553 U.S. 880, 893-895 (2008)
Brent Taylor and Greg Herrick were friends who shared an interest in restoring antique aircraft, including the F-45 model manufactured in the 1930s.1 In 1997, Herrick submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the Federal Aviation Administration seeking technical documents from the F-45 certification process held in agency records.2 The FAA denied the request under the trade secrets exemption after consulting with Fairchild Corporation, the corporate successor to the original manufacturer, which objected to disclosure.3 Herrick then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.4
The Wyoming District Court granted summary judgment to the FAA, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision on July 24, 2002, upholding the exemption despite a 1955 letter from the manufacturer authorizing public use of the documents.5 Less than a month later, on August 22, 2002, Taylor submitted an identical FOIA request to the FAA for the same F-45 documents.6 When the agency did not respond, Taylor filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the 1955 letter had removed trade secret protection and raising additional issues about whether protection could be restored or recaptured.7
After Fairchild intervened as a defendant, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Taylor's suit, concluding that he was virtually represented in Herrick's prior action.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, applying its own five-factor test for virtual representation that included identity of interests, adequate representation, and a close relationship.9
The record showed that Taylor served as president of the Antique Aircraft Association to which Herrick belonged, that Herrick had asked Taylor to assist with restoring his F-45 without a formal contract, that Taylor later retained the same attorney who represented Herrick, and that Herrick had provided Taylor with documents obtained during discovery in the Wyoming litigation.10 Taylor had not participated directly in Herrick's suit, received no notice of it, and exercised no control over its conduct.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the virtual representation doctrine applied by the lower courts.12
Whether a nonparty to a prior federal lawsuit may be bound by the judgment under a doctrine of virtual representation based on a close relationship and shared interests with the party?13
The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law.14 A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them but does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.15 This rule is subject only to limited exceptions such as preexisting substantive legal relationships or adequate representation by a party with the same interests.16
No. The Court of Appeals held Taylor virtually represented in Herrick's suit because the two men were close friends with identical interests in the F-45 documents and Taylor assisted Herrick in preparing the case.17 This broad interest-based theory expands preclusion beyond the recognized exceptions of preexisting legal relationships or adequate representation with notice.18 The established facts show Taylor and Herrick had no legal relationship.19 Taylor received no notice of Herrick's Wyoming suit.20
Herrick did not understand himself to be acting in a representative capacity for Taylor when he filed his FOIA action in 1997 and litigated it to the Tenth Circuit's July 24, 2002 affirmance.21
Taylor's suit is not precluded by the doctrine of virtual representation.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion and wrote separately to emphasize that the virtual representation doctrine applied by the Court of Appeals sweeps too broadly and risks binding individuals who have never had their day in court.23 He noted that the narrower exceptions based on preexisting legal relationships or adequate representation with notice are sufficient to protect judicial economy without sacrificing fundamental fairness.24 On the facts of this case, Justice Stevens concluded there is no basis for finding that Taylor was adequately represented in Herrick's prior litigation or that he should otherwise be bound by the judgment against his friend.25
Whether adequate representation for purposes of nonparty preclusion requires that the party understood itself to be acting in a representative capacity or that special procedures protected the nonparty's interests?26
Adequate representation for nonparty preclusion exists only if the interests of the nonparty and the party are aligned.27 The party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the nonparty's interests.28 In some circumstances the nonparty had notice of the suit.29
No. Although Taylor and Herrick shared aligned interests in obtaining the F-45 documents, Herrick did not understand himself to be suing on Taylor's behalf, as his complaint never mentioned Taylor and he sought to add Taylor as a plaintiff only after the government moved to dismiss.30 Taylor received no notice of the Wyoming litigation, and the Wyoming District Court took no special care to protect Taylor's interests when it granted summary judgment to the FAA on grounds later affirmed by the Tenth Circuit on July 24, 2002.31
Herrick did not adequately represent Taylor for purposes of nonparty preclusion.32
Whether a subsequent litigant who did not control or finance the prior suit but shares the same attorney and objectives is precluded from bringing his own action?33
A nonparty is bound by a judgment if he assumes control over the litigation.34 A nonparty is bound if he brings suit as the designated representative or agent of a party bound by the prior adjudication.35 Merely sharing an attorney or objectives does not satisfy the control or agency requirements for preclusion.36
No. Taylor did not participate directly in Herrick's suit, exercise control over its conduct, or finance the Wyoming litigation.37 Although Taylor later retained the same attorney and shared the objective of obtaining the F-45 documents after the Tenth Circuit's July 24, 2002 decision, the established facts show only that Herrick asked Taylor to assist with restoring his F-45 without a formal contract, that Herrick provided Taylor with some discovery documents, and that Taylor served as president of the Antique Aircraft Association to which Herrick belonged.38 None of these facts amounts to the control or agency needed to bind Taylor.39
Taylor is not precluded from bringing his own action.40