50 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1898)
In 1894, the plaintiff’s son, who had been employed by the defendant for six years as chief salesman, was accused of embezzling money from the defendant.1 The son signed a confession admitting to stealing $1,500 and agreed to provide security for that amount.2 The plaintiff, seeking to protect her son, visited the defendant at his home after learning of the situation from her son.3
During the meeting, the defendant stated that he would have to tell the plaintiff’s husband about the embezzlement when the plaintiff proposed inadequate security such as a chamber set.4 The plaintiff had previously discussed her husband’s mental condition with the defendant.5 She believed that disclosure would cause her husband, who was suffering from mental trouble making him irritable, melancholy, and unable to sleep, to become insane, although he was still attending to his business affairs at the time.6
To prevent the defendant from informing her husband, the plaintiff executed an assignment of her share in her father’s estate the next day at the office of the defendant’s lawyer.7 The assignment was dated October 10, 1894.8 Her son was present and protested the transaction.9
Thereafter, the plaintiff joined with her sisters in employing a lawyer to secure her share in her father’s estate for payment to the defendant.10 On March 12, 1895, she signed a petition for distribution that referenced the assignment.11 She did not claim the assignment was invalid until December 19, 1895.12 In the lower court, a verdict was directed for the defendant, after which the case was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.13
Whether the evidence supported a finding that the defendant obtained the assignment from the plaintiff by duress?14
Duress sufficient to avoid a contract exists when a party obtains the contract by creating a motive from which the other party ought to be free.15 This motive must in fact be and be known to be sufficient to produce the result.16 It does not matter that the threatened act would not be actionable.17 It also does not matter that the motive would not have prevailed with a person of ordinary courage.18
Yes. The defendant threatened to tell the plaintiff's husband about the son's embezzlement during the meeting at his home after the plaintiff proposed inadequate security. The plaintiff had previously discussed her husband's mental condition with the defendant, and she believed disclosure would cause him to become insane while he remained active in business. To prevent this disclosure the plaintiff executed the assignment the next day at the defendant's lawyer's office.19
These facts, if believed by the jury, establish that the defendant obtained the assignment solely by inspiring fear of what he threatened to do. The ground for her fear was known to him. The fear was reasonable and sufficiently powerful to overcome self-interest.20
The evidence supported submitting the question of duress to the jury rather than directing a verdict for the defendant.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Lathrop, J.
Justice Knowlton dissented from the majority conclusion that the evidence warranted submitting the duress question to the jury.22 He found no evidence of an improper threat or wrongful influence by the defendant.23 The statements about telling the father were natural when inadequate security was offered.24
The plaintiff had previously discussed only the husband's actual condition with the defendant, not her private belief that disclosure would cause insanity.25 The record contained nothing showing that the defendant knew or believed his words would overcome the plaintiff's will.26 The presumption of honest dealing therefore required upholding the directed verdict.27
Whether the plaintiff's subsequent acts ratified the assignment if it was initially procured by duress?28
No. Although the plaintiff joined with her sisters in employing a lawyer, signed a petition for distribution on March 12, 1895 that referenced the assignment, and took further steps before claiming invalidity on December 19, 1895, these acts occurred in connection with the defendant's former lawyer who appeared to act only in the defendant's interest.31 The facts therefore permitted the jury to find that the later acts were done before the plaintiff had gained an independent foothold or realized her independence.32 Ratification was not established as a matter of law.33
The subsequent acts did not ratify the assignment as a matter of law, and the case should have been left to the jury on both duress and ratification.34