867 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 2015)
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Iowa R. Evid.
5.702. Second, we consider whether under the unique facts of this case,
Dr. Thompson’s opinions amounted to an impermissible comment on
Tyler’s credibility. See Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 676. We address each of
these points in turn.
First, we conclude Dr. Thompson’s opinions on the cause andmanner of Baby Tyler’s death were not sufficiently based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge so as to assist the jury. Rather,
Dr. Thompson admitted that his opinions on the cause and manner of
Baby Tyler’s death were based primarily, if not exclusively, on Tyler’s
inconsistent and uncorroborated statements to police, as opposed to
objective medical findings. The central issue in this case was whether
Baby Tyler was born alive and survived for a sufficient period of time for
Tyler to drown him, or whether he was stillborn or died immediately after
birth such that Tyler could not have drowned him. Without the benefit
of objective medical findings, Dr. Thompson testified to the ultimate
issues of fact questions for the jury to determine. Clearly, a medical
examiner could testify concerning the medical signs of drowning,
whether the autopsy findings were consistent with drowning, whether
there were other possible causes of death, whether he or she could rule
out other possible causes of death, and whether he or she could
legitimately render definitive opinions on cause or manner of death.
Much of Dr. Thompson’s testimony assisted the jury in these respects.
However, the record in this case does not support the conclusion that Dr.
Thompson relied on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
to classify the cause of Baby Tyler’s death as bathtub drowning or the
manner of his death as homicide, rather than undetermined. Instead,
the record established Dr. Thompson’s opinions were based primarily, if
not exclusively, on Tyler’s inconsistent and uncorroborated statements to
police.
After performing the autopsy and pathology examination, Dr.Thompson’s opinions on the cause and manner of Baby Tyler’s death
were undetermined. In his final report, however, Dr. Thompson
concluded the cause of death was bathtub drowning and the manner of
death was homicide. His final report clearly indicated that in forming his
opinions he relied on Tyler’s statements to police. His report stated: “The
mother claimed she had given birth the previous day in the motel room
and then placed the infant in a bathtub partially filled with water shortly
after the birth. The baby reportedly moved and cried after birth.” At the
hearing on the motion in limine, Dr. Thompson agreed with defense
counsel that based on the autopsy, he was unable to reach a conclusion
on both the cause and manner of Baby Tyler’s death. He admitted the
only way he reached his final opinions was by reference to Tyler’s
statements to police during her interview at the police station.
At trial, Dr. Thompson testified on direct examination that therewas nothing inconsistent with his autopsy findings and the State’s theory
that Baby Tyler was born alive and survived for a sufficient period for
Tyler to drown him. Based on his physical examination of Baby Tyler’s
body, he ruled out several possible alternative causes of death. He
further testified that there were indications Baby Tyler may have taken a
breath because the alveoli in the lungs were partially, although not
entirely, expanded. He then opined, “given the history that Baby Tyler
cried and moved . . . Baby Tyler probably took a few breaths.” He further
opined the cause of death was drowning and the manner of death was
homicide. On cross-examination, defense counsel pressed Dr. Thompson
on the basis for his conclusions. Ultimately, Dr. Thompson testified
there were several other possible causes of death he could not rule out
based on the autopsy. He explained that partially expanded alveoli
would also be consistent with the production of methane gas by bacteria
found in the body after death, which “will diffuse up into the lungs and
can expand those a[l]veolar spaces.” He agreed with defense counsel that
it was possible Baby Tyler died either in utero or immediately after birth.
He then stated, “without the witness statements, I could not have
diagnosed drowning in this case.”
Thus, the record shows Dr. Thompson’s opinions that the cause ofdeath was drowning and manner of death was homicide were not based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Iowa R. Evid.
5.702. Instead, the record shows that absent Tyler’s statements, Dr.
Thompson would have been unable to render definitive opinions on both
cause of death and manner of death. Further, the record does not
support the conclusion that Dr. Thompson relied on any other
corroborating evidence, aside from Tyler’s statements, in reaching his
opinions on cause or manner of death. Dr. Thompson did testify that his
opinions were based on “a combination of history, which includes scene
findings [and] witness statements,” in addition to “[the] autopsy findings .
. . and . . . supplemental testing.” However, he did not explain how the
scene findings or other objective information factored into his opinions.
In fact, the record is devoid of any such objective evidence. Instead, he
admitted Tyler’s statements to police were the but-for factor in rendering
his opinion. Consequently, Dr. Thompson’s opinions on the cause and
manner of death were not sufficiently based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge as required by our rules. Iowa R. Evid.
5.702. He was in no better position to determine the cause or manner of
death than were the members of the jury who watched and listened to
Tyler’s interviews with the special agents and had the opportunity to
evaluate her credibility. His opinions on cause and manner of death did
not assist the trier of fact and were therefore inadmissible under rule
5.702.
This case closely resembles cases from other jurisdictions in whichcourts have excluded medical examiner testimony for similar reasons.
As discussed above, in those cases the medical examiner performed an
autopsy, was unable to render an opinion on cause or manner of death,
and then after review of witness statements or information obtained
through police investigation, rendered an opinion based largely on that
information. See, e.g., Sosnowicz, 270 P.3d at 922; Maxwell, 414 S.E.2d
at 473–74; Perry, 593 N.E.2d at 714; Vining, 645 A.2d at 20–21;
Jamerson, 708 A.2d at 1189–90, 1195; Eberle, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 219;
Bond, 311 S.E.2d at 772. This is not a case where the medical examiner
simply considered witness statements or information obtained from
police, but based his or her opinions primarily on the physical evidence.
See, e.g., Rollins, 897 A.2d at 848–49, 851–52; Dao Xiong, 829 N.W.2d at
397–98; Bradford, 618 N.W.2d at 790, 793; Boyer, 741 N.W.2d at 757.
Nor is it a case where the medical examiner relied on information fairly
characterized as “anecdotal.” See, e.g., Commander, 721 S.E.2d at 415.
Instead, Dr. Thompson’s opinions on the cause and manner of Baby
Tyler’s death were based primarily, if not exclusively, on Tyler’s
inconsistent and uncorroborated statements to police.
We also conclude that under the unique facts of this case, Dr.Thompson’s opinions were inadmissible because they amounted to an
impermissible comment on Tyler’s credibility. As discussed above, an
expert witness cannot comment, directly or indirectly, on a witness’s
credibility. See Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 676–77. We prohibit such
opinions because they “not only replace the jury’s function in
determining credibility, but the jury can employ this type of testimony as
a direct comment on defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. We recently
addressed the application of this rule in three child sex-abuse cases.
In Dudley, we held an expert who opined that a child victim’s“physical manifestations and symptoms were consistent with a child
dealing with and suffering from sexual abuse trauma” impermissibly
commented on the child’s credibility. Id. at 677–78. We reasoned that
when an expert testifies that the child’s physical manifestations or
symptoms are consistent with sexual abuse trauma, “the expert is saying
these symptoms mean the child suffered a sexual abuse trauma;
therefore, the child must be telling the truth when he or she relates his
or her story to the jury.” Id. at 677. In Dudley, we also held another
expert impermissibly commented on the child’s credibility in
communicating to the jury that she recommended the child receive
therapy and stay away from the defendant. Id. at 678. Because she
based these recommendations on her belief that the defendant had
sexually abused the victim as was related to her by the victim, we
concluded the expert necessarily communicated to the jury that she
believed the victim’s story. Id. at 673, 678.
In State v. Brown, 856 N.W.2d 685, 688–89 (Iowa 2014), we heldan expert impermissibly opined on a child victim’s credibility when the
expert’s report stated the victim communicated to the expert that the
defendant had inappropriately touched her and the expert believed “ ‘this
disclosure [to be] significant and that an investigation [was] clearly
warranted.’ ” We reasoned this final statement “indirectly convey[ed] to
the jury that [the victim was] telling the truth about the alleged abuse
because the authorities should conduct a further investigation into the
matter.” Id. at 689.
Finally, in State v. Jaquez, 856 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 2014), weheld an expert crossed the line in testifying that a child victim’s
demeanor was “ ‘completely consistent with a child who has been
traumatized, particularly multiple times.’ ” We concluded this testimony
indirectly vouched for the child’s credibility because the expert was in
effect saying the child’s “demeanor means the child suffered a sexual
abuse trauma, therefore, the child must be telling the truth.” Id.
An analogous situation occurred here. Tyler made variousinconsistent statements to the special agents regarding whether Baby
Tyler was born alive. During the ride from the trailer to the police station
and for the first half of the three-hour interview at the police station, she
told the special agents that after Baby Tyler was born he was silent, he
did not move, and she immediately placed him in the garbage can. After
the special agents interviewed her for over an hour and a half, Tyler then
stated that after Baby Tyler was born he moved and cried and she placed
him in the bathtub and turned the water on for the purpose of drowning
him. There is no additional objective evidence indicating Baby Tyler was
born alive. Therefore, aside from Dr. Thompson’s opinions, Tyler’s
statements to police were the only evidence presented to the jury
showing whether Baby Tyler was born alive. Dr. Thompson’s opinions
that the cause of death was bathtub drowning and the manner of death
was homicide were based primarily, if not exclusively, on Tyler’s
statements. Significantly, Dr. Thompson did not credit Tyler’s initial
statements to police that after Baby Tyler was born he was silent and did
not move. 13 Instead, he selectively credited her statements during the
second half of the interview when she stated Baby Tyler was born alive
and described her actions after the birth. It is clear that if Tyler never
stated Baby Tyler was born alive, Dr. Thompson could not have opined
that the cause of death was drowning or that the manner of death was
homicide. Thus, in opining on cause and manner of death, Dr.
Thompson necessarily credited one version of Tyler’s story over another.
He at least indirectly communicated to the jury that he believed Tyler’s
statements when he stated on direct examination, “given the history that
Baby Tyler cried and moved . . . Baby Tyler probably took a few breaths.”
As a result, Dr. Thompson’s opinions on the cause and manner of death
crossed that very thin line between testimony that assists the trier of fact
and testimony that vouches for a witness’s credibility.
Finally, for similar reasons, we have serious doubts as to whetherDr. Thompson possessed a reasonable degree of medical certainty with
respect to his opinions on the cause and manner of Baby Tyler’s death.
13In fairness to Dr. Thompson, police may not have provided him with the audiorecording of the ride from the trailer to the police station in which Tyler stated Baby
Tyler did not cry or move after the birth.
Again, the record showed that after conducting the autopsy, Dr.Thompson was unable to reach an opinion on cause or manner of death.
He then watched Tyler’s interview with police and changed his opinion.
By his own admission, he was only able to determine to a reasonable
degree of forensic or medical certainty that Baby Tyler’s cause and
manner of death were undetermined. For all of these reasons, the
district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Thompson to
communicate his opinions concerning the cause and manner of Baby
Tyler’s death to the jury. 14
E. Summary. In reaching the above conclusion, we do not createa bright-line rule to govern every criminal case in which a medical
examiner is called to testify to a victim’s cause or manner of death. Nor
do we conclude medical examiners may never rely in part on witness
statements or information obtained from police in forming their opinions.
In this case, however, Dr. Thompson conceded he was unable to form an
opinion on the cause or manner of Baby Tyler’s death based on the
autopsy and his investigation. Instead, he based his opinions primarily,
if not exclusively, on Tyler’s inconsistent and uncorroborated statements
to police. Without her statements, crediting some and discounting
14“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidenceunless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .” Iowa R. Evid. 5.103. “In cases
of nonconstitutional error, we start with the presumption that the substantial rights of
the defendant have been affected. The State has the burden to affirmatively establish
the substantial rights of the defendant were not affected.” Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 678
(citation omitted); accord State v. Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32, 41–42 (Iowa 2012). While
the State makes a passing reference to harmless error in its brief, in context, it is clear
the State is not arguing harmless error in this case. The State failed to cite any
authority in support of this issue and did not argue this in its application for further
review or at oral argument. Therefore, the State has waived the issue of harmless error
on appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an
issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 678 (finding the
State waived a harmless-error argument by failing to raise it on appeal); In re Det. of
Blaise, 830 N.W.2d 310, 320–21 (Iowa 2013) (acknowledging that the State waives a
harmless-error argument by failing to raise it on appeal).
others, Dr. Thompson could not have offered an opinion on the critical
issue in this case: whether Baby Tyler was born alive. His opinions were
not sufficiently based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge and therefore did not assist the trier of fact. Iowa R. Evid.
5.702. Further, under the unique facts of this case, Dr. Thompson
indirectly vouched for Tyler’s credibility. Because Dr. Thompson’s
opinions on these matters failed to comply with our evidentiary rules, we
vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the conviction, and
remand the case for a new trial.
IV. Other Issues on Appeal.
Tyler raised other issues in this appeal. While not dispositive,these issues may form the basis for a subsequent appeal. Therefore, we
elect to address them as part of this appeal. Specifically, we address
whether the search of room 225 violated the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and whether the special agents’ various
questionings of Tyler violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. 15
A. Search of the Hotel Room. The Fourth Amendment to theUnited States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
15In district court, Tyler cited the Federal Constitution and the Iowa Constitutionin both her motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of room 225 and
her motion to suppress her statements to the special agents. As it relates to both
motions, Tyler did not make a specific argument based on the Iowa Constitution.
Further, the district court’s rulings on both of these motions were based entirely on the
Federal Constitution. Tyler did not file a motion to enlarge the trial court’s ruling. See
State v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Iowa 2008). Thus, because Tyler’s state
constitutional claims were not sufficiently raised or ruled on by the district court, any
such claims she has raised in this appeal were not adequately preserved. See id.; Meier
v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate
review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court
before we will decide them on appeal.”). Accordingly, we consider Tyler’s claims only
under federal constitutional standards.
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend.
IV. In assessing whether a search resulted in a Fourth Amendment
violation, we apply a two-step approach. State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d
197, 204 (Iowa 2009). “First, the defendant must show that he or she
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. ‘Second, if
the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy, we must then
decide whether the State unreasonably invaded the protected interest.’ ”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 342
(Iowa 1995)).
1. Expectation of privacy. To establish a legitimate expectation ofprivacy in the area searched, “a defendant challenging a search must
show (1) a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) this expectation of
privacy was reasonable.” State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa
2000); accord State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 567 (Iowa 2012). “ ‘The
determination of whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy
with respect to a certain area is made on a case-by-case basis,
considering the unique facts of each particular situation.’ ” State v.
Fleming, 790 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Breuer, 577
N.W.2d 41, 46 (Iowa 1998)). Whether a defendant’s expectation of
privacy is reasonable “is determined by examining property laws as well
as society’s generally recognized and permitted expectations about
privacy.” Id. We first analyze whether Tyler has demonstrated a
subjective expectation of privacy in room 225.
Tyler originally rented room 225 in the early morning hours ofSeptember 19. She paid for the room at that time. Based on the record,
it is reasonable to conclude she was having contractions and was looking
for a private location in anticipation of the birth of Baby Tyler. Tyler
brought nothing with her for an overnight stay. Further, after giving
birth to Baby Tyler, Tyler left the room and returned to the trailer in
Coalville where she stayed for the night. However, when Tyler returned
to the hotel the next morning to check out, the hotel manager informed
her that she could rent room 225 for an additional night. She did so and
paid for the second night at that time. It is undisputed that at all times
during this period, the room was registered to Tyler. Shortly thereafter,
she left the hotel and returned to the trailer. Upon her departure, she
left a “Do Not Disturb” sign hanging from the doorknob of room 225. See
United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 2011) (concluding a
“Do Not Disturb” sign hanging from a hotel room’s doorknob supported
the conclusion that the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy
in his hotel room). She left her bloody hoodie coat, two vodka bottles,
eight dollars, and Baby Tyler’s body in the room. See id. (suggesting a
defendant’s decision to leave clothing and “a lot of cocaine” in his hotel
room supported the conclusion that the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy in his hotel room). The record further established
that Tyler intended to return to the room later to clean up. Thus, while
Tyler was not present when police entered the room, the record supports
the conclusion that after she departed from the hotel on September 20,
she maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in room 225.
Having concluded Tyler had a subjective expectation of privacy inroom 225, we turn now to consider whether this expectation of privacy
was one “ ‘that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Fleming,
790 N.W.2d at 565 (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97, 110
S. Ct. 1684, 1688, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85, 93 (1990)). The Fourth Amendment
clearly establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379, 63
L. Ed. 2d 639, 650 (1980). “The case law extends this protection to hotel
or motel rooms.” Brooks, 760 N.W.2d at 205; accord Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S. Ct. 889, 891, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 859 (1964);
Fleming, 790 N.W.2d at 565; State v. Smith, 178 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa
1970). However, as we have previously explained:
The mere fact that a premise[s] may be characterized
as a residence or a motel room does not, by itself, establish
that a particular person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the premises. For example, the use of a hotel or
motel room as a center for drug transactions and not as a
residence does not give rise to legitimate expectations of
privacy within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. A
defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
when the motel or hotel room is nothing more than “a
convenient processing station” for the packaging and
distribution of drugs.Brooks, 760 N.W.2d at 205 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83,
102, 119 S. Ct. 469, 479, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 388 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
Ultimately, a defendant must establish that he or she was using ahotel or motel room as a residence, or for some other purpose for which
he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Brooks, 760
N.W.2d at 205. “A bald assertion that one has been staying in a hotel,
without further proof, is generally insufficient; as is the defendant’s mere
presence in the motel room at the time of the search.” Id. Whether the
guest checked into and paid for the room is one factor we consider in
assessing whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the room. United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.
2000); United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1105–06 (8th Cir. 1988).
We also consider whether the room is rented to the defendant at the time
of the search. See United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir.
room after the rental period has expired.”); United States v. Parizo, 514
F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[W]hen the term of a guest’s occupancy of a
room expires, the guest loses his exclusive right to privacy in the room.”).
Another relevant factor is “the presence of the defendant’s belongings.”
Brooks, 760 N.W.2d at 205; accord Cooper, 203 F.3d at 1284.
We turn now to apply these principles to the unique facts of thiscase. We must decide, based upon the record developed, whether Tyler
was using room 225 as an overnight guest, thereby giving rise to a
reasonable expectation of privacy, or whether she was using the room for
a purpose for which she had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Upon
our de novo review of the record, we conclude Tyler’s expectation of
privacy in room 225 was reasonable. Tyler rented room 225 in her own
name. She paid for the room on both September 19 and September 20.
The room was rented to her at the time of the search. She brought
personal property with her to the room, albeit a minimal amount. She
placed a “Do Not Disturb” sign on the door indicating she expected
privacy. As stated earlier, it is reasonable to assume she checked into
the room believing she was about to give birth. These actions are
consistent with her continuing efforts to conceal the pregnancy from her
friends and family. The mere fact that she gave birth to a child in the
room does not, alone, diminish her otherwise reasonable expectation of
privacy in the room. On this record, we cannot conclude Tyler’s sole
purpose for renting room 225 was to commit a criminal offense.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Tyler had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in room 225.
2. Invasion of protected interest and the exclusionary rule.“ ‘Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if they do not fall within
one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.’ ”
Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 568 (quoting State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107
(Iowa 2001)). Further, if a defendant had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the searched area, and the search does not fall within an
exception to the warrant requirement, “[t]he exclusionary rule requires
the suppression of evidence discovered as a result of [the] illegal
government activity.” State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Iowa
2007). “However, there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule.” Id. at
warrant. Therefore, any analysis should include whether an exception to
the warrant requirement or exclusionary rule applies in this case.
In its ruling on the motion to suppress evidence obtained by policeduring the search of room 225, the district court concluded Tyler did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room because “as was the
case in Brooks, the motel room was not intended to be used as a
‘residence’ but rather a venue for the commission of an alleged crime.”
As discussed above, the district court erred in denying Tyler’s motion on
that basis alone because the conclusion that Tyler rented room 225 for
the sole purpose of committing a criminal offense is not supported by the
record. Because of the district court’s specific ruling on that issue, it did
not address whether any exceptions to the warrant requirement or
exclusionary rule may apply to law enforcement’s search of room 225.
One potentially applicable exception to the warrant requirement inthis case is the community caretaking exception. See State v. Kern, 831
N.W.2d 149, 172 (Iowa 2013). “A core notion of the community
caretaking exception is that . . . it is ‘totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441,
93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 715 (1973)). “ ‘The community
caretaking function involves the duty of police officers to help citizens an
officer reasonably believes may be in need of assistance.’ ” Id. at 172–73
(quoting State v. Mireles, 991 P.2d 878, 880 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999)).
We have recognized that “ ‘the community caretaking exceptionencompasses three separate doctrines: (1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2)
the automobile impoundment/inventory doctrine, and (3) the “public
servant” exception.’ ” State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Iowa 2012)
(quoting State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Iowa 2003)). The
emergency aid doctrine and the public servant exception are closely
related. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 541. As we have previously
recognized:
Under the emergency aid doctrine, the officer has an
immediate, reasonable belief that a serious, dangerous event
is occurring. . . . [I]n contrast, the officer in a public servant
situation might or might not believe that there is a difficulty
requiring his general assistance. For example, an officer
assists a motorist with a flat tire under the public servant
doctrine, but an officer providing first aid to a person
slumped over the steering wheel with a bleeding gash on his
head acts pursuant to the emergency aid doctrine.Id. at 541–42 (alterations in original) (quoting Mary Elisabeth Naumann,
Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth Amendment
Exception, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 325, 333–34 (1999)).
The determination of whether the community caretaking exceptionapplies
require[s] a three-step analysis: (1) was there a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?; (2) if so, was
the police conduct bona fide community caretaker activity?;
and (3) if so, did the public need and interest outweigh the
intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen?Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543; accord Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 173. While
the test “does not primarily focus on searches,” we have previously
applied the community caretaking exception to justify searches in several
cases. Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 173 (collecting cases).
One potentially applicable exception to the exclusionary rule inthis case is the inevitable discovery doctrine. See McGrane, 733 N.W.2d
at 681. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, “relevant, probative
evidence gathered despite Fourth Amendment violations is not
constitutionally excluded when the police would have inevitably
discovered the same evidence acting properly.” State v. Christianson, 627
N.W.2d 910, 912 (Iowa 2001).
Unfortunately, the State did not develop an adequate a record onthese issues in the district court. While it was error for the district court
to conclude Tyler had no reasonable expectation of privacy in room 225,
we will allow the State to develop an additional record on whether these
or any other potential exceptions to the warrant requirement or
exclusionary rule apply. On this record, we reverse the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress and remand this issue for further
hearing and ruling by the district court.
B. Tyler’s Statements to Police. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436, 471, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1626, 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 722,
726 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States required police to
advise suspects of their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution before a custodial interrogation. The Court required
that police tell the suspect
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.Id. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726.
In determining the admissibility of a defendant’s inculpatorystatements over a Fifth Amendment challenge we apply a two-part test.
State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997). “We first
determine whether Miranda warnings were required and, if so, whether
they were properly given. Second, we ascertain whether the statement is
voluntary and satisfies due process.” Id. Miranda warnings are only
required if, at the time of police questioning, the suspect is both: 1) in
custody, and 2) subject to interrogation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 429, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3144, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 328 (1984); accord
Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 557. Once police give a suspect the
requisite warning, the “[s]uspect[] may waive [his or her] Miranda rights
as long as the suspect has done so knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.” State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Iowa 2009). We turn
now to address Tyler’s specific arguments.
1. Custodial interrogation. Tyler asserts she was in custody whenthe special agents questioned her at the police station, prior to giving her
Miranda warnings, in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. For
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, a suspect is in custody “as soon as a
suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with
formal arrest.’ ” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S. Ct. at 3150, 82 L. Ed.
2d at 335 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct.
3517, 3520, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275, 1279 (1983) (per curiam)). “ ‘[A] court
must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,
but “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was ‘a formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.” ’ ” Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 557–58 (quoting Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528–29, 128 L. Ed. 2d
293, 298 (1994) (per curiam)). In deciding whether a suspect is in
custody at a given time, “we examine the extent of the restraints placed
on the suspect during the interrogation in light of whether ‘a reasonable
man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation’ to be
one of custody.’ ” Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S.
at 442, 104 S. Ct. at 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 336). We consider four
factors in making this determination:
(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the
purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to
which the defendant is confronted with evidence of her guilt;
and (4) whether the defendant is free to leave the place of
questioning.Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558. We turn now to determine whether
Tyler was in custody at the Fort Dodge police station on September 20
when she stated she drowned Baby Tyler.
First, we must assess the language the officers used to summonTyler. When the officers approached Tyler at the trailer, they did not
demand that she go with them. They knocked on the door to the trailer,
told her they needed to speak with her, and asked her if she needed
medical attention. Tyler agreed to speak with them and said she did not
need medical attention. Detective Chansler asked Tyler if she was “okay”
with going with Special Agent Roehrkasse and speaking with the officers.
Tyler responded, “Yea.” Tyler was neither handcuffed nor forcibly placed
in the back of Special Agent Roehrkasse’s vehicle. See State v. Miranda,
672 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Iowa 2003) (considering the fact that the suspect
was handcuffed as weighing in favor of custody). The record shows that
Tyler voluntarily accompanied Special Agent Roehrkasse to the police
station. See State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Iowa 1996) (“Although
coming to the center voluntarily is not alone enough to negate a finding
of custody, it is indicative of the state of mind of a reasonable person in
the situation.”); State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Iowa 1983) (“He
accompanied officers to the police station voluntarily and was at no time
subjected to either physical or verbal restraint.”); see also Purvis v.
Dugger, 932 F.2d 1413, 1415, 1419 (11th Cir. 1991) (considering
suspect’s voluntary decision to accompany officers to the police station in
a police vehicle as weighing against custody); State v. Atkinson, 670 A.2d
276, 285 (Conn. 1996) (considering a suspect’s voluntary decision to
accompany “two plainclothes detectives in an unmarked vehicle” to the
police station as weighing against custody). This factor weighs against
custody.
Second, we must examine the purpose, place, and manner of theinterrogation. As we have previously recognized, while a three-hour
interview may seem like a long time, this does not necessarily mean the
suspect was in custody. See Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558 (“The
three-hour length of the conversation did not render it custodial.”);
Brown, 341 N.W.2d at 16 (finding no custody despite two and one-half
hours of questioning). Further, that an interview takes place at the
police station does not, itself, render the suspect in custody. See
Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558 (finding no custody when interview
occurred at the sheriff’s office). In examining the purpose, place, and
manner of an interrogation, we examine factors including the number of
persons conducting the questioning, the number of breaks taken during
the questioning, the availability of restroom breaks or other breaks, and
the type of questioning in which those conducting the interview engage.
See id; see also Smith, 546 N.W.2d at 924.
Here, although the interrogation took place over the course of athree-hour period, the room in which it occurred was carpeted and well
lit. See Smith, 546 N.W.2d at 924 (considering building’s furnishings in
assessing custody). Although the special agents who questioned Tyler
were armed, they were dressed in plain clothes. Id. (finding the fact that
officers were casually dressed weighed against custody). During the
questioning, only two special agents were present at any given time. See
id. (noting “[o]ne fact of particular significance is the number of law
enforcement officers taking part in the interview process” and finding no
custody when two officers conducted the interview). In fact, for the
majority of the questioning only Special Agent Roehrkasse was present.
See id. (considering the fact that only one officer was present for a
majority of the questioning as weighing against custody). At the start of
the interview, Special Agent Thiele asked Tyler if she needed to go to the
restroom and told her that if she needed anything to drink, to let them
know. The special agents again asked Tyler if she needed medical
treatment. She responded, “No.” The special agents did not engage in
confrontational or aggressive questioning, but rather asked Tyler open-
ended questions about the events that transpired at the hotel. See
Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558 (finding nonconfrontational nature of
questioning weighed against custody). During the course of the
interview, the special agents did not raise their voices, but conducted
themselves in a calm, respectful manner, often times prefacing questions
with statements such as “[we] are not here to judge you.” Finally, while
“[a] policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question
whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time,” Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 442, 104 S. Ct. at 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 336, the record revealed
the special agents were not attempting to get Tyler to confess to a crime.
Rather, their discussion outside of Special Agent Roehrkasse’s vehicle
before transporting Tyler to the police station suggests they did not know
what had happened at the hotel. Specifically, one of the officers stated,
“We don’t know what we got.” Thus, the purpose of the questioning was
to ascertain what had happened, as opposed to getting Tyler to confess to
a murder. Importantly, the special agents intentions manifested in the
manner of their questioning, as they repeatedly informed Tyler that they
were only trying to gather information. Their demeanor, tone, and line of
questioning do not suggest a reasonable person would have understood
him or herself to be in custody. This factor weighs against custody.
Third, we must examine the extent to which the special agentsconfronted Tyler with evidence of her guilt. Again, the record revealed
that when the special agents began questioning Tyler they did not know
whether Baby Tyler was born alive. While Special Agent Roehrkasse did
ask Tyler if the autopsy would show that there had been air in the baby’s
lungs or that the baby was born alive, he did not suggest the autopsy
would in fact show that Baby Tyler ever took a breath or was born alive.
These questions were not accusatory in nature, but rather intended to
encourage her to tell the truth. See Smith, 546 N.W.2d at 925 (finding
officers decision to tell the defendants their stories did not match was a
“tool with which to urge the defendants to provide more information,” as
opposed to an accusation of guilt). Prior to her confession, the special
agents did not confront Tyler with any other evidence that she drowned
Baby Tyler. This factor weighs against custody.
Finally, we must consider whether Tyler was free to leave theplace of questioning. At the start of the interview, Special Agent
Roehrkasse informed Tyler that, although she had ridden with him to the
police station, she was free to leave at any time and that he would give
her a ride back to Coalville if she desired. See Miranda, 672 N.W.2d at
760 (“ ‘The most obvious and effective means of demonstrating that a
suspect has not been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
freedom of action is for the police to inform the suspect that an arrest is
not being made and that the suspect may terminate the interview at
will.’ ” (quoting United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir.
1990))). Although the door to the interview room was closed, it was
unlocked and Tyler’s path to it was unobstructed. Special Agent
Roehrkasse told Tyler that the fact that the door was shut should not
deter her from leaving. During the interview, the special agents told
Tyler she was free to leave one additional time. Immediately before the
forty-three minute break, Special Agent Thiele reminded Tyler that the
door was unlocked and informed her that she was free to “get up and
roam around” if she wanted.
We recognize that Tyler had given birth the day before theinterview and possibly remained under the stress of that event.
Notwithstanding, the record revealed her physical state did not affect her
ability to leave. Specifically, the afternoon of the birth Tyler drove herself
from the hotel to the trailer and spent the night there. The following
morning, she ate breakfast with Cyphers, ran errands, and returned to
the hotel to check out. After renting room 225 for an additional night,
she drove herself back to the trailer. Thus, Tyler’s own conduct following
Baby Tyler’s birth undermines any claim that her medical condition
precluded her from leaving the interview. Further, the special agents
asked Tyler if she needed any medical attention prior to transporting her
to the police station and several more times during the interview. Tyler
coherently answered the special agents’ questions and told them she did
not need medical attention. We do not find that her medical state
precluded her from leaving. This factor weighs against custody.
Upon our de novo review, we conclude Tyler was not in custody atany time prior to when she confessed to drowning Baby Tyler. Because
Tyler was not in custody when she initially confessed to drowning Baby
Tyler, her initial confession was not obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
2. Waiver. Tyler next argues that she did not execute a validwaiver of her Miranda rights at the police station before her confirmation
confession or later at the hospital when she again admitted to drowning
Baby Tyler. She maintains that she did not voluntarily waive her
Miranda rights during these police encounters. In order to execute a
valid waiver of one’s Miranda rights, the waiver must be made
“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251.
“ ‘[V]oluntariness’ for . . . due process purposes and Miranda purposes
are identical.” Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 559. Therefore, “a Miranda
waiver is involuntary only when it is shown to be the product of police
misconduct or overreaching.” Id. “For a waiver to be made voluntarily,
the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary, meaning it
was the product of the suspect’s free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251. The
question of whether a suspect voluntarily waived his or her Miranda
rights “is to be made by inquiring into the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the suspect in fact
‘decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of
counsel.’ ” Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25, 99 S.
Ct. 2560, 2571–72, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197, 212 (1979)). The State has the
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Tyler voluntarily
waived her Miranda rights. Payton, 481 N.W.2d at 328.
A number of factors are helpful in determining whether adefendant voluntarily waived their Miranda rights. These factors include:
defendant’s age; whether defendant had prior experience in
the criminal justice system; whether defendant was under
the influence of drugs; . . . whether defendant was mentally
“subnormal”; whether deception was used; whether
defendant showed an ability to understand the questions
and respond; the length of time defendant was detained and
interrogated; defendant’s physical and emotional reaction to
interrogation; whether physical punishment, including
deprivation of food and sleep, was used.Id. at 328–29 (citations omitted). Further, while “[a] written waiver of
constitutional rights is not alone sufficient to establish the waiver as . . .
voluntary[,] [i]t is . . . strong proof of its validity.” Countryman, 572
N.W.2d at 559 (citation omitted). We now turn to consider whether Tyler
voluntarily waived her Miranda rights, both at the police station after
Special Agent Roehrkasse informed her she was going to be charged, and
the next day at the hospital during the special agents’ follow-up
questioning.
After Tyler initially confessed at the police station, Special AgentRoehrkasse took two breaks before telling Tyler she would be “charged
today.” He then read Tyler her Miranda rights aloud, and she signed a
written waiver form. This is strong proof that Tyler executed a voluntary
waiver. Id. Further, prior to reading Tyler her Miranda rights, Special
Agent Roehrkasse asked Tyler if she was forced to make any of the
statements she had previously made. She responded, “No.” At the time
of the questioning, Tyler was thirty-one years old. She had prior
experience with the criminal justice system from a prior theft
prosecution. She had graduated from high school and had taken several
college courses. The record reflects that prior to the interview, Tyler had
taken some cold medicine and felt “spacey” as a result. She also gave
birth the day before the interview and was questioned for a long period.
However, the record shows that the special agents took several breaks
during the questioning and offered Tyler food, drink, and the opportunity
to use the bathroom. She was readily capable of understanding and
answering the special agents’ questions. Further, she voluntarily stayed
at the police station and answered questions despite Special Agent
Roehrkasse’s offer to take her home. While on several occasions she
began to cry, she never lost control or had a breakdown. The special
agents never threatened Tyler, nor did they make any promises of
leniency in exchange for her cooperation. Finally, the special agents did
not engage in any deceptive tactics during the questioning. Tyler
voluntarily answered the special agents’ questions and then, after Special
Agent Roehrkasse read Tyler her Miranda rights, she voluntarily waived
her rights and confirmed her prior confession. Considering the totality of
the circumstances, Tyler voluntarily waived her Miranda rights at the
police station on September 20.
Many of the same factors also support the conclusion that Tylervoluntarily waived her Miranda rights at the hospital on September 21.
Before this follow-up interview, Special Agent in Charge Hedlund again
read Tyler her Miranda rights. Tyler explained what each of her rights
meant to her, acknowledged that she understood her rights, and signed
another written waiver form. Prior to this second interview, Tyler
received a surgical repair for a tear from childbirth, she had lost a large
amount of blood, her blood pressure was high, and she was taking
several medications. Further, she initially told the officers she was
“really out of it.” However, she remembered speaking with Special Agent
Roehrkasse the previous day and that his name was “Mike,” knew she
was at the hospital, never appeared confused, and was alert and tracking
with the special agents’ questions. See Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 559
(finding a defendant’s statements were voluntarily given despite the fact
that the defendant was “under the influence of drugs and was confused”
because “she was easy to understand”); State v. Edman, 452 N.W.2d 169,
170 (Iowa 1990) (“Being ‘under the influence’ does not, standing alone,
render inculpatory statements involuntary.”). Additionally, when the
special agents asked Tyler if she would prefer “[they] come back later,”
Tyler responded, “You can talk to me.” Considering the totality of the
circumstances, Tyler voluntarily waived her Miranda rights at the
hospital on September 21.
3. Voluntariness of confessions. Finally, Tyler maintains that all ofher confessions to the special agents were involuntary and therefore in
violation of her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. As noted above, “ ‘voluntariness’ for . . .
due process purposes and Miranda purposes are identical.” Countryman,
572 N.W.2d at 559. Thus, the same factors outlined in the preceding
subsection are relevant in determining whether Tyler’s confessions were
voluntarily given.
For many of the same reasons noted above, our de novo review ofthe record reveals that each of Tyler’s confessions was voluntarily given.
During the first interview, Special Agent Roehrkasse told Tyler that she
was free to leave and that he would give her a ride home if she desired.
The special agents asked her if she needed medical treatment. She
responded, “No.” While she had just given birth and had taken cold
medicine, her own actions that morning suggest that she was capable of
leaving if she desired. She voluntarily remained at the police station and
answered questions. Her responses to the questioning clearly indicated
she was capable of both understanding and answering the special agents’
questions. The special agents made no threats or any promises of
leniency in exchange for her cooperation. Neither did they engage in
deceptive tactics. Tyler voluntarily answered the special agents’
questions, and then after being informed both that she would be
“charged today” and of her Miranda rights, she told the special agents
she had not been forced to confess previously. She then proceeded to
confirm her initial confession.
At the hospital, although Tyler was tired, medicated, and hadundergone surgery recently, she again agreed to speak with the special
agents despite their offer to return later. She never appeared confused
and was alert and tracked with the special agents’ questions. While she
had previously confessed, making it difficult for her to change her story,
her prior confession was not the product of coercion. Although Special
Agent Roehrkasse again participated in the follow-up interview, the
interview took place at an entirely different location and a day later. The
record does not reflect a woman whose will was overborne. Considering
the totality of the circumstances, Tyler’s confessions both at the police
station and later at the hospital were voluntarily given and therefore not
in violation of her due process rights.
Tyler was not in custody during her initial confession to the specialagents at the police station. She voluntarily waived her Miranda rights
both at the police station and later at the hospital. Each of her
confessions was voluntarily given. The district court properly denied
Tyler’s motion to suppress her statements to police.
V. Conclusion.
The district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Thompsonto opine on the cause and manner of Baby Tyler’s death because he
based his opinions primarily, if not exclusively, on Tyler’s inconsistent
and uncorroborated statements to police as opposed to objective,
scientific, or medical evidence. On retrial, should the State attempt to
use Dr. Thompson as an expert witness, the district court should
prohibit him from testifying that the cause of death was “drowning” and
the manner of death was “homicide.” Likewise, it should redact the
portions of the autopsy report stating his ultimate opinions on cause and
manner of death.
With respect to Tyler’s motion to suppress evidence obtained bypolice during the search of room 225, we conclude the district court
erred in denying this motion based solely on the legal conclusion that
Tyler had no reasonable expectation of privacy in room 225 because she
obtained it for the purpose of committing a crime. We reverse this
motion and remand the issue for further hearing and ruling by the
district court concerning the applicability of exceptions to the warrant
requirement or exclusionary rule. With respect to Tyler’s motion to
suppress statements made to police during her initial contact with law
enforcement, at the police station, and at the hospital, we affirm the
district court’s ruling. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals,
affirm the judgment of the district court in part and reverse in part, and
remand the case for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion
and a new trial.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICTCOURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART
AND CASE REMANDED.
Hecht, J., files a concurrence in part and dissent in part in whichWiggins and Appel, JJ., join. Appel, J., files a concurrence in part and
dissent in part in which Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join. Waterman, J., files
a concurrence in part and dissent in part in which Cady, C.J., and
Mansfield, J., join.
I agree the district court erred in allowing the medical examiner torely primarily upon Tyler’s uncorroborated statements in forming an
opinion as to the cause of Baby Tyler’s death. I also agree the district
court erred in concluding Tyler had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the hotel room. However, I dissent in part because I conclude all of
Tyler’s statements to the police are inadmissible. The circumstances—
especially the officers’ repeated verbal assurances that Tyler was not in
custody and their subsequent decision to administer warnings only after
Tyler made all of the inculpatory statements they sought—demonstrate a
calculated strategy to circumvent Miranda. In my view, the police
questioning in this case constitutes a “midstream recitation of warnings
after interrogation and unwarned confession” in violation of Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2605, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643,
650 (2004) (plurality opinion), and all of Tyler’s statements made during
the police station and hospital interrogations should have been
suppressed.
Our court has not had occasion to apply Seibert. Thus, this casepresents the first opportunity to consider the problem of midstream
Miranda warnings in successive interrogations. Seibert was a split 4–1–4
decision, so courts applying it must determine whether the plurality
opinion or Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion provides the controlling
rule. See Kuhne v. Commonwealth, 733 S.E.2d 667, 673 (Va. Ct. App.
under a multi-factor test . . . . Justice Kennedy’s opinion would apply a
form of heightened scrutiny only to those two-step cases in which law
enforcement officers deliberately employed a two-step procedure designed
to weaken Miranda’s protections.”). A majority of federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals have adopted Justice Kennedy’s standard, and so have several
state courts. See generally id. at 672 & nn. 5–6 (collecting cases); see
also State v. Nightingale, 58 A.3d 1057, 1066–67 (Me. 2012); State v.
Fleurie, 968 A.2d 326, 332–33 (Vt. 2008).
I would not expressly adopt either standard in this case because Iconclude the officers violated both. See United States v. Aguilar, 384
F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding a Miranda violation under both the
Seibert plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in the
same case); see also United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427
n.11 (6th Cir. 2008) (same). The officers’ strategy and technique in this
case clearly exemplify the use of a “question-first tactic” that subverts
Miranda’s rationale, see Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617, 124 S. Ct. at 2613, 159
L. Ed. 2d at 658, and epitomizes a “deliberate two-step strategy,” id. at
622, 124 S. Ct. at 2616, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
This case involves two successive interrogations: one beginning inthe police car and continuing at the police station, and another at the
hospital. Tyler received Miranda warnings toward the end of the three-
hour police station interrogation only after she made incriminating
statements regarding Baby Tyler’s death. After receiving Miranda
warnings at the police station, Tyler did not repeat her incriminating
statements anew, but simply answered “Yes” as the officers confirmed
what she had previously said. 16 She also received additional Miranda
16The transcript of the police station interview in the record fills sixty-eightpages. Miranda warnings precede only the final six pages, which span the final sixteen
minutes of the three-hour interrogation. During that time, Tyler overwhelmingly
provided one-word answers, likely because the officers asked almost exclusively yes-or-
no questions—for example, “You gave birth at approximately 12:00 p.m., okay?”; “[Y]ou
said you filled up the bathtub with approximately two to three inches of water?”; and
warnings at the hospital the next day where she repeated her
incriminating statements.
I. Custody Principles.
As a threshold matter, Tyler brings claims under both the Federaland State Constitutions. Because I conclude Seibert is dispositive, I
would not reach the question whether the Iowa Constitution provides
different standards. Cf. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Iowa
we resolve this issue based upon the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.”).
Custody for Miranda purposes is ordinarily an objective test thatconsiders the totality of the circumstances. Stansbury v. California, 511
U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 298 (1994) (per
curiam). “[T]he ultimate inquiry is . . . whether there is a ‘formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct.
3517, 3520, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275, 1279 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714,
719 (1977) (per curiam)). When making this inquiry, courts must keep
in mind the purpose of the Miranda rule: to protect individuals from
coerced or involuntary self-incrimination. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608,
124 S. Ct. at 2608, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 652–53 (plurality opinion); Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3146–47, 82 L. Ed. 2d
317, 330 (1984).
“[Y]ou brought the baby out of the tub and placed him in a trash can, correct?” In the
few instances in which the officers did not ask a yes-or-no question, Tyler still answered
very briefly. For example, to answer a question about where she gave birth, Tyler used
just five words: “I was in the bathroom.”
Our cases generally examine four factors in determining whether asuspect is in custody:
“(1) the language used to summon the individual;
(2) the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation;
(3) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with
evidence of her guilt; and
(4) whether the defendant is free to leave the place of
questioning.”State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2009) (quoting State v.
Miranda, 672 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 2003)). These factors, however, are
not exclusive, and no one fact or factor is determinative. State v. Smith,
546 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Iowa 1996) (en banc).
II. Applying Custody Principles to This Case.
Recognizing their primary purpose was to obtain admissions ofcriminal conduct from the only suspect in their investigation, and
understanding the circumstances surrounding the transaction had
characteristics of interrogation raising Miranda implications, the officers
told Tyler she was free to leave soon after she arrived at the police station
and as the questioning began. They told Tyler she was free to leave
because they knew a suspect’s freedom to leave the interrogation room is
a relevant factor in determining whether that suspect is in custody. See
Bogan, 774 N.W.2d at 680; State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 251–52 (Iowa
2009); accord United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir.
1990). But telling Tyler she was free to leave “is not ‘talismanic’ or
sufficient in and of itself to show a lack of custody.” United States v.
Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 180 (4th Cir. 2010). Actions speak louder than
words in this context, and several other factors convince me that Tyler
was in custody from the time the officers took her from her residence and
should have received Miranda warnings before the questioning began.
See People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d 348, 357 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (declining
to credit officers’ assurances the defendant was free to leave “when all
external circumstances appear[ed] to the contrary”); Buck v. State, 956
A.2d 884, 908 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (finding custody despite “what
the detectives said about . . . not being under arrest and being free to
leave,” in part because the detectives used “catchphrases” in an effort “to
create an interrogation that could be labeled non-custodial”); see also 2
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.6(d), at 737 n.57 (3d ed.
2007 & Supp. 2014) [hereinafter LaFave] (noting an assurance the
suspect is free to leave “will not carry the day where it is, in effect,
nullified by other police conduct”).
First, Tyler did not voluntarily contact the police to offer astatement. See Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1351 (“[W]hen the confrontation
between the suspect and the criminal justice system is instigated at the
direction of law enforcement authorities, rather than the suspect,
custody is more likely to exist.”).
Second, the words the three officers used when they arrived atTyler’s residence did not constitute a mere invitation for Tyler to come
with them to the police station. Within fifteen seconds of Tyler opening
the door, one officer told Tyler, “What we’re going to do . . . I want to have
you go with . . . this guy right here. OK. We need to get to the bottom of
what’s going on. OK.” The officers discussed waking Cyphers, asking,
“He knows what’s going on?” Tyler responded that he did not. One
officer stated, “May I ask you why not?” Tyler gave an inaudible
response and the officer stated, “There’s no way around this right now,
he’s going to know.” Another officer stated, “We need to talk to him” and
“We might as well get this over with.” Thereafter, the officer told Tyler,
“why don’t you ride with Mike,” another officer. A DCI agent then
directed Tyler to a police vehicle.
“If the so-called ‘invitation’ involves the person going to the stationin the company of the police, then a finding of custody is much more
likely.” 2 LaFave § 6.6(d), at 735. Here, the words spoken at Tyler’s
residence communicated the notion that the officers insisted upon
speaking with her at the police station about Baby Tyler. See Bogan, 774
N.W.2d at 680 (noting we consider “the language used to summon the
individual” when determining whether a suspect was in custody); Ortiz,
766 N.W.2d at 251–52 (same); State v. Werner, 9 S.W.3d 590, 596 (Mo.
suspect accompany him to the police station and did not tell the suspect
he could refuse to do so).
Third, the questions posed to Tyler during the car ride to the policestation and soon thereafter at the police station lasted more than three
hours. While the duration of three hours certainly is not dispositive on
the question whether Tyler was in custody, it is nonetheless a relevant
consideration. See United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 775 (5th Cir.
N.W.2d at 680 (noting we consider “the purpose, place, and manner of
interrogation” (emphasis added)); see also Aguilar, 384 F.3d at 527
(suppressing a confession in part because the “questioning was not
brief”); Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 7, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a
Seibert violation when pre-Miranda questioning lasted seven hours).
Fourth, the officers took numerous lengthy breaks during thequestioning at the police station and, after each of them, refocused their
questions or asked specific follow-up questions about Baby Tyler’s death.
They did not accept Tyler’s explanation that Baby Tyler was stillborn.
These breaks in the action and accusatory follow-up questions were
obviously in furtherance of the officers’ strategy for eliciting admissions
establishing Tyler’s guilt on each of the elements of a first-degree murder
charge prior to giving the Miranda warnings. See Bogan, 774 N.W.2d at
680 (noting we consider the extent to which a suspect is confronted with
evidence of guilt).
To be sure, the lengthy prewarnings session at the police stationcannot reasonably be characterized as merely gathering nonsubstantive
background facts. Compare State v. Lewis, 326 P.3d 387, 398 (Kan.
lasted only 10 minutes with nothing of substance revealed”), and State v.
Juranek, 844 N.W.2d 791, 803–04 (Neb. 2014) (finding no Seibert
violation when the prewarnings questions “did not touch upon key points
in the investigation”), with Payne, 854 N.E.2d at 15 (finding a Seibert
violation because police “waited to advise [the defendant] of her Miranda
warnings until she essentially had divulged her entire involvement”).
Notably, it was not until after Tyler stated she placed Baby Tyler face
down in a bathtub containing water that Agent Roehrkasse left the room
and returned with a written Miranda waiver form. 17 He then thoroughly
reviewed with Tyler each of the Miranda warnings before eliciting with
leading questions all of the details of Tyler’s confession that had
previously been methodically extracted from her.
17Tyler had previously revealed that Baby Tyler cried briefly after he was born. Ifind it significant that the officer did not stop posing questions and administer the
Miranda warnings at that point. Instead, the officer forged ahead with the interrogation
and didn’t stop until Tyler had admitted she had placed the baby face down in water in
the bathtub. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616, 124 S. Ct. at 2612, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 657
(“When the police were finished there was little, if anything, of incriminating potential
left unsaid.”).
Further, although Tyler was not informed of her arrest on themurder charge before she was taken from the police station to the
hospital for medical attention, the record reveals a law enforcement
officer was posted outside her hospital room while she was there. See
Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1355 (concluding when a suspect was arrested at the
end of an interview, the arrest was objective evidence weighing in favor of
custody “from the inception of the encounter”); Buck, 956 A.2d at 908
(finding custody even though officers repeatedly told the defendant he
was free to leave and did not formally arrest him until after they drove
him back home). On these facts, I would conclude Tyler was not free to
leave the police station and therefore was in custody.
My conclusion that Tyler was in custody at all times en route tothe police station and during the three hours of interrogation conducted
after they arrived there is strongly influenced by the circumstances
surrounding her physical and mental health. The officers knew from the
outset of the questioning that Tyler had given birth at a hotel without
medical assistance—indeed, without assistance from anyone—during the
previous forty-eight hours. Although Tyler denied a need for medical
assistance when the officers inquired, the officers either knew or
certainly should have known that she had received no medical care
during or after the delivery, and she therefore needed it promptly. There
was clearly no urgent need for the interrogation to occur before a
physical examination and postnatal medical treatment. Yet, the agents
decided to interrogate Tyler as a suspect in a crime first, knowing that
she had gone through a very traumatic event the night before.
III. The Seibert Standard.
Because I conclude Tyler was in custody during the entire time shewas en route to the police station and during the interrogations
conducted there and at the hospital, I would apply Seibert. In Seibert,
the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion set forth a number
of relevant facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings
delivered midstream could be effective enough to accomplish
their object: the completeness and detail of the questions
and answers in the first round of interrogation, the
overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and
setting of the first and second, the continuity of police
personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s
questions treated the second round as continuous with the
first.Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615, 124 S. Ct. at 2612, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 657. The
police interrogation in this case meets each of those factors. The first
round of interrogation was extremely detailed and complete and, as I
have noted, the officers did not stop to administer Miranda warnings at
the first sign Tyler might be culpable—her admission that Baby Tyler
cried. The two statements fully overlap; indeed, the officers simply
repeated Tyler’s statements back to her and asked for an
acknowledgement that they were correct. As in Seibert, “[t]he warned
phase of questioning proceeded after a pause of only 15 to 20 minutes, in
the same place as the unwarned segment.” Id. The same officers
conducted both interrogations. Finally, the officers expressly referred to
previous statements using phrases such as “you told me” and “you said.”
With every one of these factors satisfied, just as in Seibert, this
interrogation “by any objective measure reveal[s] a police strategy . . . to
undermine the Miranda warnings.” Id. at 616, 124 S. Ct. at 2612, 159 L.
Ed. 2d at 657.
Additionally, the officers took no curative measures once theyfinally administered warnings. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 124 S. Ct.
at 2616, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“If the deliberate two-step strategy has been used, postwarning
statements that are related to the substance of prewarning statements
must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before the
postwarning statement is made.”). Only fifteen minutes passed between
the prewarning statements and the first Miranda warning at the police
station, leaving Tyler insufficient time “to distinguish the two contexts
and appreciate that the interrogation ha[d] taken a new turn.” See id.;
see also Aguilar, 384 F.3d at 525 (suppressing a confession when the
“two interrogations were not separated in time, occurred in the same
interrogation room, and the same officers participated in the
questioning”). Compare Vasquez v. State, 453 S.W.3d 555, 574–75 (Tex.
App. 2015) (concluding officers did not undertake curative measures
when they provided Miranda warnings after just a short bathroom
break), with United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2006)
(concluding a properly Mirandized confession made “more than one year”
after an unwarned confession need not be suppressed).
Further, the officers interrogating Tyler did not augment theMiranda warning with an additional disclosure that her previous
unwarned statements might be inadmissible against her. See Seibert,
542 U.S. at 622, 124 S. Ct. at 2616, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 661. Instead, after
administering the Miranda warnings at the police station and at the
hospital, the officers expressly brought to Tyler’s attention and actively
used the inculpatory statements she had made before the warnings. See
Martinez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 615, 626–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(including abstention from reference to the prior statement among a list
of nonexhaustive curative measures gleaned from the Seibert plurality
and concurring opinions). Thus, no matter which opinion sets forth the
controlling Seibert rule, the officers violated it and Tyler’s statements
should be suppressed.
IV. Voluntariness.
After watching the video of the police station interrogation in thiscase, I find Tyler’s physical condition and her emotional state