523 U.S. 1 (1998)
Randy G. Spencer began serving concurrent three-year sentences in Missouri on October 17, 1990, after convictions for felony stealing and burglary.1 He was released on parole on April 16, 1992.2 On September 24, 1992, the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole held a hearing and issued an Order of Revocation finding that Spencer had violated three conditions of parole set out in Missouri's Code of Regulations, Title 14, section 80-3.010: obeying all laws, refraining from possession or use of controlled substances, and refraining from possession of weapons.3
The board relied on an Initial Violation Report dated July 27, 1992, prepared by State Probation and Parole Officer Jonathan Tintinger.4 That report summarized a June 3, 1992 Kansas City police report alleging that a woman had smoked crack cocaine with Spencer at a crack house and at his home, after which he pressed a screwdriver against her side and raped her.5 Spencer admitted smoking crack cocaine with the woman but denied using a weapon or committing rape.6 The report noted Spencer's prior status as a registered sex offender.7
Officer Tintinger's report tentatively recommended that petitioner's parole be continued, but that he be placed in a drug treatment center.8 A September 14, 1992 followup report prepared by Institutional Parole Officer Peggy McClure concluded that there did appear to be significant evidence that Spencer had violated the conditions of his parole as stated, and recommended that petitioner's parole be revoked.9 Spencer was never charged with any crime arising from the incident.10
After the Missouri courts denied relief, Spencer filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on April 1, 1993.11 The district court granted the state two extensions of time to respond.12 On August 7, 1993, Spencer was re-released on parole, and his sentence expired on October 16, 1993.13 On August 23, 1995, the district court dismissed the petition.14
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether Randy G. Spencer's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the September 24, 1992 order revoking his parole is moot?17
Under Article III, section 2, a case or controversy must subsist through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, requiring the parties to maintain a personal stake in the outcome such that the plaintiff has suffered or is threatened with an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.18 An incarcerated convict's challenge to a conviction satisfies this requirement because the incarceration constitutes a concrete injury, but once the sentence expires some concrete and continuing collateral consequence must be shown.19
Yes. Spencer's petition became moot when he completed his sentence on October 16, 1993, because the reincarceration resulting from the parole revocation could not be undone and no continuing collateral consequences were demonstrated.20
The established facts establish that Spencer filed his habeas petition on April 1, 1993, while still in custody due to the revocation, but the district court did not dismiss the petition until August 23, 1995, after the sentence had expired.21 The Eighth Circuit affirmed that dismissal.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the mootness question.23
The district court's conclusion that Spencer was no longer in custody was erroneous because custody existed at the time of filing.24 Yet the subsequent release eliminated the concrete injury without any proven ongoing effects from the revocation itself.25 The facts show that the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole revoked parole based on the violation report.26 Spencer was re-released on August 7, 1993, and his term expired two months later, leaving only the abstract question of the revocation's validity.27
Spencer's habeas petition is moot because he completed the term of imprisonment and failed to demonstrate continuing collateral consequences from the parole revocation.28
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Justice Souter joined the majority opinion and judgment but added that Spencer could pursue relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without satisfying a favorable-termination requirement.29 He explained that Heck v. Humphrey does not bar such actions by former prisoners no longer in custody, because the habeas statute's exhaustion rules no longer apply after release.30 This removes any argument that mootness of the habeas petition would leave Spencer without a federal forum, confirming that the case-or-controversy requirement is not satisfied merely to avoid that result.31
Justice Ginsburg stated that she joined the Court's opinion in Heck v. Humphrey.32 Mindful of real-life examples among them this case, she has come to agree with Justice Souter's reasoning that individuals without recourse to the habeas statute because they are not in custody fit within section 1983's broad reach.33 On that understanding of the state of the law, she joins both the Court's opinion and Justice Souter's concurring opinion in this case.34
Whether the presumption of collateral consequences that applies to challenges to criminal convictions extends to challenges to parole revocations?35
The presumption of collateral consequences applied to criminal convictions, under which courts accept even remote or hypothetical consequences as sufficient to avoid mootness, does not extend to parole revocations.36 In Lane v. Williams the Court refused to presume such consequences from parole revocation because no civil disabilities result as a matter of law.37 Any future effects are contingent on new violations and discretionary decisions by parole authorities or sentencing judges.38
No. The Court declined to extend the Sibron presumption to parole revocations and instead adhered to Lane v. Williams, applying that precedent directly to the established facts of Spencer's revocation.39 The facts show that the Missouri board revoked parole after finding violations of conditions regarding laws, drugs, and weapons based on the Tintinger and McClure reports, yet Spencer does not attack his underlying convictions.40 Because the revocation order produced no automatic legal disabilities comparable to those flowing from a conviction, the presumption is inapplicable.41
The established facts further illustrate why the presumption does not fit: Spencer was never charged with the alleged rape.42 The revocation rested on a violation report rather than a criminal judgment.43 Any future impact would depend on discretionary parole board decisions under Missouri Revised Statutes section 217.690, which grants almost unlimited discretion.44 This contingency distinguishes parole revocation from the concrete, automatic consequences presumed to attend criminal convictions.45
The presumption of collateral consequences that applies to challenges to criminal convictions does not extend to challenges to parole revocations.46
Whether Spencer demonstrated concrete continuing injuries-in-fact from the parole revocation sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement?47
A petitioner challenging a parole revocation after sentence expiration must prove concrete continuing injuries in fact, such as automatic use in future parole proceedings, mandatory sentence enhancement, or impeachment or evidentiary uses.48 Speculative possibilities dependent on future violations, discretionary decisions, or uncertain appearances as a witness or defendant do not suffice.49
No. Spencer asserted four possible injuries but none rose above speculation when measured against the established facts and Missouri law.50 The revocation could be considered in a future parole proceeding, yet under the governing statute it is merely one factor among many and does not render Spencer ineligible for parole.51 The possibility of increased sentence in a future prosecution is likewise contingent on Spencer violating the law again, being convicted, and facing discretionary judicial decisions.52
The facts show that Spencer was never charged with rape or weapon offenses arising from the June 1992 incident.53 The revocation order cited the violation report without detailing conduct.54 Any impeachment or direct evidentiary use would require Spencer to appear as a witness or defendant in future proceedings whose occurrence is purely hypothetical.55 Even if such proceedings occurred, the underlying conduct rather than the revocation finding itself would likely be the focus, and two prior convictions already exist for impeachment purposes.56 These contingencies fail to establish the required concrete, redressable injury.57
Spencer did not demonstrate concrete continuing injuries-in-fact from the parole revocation sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement.58
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the official determination that Spencer committed forcible rape causes a sufficient injury to reputation and good name to defeat mootness.59 He distinguished Lane v. Williams on the ground that the respondents there did not challenge the factual findings underlying their parole revocations, whereas Spencer directly attacks the board's finding of guilt on the rape allegation.60 Stevens maintained that an interest in vindicating one's reputation is constitutionally adequate as a personal stake in the outcome, even if it would not trigger due-process protections under Paul v. Davis, and noted that tangible consequences also exist on these facts.61