310 U.S. 88 (1940)
Byron Thornhill was convicted in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, after being charged with violating Section 3448 of the Alabama Code of 1923 for his activities on a picket line at the Brown Wood Preserving Company plant.1
Several weeks before the arrest, a union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor issued a strike order covering all but four of the plant's approximately one hundred employees.2 Since that time, a picket line with two posts of six to eight men each had been maintained around the plant twenty-four hours a day on company property at a private employee entrance.3 On the morning the company scheduled the plant to resume operations, Thornhill was observed in the company of six or eight other men on the picket line.4
Thornhill approached Clarence Simpson, a non-union employee reporting for work, and told him that the workers were on strike and did not want anybody to go up there to work.5 The conversation took place peacefully without threats, as Simpson testified that Thornhill approached him in a peaceful manner and did not put him in fear.6 A second witness, J. M. Walden, confirmed that he heard no harsh words and saw nothing threatening in the manner of either man during the exchange, after which Simpson turned and went back home without reporting for work.7
Thornhill was initially convicted in the Inferior Court of Tuscaloosa County and sentenced to fifty-nine days imprisonment in default of a one-hundred-dollar fine and costs.8 Upon appeal, the Circuit Court conducted a trial de novo without a jury, overruled a motion to exclude the testimony on constitutional grounds, found Thornhill guilty of loitering and picketing as charged in the three-count complaint, and sentenced him to seventy-three days imprisonment in default of the fine and costs.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.10 The Alabama Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.11
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions presented.12
Whether Section 3448 of the Alabama Code of 1923 abridges the freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment against state action through the Fourteenth Amendment?13
The freedom of speech and of the press are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States. These rights are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State. The safeguarding of these rights is essential to free government. It allows men to speak as they think on matters vital to them. Falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion. Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.14
Yes. Section 3448 prohibits without just cause or legal excuse going near to or loitering about the premises of any person engaged in lawful business for the purpose of influencing others not to trade with or be employed by such person, or picketing for the purpose of hindering the business.15 Byron Thornhill was convicted for his activities on the picket line where he peacefully told Clarence Simpson that the workers were on strike and did not want anybody to go to work.16 This conduct amounted to the publicizing of the facts of a labor dispute in the vicinity of the place of business.17
The dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Satisfactory hours and wages and working conditions in industry have an importance which is not less than the interests of those in the business directly concerned. The range of activities proscribed by the statute embraces nearly every practicable means whereby those interested may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute.18
Section 3448 of the Alabama Code of 1923 abridges the freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Related opinions on this issue
Mr. Justice McReynolds is of opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed.20
Whether the statute's broad prohibition on loitering and picketing near places of business for the purpose of influencing others can be sustained as applied to the peaceful communication of information regarding a labor dispute?21
It is not enough to say that the statute is limited in its application to such activity that takes place at the scene of the labor dispute.22 The streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion.23 The danger of breach of the peace or serious invasion of rights of property or privacy at the scene of a labor dispute is not sufficiently imminent in all cases to warrant the legislature in determining that such place is not appropriate for the range of activities outlawed by the statute.24 Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.25
No. The state urges that the purpose of the challenged statute is the protection of the community from the violence and breaches of the peace which are the concomitants of picketing.26 However, no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter.27 In Thornhill's case, the conversation with Simpson was peaceful, with no harsh words or threatening manner, and Simpson was not put in fear.28 The statute does not aim specifically at serious encroachments on these interests and does not evidence any such care in balancing these interests against the interest of the community and that of the individual in freedom of discussion on matters of public concern.29
The vague contours of the term picket are nowhere delineated. The phrase without just cause or legal excuse does not in any effective manner restrict the breadth of the regulation.
The statute's broad prohibition cannot be sustained as applied to the peaceful communication of information regarding a labor dispute.30
Whether the constitutionality of the statute must be determined on its face rather than based on the specific evidence presented in the case?31
The section in question must be judged upon its face.32 The finding against petitioner was a general one.33 It did not specify the testimony upon which it rested.34 The charges were framed in the words of the statute and so must be given a like construction.35 There is a further reason for testing the section on its face.36 Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of ideas.37 A like threat is inherent in a penal statute which does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press.38
Yes. The trial court found petitioner guilty of loitering and picketing as charged in the complaint without specifying the testimony.39 The charges were phrased substantially in the very words of the statute.40 The courts below expressed no intention of narrowing the construction put upon the statute by prior state decisions.41
Therefore, there is no occasion to go behind the face of the statute or of the complaint for the purpose of determining whether the evidence could support a conviction founded upon different and more precise charges.42 The existence of such a statute results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.43 An accused after arrest and conviction under such a statute does not have to sustain the burden of demonstrating that the State could not constitutionally have written a different and specific statute covering his activities as disclosed by the charge and the evidence introduced against him.44
The constitutionality of the statute must be determined on its face rather than based on the specific evidence presented in the case.45