4 Wheat. 122, 17 U.S. 122 (1819)
The Supreme Court of the United States took up this case after it was adjourned from the Circuit Court of the United States for the first circuit and the district of Massachusetts.1 The judges of that court were divided on several points stated in the record.2
The plaintiff Sturges sued the defendant Crowninshield to recover on a promissory note.3 Crowninshield promised to pay a sum of money on or before a specified date.4
Crowninshield defended the action by pleading a statute of the State of New York.5 The statute liberated the person of the debtor and discharged him from all liability for any debt previously contracted upon surrendering his property in the manner prescribed by the act.6
Whether, since the adoption of the constitution of the United States, any State has authority to pass a bankrupt law, or whether the power is exclusively vested in the Congress of the United States?7
Until Congress exercises its power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, the States retain authority to pass bankrupt laws provided such laws contain no principle violating the obligation of contracts under the Constitution.8
Yes. The power granted to Congress may be exercised or declined.9 It is not the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the States.10 Until the power to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies be exercised by Congress, the States are not forbidden to pass a bankrupt law, provided it contain no principle which violates the 10th section of the first article of the constitution of the United States.11
States retain authority to pass bankrupt laws until Congress exercises its power, provided the state laws do not impair the obligation of contracts.12
Whether the law of New-York, which is pleaded in this case, impairs the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States?13
A state law that liberates the debtor and discharges all liability for debts previously contracted upon surrender of property impairs the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Constitution.14
Yes. The New York statute liberates the person of the debtor and discharges him from all liability for any debt previously contracted on his surrendering his property in the manner it prescribes.15 Any law which releases a part of this obligation must in the literal sense of the word impair it.16 Much more must a law impair it which makes it totally invalid and entirely discharges it.17
The act of New-York which is pleaded in this case so far as it attempts to discharge the contract on which this suit was instituted is a law impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the constitution of the United States.18
The New York law impairs the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Constitution and provides no bar to the action.19