515 U.S. 506 (1995)
In the 1980s, respondent engaged in multiple real estate transactions financed by loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration, an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development.1 Respondent would purchase rental housing, renovate it, obtain an inflated appraisal, and sell it to a straw buyer for whom respondent would arrange an FHA-insured mortgage loan.2 Then, as prearranged, respondent would repurchase the property at a small profit to the straw buyer and assume the mortgage loan. Twenty-nine of these ventures went into default.3
Respondent was charged by federal indictment with multiple counts of making false statements on federal loan documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001.4 Two of these counts charged that respondent had made false statements on HUD/FHA form 92800-5 by knowingly inflating the appraised value of the mortgaged property.5 The other false-statement counts charged that respondent had made misrepresentations on HUD/FHA form HUD-1, the settlement form used in closing the sales of the properties. Line 303 of this form requires disclosure of the closing costs to be paid or received by the borrower/buyer and the seller. The forms executed by respondent showed that the buyer was to pay some of the closing costs, whereas in fact he, the seller, had arranged to pay all of them.6
To prove the materiality of these false statements, the Government offered the testimony of several persons charged with administering FHA/HUD programs, who explained why the requested information was important.7 At the close of the evidence, the United States District Court for the District of Montana instructed the jury.8 The court stated that the issue of materiality was not submitted to the jury for its decision but was instead a matter for the court.9 The court further instructed that the statements charged in the indictment were material statements. The jury convicted respondent of the §1001 charges.10
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed these convictions.11 On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals stood by its precedent.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether it was constitutional for the trial judge to refuse to submit the question of materiality to the jury?14
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one will be deprived of liberty without due process of law. The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. These provisions require that criminal convictions rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.15
No. The United States District Court for the District of Montana instructed the jury that materiality was not for their decision but was instead a matter for the court. It further told the jury that the statements charged were material.16 Respondent had engaged in numerous FHA-financed real estate transactions. He was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for false statements on HUD forms regarding appraised values and closing costs.17
The Government introduced testimony from program administrators to show why the information was important.18 However, the jury never applied the materiality standard to the facts of what statements were made and what decisions the agency sought to make.19 Because materiality is an element of the § 1001 offense that the Government conceded it must prove, the instruction violated the constitutional requirement that the jury determine guilt on every element beyond a reasonable doubt.20
It was not constitutional for the trial judge to refuse to submit the question of materiality to the jury, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the convictions is affirmed.21
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the Court's opinion.22 He emphasized that the Government's concessions made the case straightforward.23 The concessions included that materiality is an element of §1001 and that the error was structural and plain.24
Rehnquist noted that whether materiality is truly an element under the false-statement clause of §1001 is not obvious from the statutory text.25 A conflict exists among the circuits on this point.26 Legislatures retain flexibility to define the elements of federal crimes within constitutional bounds.27
Many other mixed questions of law and fact remain for the trial court. Examples include evidentiary admissibility and the legality of searches.28