488 U.S. 563, 109 S. Ct. 757 (1989)
In 1981 and 1982, the United States obtained two separate indictments against Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Co., Inc., charging each with a distinct conspiracy to rig bids on different Kansas highway projects in violation of the Sherman Act.1
The first indictment alleged an agreement beginning in April 1978 to rig bids on one project, while the second alleged a similar agreement beginning in July 1979 on another project.2 During plea negotiations, respondents acknowledged they were subject to separate sentences on each count.3 In a single proceeding, respondents entered guilty pleas to both indictments after a Rule 11 hearing in which the District Court confirmed the pleas were voluntary and counseled.4
The District Court sentenced Broce to two years' imprisonment on each count, the terms to run concurrently, and to a fine of $50,000 on each count.5 The corporation was fined $750,000 on each count, for a total of $1,500,000.6 Neither respondent having appealed, the judgments became final.7
On the same day that respondents entered their pleas, an indictment was filed against Robert T. Beachner and Beachner Construction Co. charging a violation of both the Sherman Act and the mail fraud statute.8 These defendants, however, chose a different path than that taken by the Broce respondents: they proceeded to trial and were acquitted.9 After the acquittal in the Beachner case (Beachner I), a second indictment was returned by the grand jury charging Beachner Construction Co. with three new Sherman Act violations and three new acts of mail fraud.10
Prior to trial, Beachner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the bid-rigging arrangements identified were merely smaller parts of one overarching conspiracy existing among Kansas highway contractors to rig highway bids within the State.11 The District Court granted the motion after finding a continuous, cooperative effort among Kansas highway contractors to rig bids, thereby eliminating price competition, has permeated the Kansas highway construction industry in excess of twenty-five years, including the period of April 25, 1978, to February 7, 1980, the time period encompassed by the Beachner I and Beachner II indictments.12 Concluding that the District Court's findings were not clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.13
Relying on Beachner II, the Broce respondents filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) to vacate their own sentences on the Sherman Act charge contained in the second indictment.14 The District Court denied the motion, concluding that respondents' earlier guilty pleas were an admission of the Government's allegations of two conspiracies, an admission that foreclosed and concluded new arguments to the contrary.15 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.16 That judgment was vacated and the case reheard en banc.17 A divided en banc court concluded that respondents were entitled to draw upon factual evidence outside the original record, including the Beachner II findings, to support the claim of a single conspiracy.18 On remand, the District Court, citing Beachner II, concluded that the indictments merely charged different aspects of the same conspiracy to restrain competition.19 It vacated the judgments and sentences entered against both respondents on the second indictment.20 It then held that the District Court's finding of a single conspiracy was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 485 U. S. 903 (1988).22
Whether a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty to two separate conspiracy counts may later assert a double jeopardy claim in a collateral attack by contending that only one conspiracy existed?23
A voluntary and intelligent guilty plea admits all factual and legal elements of the offenses charged and forecloses collateral attack on the resulting conviction, including double jeopardy claims, unless the claim is that the government lacked constitutional power to prosecute on the face of the record.24
No. Respondents entered counseled and voluntary guilty pleas to two indictments whose facial allegations described distinct agreements formed at different times and directed at different projects.25 Those pleas therefore conceded the existence of two separate conspiracies.26 The subsequent Beachner findings rested on evidence outside the original record and could not be used to contradict the admissions inherent in the pleas.27
The Blackledge and Menna exception does not apply because the indictments on their face charged separate offenses rather than a single duplicative charge that the government was constitutionally barred from prosecuting.28 Respondents had the opportunity at the time of the pleas to litigate the single-conspiracy theory but chose instead to plead guilty, relinquishing that right.29
The double jeopardy claim is foreclosed by the guilty pleas and judgments of conviction.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to identify the doubtful character of the basic premise on which respondents’ double jeopardy claim rests.31 He noted that a conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.32 It does not become several conspiracies because it continues over a period of time or because it is an agreement to commit several offenses.33 Each indictment alleged every element of a complete Sherman Act violation on its own facts.34
Stevens suggested that separate bid-rigging arrangements carried out in furtherance of a larger plan may still be prosecuted independently.35 He concluded that whether the law requires merger of all violations into one need not be decided here, but the Court has not resolved that question.36
Justice Blackmun dissented, contending that a guilty plea does not waive a double jeopardy claim when the claim that the government lacked power to prosecute is apparent from the face of the indictments read in light of the existing record.37 He argued that the two indictments were vague and substantially overlapping, creating a strong inference of a single conspiracy.38 An evidentiary hearing should be permitted to resolve the factual question without undermining the finality interests served by guilty pleas.39
Blackmun maintained that neither Blackledge nor Menna conditioned the availability of collateral review on whether the double jeopardy violation could be detected without an evidentiary hearing. He emphasized that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy remains available even when additional evidence is needed to demonstrate that two indictments charge the same offense.40
Whether a guilty plea and resulting conviction foreclose a defendant from introducing evidence outside the original record to support a claim that two indictments charged only a single conspiracy?41
When a judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final, the inquiry on collateral attack is confined to whether the plea was counseled and voluntary.42 New evidence outside the record may not be introduced to challenge the separate nature of offenses to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.43
Yes. The Tenth Circuit erred in permitting respondents to rely on the Beachner record and other extrinsic evidence to prove a single conspiracy.44 Once the pleas were accepted, the indictments' facial allegations of two distinct agreements became conclusive admissions that could not be contradicted by later-developed facts.45 Allowing such evidence would undermine the finality that guilty pleas are intended to achieve.46
The Menna footnote requires that any double jeopardy claim be judged on the face of the charge.47 Because the Broce indictments described separate conspiracies, respondents could not prevail without contradicting their own pleas.48
A guilty plea forecloses introduction of evidence outside the original record to support a single-conspiracy claim.49
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun maintained that neither Blackledge nor Menna conditioned the availability of collateral review on whether the double jeopardy violation could be detected without an evidentiary hearing.50 He emphasized that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy remains available even when additional evidence is needed to demonstrate that two indictments charge the same offense. The majority's reading of the Menna footnote places undue emphasis on judging the claim solely on the existing record without hearing.51
Blackmun argued that an evidentiary hearing would not be overly burdensome and would properly balance finality interests with constitutional protections.52