144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024)
This case concerns the federal indictment of a former President of the United States for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office. We consider the scope of a President's immunity from criminal prosecution.
From January 2017 until January 2021, Donald J. Trump served as President of the United States. On August 1, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted him on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results.
According to the indictment, Trump advanced his goal through five primary means. First, he and his co-conspirators used knowingly false claims of election fraud to try to get state legislators and election officials to change electoral votes for his opponent to electoral votes for him. Second, they organized fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted States and caused those fraudulent electors to transmit false certificates to the Vice President and other government officials to be counted at the certification proceeding on January 6. Third, they attempted to use the Justice Department to conduct sham election-crime investigations and to send a letter to targeted States falsely claiming that the Justice Department had identified significant concerns that may have impacted the election outcome. Fourth, they attempted to persuade the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results. And when that failed, on the morning of January 6, they repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice President had the authority to and might alter the election results, and directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the certification proceeding; when the crowd violently attacked the Capitol and halted the proceeding, Trump and his co-conspirators exploited the disruption by redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud and convince Members of Congress to further delay the certification.
Based on this alleged conduct, the indictment charged Trump with (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, (2) conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k), (3) obstruction of and attempt to obstruct an official proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and (4) conspiracy against rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241.
Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity. He argued that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities so that he can perform the especially sensitive duties of his office with bold and unhesitating action. The District Court denied the motion, holding that former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Both courts declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.
We granted certiorari to decide whether and to what extent a former President enjoys Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.
This is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation's history of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. Determining whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential power under the Constitution. We conclude that under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office.
Article II vests "executive Power" in a President. The President's duties are of unrivaled gravity and breadth. His authority to act necessarily stems either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. When the President exercises authority that stems from the Constitution itself—authority that is "conclusive and preclusive"—Congress cannot act on that subject, and courts cannot examine the President's actions. It follows that an Act of Congress may not criminalize the President's actions within his exclusive constitutional power, and courts may not adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. We thus conclude that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority.
Not all official acts fall within the President's "conclusive and preclusive" authority. Where his authority is shared with Congress, the reasons that justify absolute immunity do not extend. To determine the President's immunity in these contexts, we look to the Framers' design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, precedent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents.
The Framers designed the Presidency to provide for an energetic Executive and vested the President with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. Recognizing the unique risks that may arise when the President's energies are diverted by proceedings that might render him unduly cautious, this Court has recognized certain Presidential immunities and privileges rooted in separation-of-powers tradition and supported by history. In Fitzgerald, for instance, we recognized absolute immunity from damages liability for acts within the "outer perimeter" of official responsibility.
When prosecutors have sought evidence from the President, however, the Court has consistently rejected claims of absolute immunity while recognizing a "presumptive privilege" to protect presidential communications. In United States v. Burr and United States v. Nixon, the Court refused to treat the President as absolutely exempt from subpoenas or discovery, while acknowledging privileges for certain official papers and communications.
Criminally prosecuting a President for official conduct poses a greater threat of intrusion on the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his possession. The threat of trial, judgment, and imprisonment is a far greater deterrent than civil damages and more likely to distort Presidential decisionmaking. Taking into account these competing considerations, the separation of powers principles explained in precedent require at least a presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the outer perimeter of official responsibility to safeguard the independence and effective functioning of the Executive Branch.
Accordingly, the President must be immune from prosecution for an official act unless the Government can show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. We need not decide here whether that immunity is absolute or presumptive for all non-core official acts; the present proceedings do not require resolution of that question.
As for a President's unofficial acts, there is no immunity. The separation of powers does not bar prosecution predicated on unofficial conduct. The immunity recognized for official actions is to ensure the President's decisionmaking is not distorted by the threat of litigation; that justification does not support immunity for private conduct.
Determining whether a former President is entitled to immunity from a particular prosecution requires applying these principles to the conduct at issue. The first step is to distinguish official from unofficial actions. No court has yet made that distinction with respect to the indictment's detailed allegations. Given the expedited record and limited briefing below, we offer guidance and remand to the District Court to consider several categories of the indictment's allegations in the first instance.
Distinguishing a President's official actions from his unofficial ones can be difficult. When the President acts pursuant to constitutional and statutory authority, he takes official action. The immunity recognized extends to the "outer perimeter" of the President's official responsibilities, covering actions not manifestly or palpably beyond his authority. In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President's motives, nor deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the conduct alleged in the indictment.
Certain allegations concerning the Justice Department plainly implicate the President's use of official power. The Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, and the President's management of the Executive Branch includes authority to remove key subordinates. The indictment alleges Trump sought to leverage the Justice Department—met with the Acting Attorney General and other officials to discuss investigations, sought a Department letter to targeted States, and threatened to replace the Acting Attorney General when he resisted. Those allegations implicate the President's conclusive and preclusive authority over prosecutorial decisions and the removal power. The indictment's allegations that the requested investigations were shams or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President of exclusive authority over the Justice Department's functions. Because the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority, Trump is absolutely immune from prosecution for alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials.
The indictment alleges that Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to enlist the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to alter the election results. The President and Vice President often discuss official responsibilities, and the Vice President's role in counting electoral votes is a constitutional and statutory duty. The allegations that Trump pressured the Vice President therefore involve official conduct, and Trump is at least presumptively immune from prosecution for such conduct. Whether that presumption is rebutted here is a matter for the District Court to assess in the first instance; the Government bears the burden to rebut the presumption and must show that applying criminal law to such conduct would pose no dangers of intrusion on Executive authority and functions.
The indictment's remaining allegations involve interactions with persons outside the Executive Branch—state officials, private parties, and the general public—including attempts to convince state officials that election fraud tainted their popular vote counts and the organization and submission of fraudulent slates of electors. Trump argues those actions were official because they were undertaken to ensure the integrity of the federal election; the Government sees them as private and campaign conduct. Resolving which characterization is correct requires a fact-specific analysis of the interrelated allegations. The District Court should determine in the first instance whether Trump's conduct in this area was official or unofficial.
The indictment also alleges conduct in connection with January 6 itself—communications by Tweet and public address. The President possesses extraordinary power to speak to the public and frequently speaks in his official capacity; most public communications will fall comfortably within the outer perimeter of official responsibilities. But there may be contexts in which the President speaks in an unofficial capacity. Whether the communications alleged in the indictment involve official conduct depends on the content and context of each and is factbound. The District Court should determine in the first instance whether this alleged conduct is official or unofficial.
Presidents cannot be indicted based on conduct for which they are immune. The District Court must carefully analyze the indictment's remaining allegations on remand to determine whether they involve conduct that requires immunity. The parties and the District Court must ensure that sufficient allegations support the indictment's charges without relying on any conduct for which the President is immune. Testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing official conduct may not be admitted as evidence at trial.
Trump advances a broader immunity argument: that the Impeachment Judgment Clause requires impeachment and Senate conviction to precede a President's criminal prosecution. The Clause does not address whether and on what conduct a President may be prosecuted if never impeached and convicted. Historical evidence lends little support to Trump's position, and transforming impeachment into a necessary step for criminal enforcement finds little textual or structural support.
The Government argued for no immunity at all, preferring as-applied challenges and deferring review until after trial. We reject that approach. Questions about whether the President may be held liable for particular actions must be addressed at the outset of a proceeding; even if a President is ultimately not found liable for certain official actions, the possibility of extended proceedings may render him unduly cautious in discharging official duties, hindering effective government.
This case presents a question of lasting significance. Our answer is guided by enduring separation-of-powers principles. The President enjoys no immunity for his unofficial acts, and not everything the President does is official. But under our system of separated powers, the President may not be prosecuted for exercising his core constitutional powers, and he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for his official acts. That immunity applies equally to all occupants of the Oval Office. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, concurring.
Few things would threaten our constitutional order more than criminally prosecuting a former President for his official acts. The Constitution does not permit us to chart such a dangerous course. The Framers deemed an energetic Executive essential to the security of liberty, and our system of separated powers accordingly insulates the President from prosecution for his official acts. To conclude otherwise would hamstring the vigorous Executive our Constitution envisions.
I write separately to highlight another way in which this prosecution may violate our constitutional structure. In this case, the Attorney General purported to appoint a private citizen as Special Counsel to prosecute a former President on behalf of the United States. I am not sure that any office for the Special Counsel has been "established by Law," as the Constitution requires. Article II requires that the appointment process and the office itself be created "by Law." If there is no law establishing the office that the Special Counsel occupies, then he cannot proceed with this prosecution. A private citizen cannot criminally prosecute anyone, let alone a former President.
The Appointments Clause prescribes how officers are to be appointed and requires that offices be "established by Law." The Founders deliberately removed from the President the power to create offices, leaving that to Congress. Longstanding practice has Congress creating offices by statute. Although Congress has at times created offices similar to a special counsel, and regulations contemplate an "outside" Special Counsel, it is far from clear that the Attorney General's appointment here rests on an office "established by Law." The statutes cited by the Attorney General are general delegations and do not clearly create an office for an independent Special Counsel with authority to prosecute.
Even if the Special Counsel has a valid office, questions remain whether the appointment complied with the Appointments Clause and whether the Special Counsel is a principal or inferior officer. If principal, his appointment without Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation would be invalid; if inferior, Congress must have vested the Attorney General with authority by law to appoint him. These questions must be answered before this prosecution can proceed.
Respecting the protections the Constitution provides for the Office of the Presidency secures liberty. The Constitution also secures liberty by separating the powers to create and fill offices. There are serious questions whether the Attorney General has violated that structure by creating an office of the Special Counsel that has not been established by law. Those questions must be answered before this prosecution can proceed. We must respect the Constitution's separation of powers in all its forms.
I do not join Part III–C of the Court's opinion. The remainder is consistent with my view that the Constitution prohibits Congress from criminalizing a President's exercise of core Article II powers and closely related conduct. I would have framed the issues differently. I treat the Court's use of the term "immunity" as shorthand for two propositions: the President can challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute as applied to official acts alleged in the indictment, and he can obtain interlocutory review of the trial court's ruling.
There is substantial agreement that some prosecutions of a President's official conduct may be unconstitutional. If a statute covers the alleged official conduct, prosecution may proceed only if applying it to the circumstances poses no danger of intrusion on Executive authority and functions. I would have addressed threshold statutory questions in many instances now, and I would have affirmed that the President is entitled to interlocutory review of trial-court denials of as-applied Article II challenges because those questions are collateral to guilt or innocence and trial would irreparably undermine the Executive's independence.
I do not join Part III–C, which holds that the Constitution limits the introduction of protected official-conduct evidence in criminal prosecutions beyond existing privilege doctrines. I would not adopt that evidentiary rule. The rules of evidence, including Rule 403 and limiting instructions, are generally adequate to protect the President's interests while allowing the Government to present evidence necessary to prove elements like intent in prosecutions such as bribery or quid pro quo allegations.
In short, the President may challenge the constitutionality of criminal statutes as applied to official acts, and interlocutory review is appropriate. But the Constitution does not require the categorical evidentiary bar the Court endorses in Part III–C.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, dissenting, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice JACKSON join.
Today's decision to grant former Presidents criminal immunity reshapes the institution of the Presidency and makes a mockery of the foundational principle that no one is above the law. The majority grants former President Trump all the immunity he sought and more. The Constitution does not shield a former President from answering for criminal and treasonous acts, and I therefore dissent.
The indictment paints a stark portrait of a President desperate to stay in power—spreading false claims of outcome-determinative fraud, attempting to bully state officials to change or "find" votes, organizing fraudulent slates of electors, attempting to use the Justice Department to give official cover to false claims, pressuring the Vice President to alter the certification, and addressing a crowd that then attacked the Capitol. The indictment alleges Trump delayed responding to the violence and sought to exploit it to reverse the certification.
The majority invents an atextual, ahistorical, and unjustifiable immunity that largely insulates Presidents from criminal liability. It creates absolute immunity for "core constitutional powers," expansive immunity for all "official acts" (at least presumptive and perhaps absolute), and then bars evidence concerning acts for which the President is immune from playing any role in prosecutions of private crimes. Each of these steps is unsupported by text, history, or logic.
Textually, the Constitution contains no provision immunizing Presidents from criminal prosecution. The Framers knew how to provide immunities—they included the Speech or Debate Clause for legislators—but they did not do so for the President. The Impeachment Judgment Clause in fact contemplates criminal liability after impeachment and conviction, indicating the Framers assumed ordinary criminal process could apply.
Historically, key Founders like Hamilton and Story indicated that Presidents are amenable to prosecution and punishment under the ordinary course of law. Practice since Watergate and later special-counsel investigations has proceeded on the assumption that former Presidents can be prosecuted. Even Trump's own counsel in the Senate trial said a former President could be tried in a court of law. The majority ignores or downplays these historical indications.
Functionally, the majority misapplies Fitzgerald's balancing and extends it to criminal prosecutions in ways the Fitzgerald Court did not contemplate. Criminal prosecutions include robust protections—departmental screening, grand juries, trial protections, and appellate review—that reduce the risk of vexatious prosecutions and are weighty public interests in favor of prosecution. The majority gives undue weight to concerns about chilling Presidential decisionmaking while discounting the countervailing public interest in fair and effective law enforcement and the Executive Branch's own interest in upholding the law.
The majority's treatment of official-acts evidence is particularly troubling. Even if a President cannot be prosecuted for certain official acts, evidence of those acts may be necessary in prosecutions of truly private crimes to prove knowledge or intent. Excluding all such evidence as the majority suggests would hamstring legitimate prosecutions without any convincing justification. Existing evidentiary tools and defenses are more appropriate and precise than the categorical bar the majority adopts.
The majority's approach will have grave consequences. It creates an immunity that invites future Presidents to abuse power, knowing that many official uses of power will be presumptively out of reach for criminal enforcement. The result is a presidency that is less accountable and a Constitution that protects the person rather than the office. For these reasons I dissent.
I agree with Justice SOTOMAYOR that the Court's reasoning and conclusion are deeply flawed as a matter of history, law, and logic. I write separately to explain the theoretical mechanics of what the majority has done and the paradigm shift it effects for presidential accountability.
Immunity is an exemption from the duties and liabilities imposed by law. In the American system, immunity from criminal prosecution is an extraordinary departure from the norm that no one is above the law. Our criminal justice system is built on an individual accountability model: Congress defines crimes; prosecutors seek indictments; grand juries and juries apply legal standards; defendants enjoy procedural protections and may assert defenses; the People—through their representatives and juries—hold individuals accountable. That model presumes the law applies to all persons, including public officers.
The majority replaces that longstanding model for Presidents with a new Presidential accountability model. Under it the Court draws a multi-layered immunity framework: (1) absolute immunity for "core constitutional powers" within the President's exclusive authority; (2) a presumptive immunity for other official acts within the "outer perimeter" of official responsibility; and (3) no immunity for unofficial acts. Determining whether conduct is "core," "official," or "unofficial"—and whether the presumptive immunity is rebutted—requires courts to perform complex and indeterminate line-drawing prior to trial. The result is uncertainty about when a President may be criminally liable and a judicial gatekeeping role that displaces the political branches' authority to determine and apply criminal law.
This paradigm shift has structural and practical consequences. It augments the power of the Presidency by exempting many official acts from criminal law and it augments judicial power by placing courts in the role of preclearing criminal liability applications against Presidents. The model undermines deterrence: Presidents now have an incentive to commit crimes while in office so long as those actions are framed as official, because the law will not reliably reach them.
For generations the United States has relied on the law to keep Presidents in check. Today the Court removes that guardrail and substitutes an indeterminate and judge-driven test. I dissent.