The government posited that the defendants’
efforts supported an international network of radical Islamists, including al-Qaeda
and other terrorist groups such as Maktab al-Khidamat (“MAK”), the precursor to
al-Qaeda founded by Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, and The Islamic Group of
Egypt founded by an Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (“the Blind
Sheikh”). The government claimed that each defendant performed an important,
but different, role in this support cell. To support its theory, the government
presented evidence of intercepted telephone calls among defendants, faxes from
support groups to defendants, checks and receipts showing financial transactions
by defendants, and an al-Qaeda “mujahideen identification form” that the
government contended Padilla completed in July 2000, in order to attend a jihad
training camp.
The defendants’ primary defense was their lack of intent to support a violent
form of jihad. They contended that they provided only humanitarian aid to
oppressed Muslims and did not knowingly participate in a conspiracy to provide
material support or resources for terrorist organizations that engaged in murder,
kidnapping, or maiming in their efforts to establish Islamic states.
The government began its presentation of evidence with Jennifer Keenan,
an FBI special agent, who was a legal attache in Yemen and Islamabad, Pakistan,
in 2001. During this time, United States personnel obtained evidence such as
photographs, letters, documents, passports, videotapes, and a blue binder from
Kandahar, Afghanistan. The FBI reviewed them for any imminent threat
information. The FBI examined the binder for latent fingerprints, but did not
translate any of the documents in the binder. [Doc. 1061, p. 9–54.] Tom
Langston, a CIA officer, worked in Afghanistan collecting intelligence in support
of military operations. He testified that an individual brought him the blue binder,
telling Langston that he discovered it in an office that was formerly used by Arabs.
This individual was affiliated with a tribal network that was cooperating with the
United States against the Taliban. [Id. at 58, 67.]
Peter Carlson, Assistant Special Agent in charge of the Miami, Florida field
office for the United States Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service,
testified that he issued visas and passports and assisted United States citizens who
traveled abroad. [Id. at 85.] He identified a certified copy of Padilla’s passport
application that he received from Washington, D.C., copies of Padilla’s social
security card and driver’s license, and a certified copy of a passport application
that Padilla made in February 2001 in Karachi, Pakistan. [Id. at 101; Gov’t Ex.
408, 408A, 408D, 409.] Carlson also identified a photocopy of the signature page
and face page of Padilla’s allegedly lost 1996 passport. [Id.; Gov’t Ex. 409A.]
John Morgan, a fingerprint specialist, compared the prints from the blue binder
with the FBI’s print card containing Padilla’s prints. [Doc. 1098, p. 22.] He
identified Padilla’s prints on the front and back of a “mujahideen identification
form,” which was in the blue binder. [Id. at 35.] An FBI language analyst and
interpreter, Nancy Khouri, translated the documents in the blue binder, 403TR–A
through 403TR–E, from Arabic to English. She testified that the identification
form had “Top Secret” on the bottom of it, and the applicant noted on the form
that “Abu al–Fida” recommended him. [Id. at 148–49.] The applicant also noted
that he had traveled to Egypt for study, Saudi Arabia for hajj (pilgrimage), and
Yemen for jihad. [Id.] The applicant answered some questions in Arabic, stated
that his country was the United States, and gave his date of birth as 10/18/70,
which was the same as the birth date on Padilla’s passport. [Id. at 144, 148.]
The government then presented evidence from FBI language specialists and
agents identifying numerous exhibits containing translated summaries of
intercepted phone calls. One language specialist testified that he reviewed
verbatim transcripts of the calls and made verbatim translations. [Doc. 1099, p.
61.] When he drafted the summaries, he listened to the calls while he read the
translations to ensure a proper and accurate summary. [Id. at 80.] FBI Agent Kent
Hukill testified that Hassoun was the subject of an intelligence investigation that
Hukill, along with other agents, began in May 2002. [Doc. 1110, p. 77.] The
agents reviewed the audio summaries and identified the other defendants as part of
the investigation. [Id. at 90–91.] Agent Hukill interviewed Hassoun numerous
times and identified his voice on the recordings. [Id. at 106.] He testified that the
agents used verbatim transcripts of the pertinent call summaries, which numbered
700 out of 150,000 total calls. [Id. at 124.] He acknowledged that Padilla’s voice
was identified on only seven of the calls. [Id. at 162.]
Another government witness, Yahya Abrahim Goba, testified that he
attended an al-Qaeda camp for the purpose of preparing for jihad, which he
defined as military fighting. [Doc. 1383, p. 52.] When he obtained a visa from the
Pakistani Consulate en route to training camp, Goba told the personnel that he was
going to Afghanistan for “tourism.” [Id. at 61.] Goba stated that an individual
who wanted to attend camp had to have a known and trusted al-Qaeda contact
recommend him. [Id. at 59.] Goba explained that the camp participants stopped at
“guest houses” in Pakistan that were managed by the Taliban and used for new
recruits. Guards armed with AK-47 machine guns were at the guest houses. [Id.
at 72.] When a participant arrived at the guest house, he relinquished his passport
and other personal belongings to a trustee and filled out paperwork using an alias.
[Id. at 79–82.] Goba stated that a recruit participated in basic training at the
camps, which included war tactics, topography, and instruction with firearms and
explosives such as hand grenades, land mines and Molotov cocktails. [Id. at 98.]
Goba emphasized that no humanitarian work occurred at the guest houses, and the
recruits all practiced military jihad at the camp. [Id. at 195, 202.]
Other FBI language specialists testified regarding the translations of the
intercepted telephone calls. [Doc. 1111.] Fady Haydar stated that in numerous
calls, individuals referred to Padilla as “Ibrahim,” “Abu Abdullah,” or the
“Spanish Brother.” [Id. at 56.] Baria Dagher commented that Hassoun and
Jayyousi were the primary participants in the intercepted calls he translated, and
Joyce Kandalaft stated that she recognized the voices of Hassoun, Jayyousi,
Kaseem Daher, and Mohammad Youssef on the calls, and she noted that the
individuals often used nicknames. [Id. at 160.] The government admitted the
audiotapes through FBI Agent Russell Fincher, a counter-terrorism agent who
listened to numerous audio tapes and read transcripts while listening to the tapes.
Agent Fincher also interviewed Padilla at the Chicago O’Hare airport on May 8,
over the defendants’ authentication and relevancy objections. [Id. at 154.]
The government also presented the testimony of two individuals who met
some of the defendants at a mosque. Herbert Atwell testified that he attended a
mosque in South Florida where he met Hassoun and Padilla. [Doc. 1114, p. 6–48.]
Atwell stated that Hassoun would invite people in the mosque to be mujahideen
fighters, but that Hassoun was not recruiting people to be terrorist fighters. [Id. at
25.] Atwell understood that the mujahideen fight in wars for the cause of Islam.
[Id. at 43.] Jeremy Collins testified that he met Jayyousi at a mosque in California,
and after becoming friends with Jayyousi, learned that he was publishing a
newsletter, “The Islam Report.” [Id. at 49.] Collins stated that Jayyousi was
particularly concerned about the Blind Sheikh, who was convicted of conspiring to
blow up the World Trade Center, and solicited funds for his defense. [Id. at 64.]
Collins also met Mohamed Zaky at the California mosque and learned that
Zaky was forming an organization called “Save Bosnia Now,” which he later
renamed “American Worldwide Relief” (“AWR”), and this group worked with the
American Islamic Group. Collins performed several duties for AWR—he paid
bills, deposited checks, purchased medicine to send to Chechnya, sent sleeping
bags and shoes to Chechnya on behalf of AWR, and purchased minutes for
satellite phones AWR sent to Chechnya. [Id. at 70–77.] Later, AWR learned that
the satellite phones had been disconnected. AWR also sent hand-held walkie-
talkies to Chechnya. Jayyousi was President of AWR and made the decisions
about where the organization sent its aid. [Id. at 83, 111, 120]. Collins stated that
at some point he became concerned that AWR might be involved in more than
humanitarian aid to the Chechen refugees. [Id. at 88.] Collins began to distance
himself from AWR because the organization’s work “seemed to be more fighting
than relief work.” [Doc. 1115, p. 81.]
A. FBI Agent John Kavanaugh’s testimony
Over the defendants’ objections, the government presented the lay opinion
testimony of FBI Agent John Kavanaugh, who began working on the present case
in May 2002. [Doc. 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1123, 1120, 1121, 1140, 1141,
1393.] Agent Kavanaugh reviewed the telephone intercepts, the summaries for the
intercepts, financial records, interview summations, faxes, and other documents
pertaining to the case. Based on the present investigation and his participation in
over 20 terrorist-related cases, he remarked that the people who were involved in
terrorism-related cases used code words in their communications. [Doc. 1116, p.
90–91.] In reviewing the intercepted calls in this case, Agent Kavanaugh noticed
the use of code words such as “football” and “soccer” for jihad; “tourism” for
jihad; “tourist” for mujahideen; “sneakers” for support; “going on the picnic” for
travel to jihad; “married” for martyrdom; “trade” for jihad; “open up a market” for
opening a group in support of jihad; open up a “branch” for starting a jihad
support group; “the first area” for Afghanistan; “school over there to teach
football” for a place to train in jihad; “students” for Taliban; “iron” for weapon;
“joint venture” for a group of mujahideen; “full sponsorship” for income for room
and board (at training camp); and “open the door” for opportunity to go to jihad.
[Doc. 1116, p. 91, 141, 161; Doc. 1117, p. 21–61, 100, 105; Doc. 1118, p.
20–126.] Agent Kavanaugh stated that he knew the speakers were using code
words because on some occasions they said they were, and at other times he could
detect the speakers were using code words by the context of the conversations.
[Doc. 1116, p. 90–91.] The agent mentioned that the FBI did summarize a few of
the satellite calls, but they were not produced in full transcript form. [Doc. 1121,
p. 19.] He testified that the satellite phones were purchased through the AWR
organization.
Agent Kavanaugh testified that the defendants were also secretive in their
communications. The speakers on the intercepted calls mentioned that they were
not to discuss any “relief” matters over the phone [Id. at 99.]; that they knew the
lines were always monitored [Id. at 105.]; and that they did not like to “name
names or areas” during phone conversations. [Doc. 1141, p. 131–33.] Jayyousi
mentioned in one of the intercepted calls that “all these calls are recorded.” [Doc.
1141, p. 146.]
Agent Kavanaugh stated that it was not unusual for these individuals to use
nicknames in their intercepted communications. In one call, Youssef referred to
Hassoun by his nickname, Abu Sayyaf. [Doc. 1118, p. 20, 28–29.] In a call
between Hassoun and Youssef, Hassoun stated that they were sending the
“Spanish Brother”—Padilla—to Kosovo, where Youssef was participating with
Kosovar Muslims in a fight with the Serbian government. [Doc. 1118, p. 33–35.]
In another call between Hassoun, Youssef, and an unidentified male, they referred
to Padilla as “the Puerto Rican” because of his Puerto Rican descent. [Doc. 1118,
p. 81.] Defendants also referred to Padilla by other names, such as “Ibrahim” and
“Ukasha.” [Doc. 1116, p. 167; Doc. 1117, p. 33; Doc. 1118, p. 35, 37, 81–82;
Doc. 1119, p. 33; Doc. 1123, p. 85.]
Agent Kavanaugh testified about Hassoun, Youssef, and Padilla’s plans for
Padilla to travel to Kosovo. [Doc. 1118, Gov’t Ex. 107TR.] They discussed
Padilla’s visit with the Blind Sheikh. [Doc. 1116, p. 167.] In a call between
Hassoun and Youssef, Youssef mentioned his “partner,” Padilla, in their
discussions about travel arrangements to Afghanistan. [Doc. 1117, p. 31–33
(Youssef mentions to Hassoun that Ibrahim will be in agreement to join Youssef).]
In another call between Hassoun, Padilla, and others, Padilla stated that an
individual needed discipline and obedience to participate in a jihad. [Doc. 1117,
p. 105; Gov’t Ex. 81TR.]
The agent also mentioned several intercepted calls discussing Padilla’s
travel to Egypt. While Youssef was in Egypt, Hassoun discussed with another
individual who attended the South Florida mosque that he was getting together
some money for Padilla to travel to Egypt. [Doc. 1118, p. 75–76.] Several months
later Padilla traveled to Egypt, where he and Hassoun discussed Padilla’s finances.
[Id. at 95–125.] In October 1998, Hassoun conversed with Youssef, who was in
Egypt, and an unidentified male, and in response to Hassoun’s inquiry about the
Puerto Rican, Youssef responded that Padilla was happy; he was next to him in the
building. [Id. at 80–81; Gov’t Ex. 110TR.] During this October call, Hassoun and
Youssef discussed finances, particularly Padilla’s monthly expenses. [Id. at 83.]
During this same call, Hassoun referenced other people traveling from the United
States to Egypt because they “have established the groundwork through Ibrahim.”
[Id. at 84.]
Furthermore, while Padilla was still in Egypt, he spoke with Hassoun about
finances again and asked Hassoun to send him some money. Hassoun told Padilla
that he would send him “one grand.” [Id. at 103.] In a later call, Padilla
mentioned to Hassoun that he asked a sister (it was unclear from the record exactly
who Padilla asked to assist him) to tell his mother to send him an Army jacket,
book bag, and sleeping bag so he would be ready when “the door opened.” [Id. at
108–14.] Also during this time, in October 1999, Hassoun and Padilla conversed
about the lack of information Padilla was receiving in Egypt. [Id. at 123; Gov’t
Ex. 116TR.] Agent Kavanaugh stated that the information to which Padilla
referred regarded the occurrence of jihads. [Id. at 126–130.] Hassoun told Padilla
to prepare financially so he could be ready to move to “some area close by.” [Id.]
Later in the conversation, they discussed whether Padilla would travel to Yemen.
Padilla told Hassoun that he did not know if the brothers were good or whether he
needed a recommendation to connect him with the “good brothers with the right
faith.” [Id. at 134.] Agent Kavanaugh opined that he understood the good
brothers to be people who shared the same view of Islam as Padilla did. [Id. at
135.]
In a September 2000 call between Hassoun, Youssef, and an unidentified
female, Youssef mentioned that he would be over at “[O]sama’s,” and Padilla was
expected to be there. [Doc. 1119, p. 33, 44; Gov’t Ex. 403TR (English translation
of Arabic mujahideen data form dated July 24, 2000).] Agent Kavanaugh
understood this to be a reference to Osama bin Laden. [Id.] In another call,
Youssef told Hassoun and another individual that he traveled to Azerbaijan, near
Chechnya, and Padilla went to Al Muqbil, Yemen. [Id. at 87–88.] Padilla told
Hassoun that he performed the jihad and met some brothers from Yemen. [Doc.
1121, p. 170–172.]
Agent Kavanaugh testified that the defendants referenced other terrorist
groups and leaders in their conversations. [Doc. 1116.] Hassoun mentioned
Sheikh Abu Azzam, leader of MAK. [Id. at 145.] In one call, Youssef mentioned
to Jayyousi that he and Padilla wanted to visit the Blind Sheikh (Islamic Group of
Egypt). [Doc. 1116, p. 167.] Hassoun and Youssef discussed Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri and Abu Fayez (“Mohammad Chehade”), the leader of the Global Relief
Foundation. [Doc. 1118, p. 20.]
Agent Kavanaugh also testified about a fax that Hassoun received that
contained two documents. [Doc. 1117, p. 78; Govt’ Ex. 212FT.] One of the
documents was a letter about an issue in Ogaden, Ethiopia, and the second one
was a communique involving Libya. The letter mentioned the killing of 200
infidels, which referenced the number of Ethiopian soldiers who were killed by the
Muslim brothers. In a call regarding the fax, Hassoun told Youssef that 56 of the
brothers were “married there,” which indicated that they were martyred during the
fighting. [Doc. 1117, p. 73; Gov’t Ex. 212FT.] Hassoun also stated that the
Ethiopian army moved in with tanks and armored vehicles and the brothers
launched a counterattack and drove them away. [Id. at 76] Hassoun mentioned
that there were heavy casualties, and that the “dogs” were helping the Ethiopian
Army. [Id.] Agent Kavanaugh opined that he understood the reference to the
dogs as being a reference to the United States government. [Id. at 77.]
Agent Kavanaugh interpreted a call between Hassoun, Kassem Daher, and
another individual, in which Hassoun stated that “they [were] playing football in
Somalia” and they needed to send “sneakers” over there. [Doc. 1117, p. 102–03
(stating that Hassoun meant jihad and support for jihad).] In a lengthy call in
August 1998, Youssef called Hassoun from Egypt to inform Hassoun that the
“joint venture” they had formed resulted in the loss of 70. [Doc. 1118, p. 58.]
Hassoun responded that “70 got married completely.” [Id.] Youssef then talked
about the various groups he encountered in Kosovo and told Hassoun that they
thought of joining brothers in another town, but by the time they wanted to join the
“club,” it was being shelled heavily by the enemy. [Id. at 64.] Hassoun asked
Youssef if they had “balls and clothes and everything, sports equipment?” [Id. at
65.] Agent Kavanaugh opined that these words indicated weaponry. [Id.]
Agent Kavanaugh identified banking records associated with Hassoun.
[Doc. 1117, p. 103, Gov’t Ex. 600A–E.] One of the checks, dated 1/31/97, was
addressed to Kassem Daher for the amount of $2,000 and the word “Somalia” was
written on the reference line. The check was written five days after a phone call in
which Hassoun discussed playing football in Somalia. [Id. at 104–05.] Agent
Kavanaugh identified a cashier’s check written by Hassoun for $5,000 to
Mohammad Hisham Sayefedeen, part of Youssef’s full name, that appeared in
wiretap intercepts and Youssef’s passport. [Id. at 137–38, Gov’t Ex. 413.] The
government introduced a deposit slip for $5,000 in the name of Hassoun. [Id. at
140, Gov’t Ex. 600D.] The agent identified a financial document involving a wire
transfer from Hassoun to Mohammad Hisham Youssef. [Id. at 141, Gov’t Ex.
601.] The government presented Hassoun’s credit card statement for June/July
1998, and the agent identified the $5,242 transaction as the amount for the wire
transfer reflected in government’s exhibit 413. [Id. at 143–44, Gov’t Ex. 602.]
The agent also identified several other checks from Hassoun. [Doc. 1141, p.
36–91.] There were two checks from Hassoun to Global Relief Foundation—each
in the amount of $2,500—with one check containing the words “tourism” and
“Chechen information” on the memo line, along with a quote from the Koran.
Defendants elicited from Agent Kavanaugh the fact that Padilla was
involved in very few phone calls; that Padilla did not use code words in his
conversations [Doc. 1121, p. 58–172.]; and that Hassoun and Jayyousi used
similar phrases when they discussed charitable relief work. [Doc. 1119, p. 88;
Doc. 1123; Doc. 1120; Doc. 1121, Doc. 1140.] Agent Kavanaugh acknowledged
that the government did not intercept any calls between Padilla and Youssef.
[Doc. 1121, p. 58–172.] Defendants questioned Agent Kavanaugh about many
calls involving the defendants’ relief work to show the jury that they lacked the
intent necessary to commit the charged crimes. [Doc. 1140, p. 53.]
B. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna’s testimony
The government also presented historical background information about
conflict zones and key figures in the violent Islamic movement through the
testimony of Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, the head of the International Center for
Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Asia. Dr. Gunaratna testified about
the characteristics of the support cells upon which the violent Islamic movement
relies. [Doc. 1393, p. 114–184; Doc. 1137; Doc. 1138; Doc. 1139; Doc. 1136,
Doc. 1394; Doc. 1157; Doc. 1158.] Dr. Gunaratna had studied the fields of
terrorism and political religious violence for about twenty-five years and had been
a teaching fellow at the U.S. Military Academy and at the Fletcher School for Law
and Diplomacy at the Egyptian Center for Counter Terrorism Studies. He testified
that the International Center manages one of the largest terrorism databases in the
world, and it creates counter-terrorism research centers in conflict zones such as
Kabul, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He explained that the International Center
works with a number of governments and countries around the world to create
environments that hinder terrorist support.
Dr. Gunaratna testified that he had a special focus on Islamic organizations
from 1993 to 1996, particularly organizations advocating jihad. He authored ten
books, one entitled “Inside Al-Qaeda,” and he had been an expert witness in
terrorism cases for both the prosecution and the defense. While conducting his
research into al-Qaeda, he interviewed members of Islamist radical groups, spoke
to academicians, and traveled to countries where radical Islamist violence
occurred, such as Pakistan and Iraq. The district court admitted him as an expert
in the area of al-Qaeda and its associated groups and in the area of international
terrorism. [Doc. 1393, p. 134.]
Dr. Gunaratna provided background information on al-Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden, a Saudi who moved to Pakistan and founded al-Qaeda, an organization
committed to establishing Islamic states based on Islamic law. Islamic law is
historically opposed to the political process and to democratic regimes. [Doc.
1393, p. 135–39.] Abdullah Azzam helped found the predecessor of al-Qaeda, and
he was a key ideologue of the jihadist movement. [Id.] Abdullah Azzam
consistently campaigned for the creation of Sharia-based Islamic states (states
governed by strict imposition of Islamic laws), and had no problem with using
force to achieve his political objectives. When he used the word “jihad,” he meant
the use of violence. [Id.] Abdullah Azzam and bin Laden created MAK, an
organization to recruit and assist fighters coming to Afghanistan. In November
1989, Abdullah Azzam was killed, and bin Laden took control of MAK and
created al-Qaeda to work with MAK to support different jihadist groups which
were fighting globally. Al-Qaeda had a military training camp on the
Afghanistan/Pakistan border. [Id. at p. 144–155.]
Dr. Gunaratna testified that al-Qaeda established and managed the Advice
and Reformation Committee to distribute propaganda. This committee had an
office in the United Kingdom, and Khalid al-Fawwaz served as the leader. Dr.
Gunaratna acknowledged that Jayyousi received a fax from this committee,
informing Jayyousi that al-Fawwaz had been appointed as bin Laden’s
representative to operate in that region. He acknowledged that this publication,
which Jayyousi received via fax, was sent to a specific group of people. [Id. at
158– 63.] He stated that al-Qaeda had relationships with other radical Islamist
groups outside of Afghanistan, and it provided support for these like-minded
groups. [Id. at 169–70.]
Dr. Gunaratna also provided information regarding the support cells that
provide assistance to terrorist and militant organizations. He stated that the
support cells provide funds, transportation, safe houses, communications, training,
and recruitment. He explained that these cells operate through “front”
organizations, such as community, religious, humanitarian, and educational
charities. [Id. at 173–80.] He also testified that in his research, he learned that
members of these support cells and groups use code words and double talk in their
communications by substituting key words likely to draw suspicion with more
common verbiage. [Id. at 181.]
In reviewing the telephone intercepts in this case, Dr. Gunaratna opined that
the defendants used code words in some of their communications. When they
used the word “tourism,” that meant armed jihad; the word “football and/or
soccer” meant fighting or combat; the phrase “to be married” referred to going to
paradise or martyrdom; the phrase “first area” meant Pakistan or Afghanistan; the
word “screws” meant bullets; the word “eggplant” meant a rocket propelled
grenade launcher; and other words denoting fruits and vegetables were used as
codes for arms. [Doc. 1137, p. 11–15.] He noted that many of these words were
in other transcripts that he reviewed between radical Islamist groups and their
supporters. [Id. at 12.] His interpretation of the code words’ meanings was
similar to Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony, except that Dr. Gunaratna opined that
when the defendants used the word jihad, they meant the violent or armed jihad,
whereas the agent did not specify if the word jihad meant violent or peaceful jihad.
Dr. Gunaratna testified that during a phone call, Hassoun referenced bin
Laden by his nickname, “Abu Abdallah,” which was known only by his
supporters. [Id. at 27.] In a later call, Jayyousi mentioned bin Laden’s mentor,
Sheikh Salman, and mentioned a CNN interview with bin Laden that showed the
radical Islamic violence in Somalia during that time period. Both Hassoun and
Jayyousi discussed a statement or “fatwa” (a religious opinion usually issued by
established religious leaders but also issued by radical leaders) that threatened
America. Dr. Gunaratna opined that this fatwa the defendants discussed was “very
likely” the same fatwa issued by bin Laden in August 1996. [Id. at 52–53.] In that
same call, Jayyousi mentioned Armed Islamic Group, which was one of the most
violent groups and wanted to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. [Id. at 58.] In
commenting on a statement by Hassoun that MAK can deal with “these people” by
“the sword,” Dr. Gunaratna testified that “these people” meant the people in the
White House, and by “the sword” was a term commonly used by the MAK leader
and radical Islamists. [Id. at 72.]
The government presented other calls in which the defendants discussed the
Chechen conflict. Dr. Gunaratna explained that the Chechens were Muslims who
lived in Russia and were attempting to separate from Russia. [Id. at 94–132.] At
some point, the Arab mujahideen assisted the Chechen separatists, and Ibham
Omar al Khattab—together with bin Laden and Fat’hi Shishani, leader of the
International Islamic Brigade—fought with the Afghans against the Soviets.
Shishani’s group was violent and wanted to create Islamic states wherever
Muslims lived; this group was an extension of al-Qaeda. [Id. at 104–06.] Dr.
Gunaratna testified that the foreign mujahideen fighters in Chechnya engaged in a
lot of violence; killings, suicide attacks, and martyrdom were common. [Id. at
108.] He stated that al-Qaeda provided financial support directly to the fighters in
the Chechen conflict. [Id. at 117.] Dr. Gunaratna also commented on calls
between some of the defendants in which they discussed the success of the
Chechen conflict, evidenced by the fact that the Russian flag was no longer flying
over the Chechen capital of Grozny. They also discussed the provision of funds to
the Chechen separatists. [Id. at 111–22.]
Dr. Gunaratna described the conflict in the Muslim area of Kosovo,
Yugoslavia that occurred in the 1990s. [Id. at 143.] Foreign mujahideen assisted
in this conflict, later establishing a presence in bordering Albania. Al-Qaeda
provided financial and other support to these fighters in Kosovo. The Kosovar
people opposed these fighters because the people perceived them as too violent.
Dr. Gunaratna commented on a call in which Youssef informed Hassoun that he
was in Albania, which was the launching pad for the Arab mujahideen to enter
Kosovo. [Id. at 149.]
Dr. Gunaratna testified that al-Qaeda’s most significant number of training
camps was in Afghanistan, and their purpose was to train people to participate in
violence. [Doc. 1139, p. 7.] “Al-Qaeda’s premier facility for providing training in
the 1990's was the al-Frooq camp” near Kandahar. [Id. at 10.] He commented on
the secrecy of the training camps and the necessity of having an individual
recommend you for training, especially for American Muslims. He stated that al-
Qaeda kept records on the people who attended the training camps, and the
attendees had to complete a mujahideen application form. He noted that a number
of these forms were discovered from various Arab safe houses and training camps.
[Id. at 19–30.] He testified that a new recruit could not provide his real name on
the identification form. [Id. at 31.]
The government questioned Dr. Gunaratna regarding other intercepted calls
he reviewed. In one call, Hassoun identified himself with the Abu Muhjin group,
and he discussed al-Ittihad al-Islami. Dr. Gunaratna stated that both of these
groups are radical Islamic groups. [Doc. 1158, p. 145.] He also commented on
several calls involving Jayyousi. In one call, Jayyousi referred to funds for
preparations and referred to the “first area”—code for Afghanistan. [Id. at
146–47.] In another call, Jayyousi spoke to the Blind Sheikh and referred to
Chechnya, saying that the government was an Islamic government, “but it is full of
heresy.” Dr. Gunaratna noted that this statement was consistent with the view of
establishing an Islamic state in Chechnya. [Id. at 168.] Jayyousi also referred to
bin Laden in another call and discussed a fundraiser to collect money to send to
Afghanistan. Jayyousi clarified that the brother of whom he spoke was Arab, not
Afghani, which Dr. Gunaratna testified was an important distinction because the
terrorist groups wanted to support primarily the Arab mujahideen. [Id. at 177–79.]
On cross-examination, defendants attacked Dr. Gunaratna’s credibility and
his qualifications as an expert. [Doc. 1139, p. 71; Doc. 1136; Doc. 1394; Doc.
1157.] They did elicit from Dr. Gunaratna that he had not listed AWR and Save
Bosnia Now as cover organizations for jihad terrorist groups; however, he did list
the Islamic Group of Egypt as one. [Doc. 1157, p. 96.] He acknowledged that in
the intercepted calls he reviewed involving Jayyousi, he discerned no code talk.
[Id. at 113.]
The government presented several other witnesses in its case-in-chief. A
Department of Defense employee testified that he performed a personnel search on
Padilla and discovered that Padilla did not serve in the military. [Doc. 1159, p.
21.] FBI Agent Russell Fincher testified that he interviewed Padilla at the
Chicago O’Hare airport in 2002. [Id. at 90–101.] Fincher stated that Padilla
acknowledged some of his travels, but was evasive regarding his overseas travel.
Joyce Kandalaft, a contract linguist with the FBI, identified several documents:
two checks from Hassoun to the Canadian Islamic Association, one in the amount
of $8,000 for “tourism” and another in the amount of $3,000 for “tourism” and
“tourists”; a check from Hassoun to AWR in the amount of $5,000 “for the
brothers”; a check from Hassoun to Jayyousi for $600; several checks from
Hassoun to Global Relief, one in the amount of $5,000 for “Kosovo,” one in the
amount of $600 for “Kosovo support,” one with “Chechen tourism and media” and
a Koranic verse on it, and one in the amount of $2,000 for “Afghan Relief.” [Doc.
1160, p. 7, Gov’t Ex. 600H–R.] The government also presented a portion of a
CNN videotape of an interview with Osama bin Laden. [Doc. 1137, p. 32.]
C. Defense case
The defendants presented an expert in English/Arabic interpretation and
translation to challenge the government’s evidence regarding the defendants’ use
of code words. [Doc. 1200.] He testified that many of the alleged code words had
other, more innocuous meanings than indicated by the government witnesses. He
stated that a mujahid is someone who fights for a cause, either religious or
political, or it can mean a person who provides a service for the infirm or for
refugees. [Id. at 71, 97.] However, he acknowledged that most of the
government’s translations were correct. [Id. at 127-28.]
An Iman, a religious leader in the Muslim community , testified that he met
Hassoun at a Florida mosque. [Doc. 1201.] He testified that the mosque was very
involved in charity and “alms giving,” and the mosque collected money for
victimized Muslims in other countries. Hassoun asked him for permission to hold
fundraisers in the mosque for projects in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya. The
Iman testified that Hassoun did not recruit mujahideen fighters within the mosque.
Hassoun presented the testimony of his father-in-law, who testified that he and
Hassoun were joking when they spoke of belonging to Abu Muhjin. [Doc. 1203, p.
45–59.] The other defense witnesses were character witnesses, such as co-workers
and people who participated in humanitarian relief efforts with some of the
defendants. [Doc. 1246, 1204, 1205.]
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony
Defendants challenge the district court’s admission of Agent Kavanaugh’s
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, specifically arguing that the
district court abused its discretion in allowing Agent Kavanaugh to testify
regarding his interpretation of the meanings of alleged code words the defendants
used in the telephone intercepts. They argue that the agent should not have been
allowed to proffer his lay opinion because he was not present during all of the
intercepted calls and he did not have a rationally based perception of what the
individuals meant when they used the code words. We review the district court’s
ruling regarding the admissibility of the agent’s lay testimony under Rule 701 for a
clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1576–77
(11th Cir. 1992).
Rule 701 allows a lay witness to offer opinions or inferences if they are “(a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Subsection “(a) is the familiar
requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation” and the limitation in (b) is
phrased in terms of requiring that the lay witness’s testimony be helpful in
resolving issues. Id. advisory committee’s note. In the 2000 Amendments, Rule
701 was changed “to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in
Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in
lay witness clothing.” Id. advisory committee’s note.4
Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was rationally based on his perception.
While investigating this case for five years, Agent Kavanaugh read thousands of
wiretap summaries plus hundreds of verbatim transcripts, as well as faxes,
publications, and speeches. He listened to the intercepted calls in English and
Arabic.
At trial, defendants objected to Agent Kavanaugh’s opinion testimony
because he did not personally observe or participate in the defendants’
conversations and based his testimony largely on documents admitted into
evidence. We have never held that a lay witness must be a participant or observer
of a conversation to provide testimony about the meaning of coded language used
in the conversation. We have allowed a lay witness to base his opinion testimony
on his examination of documents even when the witness was not involved in the
activity about which he testified. We have held that the testimony of a financial
analyst of the FBI who “simply reviewed and summarized over seven thousand
financial documents,” was properly admitted under Rule 701 in *United States v.
Hamaker*, 455 F.3d 1316, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2006). The financial analyst of the
FBI in Hamaker “added and substracted numbers from a long catalogue of . . .
records, and then compared those numbers in a straightforward fashion.” Id. The
testimony was “rationally based on the perception of the witness.” Id. at 1332
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701). We have also held that testimony of a lay witness in
a prosecution for Medicare fraud was “based on ‘first hand knowledge or
observation,’” United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee note), when it was “based on [the witness’s]
own examination of . . . store[] records,” id.
Defendants rely on United States v. Cano, 289 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2002),
to support their argument, but their reliance is misplaced. In Cano, a cocaine
trafficking and money laundering case, the government proffered Case Agent
Donnelly to testify regarding the “hieroglyphics” or symbols contained in a
defendant’s phone book. Id. at 1360–61. The government did not proffer the
agent as an expert. Id. at 1360. The agent “decipher[ed] the hieroglyphics–by
correlating the ten digit telephone number of members of the conspiracy (obtained
from the wiretaps) with the ten hieroglyphic symbols opposite their names in the
phone book.” Id. at 1360–61. For the first time on appeal, the defendants
objected, based on Rule 701(a), to Agent Donnelly’s testimony regarding his
deciphering. We agreed with the defendants that the agent was prohibited from
testifying about the meaning of a simple code that the jury could have deciphered
easily based on evidence admitted at the trial, id. at 1363–64, but based on the
overwhelming evidence of guilt, we concluded that the error did not affect the
defendants’ substantial rights. Id. at 1364.
In the present case, Agent Kavanaugh testified about the meanings of code
words that he learned through his examination of voluminous documents during a
five-year investigation. His testimony was more similar to the lay testimony held
admissible in Hamaker and Gold than the testimony held inadmissible in Cano.
Just as the testimony of the lay witnesses in Hamaker and Gold was “rationally
based,” Fed. R. Evid. 701(a), on their perception of business records, Agent
Kavanaugh’s testimony was also based on a review of documents and “rationally
based on [his] perception,” id. By contrast, Agent Donnelly “merely delivered a
jury argument from the witness stand ” when he drew “inferences . . . based on
facts already in evidence.” Cano, 289 F.3d at 1363. But Agent Kavanaugh had
examined thousands of documents, many of which were not admitted into
evidence. Agent Donnelly deciphered only a simple code, but Agent Kavanaugh’s
familiarity with the investigation allowed him to perceive the meaning of coded
language that the jury could not have readily discerned.
We also reject the defendants’ argument that Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony
was not “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). We have held that a lay
witness may provide interpretations of code words when the meaning of these
words “[is] not ‘perfectly clear’ without [the witness’s] explanations.” *United
States v. Awan*, 966 F.2d 1415, 1430–31 (11th Cir. 1992)
Agent Kavanaugh’s knowledge of the investigation enabled him to draw
inferences about the meanings of code words that the jury could not have readily
drawn. His testimony helped the jury understand better the defendants’
conversations that related to their support of international terrorism because they
“would likely be unfamiliar with the complexities” of terrorist activities. Id. at
transfers, and other discrete acts of material support that put the code words into
context. [Doc. 1120, p. 21.]
The defendants also contend that the district court erred in allowing Agent
Kavanaugh’s testimony under Rule 701(c). We disagree. In Hamaker, the
financial analyst of the FBI testified as a lay witness even though “his expertise
and the use of computer software may have made him more efficient at reviewing
[the] records.” 455 F.3d at 1331–32. We permitted his testimony because he “did
not testify . . . based on his financial expertise, nor did he express any expert
opinion.” Id. at 1331. See also United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 832–33
(7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a law enforcement agent’s testimony was admissible
under Rule 701(c), even though the agent had “years of experience as a law
enforcement officer,” because “his understanding of the[] conversations came only
as a result of the particular things he perceived from monitoring intercepted calls”
and his testimony was based on his “perceptions derived from [that] particular
case”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3343 (2010).
The record confirms that Agent Kavanaugh based his testimony about the
meaning of the code words on his experience from this particular investigation.
He limited his testimony to what he learned during this particular investigation,
and he testified that he interpreted code words based on their context [Doc.
1116,p. 90, 93.] The district court explained that “it appears as if this witness’s
training and experience to opine on what certain things mean is the investigation
of this case.” [Doc. 1116, p. 41.] The district court also limited the agent’s
testimony to facts he learned in his investigation of the defendants. [Doc. 1119, p.
118 (“I want to make sure . . . this witness’s answer . . . is based upon things that
he learned in the course of this investigation. That is how he was proffered to the
Court as a 701 witness.”).] Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing Agent Kavanaugh to testify regarding his
interpretation of the defendants’ use of code words in the intercepts because the
government satisfied the criteria under Rule 701.
B. Sufficiency of the evidence
Padilla challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all three counts, and
Jayyousi contends that the government did not present sufficient evidence to
convict him on Count 3, the substantive 18 U.S.C. § 2339A material support
offense based upon an underlying 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) conspiracy. In reviewing
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must accept all reasonable
inferences that support the verdict and “affirm the conviction if a reasonable trier
of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 656 (11th Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When a reasonable trier of fact could find that
the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “[i]t is not necessary
that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly
inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt . . . A jury is free to choose
among the constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d
1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Hardy, 895 F.2d 1331, 1334
(11th Cir. 1990)).
The record shows that the government presented evidence that the
defendants formed a support cell linked to radical Islamists worldwide and
conspired to send money, recruits, and equipment overseas to groups that the
defendants knew used violence in their efforts to establish Islamic states. Agent
Kavanaugh, who was in charge of the bulk of the investigation in this case,
identified numerous conversations among the defendants discussing Padilla’s
travels to countries where Muslims were victimized. The government presented
Padilla’s mujahideen identification form that indicated his intent to attend a jihad
training camp. The government’s expert testified to the secrecy of the training
camps, and the requirement that a recruit, particularly an American Muslim,
receive a recommendation from a reliable brother to attend the camp. He also
acknowledged that al-Qaeda kept records on the recruits who attended the training
camps and that the recruits did not provide their real names on the identification
forms. Government witness Goba confirmed the expert’s testimony regarding the
secrecy of the jihad training camps, the need for someone to recommend each
recruit, and the purpose of the camp, which was to train individuals in weapons
and war tactics for military jihad.
The record provides sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
Padilla trained with al-Qaeda and shared his conspirators’ intent to support jihad
violence overseas to establish Islamic states. The government presented evidence
of numerous discussions between the conspirators regarding the various conflicts
involving Muslims overseas. The evidence showed that Youssef, Hassoun, and
Padilla began discussing attendance at al-Qaeda camps before Padilla left for
Egypt in September 1998. [Doc. 1117, p. 28–35, 43–50; Gov’t Ex. 58TR.] In
various calls, Youssef stated that he was ready to work with the refugees in
Kosovo, and that he fought on the front lines in the Kosovar conflict. [Doc. 1117,
p. 149–51; Doc. 1118, p. 35–37; Gov’t Ex. 97TR, 100TR.] Hassoun expressed his
desire to send another recruit to Kosovo, and Youssef suggested Padilla. [Doc.
1117, p. 150–51.] Later, Hassoun told Youssef that he would send money with
Padilla. [Doc. 1118, p. 35–37.] Further, Padilla was secretive about his plans to
attend the training camp, instructing Hassoun not to tell Youssef any plans over
the phone. [Doc. 1117, p.117–18; Gov’t Ex. 88TR.]
The record also demonstrates that the conspirators did not intend for Padilla
to remain in Egypt, but instead, they planned for him to prepare to leave Egypt for
jihad at the first opportunity, [Doc. 1118, p. 105; Gov’t Ex. 113TR/114TR (Padilla
telling Hassoun how to reach him in case the “door opens”).], and planned for
Padilla to travel to the Chechen jihad after he received his training. While
traveling to fight in Chechnya, Youssef told Hassoun that he would soon be with
bin Laden and Khattab’s company, and when Hassoun asked about Padilla,
Youssef stated that Padilla was traveling to the “area of [O]sama [bin Laden].”
[Doc. 1119, p. 44–46, 58–59; Doc. 1158, p. 153–56, Doc. 1393, p. 58–63; Gov’t
Ex. 118TR, 119TR.] Another intercept further dispels Padilla’s contention
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. In October 2000, Hassoun asked
Youssef if he would join “Abu Abdullah, the Puerto Rican” in Afghanistan, and
Youssef responded that he had experience fighting on the front lines and did not
need to hone his military skills. [Doc. 1119, p. 79–80; Gov’t Ex. 124TR.] Based
on the above, we conclude that there is sufficient record evidence to support
Padilla’s convictions on Counts 1 and 2.
Padilla and Jayyousi both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict them on Count 3. In order to convict Padilla and Jayyousi under the
substantive count, the government did not have to prove that Padilla and Jayyousi
personally committed violent acts; rather, the government had to prove that these
individuals knew that they were supporting mujahideen who engaged in murder,
maiming, or kidnapping in order to establish Islamic states. The evidence supports
the jury’s reasonable inference that Padilla and Jayyousi knew the training camps
trained recruits in weaponry and war tactics and that they shared a common
purpose to support violent jihad to regain the lands that were once under Islamic
control [See, e.g., Gov’t Ex. 802, The Islam Report where Jayyousi wrote, “May
Allah help the mujahideen topple these un-Islamic and illegal puppet regimes in
our Muslim lands.”]. The record indicates Padilla provided himself as material
support in the form of a recruit for jihad training; personal information on the
mujahideen identification form matched Padilla’s personal information on his
passport; the government expert identified Padilla’s fingerprints on the form; the
government expert testified that the use of code words is a signature trait of a
terrorism support cell; Jayyousi received a fax that had bin Laden’s signature on it
[Gov’t. Ex. 200.]; Jayyousi oversaw the purchase of satellite phones, walkie
talkies and encrypted radios to send to Chechnya to aid the Muslims in their armed
conflict; Jayyousi told Mohamed Shishani that the donations for the radios (to
assist in communication during fighting) did not come in time to prevent the
killing of mujahideen by friendly fire; and Jayyousi acknowledged in a
conversation that all their calls were recorded. We conclude that this evidence,
along with other evidence presented by the government, was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to conclude that Jayyousi and Padilla were guilty of providing
material support or resources, knowing that these would be used in preparation for
carrying out a conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim overseas.
C. Admission of Dr. Gunaratna’s testimony
Defendants argue on appeal that the district court erred in allowing Dr.
Gunaratna to testify as an expert witness because his methodology was unreliable.
Specifically, they claim that they were unable to verify his methods because he
would not identify the interviewees upon whom he based his information due to
confidentiality agreements he had signed with them. Furthermore, Dr. Gunaratna
had to rely on translators during his communications with the interviewees, and
defendants contend that this compromised the reliability of the information he
gleaned from his interviews. They also contend that he was not qualified to testify
about the use and importance of code words in communications among violent
jihad supporters. “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings on the admission
of expert witness testimony for abuse of discretion.” *Toole v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp.*, 235 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000).
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence controls the admission of expert
testimony. It provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
592–95, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796–98 (1993), the Supreme Court stated that Rule 702
compels the district courts to perform the critical “gatekeeping” function
concerning the admissibility of expert evidence. This function “inherently
require[s] the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis” of the foundations of
expert opinions to ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule
2002). In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702,
district courts must consider whether the expert can testify competently on the
areas he intends to discuss, whether the expert’s methodology is sufficiently
reliable, and whether the expert’s testimony, through the application of his
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d
548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998).
Defendants filed a pre-trial Daubert motion, which the district court denied
without holding a hearing. At trial, the district court accepted Dr. Gunaratna as an
expert in the areas of al-Qaeda and its associated groups and international
terrorism. During their cross-examination, defendants objected to Dr. Gunaratna’s
testimony because he based his opinion on confidential or classified information.
[Doc. 1136, p. 42–50.] They also made a Sixth Amendment objection. [Id.] The
government responded that the location where Dr. Gunaratna interviewed these
individuals was irrelevant, and he would be breaching confidentiality agreements
with governments if he revealed where he conducted the interviews and the
identity of the people he interviewed. [Id. at 50–54.] The government also
responded that Dr. Gunaratna based his identification of the al-Qaeda form from
his viewing of similar documents, not from his interviews. [Id.]
The district court noted that the defendants had been able to call into
question Dr. Gunaratna’s credibility on cross. [Id. at 49.] Then, the district court
sustained the objections on relevance grounds, finding that “the fact that he has
maintained confidential relationships with other governments is not relevant to
this case.” [Id. at 54–55.] The defendants made no specific objection to Dr.
Gunaratna’s testimony about the use of code words by violent Islamists.
Therefore, because the defendants did not preserve this particular challenge to Dr.
Gunaratna’s testimony regarding code words, we will address this challenge under
the plain error doctrine. See United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168,
1185 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that appellate court will remand on an issue not
raised in the district court only if “there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that
affects substantial rights, and . . . (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”). We conclude from the
record that the district court did not plainly err in allowing Dr. Gunaratna to testify
regarding the use of code words by violent radical groups. Based on his
specialized knowledge of Islamist radicals, Dr. Gunaratna was able to testify
regarding their method of communication. Further, his testimony related to trial
evidence, helped the jury understand the unique use of certain words in the
intercepted calls, and countered defendants’ claim that these words did not have
violent connotations.
With regard to defendants’ objection to Dr. Gunaratna’s qualification as an
expert, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting
him as an expert witness. A review of the record indicates that the defendants had
broad latitude in their cross-examination, and the district court acknowledged that
they had been able to call into question Dr. Gunaratna’s credibility during cross.
Defendants challenged his undisclosed sources for his published works and
thoroughly questioned him about his interviews with extremists. [Docs. 1139,
1136, 1394, 1157, 1158.] The district court properly determined that the
defendants’ inability to obtain the location of Dr. Gunaratna’s interviews and the
identities of the interviewees did not make Dr. Gunaratna’s methodology
unreliable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s admission of Dr.
Gunaratna’s testimony was not “manifestly erroneous. United States v. Douglas,
489 F.3d 1117, 1124 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Quiet Tech. DC-8 v. Hurel-Dubois
UK Ltd.*, 326 F.3d 1333, 1339–40 (11th Cir. 2003)).
D. Admissibility of televised interview of Osama bin Laden
Defendants argue that the district court erred by admitting into evidence a
portion of a 1997 CNN interview with Osama bin Laden. Jayyousi and Hassoun
objected at trial to the video’s presentation based on Rule 401, arguing relevancy.
Padilla objected based on Rule 403, arguing that it was prejudicial to him because
there was no evidence he watched the interview or discussed the interview with
another co-defendant. The district court admitted a seven-minute portion of the
bin Laden interview, stating that the jury could consider the evidence as it
pertained to Jayyousi and Hassoun’s states of mind, but not Padilla’s. The
government presented evidence of numerous calls, [see Gov’t Ex. 84, 85, 52, 53],
in which Jayyousi and Hassoun referred to bin Laden by his nickname “Abu
Abdallah,” which was known only to his supporters and identified him as one of
the biggest backers of jihad in Afghanistan. The two also discussed the
videotaped interview and an August fatwa that Dr. Gunaratna stated was “very
likely” issued by bin Laden as a threat to America. [Doc. 1137, p. 23.]
We review the district court’s admission of the edited portion of the
videotaped interview for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jiminez, 224
F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states that
relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. The district
court conducted the proper balancing test and mitigated the prejudice to the
defendants by instructing the jury to consider the video not for its truth, but rather
as state of mind evidence against Hassoun and Jayyousi. [Doc. 1137, p. 32–34.]
The district court clearly expressed to the jury that there was no indication that the
defendants were connected to the 9/11 attacks. [Id.] Further, the district court
only admitted a seven-minute portion of the twenty-four minute video, only played
it once for the jury, and did not allow the government to ask any witnesses
questions regarding the video’s content. Cf. United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d
365, 375 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that if the district court erred in admitting three-
minute video clip glorifying the 9/11 attacks, any error was harmless because clips
were not a central part of government’s case, they only lasted three minutes of
five-day presentation of government’s case, and clips were only played once to
jury). Because “Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only
sparingly,” United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted), the excerpted portion of the video did not
present a risk of unfair prejudice such that the district court committed an abuse of
discretion in allowing the government to present it to the jury.
E. Padilla’s Motion to Suppress
Padilla filed a motion to suppress statements he made during his interview
with FBI agents at the Chicago O’Hare International Airport in May 2002. He
argued that his statements were inadmissible because the FBI agents failed to
administer Miranda5 warnings prior to interrogating him. The magistrate judge
conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion and issued a report and
recommendation denying the motion to suppress. Padilla filed his objections with
the district court, and the government filed its response. The district court fully
adopted the factual findings of the magistrate judge and denied Padilla’s motion.
On review of the district court’s disposition of the motion to suppress, we review
the facts under the clearly erroneous standard and the application of the law to the
facts de novo. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006).
In Miranda, the Supreme Court established a set of enumerated warnings
that officers are required to give suspects prior to custodial interrogation. See
United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1148 (11th Cir. 2004). An interrogation is
custodial when “under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable man in
[Padilla’s] position would feel a restraint on his freedom of movement to such
extent that he would not feel free to leave.” Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The test is objective, and “the reasonable person from
whose perspective ‘custody’ is defined is a reasonable innocent person.” *United
States v. Moya*, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996). Additionally, because of the
sovereign interest in securing entry points to the United States, “some degree of
questioning and of delay is necessary and is to be expected at entry points.” Id. at
distinctly accusatory level before it can be said that a reasonable person would feel
restraints on his ability to roam to the degree associated with formal arrest.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895,
899 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Interrogation at the border constitutes one notable
exception to the constitutional protection of Miranda. Because of the overriding
power and responsibility of the sovereign to police national borders, the fifth
amendment guarantee against self-incrimination is not offended by routine
questioning of those seeking entry to the United States.”).
When Padilla arrived at the airport, he passed through customs where agents
discovered that he possessed $10,526 in United States currency, although his
written declaration stated that he possessed only $8,000. [Doc. 500, p. 4–46.] A
customs agent escorted Padilla to a conference room to talk to the FBI agents.
Padilla was not in handcuffs or otherwise physically restrained. FBI Agent
Fincher stated that he wanted to speak with Padilla to gain his cooperation because
the FBI believed that Padilla had information which would prevent a terrorist
attack. Agent Fincher testified that he did not restrain Padilla, and Padilla was
forthcoming about his background and some of his travels. After a dinner break,
which lasted over an hour, Agent Fincher asked Padilla if he would continue
discussing his travels and the money he had in his possession, and Padilla
indicated his desire to cooperate. Agent Fincher asked Padilla why he declared
$8,000 when he was carrying over $10,000, and Padilla stated that he did not
know that this was against the law and that the amount of money was not a “big
deal.” Agent Fincher expressed skepticism about Padilla’s statement that the
amount of money was not a big deal. Padilla then asked to call his mother, but
when Agent Fincher asked him why he wanted to call his mother, Padilla “dropped
the subject.” [Doc. 549, p. 4] Padilla did not ask to leave or to speak with an
attorney. After Padilla stated that he was tired, the agents thanked Padilla for his
cooperation and offered to take him to a hotel and pay for his stay in order to give
him an opportunity to rest and continue the interview the following day, but
Padilla declined because he wanted to “clear this up that day.” [Doc. 549, p. 4-5]
Padilla again stated that he wanted to contact his mother, and Agent Fincher
testified that the agents did not tell Padilla that he could not contact his mother.
[Doc. 549, p. 5] But Padilla did not make the phone call, and the interview
continued. [Id.] They continued discussing Padilla’s overseas travel, and when
Agent Fincher asked about his passport, Padilla stated that it had been stolen in a
market, but he could not remember the name of the market or the date it was
stolen.
Following another break, Agent Fincher confronted Padilla with what the
agent believed were Padilla’s intentions during his travels. He stated that he
believed Padilla had been in Afghanistan, training with and meeting al-Qaeda
officials, that these officials sent Padilla back to Pakistan, where he later departed
for another location to commit an act of terrorism, that Padilla had been delayed
and detailed in Karachi, and that Padilla then traveled from Zurich to Egypt and
eventually to Chicago, where he intended to commit or conduct surveillance for a
terrorist act. Agent Fincher asked for Padilla’s assistance to understand what was
going on, but Padilla stood up and announced that the interview was over and it
was time for him to go. Agent Fincher told Padilla that if he did not assist the
government, he would be served with a grand jury subpoena to compel his
testimony in New York. About an hour later, Padilla declined to assist Agent
Fincher, and the agent arrested Padilla and read him his Miranda rights.
We agree with the district court that the earlier portions of the interview
were not custodial in nature, but we do not agree with the district court’s
conclusion that the entire interview was non-custodial in nature. Similar to Moya,
where we held that a defendant was not in custody, Padilla “was [not] handcuffed .
. . physically held or moved, or . . . accompanied by uniformed officers. Nor was
he subjected to booking procedures, [or] told he was not free to leave.” Moya, 74
F.3d at 1119. “Nothing indicates that [Padilla] ever asked to leave or to see a
lawyer” before Agent Fincher’s accusation that Padilla was linked to terrorist
activities. See id. Even Agent Fincher’s offer to take Padilla to a hotel for the
night to allow him to rest establishes that a reasonable person under the
circumstances would not have believed that he was subject to a degree of restraint
comparable to arrest because he was given the opportunity to leave the interview.
After the second break, however, when Agent Fincher accused Padilla of
terrorist activities, a reasonable person would have felt subjected to a degree of
restraint comparable to arrest. At this point, the interrogation became custodial,
and it is evident by Padilla’s reaction to Agent Fincher’s accusation—he stood up
and announced that the interview was over. Because the interview became
custodial in nature, any statements Padilla made after he was accused of
participating in terrorist activities and before he received his Miranda warning