92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875)
Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual, as well as their collective, rights. The duty of a government to afford protection is limited always by the power it possesses for that purpose.
There is in our political system a government of each of the several States, and a Government of the United States. Each is distinct from the others, and has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of those governments will be different from those he has under the other.
The Government of the United States, although it is, within the scope of its powers, supreme and beyond the States, can neither grant nor secure to its citizens rights or privileges which are not expressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction. All that cannot be so granted or secured are left to the exclusive protection of the States.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford it protection, existed long before the adoption of the Constitution. The First Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting Congress from abridging the right to assemble and petition, was not intended to limit the action of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National Government alone. It left the authority of the States unimpaired, added nothing to the already existing powers of the United States, and guaranteed the continuance of the right only against Congressional interference. The people, for their protection in the enjoyment of it, must therefore look to the States, where the power for that purpose was originally placed.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of and guaranteed by the United States. The very idea of a government republican in form implies that right, and an invasion of it presents a case within the sovereignty of the United States.
The right to bear arms is not granted by the Constitution; neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendment means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress, and has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the National Government.
Sovereignty, for the protection of the rights of life and personal liberty within the respective States, rests alone with the States.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, but it adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society. The duty of protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights was originally assumed by the States, and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the Amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the National Government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.
In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 178, this Court decided that the Constitution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage upon anyone, and that the United States have no voters of their own creation in the States. In United States v. Reese et al., it held that the Fifteenth Amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right, which is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The right to vote in the States comes from the States; but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States, but the last has been.
The counts of an indictment which charge the defendants with having banded and conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate citizens of the United States of African descent, therein named, and which, in substance respectively allege that the defendants intended thereby to hinder and prevent such citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges granted and secured to them in common with other good citizens by the Constitution and law of the United States, to hinder and prevent them in the free exercise of their right peacefully to assemble for lawful purposes, deprive them of their respective several lives and liberty of person without due process of law, prevent and hinder them in the free exercise and enjoyment of their several rights to the full and equal benefit of the law, prevent and hinder them in the free exercise and enjoyment of their several and respective rights to vote at any election thereafter to be by law had and held by the people in and of the State of Louisiana, or to put them in great fear of bodily harm and to injure and oppress them because, being and having been in all things qualified, they had voted at an election theretofore had and held according to law by the people of said State -- do not present a case within the sixth section of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. 140). To bring a case within the operation of that statute, it must appear that the right the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended to hinder or prevent was one granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. If it does not so appear, the alleged offence is not indictable under any act of Congress.
The counts of an indictment which, in general language, charge the defendants with an intent to hinder and prevent citizens of the United States of African descent, therein named, in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection granted and secured to them respectively as citizens of the United States, and of the State of Louisiana, because they were persons of African descent, and with the intent to hinder and prevent them in the several and free exercise and enjoyment of every, each, all, and singular the several rights and privileges granted and secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States do not specify any particular right the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended to hinder or prevent, are too vague and general, lack the certainty and precision required by the established rules of criminal pleading, and are therefore not good and sufficient in law.
In criminal cases prosecuted under the laws of the United States, the accused has the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The indictment must set forth the offence with clearness and all necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged, and every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged. Where the definition of an offence includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms as in the definition, but it must state the species -- it must descend to particulars. The object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defence and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and, second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction. Facts are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. A crime is made up of acts and intent, and these must be set forth in the indictment with reasonable particularity of time, place, and circumstances.
By the act under which this indictment was found, the crime consists in the unlawful combination with an intent to prevent the enjoyment of any right granted or secured by the Constitution, etc. All rights are not so granted or secured. Whether one is so or not is a question of law to be decided by the court. The indictment should therefore state particulars to inform the court as well as the accused. It must appear from the indictment that the acts charged will, if proved, support a conviction for the offence alleged.
This was an indictment for conspiracy under the sixth section of the act of May 31, 1870, known as the Enforcement Act (16 Stat. 140), and consisted of thirty-two counts. The first series of counts charged that the defendants had "banded together" with intent unlawfully and feloniously to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate two citizens of the United States, of African descent and persons of color, with the unlawful and felonious intent thereby to hinder and prevent them in their free exercise and enjoyment of their lawful right and privilege to peaceably assemble together with each other and with other citizens of the United States for a peaceful and lawful purpose. The second charged an intent to hinder and prevent the exercise by the same persons of the right to keep and bear arms for a lawful purpose. The third charged an intent to deprive them of their lives and liberty without due process of law. The fourth charged intent to deprive them of the equal benefit of the laws. The fifth charged an intent to hinder and prevent them in the exercise and enjoyment of rights, privileges, immunities, and protections granted and secured to them respectively as citizens of the United States and of the State of Louisiana because of their race and color. The sixth charged an intent to hinder them in the right to vote in elections of the State of Louisiana. The seventh alleged an intent to put them in great fear of bodily harm, injure, and oppress them because they had voted. The eighth charged an intent to prevent their exercise and enjoyment of every, each, all, and singular the several rights and privileges granted and secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The next eight counts repeated the first eight but used the words "combine, conspire, and confederate together." Three of the defendants were found guilty under the first sixteen counts, and not guilty under the remaining counts.
The convicted parties moved in arrest of judgment on grounds that included: (1) the several counts did not constitute offences against the laws of the United States and did not come within the Enforcement Act; (2) the matters charged were not cognizable in the Circuit Court of the United States; (3) the offences were not constitutionally within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and were matters for State tribunals; (4) the act creating the offences was unconstitutional as an invasion of State rights; (5) certain counts were too vague and uncertain to afford proper notice to prepare a defence; and (6) the jury verdict was not warranted by law. The judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion, and the question was certified to this Court.
This case comes here with a certificate by the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana that they were divided in opinion upon a question which occurred at the hearing. It presents for our consideration an indictment containing sixteen counts, divided into two series of eight counts each, based upon section 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. That section makes it a felony if two or more persons band or conspire together with intent to violate any provision of the act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same.
The question certified arose upon a motion in arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty generally upon the whole sixteen counts, and is whether the said sixteen counts are severally good and sufficient in law, and contain charges of criminal matter indictable under the laws of the United States.
The general charge in the first eight counts is that of banding, and in the second eight that of conspiring together to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate two citizens of the United States, of African descent and persons of color, with intent thereby to hinder and prevent them in their free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges "granted and secured" to them "in common with all other good citizens of the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
The offences provided for by the statute do not consist in the mere banding or conspiring of two or more persons together, but in their banding or conspiring with the intent or for any of the purposes specified. To bring a case under the statute it must appear that the right the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended to hinder or prevent was one granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. If it does not so appear, the criminal matter charged has not been made indictable by any act of Congress.
We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each government is distinct and has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be both a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights under each government will differ. Citizens are members of the political community to which they belong; governments can exercise only the powers conferred upon them; and the duty of a government to afford protection is limited by the power it possesses for that purpose.
Experience showed the need of a national government for national purposes. The Constitution established such a government, defined its powers, and made them supreme within their scope. The national government is one of delegated powers alone; all powers not granted are reserved to the States or the people. No rights can be acquired under the Constitution or laws of the United States except such as the national government has authority to grant or secure. All others are left under the protection of the States.
We proceed to examine the indictment to determine whether the rights alleged to have been interfered with are such as had been granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The first and ninth counts state the intent to hinder and prevent the citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of their lawful right and privilege to peaceably assemble together with each other and with other citizens of the United States for a peaceful and lawful purpose. The right peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the adoption of the Constitution and is an attribute of citizenship under a free government. It derives from laws whose authority is acknowledged throughout civilization. It was not created by the Constitution, and the national government was not given direct power over it; thus it remains subject to State jurisdiction.
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging the right of the people to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. That Amendment, like others adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit State governments in respect to their own citizens but to operate upon the National Government alone. It left State authority unimpaired and added nothing to the existing powers of the United States. The right was not created by the Amendment and its continuance was not guaranteed except as against congressional interference. For protection in its enjoyment, the people must look to the States.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress or for anything connected with the national government is an attribute of national citizenship and, as such, is under the protection of and guaranteed by the United States. If these counts had alleged that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute and the scope of national sovereignty. Such, however, is not alleged. The indictment as stated would be made out if the object of the conspiracy was to prevent a meeting for any lawful purpose, and that does not bring it within the statute's protection.
The second and tenth counts charge intent to hinder the bearing of arms for a lawful purpose. That right is not granted by the Constitution nor dependent upon it for existence. The Second Amendment means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. It restricts the powers of the national government and leaves the people to look to State powers for protection against violations by fellow citizens.
The third and eleventh counts charge an intent to deprive the citizens of their lives and liberty without due process of law. This amounts to alleging a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder citizens within a State. Rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights; sovereignty for their protection rests with the States. It is no more within the power of the United States to punish a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder within a State than to punish the substantive crimes themselves.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process, but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen against another. It furnishes an additional guaranty against encroachment by the States upon fundamental rights, but these counts do not call for the exercise of powers conferred by that provision.
The fourth and twelfth counts charge intent to prevent the named citizens from enjoying the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings enacted by the State of Louisiana and the United States for the security of persons and property enjoyed by white citizens. There is no allegation this was done because of race or color. Stripped of verbiage, the charges amount to conspiracies to prevent certain citizens within the State from enjoying equal protection of the laws of the State and the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying equal protection, but it does not add anything to the rights one citizen has against another; the States assumed the duty to protect equality of rights, and the national government's role is to enforce that guaranty, but not to create new rights between citizens.
The sixth and fourteenth counts charge intent to hinder and prevent the citizens in their right to vote at elections of the State of Louisiana. In Minor v. Happersett this Court decided that the Constitution has not conferred the right of suffrage upon anyone; the Fifteenth Amendment grants citizens exemption from discrimination in exercising the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The right to vote comes from the States; the exemption from discrimination comes from the United States. Because it does not appear in these counts that the intent of the defendants was to prevent voting on account of race, the counts do not show interference with any right granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The allegation of racial motive cannot be supplied by implication; it must be alleged positively.
The seventh and fifteenth counts allege intent to put the parties in great fear of bodily harm, injure, and oppress them because they had voted at State elections. Nothing shows that the elections were other than State elections or that the conspiracy was formed on account of race. The charge is essentially of a conspiracy to commit a breach of the peace within a State. The United States is not the proper sovereign for mere police duties within the States, although the national government may assist under the Constitution in certain circumstances; this case is not such.
We conclude that the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, and fifteenth counts do not contain charges of a criminal nature indictable under the laws of the United States and are not good and sufficient in law. They do not show the intent to hinder or prevent enjoyment of any right granted or secured by the Constitution.
We next consider the fifth and thirteenth and the eighth and sixteenth counts together. The fifth and thirteenth charge intent to hinder and prevent the parties in their free exercise and enjoyment of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection granted and secured to them as citizens of the United States and of the State of Louisiana "for the reason that they . . . were persons of African descent and race, and persons of color, and not white citizens." The eighth and sixteenth charge intent to hinder and prevent them in the free exercise and enjoyment of every, each, all, and singular the several rights and privileges granted and secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The statute provides punishment for those who conspire "to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." These counts charge in substance that the intent was to hinder the citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of "every, each, all, and singular" the rights granted them by the Constitution and laws. There is no specification of any particular right; the language is broad enough to cover all.
In criminal prosecutions under the laws of the United States the accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The indictment must set forth the offence with such clearness and certainty as will apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged; every ingredient of the offence must be accurately and clearly alleged. Where the definition of an offence includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment charge the offence in the same generic terms; it must state the species and descend to particulars. Facts are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. A crime consists of acts and intent and these must be set forth with reasonable particularity of time, place, and circumstances.
The crime here is made to consist in the unlawful combination with intent to prevent the enjoyment of any right granted or secured by the Constitution. All rights are not so granted or secured. Whether one is so is a question of law for the court. The indictment should therefore state particulars to inform the court as well as the accused. It must appear from the indictment, without going further, that the acts charged will, if proved, support a conviction for the offence alleged.
It is unnecessary to extend the argument. The conclusion is irresistible that the fifth, eighth, thirteenth, and sixteenth counts are too vague and general; they lack the certainty and precision required by the established rules of criminal pleading. They are not good and sufficient in law and are so defective that no judgment of conviction should be pronounced upon them.
The order of the Circuit Court arresting the judgment upon the verdict is therefore affirmed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to discharge the defendants.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, dissenting.
I concur that the judgment in this case should be arrested, but for reasons different from those given by the Court. Power is vested in Congress to enforce by appropriate legislation the prohibition contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, and section five of the Enforcement Act provides that persons who prevent, hinder, control, or intimidate any person to whom the right of suffrage is secured by that Amendment from exercising such right by means of bribery, threats, deprivation of employment or property, or threats of violence, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Section six provides penal provisions for conspiracies to violate provisions of the act or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same.
More than one hundred persons were jointly indicted in the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana under the Enforcement Act. The indictment contained thirty-two counts in two series. Eight of the persons named appeared for trial; three were found guilty on the first series and not guilty on the second. They filed motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. The Circuit Court judges were divided and the question whether the motion in arrest of judgment should be granted was certified to this Court.
Only two causes of arrest will be considered here: (1) that the matters charged do not constitute offences against the laws of the United States nor come within the enforcement act; (2) that the several counts are too vague and uncertain to afford proper notice to plead and prepare a defence. Counsel for the United States confined argument to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and sixteenth counts of the first series, and the answers will be limited to those counts.
The thirteenth count alleges that the defendants combined and conspired with unlawful and felonious intent to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate Levi Nelson and Alexander Tillman, citizens of the United States of African descent and persons of color, and thereby to hinder and prevent them in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection granted and secured to them as citizens of the United States and the State of Louisiana, by reason of their race and color. It further alleges that these were rights granted or secured to them in common with all other good citizens by the Federal Constitution and the laws of Congress.
It is conceded that every ingredient of an offence must be accurately and clearly alleged in an indictment. Offences created by statute must be accurately described and an indictment following the words of the statute is generally sufficient unless the statute is elliptical or implies other constituents. The sixth section of the Enforcement Act contains two kinds of offences: conspiracies to violate provisions of the act, and conspiracies to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The count under consideration appears to charge the second kind. Although the description of the statutory offence in the act is indefinite, the indictment is more vague and indefinite. The statute extends protection to any right or privilege granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of Congress, and leaves it to the pleader to specify the particular right invaded. In this indictment the pleader failed to specify the particular right and instead alleged generally the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection granted and secured to them as citizens, without further specification.
Such vague and indefinite allegations do not inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Valuable rights and privileges, almost without number, are granted and secured to citizens by the Constitution and laws of Congress, and Congress intended by the statute to protect citizens in the enjoyment of all such rights, but it never intended to dispense with the requirement of certainty in criminal pleading. An accused must be given reasonable notice of the charge in order to make defence and to have the judgment operate as a bar to another prosecution.
The fourteenth count charges a conspiracy to prevent and hinder citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege to vote at any election thereafter to be held by the people of the State or parish, knowledge being alleged that the citizens were lawfully qualified to vote. Some defects of the preceding count are avoided here because a particular right is named, but the count fails to specify for what purpose the elections were to be held and when or where they were to be held. "Elections thereafter to be held" may be ambiguous as to whether the indictment refers only to the next succeeding election or to all future elections. This lack of reasonable certainty is fatal.
The sixteenth count alleges the intent to prevent and hinder the citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of each, every, all, and singular the several rights and privileges granted and secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States, without specifying any particular right or privilege. This is a more decided form of indefiniteness than in the thirteenth count and conflicts with the universal rule that every ingredient of the offence must be clearly and accurately described to bring the defendant within the true intent and meaning of the provision defining the offence.
Other causes for arrest of judgment were assigned which deny the constitutionality of the Enforcement Act, but having concluded that the indictment is insufficient for the reasons stated, it is unnecessary to consider those constitutional questions further.