436 U.S. 238 (1978)
In January 1969 petitioner, an orthodontist by profession, purchased the stock and assumed management of three corporations engaged in the food vending business.1 At the time of the purchase the corporations were indebted for approximately $250,000 of taxes, including federal wage and FICA taxes that had been withheld from employees' wages prior to January 31 but had not been paid over.2 The purchase agreement reflected the outstanding tax obligation, and the sellers represented that corporate checking accounts held sufficient balances to pay the taxes as well as other creditors.3
On February 1, 1969, petitioner sent four checks to the IRS in payment of the taxes.4 On Monday, February 3, petitioner discovered that the accounts were overdrawn and stopped payment on the checks.5 Petitioner immediately advised the IRS that the corporations had no funds with which to pay the taxes.6 IRS officials indicated they had no objection to continued operations so long as current tax obligations were met, and petitioner agreed to pay current taxes while endeavoring to address the arrearages.7 During the period from February 1 to July 15, 1969, the corporations generated gross receipts approximating $130,000 per week initially and established a system of segregating funds for payment of withheld taxes, paying approximately $249,212 in taxes that roughly covered current obligations.8
No payments were made on taxes owing for periods prior to February 1.9 In July 1969 the corporations terminated operations and petitioner instituted a proceeding under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act.10 The IRS filed a claim for the unpaid pre-acquisition taxes in that proceeding.11 After a hearing the bankruptcy judge made findings of fact that are not challenged.12 Petitioner conceded liability under § 6672 for taxes arising after he assumed control but contested liability for the pre-acquisition withheld taxes.13
The district court held petitioner liable only for post-acquisition taxes.14 On the government's cross-appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held petitioner liable for the pre-acquisition taxes as well.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that determination.16
Whether a person who purchases the stock of corporations and assumes management after withheld employment taxes have been dissipated by prior officers is personally liable under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 for those pre-acquisition taxes?17
Section 6672 imposes a penalty on any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax who willfully fails to do so, but the phrase limits the statute to persons responsible for collection of third-party taxes and does not extend liability to a person who assumes control after the taxes have been dissipated when the corporation has no liquid assets at the time of assumption.18
No. Petitioner purchased the stock and assumed management of the three corporations on January 31, 1969, after the previous management had already dissipated the withheld trust-fund taxes and when the corporations had no liquid assets.19 The petitioner therefore was not a responsible person with respect to the pre-acquisition taxes because he was not in a position to collect or pay over those specific funds at the time they were withheld.20
Petitioner is not personally liable under § 6672 for the pre-acquisition withheld taxes.21
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Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion. He noted that petitioner's argument based on the conjunctive phrasing of the statute had considerable appeal on literal language but was properly rejected because the 1954 amendment was intended to narrow rather than expand the class of liable persons.22
He stressed that liability cannot be imposed absent a willful failure and that the word "willful" requires some action that tends to impede collection of the corporation's trust-fund taxes before liability can attach.23
Joined by Burger, C. J., And Blackmun, J.
Justice White dissented from the holding on pre-acquisition taxes. He argued that a subsequent responsible person stands in the same shoes as the original officers.24 The purpose of § 6672 to assure collection of withheld taxes is frustrated by allowing a change in ownership to shield after-acquired funds from application to prior trust-fund obligations.25
There is nothing in the language or legislative history of § 6672 which distinguishes between the obligations of responsible persons on the basis of when they assumed such a position.26
Whether a responsible person who assumes control of corporations having no liquid assets violates § 6672 by willfully using subsequently generated gross receipts to pay operating expenses instead of pre-acquisition trust-fund tax obligations?27
Section 6672 does not impress a trust on after-acquired funds under § 7501 when no funds existed at the time of assumption. A responsible person therefore does not violate the pay-over requirement by using subsequently generated gross receipts for operating expenses rather than pre-acquisition taxes.28
No. When petitioner assumed control the corporations had no liquid assets and the prior trust-fund taxes had already been dissipated, so no trust attached to the later gross receipts of approximately $130,000 per week.29 Petitioner therefore did not violate § 6672 by directing those receipts to wages, rent, suppliers, and other operating expenses instead of the pre-acquisition tax obligations.30
Petitioner did not violate § 6672 by using after-acquired gross receipts for operating expenses.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the concept of fault inherent in the term willful precludes liability without personal fault. The statute cannot be read to make a responsible person a guarantor of pre-existing delinquencies simply by continuing operations.32 The Government did not advance an argument that would impose liability on that basis.33
Both the language and history of § 6672 make it perfectly clear that liability for this penalty cannot be imposed in the absence of a willful failure.34
Joined by Burger, C. J., And Blackmun, J.
Justice White dissented from Parts III-B and IV. He contended that the majority's construction improperly permits diversion of after-acquired funds from tax obligations.35 The flexible IRS practice of allowing continued operations does not justify judicially limiting the statute's reach against successor managers who knowingly apply receipts elsewhere.36 The Court exceeds its mandate by construing the statute so as to conform to its conclusions concerning the best use of tax dollars collected from American employees.37
Justice White further argued that the ruling invites sham changes in management to avoid liability.38 He maintained that the statute is purely a tax collection measure designed to ensure withheld taxes reach the Treasury rather than subsidize takeovers of troubled businesses.39