665 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)
In 1974, Sam Singer helped his daughter, Susan Singer, and her fiancé, Moore, to organize S&M.1
Part of S&M’s business was the hauling and selling of agricultural lime purchased from Southern Stone.2 Susan Singer and Thomas D. Moore each received 49 percent of the stock while Sam Singer received 2 percent.3 Sam Singer served as president and chairman of the board and made most major decisions; Moore served as vice president and managed daily operations; and Susan Singer served as secretary-treasurer and initially kept the books.4
S&M purchased lime on account from Southern Stone Company, Inc.5
Sam Singer repeatedly loaned funds to S&M through his wholly owned corporation, The Singer Company.6 In spring 1976 The Singer Company was denied a bank loan because of losses from S&M.7 In June 1976 S&M pledged all its assets, including future accounts receivable, to The Singer Company.8 S&M continued purchasing lime from Southern Stone in November and December 1976 and ceased operations on December 31, 1976.9
After S&M closed, Moore formed TM, Inc. and continued purchasing lime from Southern Stone.10 On December 8, 1977 Moore signed a personal note at Southern Stone’s counsel’s office for TM’s account.11 On the same day Southern Stone’s counsel sent Moore a letter purporting to recount statements Moore had made about S&M’s final months and the date Sam Singer decided to end the business.12 Moore did not reply to the letter.13
Southern Stone had previously obtained a judgment against S&M for unpaid lime purchases and was unable to collect by levying on S&M’s assets.14 It then filed this diversity action against Moore, Sam Singer, Susan Singer, and The Singer Company, alleging improper transfers of S&M assets and commingling of S&M and The Singer Company operations.15 After trial the jury returned a verdict for Susan Singer and The Singer Company but against Sam Singer and Moore.16
Whether the August 31, 1978 release issued to Moore extended to Southern Stone’s claims against Moore concerning S&M’s operations in late 1976?17
Under Georgia law, parol evidence is admissible to explain ambiguous language in a release.18 In determining the existence of an ambiguity in a release, Georgia law permits reference only to the face of the document.19 A release containing a dangling 'all claims' phrase after reciting specific items is ambiguous as to whether it covers subject matter not specifically recited in the document.20
No. The release issued to Moore on August 31, 1978 recited the December 8, 1977 note and any other accounts owed by TM or Moore to Southern Stone before the phrase 'all claims . . . whatsoever, known or unknown.'21
The claims arising from S&M’s operations in late 1976 were not among the items recited.22 Georgia precedent treats such a dangling phrase as ambiguous regarding unrecited subject matter.23 In Macris v. Laughlin Insulation Co. the court limited the release to the fire and lease recited before the all-claims language.24 In Warner Robins Supply Co. v. Malone the court admitted parol evidence to clarify the scope of a comparable 'paid in full' phrase.25
The parol evidence admitted at trial established that Southern Stone intended the release to cover only the note and TM’s account.26 The jury’s implicit finding that the release did not reach the S&M claims is therefore supported by the record.27
The release did not extend to Southern Stone’s claims against Moore concerning S&M’s operations in late 1976.28
Whether the December 8, 1977 letter written by Southern Stone’s counsel to Moore was improperly admitted into evidence?29
A letter is admissible as an adoptive admission under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(B) only if the recipient’s failure to respond was reasonable under the circumstances.30 When a document contains two levels of hearsay, an exception or exclusion must apply to each level. The mere presence of the declarant in the courtroom does not create an exception to the hearsay rule.31
Yes. Moore visited Southern Stone’s counsel solely to sign a personal note for TM’s account and had no reason to respond to statements about S&M, which had ceased operations nearly a year earlier.32
Moore testified that he no longer cared about S&M and considered the corporation gone.33 The letter contained two levels of hearsay: counsel’s account of Moore’s statements.34
No exception covered the first level because Southern Stone’s trial counsel did not testify.35 The letter’s admission was highly prejudicial because it contradicted Moore’s and Singer’s testimony on the critical date when the decision was made to close S&M and implied an improper motive for that decision.36 The date directly affected liability for the November and December 1976 lime purchases that formed the basis of the underlying judgment.37
The letter was improperly admitted into evidence.38
Related opinions on this issue
Circuit Judge Roney dissented from the reversal of the jury verdict.39 He argued that any hearsay problem with the letter could have been eliminated because both Moore and the writer Hardegree were available in the courtroom to be examined about the conversation.40 Roney noted that the objection was made on the basis that Hardegree was not going to take the stand for cross-examination, but after the court admitted the letter, no attempt was made to call him.41
He observed that calling opposing trial counsel may raise ethical questions, but that was not Moore's problem.42 Roney concluded that any technical error was not reversible error and the judgment should be affirmed.43 He further pointed out that the substance of the letter had been read to Moore during cross-examination to revive his memory.44 In the next trial the evidence would get in anyway if crucial through direct testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).45