832 N.W.2d 560 (Wis. 2013)
¶ 159 In the present case, the same charges were brought against the mother and father. The circumstances of the father and mother were substantially the same. Nevertheless, circumstances in the present case justified informing the jury about the mother's status. A speedy trial in the county was requested. The mother's case had been given immense publicity in the county. It was important to prevent the jury from inferring that the mother went unpunished or that the father was being singled out for prosecution. [97] Furthermore, in order to convict the father, the jury had to find that the State proved the father had a subjective awareness that his conduct created an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to Kara. The jury was admonished that the mother's and father's circumstances are not precisely the same, that their reactions may be different, and the results of the two trials may be different.
¶ 160 On our independent review of the record and giving weight to the circuit court's consideration of lack of juror bias, we conclude that the father has not sustained his burden to show that reasonable persons in the juror's position under the circumstances of the instant case could not set aside their knowledge of the mother's conviction.
¶ 161 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the second-degree reckless homicide statute and criminal child abuse statute provide sufficient notice that the parents' conduct could have criminal consequences if their daughter died. We further conclude that the jury instructions were not erroneous; that trial counsels' performance was not ineffective assistance of counsel; that the controversy was fully tried; and that the jury in the father's case was not objectively biased.
¶ 162 Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of convictions and orders denying postconviction relief.
¶ 163 The judgments of conviction and orders denying postconviction relief are affirmed.
Dale and Leilani Neumann are not likely to be viewed sympathetically by people who read the statement of facts in the majority opinion. The Neumanns' reaction to their daughter's illness was so inconsistent with the normative behavior of most contemporary parents that it is hard for people to identify with them or to understand their thinking and values.
¶ 165 It would be easy to look away from such unconventional defendants and say nothing. But the issues involved in these cases are too important for me to remain silent. First, the facts are not as black and white as they initially appear. Second, the law governing the facts is imprecise and quite confusing. Finally, the trials of the two defendants were problematic in several respects.
¶ 166 The primary purpose of this writing is not to try to change the result but to encourage the bench, the bar, and the Wisconsin Legislature to revisit some of the troublesome questions these cases present.
¶ 167 Madeline Kara Neumann, 11, died from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile onset diabetes mellitus. Majority op., ¶ 1. The theory of the prosecution and of the majority is that Kara would still be alive if her parents had provided her with medical care.
¶ 168 Diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) is one of the most serious complications of diabetes. Michelle A. Charfen & Madonna Fernández-Frackelton, Diabetic Ketoacidosis, 23 Emergency Med. Clinics N. Am. 609, 609 (2005). It is a life-threatening condition that requires prompt hospitalization and treatment. Malcolm Nattrass, Diabetic ketoacidosis, 34 Med. 104, 104 (2006). Even minor delays in recognizing the condition can have an effect on survival. Id. DKA results from insulin deficiency and excess insulin counter-regulatory hormones. Charfen, supra, at 609. Before the discovery of insulin in 1921, DKA caused death in 100 percent of cases, but now that insulin is available for treating diabetes, DKA's rate of mortality has declined to between four percent and ten percent. Id. However, mortality rates are higher when patients seek treatment from non-specialists. Lynne Jerreat, Managing diabetic ketoacidosis, 24 Nursing Standard 49, 50 (Apr. 28, 2010). Every year, there are approximately 100,000 hospitalizations for DKA in the United States, and new-onset diabetics make up 30 percent of patients who develop DKA. Charfen, supra, at 610.
¶ 169 DKA often causes vague symptoms like fatigue, nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. Id. In addition, patients often complain of excessive urination, thirst, and hunger, which are more suggestive of DKA. Id. Roughly 25 percent of patients produce vomit with a coffee ground appearance. Id. Patients with DKA appear exhausted and dehydrated and may have Kussmaul respirations, a "pattern of deep, sighing respirations." Id. at 613. Also, the breath of DKA patients may have a fruity odor due to acetone in their breath. Id. However, not everyone can smell ketones, so the fruity smell is not always a reliable way to diagnose the condition. Jerreat, supra, at 49. DKA patients may not be entirely conscious as the condition progresses, and in severe cases, the patient may slip into a coma. Charfen, supra, at 613-14. Symptoms such as acute abdominal pain could result from a variety of conditions, and non-specialists, as opposed to endocrinologists, may be more likely to order extra diagnostic tests and procedures that delay diagnosis. Claresa S. Levetan, Kathleen A. Jablonski, Maureen D. Passaro, & Robert E. Ratner, Effect of Physician Specialty on Outcomes in Diabetic Ketoacidosis, 22 Diabetes Care 1790, 1793 (1999).
¶ 170 DKA is more common in children under five years of age and in children whose families lack access to proper health care. Joseph Wolfsdorf, Nicole Glaser, & Mark A. Sperling, Diabetic Ketoacidosis in Infants, Children, and Adolescents, 29 Diabetes Care 1150, 1151 (2006). A recent survey revealed that children are at a higher risk of developing DKA if their parents have low incomes and low educational achievements. Id. DKA is also more prevalent when the family does not have health insurance because the parents delay seeking treatment. Id.
¶ 171 In this case, the majority opinion explains that "Kara had suffered gradually worsening symptoms for a few weeks before her death, leading to frequent thirst and urination, dehydration, weakness, and exhaustion." Majority op., ¶ 11. The parties stipulated, however, that "to the casual observer, ... Kara would have appeared healthy as late as the Thursday before she died." Id.
¶ 172 According to the majority, Kara did some of her homework on Friday, March 21, 2008, but was too tired to finish. Id., ¶ 12. She ate dinner in her bedroom. Id. The majority does not state whether either of the Neumanns remained at home during the day on Friday, but one of the briefs asserts that Leilani Neumann came home from work about 6:00 p.m.
¶ 173 On Saturday, Kara had the capacity to ask her parents whether she could stay home instead of going to work at the family's coffee shop. Id. Leilani left to work at the shop, returning home Saturday afternoon. Id. According to his brief, Dale stayed home to work on the family's taxes. When Leilani arrived home she "knew that something was wrong [with Kara] and called her husband into the room. The parents began rubbing Kara's legs and praying for her." Id.
¶ 174 From the facts set out in the majority opinion, it appears that the critical time period to examine is the period from Saturday afternoon, when Leilani returned from work, to Sunday afternoon when Kara died.
¶ 175 When Leilani returned home, "Kara was pale and her legs were skinny and blue." Id. She had slept all day. Id. The parents realized that their daughter was ill and they began to pray, and to enlist others to pray as well. Id., ¶¶ 13, 15-16.
¶ 176 Paragraphs 17-27 of the majority opinion describe the last 23-24 hours of Kara's life. There are facts and descriptions in the State's briefs that paint an even more disturbing picture of events than the account in the majority opinion. However, there are representations of fact in the briefs of the two defendants that lay out a different, more optimistic view of the situation.
¶ 177 There is some dispute about when Kara went into a coma. A coma is a "state of deep, often prolonged unconsciousness... in which an individual is incapable of sensing or responding to external stimuli and internal needs." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 376 (3d ed. 1992). A coma is often described as a state in which a person cannot be awakened and does not respond normally to light, sound, or painful stimuli.
¶ 178 The majority states that the Neumann juries could find that Kara was "in a coma-like condition for 12 to 14 hours." Majority op., ¶ 86. The statement appears to be consistent with representations in Dale's brief that, on Sunday morning, Kara moved her head and moaned in response to attempts to communicate with her. It is not consistent with representations that Kara was in a coma for many hours before her death.
¶ 179 In the majority opinion, there is no assertion that Kara vomited or that any vomit had a coffee ground appearance. There is no representation that the Neumanns suspected or were told that their daughter had a diabetic condition or that they detected a fruity odor on Kara's breath.
¶ 180 The majority acknowledges the Neumanns' continuing (though clearly mistaken) belief that Kara had a fever or the flu, and their mistaken perception that, on Sunday morning, she was marginally better than she had been. See id., ¶¶ 17, 20. The majority emphasizes the Neumanns' reservations about their conduct and the advice of those who suggested that they do more for their daughter. It does not mention that such advice was not universal.
¶ 181 DKA is a very dangerous condition but it is not always a condition whose gravity is quickly recognized. 1 To illustrate, DKA was at issue in a medical malpractice case decided by this court in 2004. Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis.2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866, overruled by Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis.2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.
¶ 182 During the first few days of March 1996, five-year-old Shay Leigh Maurin had not been feeling well. Id., ¶ 10. "She was lethargic, drinking fluids all day and eating poorly." Id. Shay's mother took her to a clinic on March 5 where a physician assistant examined her. Id. He diagnosed the child as having an ear infection and prescribed antibiotics. Id. However, he "advised that Shay should have a fingerstick blood test — used to check for diabetes — if her symptoms did not improve." Id.
¶ 183 "Shay's condition worsened rapidly over the next 24 hours. She was unable to eat, she vomited and dry-heaved, and the fruity odor of her breath led her mother to fear she might have diabetes." Id., ¶ 11. The mother brought Shay to a hospital late in the evening of March 6. Id. At this point, according to the opinion, "Shay's diabetes had progressed to acute diabetic ketoacidosis." Id. However, the hospital physician who examined her failed to diagnose any diabetic condition. Id.
¶ 184 The following morning, March 7, when Shay returned to the hospital, she was in serious pain. Id., ¶ 12. A different doctor diagnosed acute DKA "and attempted treatment before transferring Shay to Children's Hospital of Wisconsin. Shay lost consciousness during the ambulance ride to [the hospital] and died the next day," March 8. Id.
¶ 185 In retrospect, it is hard to imagine how the first doctor at the hospital failed to diagnose the situation, but he did. According to the facts in the opinion, the child was placed in an ambulance before she lost consciousness. Because she died the next day, she must have been under medical care for at least 12 hours.
¶ 186 The facts in Maurin are at odds with the majority's black and white narrative here and suggest that DKA does not manifest the same symptoms or follow the same timeline in every case.
¶ 187 I do not read the majority opinion as faulting the Neumanns for failing to diagnose Kara as having DKA. I read the majority opinion as holding that the Neumanns, after observing Kara's condition, had a duty to provide her with medical care because the failure to do so created an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm (that is, bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or other enumerated physical injuries). According to the majority, the Neumanns were aware of "that risk," and their failure to provide medical care caused Kara's death.
¶ 188 The overriding issue in this case is whether the Wisconsin Statutes gave the Neumanns fair notice of their "duty" to act. A larger issue is how this parental "duty" will be interpreted in cases where a parent is confronted with similar symptoms that do not arise from DKA.
¶ 189 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) reads in part: "[W]hoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony." Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) (emphasis added). This statute, which has no relationship whatsoever to the present case, is generally regarded as the most serious homicide statute. It is cited here merely to highlight the element of intent. The phrase "with intent to" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (Criminal intent) in subsection (4) as follows: "With intent to' or with intent that' means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result." Wis. Stat. § 939.23(4).
¶ 190 Proving intent can be a challenge for prosecutors, but establishing criminal intent demonstrates culpability.
¶ 191 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.21 is the child neglect statute. This statute reads, in part:
(1) Any person who is responsible for a child's welfare who, through his or her actions or failure to take action, intentionally contributes to the neglect of the child is guilty of one of the following:
(a) A Class A misdemeanor.
(b) A Class H felony if bodily harm is a consequence.
(c) A Class F felony if great bodily harm is a consequence.
(d) A Class D felony if death is a consequence.
Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1).
¶ 192 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.21(1)(d) does have a relationship to this case. It is directed toward "[a]ny person," including a parent, "who is responsible for a child's welfare. " Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1) (emphasis added). It specifically contemplates a "failure to take action" that "contributes to the neglect of the child." Id. Wisconsin juries have long been told that "[a] child is neglected when the person responsible for the child's welfare fails for reasons other than poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, medical or dental care, or shelter so as to seriously endanger the physical health of the child." Wis JI — Criminal 2150; see also State v. Evans, 171 Wis.2d 471, 481, 492 N.W.2d 141 (1992) ; cf. Wis. Stat. § 48.02(12g) (defining neglect).
¶ 193 The penalty for child neglect that results in a child's death is a Class D felony. Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(d). This is the same as the penalty for a violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.06, second-degree reckless homicide.
¶ 194 Unlike Wis. Stat. § 940.06, however, Wis. Stat. § 948.21, the child neglect statute, contains an intent element. A person cannot be convicted under the child neglect statute unless the person " intentionally contributes to the neglect of the child." (Emphasis added.)
"Intentionally" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result. In addition,... the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make his or her conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word "intentionally[.]"
Wis. Stat. § 939.23(3).
¶ 195 In prosecuting the Neumanns, the State either overlooked or consciously chose not to prosecute under Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(d). The State's decision avoided the necessity of proving intent. Instead, the State charged the defendants, in separate cases, with second-degree reckless homicide: "Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class D felony." Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1).
¶ 196 This statute requires a lot of interpretation. To explain "recklessly," the majority turns to the definition of "criminal recklessness" in Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1): "`[C]riminal recklessness' means that the actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being and the actor is aware of that risk." (Emphasis added.) The defined term is then converted to an adverb for use in Wis. Stat. § 940.06.
¶ 197 The statutory definition of "criminal recklessness" contemplates an actor creating an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or an unreasonable and substantial risk of great bodily harm and being "aware of that risk." Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1). This requires consideration of the definition of "great bodily harm," which is defined, in part, as "bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death." Wis. Stat. § 939.22(14).
¶ 198 There is no statutory definition of "creates" or "substantial risk" or "aware" to turn to in applying "criminal recklessness."
¶ 199 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.06, the second-degree reckless homicide statute, appears to be simple enough to apply when a person is creating an unreasonable risk of serious harm to another by the person's action. For example, shooting a gun in the direction of a crowd of people creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. The statute is more difficult to apply when the person is not acting but failing to take action.
¶ 200 In the present case, many people failed to act: Kara's parents, her siblings, her grandparents, some of the people who visited the Neumann family at their home. All these people could have acted to alert authorities or summon medical care, but they did not. Only the Neumanns have been prosecuted because, presumably, only the Neumanns had a "duty" to act. Thus, enforcement of the statute requires us to determine who had a duty to act and what that duty was. These elements must be imported into the reckless homicide statute.
¶ 201 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.23(2)(a) is the second-degree reckless injury statute. It reads: "Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human being is guilty of a Class F felony." This statute also requires us to examine definitions of "recklessly" and "great bodily harm." See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.24(1), 939.22(14). The majority appears to believe that the Neumanns could have been prosecuted under § 940.23(2)(a) for their failure to take action to provide medical care for Kara even if she had lived.
¶ 202 What is confusing, however, is that Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2)(a) appears to be very close to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a), which reads: "Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class E felony." The former statute refers to the victim as "another human being," whereas the latter refers to "a child." Otherwise, the two statutes use the same words and reach at least some of the same conduct. 2
¶ 203 Significantly, subsection (6) of Wis. Stat. § 948.03 then provides:
Treatment through prayer. A person is not guilty of an offense under this section solely because he or she provides a child with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone for healing in accordance with the religious method of healing permitted under s. 48.981(3)(c)4. or 448.03(6) in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.
¶ 204 The majority is undaunted by the clear overlapping of Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2)(a), the second-degree reckless injury statute, and Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) in terms of a person's action or inaction. The majority points out that the immunity granted in § 948.03(6) applies only to § 948.03. Majority op., ¶ 50. It asserts that the definition of "recklessly" in Wis. Stat. § 940.06 and, by implication, § 940.23, is different from the definition of "recklessly" in § 948.03 and Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1). Id., ¶ 73. It declares that it "is apparent ... in reading the text of the statutes, that the phrase `great bodily harm' is used in different ways in these statutes." Id., ¶ 65.
¶ 205 It is true that the immunity granted by Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) applies only to § 948.03. But as long as that immunity exists, it creates uncertainty about whether specific conduct is immune from prosecution.
¶ 206 The majority attacks this uncertainty, first, by declaring that "[n]o one reading the treatment-through-prayer provision should expect protection from criminal liability under any other statute," majority op., ¶ 50, which would include the unmentioned, overlapping Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2)(a), and, second, by hinting that the immunity in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) should be limited through judicial construction. Id., ¶ 51. But there is still confusion in the law.
¶ 207 The different definitions of "recklessly" demonstrate how "great bodily harm" operates differently in the two separate statutory schemes. In Wis. Stat. § 940.06, "great bodily harm" is incorporated into the definition of recklessness to describe the nature of the prohibited conduct, whereas in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) "great bodily harm" is used to describe the result of the prohibited conduct. Section 940.06(1) prohibits reckless conduct that results in death, where the reckless conduct means an action that "creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. " Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1) (emphasis added). In contrast, § 948.03(3)(a) prohibits reckless conduct that causes great bodily harm, where the reckless conduct means "conduct which creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm. " Wis. Stat. § 948.03(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the difference is that Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) prohibits behavior that creates a greater risk (great bodily harm), whereas Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) prohibits behavior that creates a smaller risk (harm).
¶ 208 If the difference between the use of "great bodily harm" in Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) and Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) saves the two statutes from a collision, the same cannot be said of § 948.03(3)(c). Section 948.03(3)(c) inexplicably states, "[w]hoever recklessly causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates a high probability of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H felony." Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c). This section is severely flawed because it contains a double description of the prohibited conduct. Section 948.03 uses "recklessly" to mean conduct that "creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm," § 948.03(1), but the statute goes further to define the prohibited conduct as that "which creates a high probability of great bodily harm." Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c). It is this definition of prohibited conduct within § 948.03(3)(c) that destroys fair notice.
¶ 209 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.06(1) and Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c) regulate the same conduct and therefore do not provide fair notice. The "high probability of great bodily harm" in § 948.03(3)(c) is almost identical to the "substantial risk of death or great bodily harm" in Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1). See Wis. Stat. § 939.24 (defining criminal recklessness as it applies to § 940.06(1)). It is possible to quibble over whether "high probability of great bodily harm" is more or less severe than "substantial risk of great bodily harm," but criminal liability should not depend on an unwinnable battle over semantics. Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) and Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c) prohibit the same conduct and differ only by the prohibited result. Since § 948.03(6) provides a treatment-through-prayer immunity for the conduct in § 948.03(3)(c), the parents should not be liable for that same conduct under Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1).
¶ 210 In addition to the different uses of "great bodily harm" and different definitions of "recklessly," the majority suggests that the subjective awareness requirement in Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) mitigates any vagueness because it requires the actor to be aware of the unlawfulness of the conduct. Majority op., ¶ 77. However, that reasoning is not persuasive where the vagueness makes it impossible for parents to know what conduct is unlawful. Under the Neumanns' interpretation of the statute, it was perfectly lawful for them to create a high probability of great bodily harm because the treatment-through-prayer immunity in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) allowed that conduct. Therefore, it is hard to see how being subjectively aware of a risk that the parents believed was lawful could assuage vagueness that makes it impossible to determine when conduct is not lawful.
¶ 211 The word "aware" in the Wis. Stat. § 939.23 definition of "intentionally" (that is, "aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause [a] result") should be contrasted with the word "aware" in the Wis. Stat. § 939.24 definition of "criminal recklessness" ("aware of that risk"). When "that risk" is not definite, the awareness of "that risk" cannot be definite, either.
¶ 212 The majority opinion explains that the due process issue in these prosecutions is "whether the applicable statutes are definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed." Majority op., ¶ 33.
Fair notice is part of the due process doctrine of vagueness. "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application[,] violates the first essential of due process of law."
Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926) ).
¶ 213 The Neumanns claim that the reckless homicide statute is too murky to give sufficient notice as to when parental choice of treatment through prayer becomes illegal. Given the nature of Kara's illness, as well as the imprecision in the statutory language, I agree. There is a due process problem here. On the facts before us, the statutes are very difficult to understand and almost impossible to explain. Indeed, the statutory scheme is so difficult to explain that if a prayer-treating parent were to consult an attorney on how he or she could prayer treat and stay within the bounds of the law, virtually any attorney would be at a loss to reasonably advise the client. The concerns stated would not have been so pronounced if the Neumanns had been prosecuted under the child neglect statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(d).
¶ 214 The second-degree reckless homicide statute (Wis.Stat. § 940.06) is different from the child neglect statute (Wis. Stat. § 948.21) in that it does not include any explicit language authorizing the prosecution of death caused by omission. The Neumanns concede, however, that defendants may be prosecuted for reckless homicide if they violate a known legal duty to act. State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 144 Wis.2d 745, 758, 425 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App.1988) .
¶ 215 In Cornellier, the court said:
It is just as much an "act" to deliberately or recklessly refrain from performing a known legal duty as it is to negligently perform that duty. We conclude, therefore, that the statute, impliedly, if not directly, acknowledges that the crime of reckless homicide may be committed by omission, as well as commission.
¶ 216 This principle may be sound but the truth is that Cornellier was decided under a statute that was repealed and was different from the current statute. The former statute read as follows:
Homicide by reckless conduct. (1) Whoever causes the death of another human being by reckless conduct is guilty of a Class C felony.
(2) Reckless conduct consists of an act which creates a situation of unreasonable risk and high probability of death or great bodily harm to another and which demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of another and a willingness to take known chances of perpetrating an injury. It is intended that this definition embraces all of the elements of what was heretofore known as gross negligence in the criminal law of Wisconsin.
Wis. Stat. § 940.06 (1985-86).
¶ 217 Cornellier also was heavily influenced by an alleged omission case, State v. Williquette, 129 Wis.2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986) . Williquette also was decided under a different statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.201 (1983-84), which provided, in part, "[w]hoever ... subjects a child to cruel maltreatment, including ... severe bruising, lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal injuries or any injury constituting great bodily harm ... is guilty of a Class E felony." Williquette, 129 Wis.2d at 242 n. 1, 385 N.W.2d 145 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 940.201) (emphasis added). The word "subjects" can mean "[t]o expose to something" 3 in contrast, say, to bruise, cut, fracture, or burn. "Exposing" a person to danger may be viewed as an "act" or as a failure to act through passivity.
¶ 218 In any event, both Williquette and Cornellier speak, directly or indirectly, of a defendant's failure to perform a "known legal duty." This inevitably presents the question of what "known legal duty" the Neumanns failed to perform.
¶ 219 The Neumanns' "known legal duty" had to be inserted into the standard jury instruction for second-degree reckless homicide. See Wis JI — Criminal 1060. The jury instruction in Leilani Neumann's case read as follows:
Second-degree reckless homicide is defined in Section 940.06 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, and it's committed by one who recklessly causes the death of another human being. Before you may find the defendant guilty of second-degree reckless homicide, the [State] must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following two elements were present.
First, the defendant caused the death of Madeline Kara Neumann. "Cause" means that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in producing the death. Conduct can be either by an act or an omission when the defendant has a duty to act.
One such duty is the duty of a parent to protect their children, to care for them in sickness and in [health], and to do whatever is necessary for their preservation, including medical attendance, if necessary.
(Emphasis added.) The emphasized language was added by the circuit court to the standard jury instruction.
¶ 220 The instructions in Dale Neumann's case changed the explanation of duty: "One such duty is the duty of a parent to protect their children, to care for them in sickness and in health."
¶ 221 There is obviously a distinction between the two instructions. Dale's instructions do not use the word "medical" at all. Neither instruction uses the phrase "provide medical care when necessary." See majority op., ¶¶ 100, 104. Neither instruction refers to a "known legal duty." There was imprecision in the circuit court's instructions because these cases were breaking new ground.
¶ 222 An unresolved question is whether the prayer treatment immunity provision in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) modifies a parent's "duty" to provide medical care and, if so, when and how.
¶ 223 The duty question would have been answered in a prosecution under the child neglect statute. But here, in prosecutions for second-degree reckless homicide under Wis. Stat. § 940.06, the court had to make up an answer, suggesting that a "legal duty" was not clear. See Majority op., ¶¶ 109, 111. This underscores the inadequate notice provided to the Neumanns.
¶ 224 There are several aspects of the Neumann trials that are problematic.
¶ 225 As noted above, the jury instructions with respect to "duty" are not consistent and may not provide a clear, accurate statement of parental duty.
¶ 226 The standard jury instruction for second-degree reckless homicide reads in part: "If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of ( name of victim ) by criminally reckless conduct, you should find the defendant guilty of second degree reckless homicide. If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty." Wis JI — Criminal 1060.
¶ 227 The circuit court followed the instruction closely in Dale Neumann's case. In Leilani Neumann's case, however, the key paragraph is substantially rewritten to read:
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant directly committed all of the two elements of second-degree reckless homicide or that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the commission of that crime, you should find the defendant guilty. If you are not so satisfied, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
¶ 228 The revised paragraph's reference to intentionally aiding and abetting "the commission of that crime," combined with the deletion of the phrase "caused the death of [name of victim]" muddles an already confusing legal analysis.
¶ 229 The jury instructions make no reference to the religious motivation of the defendants. It may be true that the defendants were not entitled to rely — in the jury instructions — on the treatment-through-prayer provision in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6). However, the sole reference to religion in the jury instructions — "The Constitutional Freedom of Religion is absolute as to beliefs but not as to conduct which may be regulated for the protection of society" — can only be viewed as a repudiation of the defendants' position and a legal ruling that any "duty" imposed upon parents to provide medical care for their children is the same for prayer-treating parents as it is for other parents.
¶ 230 Prior to voir dire in Dale Neumann's case, counsel for the defendant and the State met in Judge Vincent Howard's chambers and had an off-the-record discussion about how a jury's knowledge of Leilani Neumann's prior conviction for the same crime would be treated. Dale Neumann's counsel claimed that he objected to allowing any jurors with knowledge of the prior conviction to be on the panel, reasoning that "knowledge of the prior conviction would have to influence" a juror's decision in Dale Neumann's case.
¶ 231 Again, there is no record of this in-chambers discussion, and thus no record of counsel's objection to jurors with prior knowledge of Leilani Neumann's conviction. In his written decision on Dale and Leilani Neumann's joint post-conviction motion, Judge Howard acknowledged that he probably "remarked off the record that prior knowledge alone does not necessarily disqualify a juror." Faced with what appeared to be a ruling from the judge and the possibility that some jurors had knowledge of Leilani Neumann's conviction while some did not, Dale Neumann's counsel and the State agreed that all jurors should be informed of the wife's conviction rather than risk this fact being revealed during deliberations.
¶ 232 It is troubling that Dale Neumann's jury was informed of Leilani Neumann's conviction, especially since the underlying facts were the same, the law was the same, and the parents appear to have made their decisions jointly in the last 24 hours of Kara's life. It is hard to believe that a reasonable person in a juror's position at Dale Neumann's trial could have avoided being influenced by the result in Leilani Neumann's trial. Cf. State v. Faucher, 227 Wis.2d 700, 718-19, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999) .
¶ 233 Another concern arising out of the absence of a transcript of the in-chambers meeting is that we do not know whether Dale Neumann was present at that meeting. If he was not present, he did not hear vital discussion about potential jurors having knowledge about Leilani's prior conviction. That discussion could have affected his strategy and decision and might have changed the result of his trial.
¶ 234 This case is a tragedy in virtually every respect. I cannot say that the result of the Neumann trials is unjust. Nonetheless, there were and are serious deficiencies in the law and they ought to be addressed by the legislature and the courts. Failing to acknowledge these deficiencies will not advance the long-term administration of justice.
¶ 235 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
The cases were tried separately upon the State's motion.
This consolidated appeal raises several issues. Some issues are common to the convictions of both parents, although each parent has employed different arguments or reasoning in this court. To the extent that an issue affects both parents, we take into account both of their positions in discussing and deciding the issue. To the extent that an issue affects only one parent, we identify and decide the issue accordingly.
Treatment through prayer. A person is not guilty of an offense under this section [§ 948.03] solely because he or she provides a child with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone for healing in accordance with the religious method of healing permitted under s. 48.981(3)(c)4. or 448.03(6) in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.
The attorneys referred to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6), the provision protecting treatment through prayer, as a privilege, although they acknowledged it could be characterized as an exception, a defense, or an immunity. We view it as a protection from prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.03.
This court has once before considered a case in which this illness had fatal consequences, but that case involved a physician's liability for medical malpractice for failing to diagnose and treat the disease in a five-year-old child. See Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis.2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866 .
A counter-campaign urging repeal of such statutory exemptions ensued, and Congress revised the law in 1983, revoking the requirement that states enact these treatment-through-prayer provisions in order to receive federal funding. Still, the laws have remained on the books in many states.
For discussions of the federal law and the responses of the states, see, e.g., Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 269, 277-80 (2003); Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 319, 330-34 (1991); Rebecca Williams, Note, Faith Healing Exceptions Versus Parens Patriae: Something's Gotta Give, 10 First Amend. L. Rev. 692, 694-96, 698-713 (2012).
The accepted legal fiction is that every person is expected to know the law. Ignorance of the law is not ordinarily a defense. Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd. Partnership, 2002 WI 108, ¶ 13 n. 4, 255 Wis.2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (Wisconsin employs the mistake of law doctrine which says that every person is presumed to know the law and cannot claim ignorance of it as a defense); Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519 (1860) ("[D]efendants are presumed to know the law, and ignorance of the law, even if proved, would be no excuse").
Actual notice of the statutes may be irrelevant in applying the concept of fair notice. Courts require the law be clear so that those who consult the law are not confused or misled. Justice Holmes observed that "[a]lthough it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931) .
The Supreme Court of Colorado explained the language "for that reason alone" in its statute as follows:
[T]he meaning of the statutory language, "for that reason alone," is quite clear. It allows a finding of dependency and neglect for other "reasons," such as where the child's life is in imminent danger, despite any treatment by spiritual means. In other words, a child who is treated solely by spiritual means is not, for that reason alone, dependent or neglected, but if there is an additional reason, such as where the child is deprived of medical care necessary to prevent a life-endangering condition, the child may be adjudicated dependent and neglected under the statutory scheme.
In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Colo. 1982) . See also Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.3d 112, 131, 253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852 (1988) (citing the Colorado decision with approval).
The Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau regarding 1993 Senate Bill 544 explains, as follows, that the second-degree reckless homicide statute does not except treatment through prayer:
Current law provides a treatment through prayer exception to the crime of physical abuse of a child. A person is not guilty of physical abuse of a child because the person relies on treatment of the child through prayer for healing. This bill extends this coverage to provide a treatment through prayer exception for crimes involving criminal negligence or criminal recklessness.
Drafting File for 1993 S.B. 544, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.
Although 1993 S.B. 544 was never enacted, its introduction tends to show that the legislators who introduced it, and the Christian Science Committee on Publication that suggested it, did not believe that the treatment-through-prayer provision in the criminal child abuse statute provided protection from prosecution for crimes involving criminal recklessness.
According to the parents, Kara's condition had not progressed beyond "a substantial risk of death" and did not involve "imminent" death. The parents contend the imminence of death did not occur in the present case until Kara stopped breathing.
For a discussion of these cases, see articles cited at note 28, supra, and note 59, infra. See also Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 43, 103-16 (1994).
See Baruch Gitlin, Parents' Criminal Liability for Failure to Provide Medical Attention to Their Children, 118 A.L.R. 5th 253 (2004) (made current by weekly addition of released cases) (collecting cases including cases on the spiritual treatment defense).
"[R]ecklessness requires a subjective mental state: the defendant must actually (in her own mind) be aware of the risk created by the conduct." Walter Dickey et al., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L.Rev. 1323, 1352.
The jury instructions are also challenged as confusing or misleading. An appellate court should order a new trial only if upon review of the instruction, the court determines that the defendant has shown that "`there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled and therefore applied potentially confusing instructions in an unconstitutional manner.'" Gonzalez, 335 Wis.2d 270, ¶ 23, 802 N.W.2d 454 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead op.) (quoting State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis.2d 183, 194, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996) ).
See also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.1 at 422, § 6.2(a) at 434-437 (2d ed.2003) (discussing a legal duty based on a relationship).
See also D.C. Barrett, Homicide: Failure to Provide Medical or Surgical Attention, 100 A.L.R.2d 483 (1965) (made current by weekly addition of released cases) (collecting cases on the duty to provide medical care); Baruch Gitlin, Parents' Criminal Liability for Failure to Provide Medical Attention to their Children, 118 A.L.R. 5th 253 (2004) (made current by weekly addition of released cases) (collecting cases including cases on the spiritual treatment defense); Donna K. LeClair, Comment, Faith-Healing and Religious-Treatment Exemptions to Child-Endangerment Laws: Should Parental Religious Practices Excuse the Failure to Provide Necessary Medical Care to Children?, 13 U. Dayton L. Rev. 79 (1987).
The parents assert (without significant development) that the concepts of "protecting one's children," caring for them in sickness and in health (and death), and providing "medical attendance, if necessary," are simply too general to give sufficient guidance to either the parents or the juries. Again, we note that only a fair degree of definiteness is required. This language is sufficient when read with the other jury instructions.
As for the defense of religious belief, it is no interference with one's freedom of religion to convict of manslaughter one who, for religious reasons, fails to call a doctor when to fail to do so constitutes criminal negligence [sometimes referred to in some statutes as criminal recklessness]. Yet an honest religious belief that prayer is a better cure than medicine, that Providence can heal better than doctors, might serve to negative the awareness of risk which is required for manslaughter in those states which use a subjective test of criminal negligence.
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 15.4(a) at 525 n. 28 (2d ed.2003).
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), set forth a two-part test for determining whether counsel's actions constitute ineffective assistance. The first test requires the defendant to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Review of counsel's performance gives great deference to the attorney and every effort is made to avoid determinations of ineffectiveness based on hindsight. Rather, review is from counsel's perspective at the time of trial, and the burden is placed on the defendant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably within professional norms.
Even if counsel's performance is found deficient, a judgment will not be reversed unless the defendant proves that the counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
The parents appear to join their ineffective assistance of counsel claim with their argument that counsels' ineffective performances justify reversal in the interest of justice.
We need not address this argument. Because a record was not made of conversations between the circuit court and counsel on this issue and because of the importance of an unbiased jury, we exercise our discretion to address the issue of jury bias. See State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶ 44, 316 Wis.2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737 ("Juror bias seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and is per se prejudicial.").
We need not address this argument. Because a record was not made of conversations between the circuit court and counsel on this issue and because of the importance of an unbiased jury, we exercise our discretion to address the issue of jury bias. See State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶ 44, 316 Wis.2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737 ("Juror bias seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and is per se prejudicial.").