23 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)
Plaintiff Songbyrd, Inc. brought this action seeking monetary damages and a declaration of rights in the master recordings at issue.1
This case concerns the possession, ownership, and usage of several master recordings of musical performances made in the early 1970s by New Orleans musician Henry Roeland Byrd, who was professionally known as "Professor Longhair" ("Byrd").2 The tapes were produced in a Baton Rouge, Louisiana recording studio and soon thereafter came into the possession of a predecessor in interest to Bearsville located in Woodstock, New York.3
Over time several requests have been made by representatives of Byrd to secure return of the tapes.4 It is unclear what, if any, response those requests received, but the tapes have remained in the physical custody of Bearsville continuously since the 1970s.5
In August 1986, Bearsville licensed the master recordings to Rounder Records Corporation, which in 1987 released an album of Byrd's music produced from the recordings.6 In 1991, another recording based on the disputed master recordings was released by Rhino Records. That release was made possible by a licensing agreement between Bearsville and the production company.7
The action was originally filed in Louisiana state court in 1995 and was removed by Bearsville to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.8 Bearsville then moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction and that the claim was barred by Louisiana's period of prescription.9 The district court held that the action was barred by Louisiana's period of prescription and granted the motion without addressing jurisdiction.10 Songbyrd appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the claim was not prescribed under Louisiana law.11 On remand, the district court concluded that personal jurisdiction was lacking and transferred the action to this district.12 The present motion followed.13
Whether New York law governs disposition of the action after transfer from the Eastern District of Louisiana on personal jurisdiction grounds?14
When a case is transferred because the original court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the transferee court applies the law of the forum in which it sits.15
Yes. The action was originally filed in Louisiana state court in 1995 and removed to the Eastern District of Louisiana.16 Bearsville moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and on statute of limitations grounds under Louisiana law.17 The district court dismissed on limitations without addressing jurisdiction.18
The Fifth Circuit reversed on the limitations issue.19 On remand the district court found no personal jurisdiction and transferred the action to the Northern District of New York.20 Because the transfer was based on lack of personal jurisdiction, New York law governs disposition of the case.21
New York law governs disposition of the action.22
Whether the statute of limitations for Songbyrd's conversion claim began to run at the time Bearsville licensed the master recordings rather than upon demand and refusal?23
For conversion claims not involving a bona fide purchaser for value, the three-year statute of limitations under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3) begins to run at the time of the conversion when the defendant exercises dominion and control over the chattel inconsistent with the owner's rights.24
Yes. Bearsville had continuous possession of the master recordings since the 1970s and was never shown to be a bona fide purchaser for value.25 In August 1986 Bearsville licensed the recordings to Rounder Records, demonstrating exercise of dominion and control inconsistent with Songbyrd's interests.26 The rule from Sporn therefore applies rather than the demand-and-refusal rule from Guggenheim, which is limited to good-faith purchasers.27 The claim accrued no later than the 1986 licensing.28
The statute of limitations began to run at the time Bearsville licensed the master recordings.29
Whether the three-year limitations period bars the action filed in 1995?30
A conversion claim governed by the three-year statute of limitations under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3) is time-barred if not commenced within three years of the date the claim accrued.31
Yes. The conversion occurred no later than August 1986 when Bearsville licensed the master recordings to Rounder Records.32 The three-year period therefore expired in August 1989.33 Songbyrd did not file the action until 1995, well after the limitations period had run.34 Conversion is not a continuing wrong that restarts the period with each new act.35
The three-year limitations period bars the action filed in 1995.36