572 U.S. 565 (2014)
The Town of Greece, New York, a municipality with a population of 94,000 in upstate New York, began opening its monthly town board meetings with a prayer in 1999 after the newly elected town supervisor, John Auberger, decided to replicate a practice he had observed in the county legislature.1 Following the roll call and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, Auberger invited a local clergyman to deliver an invocation, after which he thanked the minister for serving as the board's chaplain for the month and presented a commemorative plaque.2 The prayer was intended to place board members in a solemn and deliberative frame of mind and invoke divine guidance in town affairs.3
A town employee selected prayer givers by calling congregations listed in a local directory until finding an available minister for that month's meeting.4 The town eventually compiled a list of willing board chaplains who had accepted invitations and agreed to return.5 The town at no point excluded or denied an opportunity to a would-be prayer giver, and its leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any persuasion, including an atheist, could give the invocation.6 From 1999 to 2007, however, all participating ministers were Christian because nearly all of the congregations in town were Christian.7 The town neither reviewed the prayers in advance nor provided guidance as to their tone or content.8
The resulting prayers often sounded both civic and religious themes, with many invoking the name of Jesus, the Heavenly Father, or the Holy Spirit, and some referencing Christian holidays, scripture, or doctrine such as the death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ or the events of Holy Week and Easter.9 Typical invocations asked the divinity to abide at the meeting, bestow blessings on the community, and grant wisdom and courage to elected officials.10 After respondents complained that Christian themes pervaded the prayers, the town invited a Jewish layman and the chairman of the local Baha'i temple to deliver prayers, and a Wiccan priestess who had read press reports about the controversy requested and received an opportunity to give the invocation.11
Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, citizens who attended town board meetings to speak about issues of local concern, objected that the prayers violated their religious or philosophical views.12 They brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.13 They alleged that the town violated the Establishment Clause by preferring Christians over other prayer givers and by sponsoring sectarian prayers such as those given in Jesus' name.14 They sought an injunction limiting the town to inclusive and ecumenical prayers that referred only to a generic God.15
The District Court on summary judgment upheld the prayer practice.16 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that aspects of the prayer program viewed in their totality by a reasonable observer conveyed the message that Greece was endorsing Christianity.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the town's prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause.18
Whether the Town of Greece's practice of opening its monthly town board meetings with a prayer given by clergy selected from local congregations violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?19
The Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.20 Legislative prayer is consistent with the Clause if it fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.21 There must be no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one faith or to disparage any other.22
Yes. The Town of Greece's practice fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.23 The town began opening its monthly board meetings with prayer in 1999 when supervisor John Auberger replicated a practice he had observed in the county legislature.24 A town employee selected unpaid volunteer clergy by calling congregations listed in a local directory until finding an available minister.25
The town eventually compiled a list of willing board chaplains.26 From 1999 to 2007 all participating ministers were Christian because nearly all congregations in town were Christian.27 Yet the town never excluded any would-be prayer giver.28 It maintained that ministers or laypersons of any persuasion could participate.29
The resulting prayers invoked the name of Jesus and Christian doctrine in some instances.30 They also addressed universal themes such as requesting wisdom and courage for elected officials and blessings on the community.31 After respondents complained, the town invited a Jewish layman, the chairman of the local Baha'i temple, and a Wiccan priestess to deliver invocations.32 The town neither reviewed prayers in advance nor provided guidance on their content.33
It left guest clergy free to compose their own devotions.34 This practice aligns with the historical tradition.35 It reflects the same acceptance of legislative prayer that the First Congress demonstrated by appointing chaplains shortly after approving the First Amendment language.36 Most states have maintained the practice for centuries.37
The town's prayer practice does not violate the Establishment Clause because it comports with the historical tradition of legislative prayer and does not exploit the opportunity to proselytize or advance a single faith.38
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Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Alito concurred to emphasize that the town's informal method of recruiting guest chaplains was typical of small municipalities and did not reflect discriminatory intent.39 He noted that the clerical employee used the local Community Guide rather than a broader directory.40 The town limited its list almost exclusively to congregations within town borders.41
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the town had no religious animus.42 Requiring demographic exactitude would pressure towns to abandon legislative prayer altogether.43 That result would be contrary to the precedent established in Marsh v. Chambers.44
The principal dissent's objection ultimately reduced to a demand for minor procedural adjustments that the town could have made without constitutional compulsion.45
Whether legislative prayer must be nonsectarian to be consistent with the Establishment Clause?46
Legislative prayer need not be nonsectarian.47 The prayers in Marsh v. Chambers were upheld not due to generic theism but because history and tradition demonstrate that prayer in this limited context can coexist with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.48 The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges absent exploitation to proselytize or advance one faith.49
No. The insistence on nonsectarian prayer is not consistent with the tradition of legislative prayer.50 The prayers delivered in Greece often invoked the name of Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or Christian holidays and doctrine.51 Yet they also invoked universal themes such as a spirit of cooperation among town leaders.52 The District Court found that references to Jesus did not amount to impermissible proselytizing.53
The Second Circuit acknowledged no inherent problem in sectarian content.54 Requiring nonsectarian prayers would force legislatures and courts to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech.55 This involvement of government in religious matters would exceed the degree present under the town's practice of neither editing nor approving prayers.56 The First Amendment is not a majority rule.57
Government may not define permissible categories of religious speech by permitting only words acceptable to the majority.58
Legislative prayer need not be nonsectarian. The historical tradition permits prayers that reflect the beliefs of the particular minister while still serving the legitimate function of lending gravity to the occasion.59
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Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas concurred in part and in the judgment to reiterate that the Establishment Clause is best understood as a federalism provision that resists incorporation against the states.60 Even assuming incorporation, the municipal prayers bore no resemblance to the coercive state establishments at the founding.61 Those establishments involved actual legal coercion such as mandatory attendance, taxes for church support, and control of religious doctrine.62
The subtle pressures alleged by respondents did not amount to the legal coercion that characterized historical establishments.63
Whether the setting and conduct of the town board meetings create coercive pressures that force nonadherents to participate in the prayers?64
A fact-sensitive inquiry that considers both the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed shows that the town is not coercing its citizens to engage in a religious observance.65 The principal audience for the invocations is the lawmakers themselves.66 Board members do not direct the public to participate.67 No pattern of prayers denigrates dissenters or indicates that decisions depend on acquiescence in the prayer.68
No. The setting and conduct of the town board meetings do not create coercive pressures that force nonadherents to participate.69 The prayer opportunity must be evaluated against the backdrop of historical practice showing that prayer has become part of the nation's heritage.70 The principal audience for the invocations is the lawmakers themselves. They may find that a moment of prayer sets the mind to a higher purpose.71
Board members stood, bowed their heads, or made the sign of the cross during the prayer.72 At no point did they solicit similar gestures by the public.73 Requests to rise came from guest ministers rather than town leaders.74 Respondents stated that the prayers gave them offense and made them feel excluded.75
Offense does not equate to coercion.76 Nothing in the record indicates that town leaders allocated benefits based on participation or signaled disfavor toward nonparticipants.77 Citizens were free to leave the room during the prayer or arrive late without standing out as disrespectful.78
The setting and conduct of the town board meetings do not create coercive pressures that force nonadherents to participate. The prayers occur during the ceremonial portion of the meeting and do not direct public participation or tie official action to religious observance.79
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Justice Breyer dissented to stress that the case is fact-sensitive and that the Court of Appeals correctly focused on the town's failure to make reasonable efforts to include prayer givers of minority faiths.80 The town made no significant effort to inform non-Christian houses of worship about the possibility of delivering an invocation.81 It limited its list almost exclusively to congregations within town borders.82
It produced an unbroken pattern of Christian prayers aside from a brief period in 2008 after complaints began.83 In a community of several faiths, the town chose to do nothing to reflect religious diversity.84 This approach promoted the political division along religious lines that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.85
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, And Sotomayor
Justice Kagan dissented to argue that the town's practice violated the norm of religious equality because the invocations were addressed directly to the citizenry rather than to lawmakers and were predominantly sectarian.86 The meetings allowed ordinary citizens to petition the government on individualized matters.87 Yet month after month the prayers invoked Christian beliefs exclusively.88
The town never sought to involve adherents of non-Christian religions except briefly when litigation loomed.89 The Town itself has never urged its chaplains to reach out to members of other faiths, or even to recall that they might be present.90 This left the prayers predominantly Christian.