385 U.S. 554 (1967)
The three cases before the Court arose from criminal prosecutions in Texas in which evidence of the defendants' prior convictions was presented to the juries along with the evidence on the current charges.1
In Spencer, the petitioner was indicted for murder with malice of his common-law wife.2 The indictment alleged that the defendant had previously been convicted of murder with malice.3 Spencer made timely objections to the reading to the jury of that portion of the indictment and to the introduction of evidence to show his prior conviction.4 The jury was charged that if it found that Spencer had maliciously killed the victim, and that he had previously been convicted of murder with malice, the jury was to assess his punishment at death or confinement in the penitentiary for life.5 The jury was instructed as well that it should not consider the prior conviction as any evidence of the defendant's guilt on the charge on which he was being tried.6 Spencer was found guilty and sentenced to death.7
In Bell, the petitioner was indicted for robbery, and the indictment alleged that he had been previously convicted of bank robbery in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.8 Bell moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the allegation and reading to the jury of a prior offense was prejudicial.9 Similar objections were made to the offer of documentary evidence to prove the prior conviction.10 The court's charge to the jury stated that the prior conviction should not be considered in passing upon the issue of guilt or innocence on the primary charge.11 The jury so found, and the judge fixed punishment, set by law for such a prior offender, at life imprisonment in the penitentiary.12
The Reed case involved a third-offender prosecution for burglary and entailed the same practice as followed in Bell.13 The petitioners in all three cases challenged the procedure through objections at trial.14 Their convictions were affirmed on appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.15 Reed also sought federal habeas corpus relief, which was denied.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the cases.17
Whether Texas' use of prior convictions in the current criminal trial of each petitioner was so egregiously unfair upon the issue of guilt or innocence as to offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?18
The Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.19 It does not establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.20 In the face of the legitimate state purpose and the long-standing and widespread use that attend the procedure under attack here, the Texas procedure is not rendered unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause as it has been interpreted and applied in our past cases.21
No. In Spencer the jury received a limiting instruction not to consider the prior murder conviction as evidence of guilt on the current murder charge.22 Yet the jury still assessed punishment at death or life imprisonment after finding the prior conviction true.23 In Bell the jury received a similar limiting instruction.24 It found the prior bank robbery conviction true, and the judge imposed life imprisonment.25
The Reed case employed identical procedures for the burglary charge.26 The procedure advances the valid state interest in enhanced punishment for recidivists through a long-used method that presents documentary evidence under limiting instructions.27 Any potential prejudice does not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness.28
Texas' recidivist procedure does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment.30 If the Constitution gave him a roving commission to impose upon the criminal courts of Texas his own notions of enlightened policy, he would not join the opinion.31 This is because recidivist procedures adopted in recent years by many other States are far superior to those utilized in the cases now before the Court.32
The question for decision is whether those procedures fall below the minimum level the Fourteenth Amendment will tolerate.33 Upon that question he joined the opinion and judgment of the Court.34
Justice Brennan dissented in part.35 He joined the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE insofar as that opinion would reverse in Nos. 68 and 69.36 He would also reverse in No. 70.37
It seems to him that the constitutional error here involved undermined the very integrity of the fact-finding process.38 He would therefore apply the rule retroactively.39