571 U.S. 69 (2013)
In 2009, Sprint Communications, Inc., a national telecommunications service provider, began withholding intercarrier access fees from Windstream Iowa Communications, Inc., a local carrier, for Voice over Internet Protocol calls after concluding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted intrastate regulation of such traffic.1 In response, Windstream threatened to block all calls to and from Sprint customers.2
Sprint filed a complaint against Windstream with the IUB asking the Board to enjoin Windstream from discontinuing service to Sprint.3 In answer to Sprint's complaint, Windstream retracted its threat to discontinue serving Sprint, and Sprint moved, successfully, to withdraw its complaint.4 Because the conflict between Sprint and Windstream over VoIP calls was likely to recur, the IUB decided to continue the proceedings to resolve the underlying legal question whether VoIP calls are subject to intrastate regulation.5 The IUB disagreed with Sprint's argument that the question was governed by federal law and ruled that the intrastate fees applied to VoIP calls.6
First, Sprint sued the members of the IUB in their official capacities in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, seeking a declaration that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the IUB's decision and an injunction against enforcement of the IUB's order.7 Second, Sprint petitioned for review of the IUB's order in Iowa state court, reiterating the preemption argument and asserting additional state law and procedural due process claims.8 The District Court granted the IUB's motion to abstain and dismissed the suit.9
For the most part, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the District Court's judgment.10 The Court of Appeals recognized the possibility that the parties might return to federal court. It therefore vacated the judgment dismissing Sprint's complaint and remanded the case with instructions to enter a stay during the pendency of the state-court action.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether, consistent with its delineation of cases encompassed by the Younger doctrine, abstention was appropriate here.12
Whether the initial administrative proceeding before the Iowa Utilities Board and the subsequent state-court review of the Board's order fall within any of the three exceptional categories of cases for which Younger abstention is appropriate?13
Younger abstention applies only in three exceptional categories: ongoing state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, and civil proceedings involving orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions, as catalogued in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989); the doctrine extends no further.14
No. The IUB proceeding was civil, not criminal in character.15 It is not akin to a criminal prosecution.16 Nor was it initiated by the State in its sovereign capacity to sanction Sprint for some wrongful act.17 A private corporation, Sprint, initiated the action.18
No state authority conducted an investigation into Sprint's activities, and no state actor lodged a formal complaint against Sprint.19 The IUB's adjudicative authority was invoked to settle a civil dispute between two private parties, not to sanction Sprint for commission of a wrongful act.20 Although Sprint withdrew its complaint, administrative efficiency, not misconduct by Sprint, prompted the IUB to answer the underlying federal question.21 The IUB proceeding does not fall within any of the three exceptional categories described in NOPSI and therefore does not trigger Younger abstention.22
The initial IUB proceeding and state-court review do not fall within any of the three exceptional categories, so Younger abstention is not appropriate and the federal court must exercise its jurisdiction.23