509 U.S. 418 (1993)
Congress has enacted a series of statutes since the early nineteenth century aimed at assisting states in regulating lotteries.1 These include the Act of March 2, 1827, the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, and the Act of March 2, 1895, which outlawed the transportation of lottery tickets.2 In 1934, Congress extended these controls to broadcasting through section 316 of the Communications Act, prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertisements.3 In 1975, Congress amended the scheme to permit advertising of state-run lotteries by stations licensed in states that conduct such lotteries.4
North Carolina prohibits lotteries and the advertising of nonexempt raffles and lotteries under its general statutes.5 Virginia, by contrast, has established a state monopoly on lotteries and actively promotes them.6 Edge Broadcasting Company owns a radio station licensed to Elizabeth City, North Carolina, but operating from a transmitter in Moyock, North Carolina, close to the Virginia border.7 The station reaches a listening audience that is 92.2 percent Virginian and 7.8 percent from nine North Carolina counties, with 95 percent of its advertising revenue coming from Virginia.8
Edge entered the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to obtain a declaratory judgment that the federal lottery advertising statutes, as applied to its operations, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The District Court applied a four-factor test for commercial speech restrictions and concluded that the statutes did not directly advance the asserted governmental interest when judged solely on their effect on Edge.10 A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment in all respects through an unpublished per curiam opinion.11
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the lower court had declared a federal statute unconstitutional.12
Whether federal statutes that prohibit the broadcast of lottery advertising by a broadcaster licensed to a State that does not allow lotteries, while allowing such broadcasting by a broadcaster licensed to a State that sponsors a lottery, are consistent with the First Amendment as applied to Edge Broadcasting Co.?13
Under the Central Hudson test for restrictions on commercial speech, a regulation is valid if (1) the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, (2) the asserted governmental interest is substantial, (3) the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.14
Yes. The federal statutes satisfy the Central Hudson test when applied to Edge Broadcasting Co.15
Congress has long assisted states in regulating lotteries through statutes dating back to the early nineteenth century.16 Congress extended those controls to broadcasting in 1934 and adjusted them in 1975 to permit advertising only by stations licensed in lottery states.17
North Carolina prohibits lotteries and their advertising while Virginia maintains a state monopoly and promotes its lottery.18 Edge Broadcasting Company owns a station licensed to Elizabeth City, North Carolina, but transmitting from Moyock near the Virginia border, where 92.2 percent of its audience resides in Virginia and 95 percent of its revenue originates there.19
The District Court and Court of Appeals held the statutes invalid as applied to Edge under the third Central Hudson factor because its North Carolina listeners receive most media from Virginia sources already carrying lottery ads.20
The third factor is satisfied because the statutes directly advance the substantial interest in supporting nonlottery states' policies by barring all North Carolina stations from airing lottery ads, thereby insulating North Carolina listeners even if Edge's audience is predominantly Virginian.21
The fourth factor is satisfied because the fit is reasonable: exempting Edge would undermine North Carolina's policy without a logical stopping point, and the restriction still leaves 11 percent of radio listening time in the nine-county area free of lottery ads despite other Virginia media exposure.22
The federal statutes are consistent with the First Amendment as applied to Edge Broadcasting Co.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court that the restriction at issue here is constitutional under our decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, even if that restriction is judged as applied to Edge itself.24 He accordingly believed it unnecessary to decide whether the restriction might appropriately be reviewed at a more lenient level of generality, and he took no position on that question.25
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Blackmun.26 He argued that the selective ban on lottery advertising fails the Central Hudson test because the means chosen are not in proportion to the asserted interest.27 He contended that the interest in discouraging lottery participation is not substantial given the national trend toward adopting lotteries.28
He maintained that the ban represents an unconstitutional form of paternalism that interferes with the flow of truthful information about legal activities in neighboring states, contrary to principles established in Bigelow v. Virginia.29