394 U.S. 147 (1969)
On the afternoon of April 12, 1963, Good Friday, petitioner Fred L. Shuttlesworth and two other Negro ministers led 52 people out of a Birmingham church.1 The group walked in orderly fashion, two abreast for the most part, for four blocks along the sidewalks to protest the alleged denial of civil rights to Negroes in Birmingham.2
The marchers stayed on the sidewalks except at street intersections.3 They did not interfere with other pedestrians, obstruct automobiles, or disobey traffic signals, although a crowd of spectators followed behind them.
The marchers were stopped by Birmingham police after four blocks and arrested for violating section 1159 of the General Code of Birmingham.4 The ordinance made it unlawful to organize or participate in any parade, procession, or other public demonstration on the city's streets without first securing a permit from the City Commission.5 To obtain a permit, an applicant had to provide details about the event, and the Commission could refuse if in its judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals, or convenience required refusal.6 Shuttlesworth was convicted and sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment at hard labor and an additional 48 days at hard labor in default of payment of a $75 fine and $24 costs.7
The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on grounds including insufficient evidence of a procession requiring a permit, discriminatory application of the ordinance, and its unconstitutionality as an invidious prior restraint.8 The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction after giving the ordinance an extraordinarily narrow construction that limited the Commission's discretion to considerations of public convenience in the use of streets.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's constitutional claims.10
More than a week before the march, Shuttlesworth sent a representative to apply for a parade permit, but Commissioner Connor denied the request, stating that no permit would be issued in Birmingham and that he would picket the applicant over to the City Jail.11 Shuttlesworth then sent a telegram to Commissioner Connor requesting a permit to picket against segregation and discrimination, specifying that normal rules of picketing would be obeyed, but Connor replied that permits were the responsibility of the entire Commission and insisted that the group not start any picketing on the streets.12 These facts were drawn from the record in the related case of Walker v. City of Birmingham, of which judicial notice was taken.13
Whether the petitioner's conviction for participating in a march without a permit under the Birmingham ordinance can be squared with the Constitution of the United States?14
A law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.15 A person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.16
No. The Birmingham ordinance as written conferred upon the City Commission virtually unbridled and absolute power to prohibit any parade, procession, or demonstration on the city's streets or public ways, guided only by their own ideas of public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience.17 This ordinance fell squarely within the ambit of decisions holding such laws unconstitutional as prior restraints.18 Applied to the established facts, Shuttlesworth led 52 marchers in an orderly sidewalk demonstration on April 12, 1963, without a permit after Commissioner Connor had denied the request outright, and the group was arrested and convicted under the ordinance as administered at that time.19
The petitioner's conviction for participating in a march without a permit under the Birmingham ordinance cannot be squared with the Constitution of the United States.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the result.21 He emphasized that the petitioner was entitled to rely on the statutory construction adopted by the front-line state officials administering the permit scheme.22 Because Commissioner Connor construed the ordinance to deny any permit and no expedited administrative or judicial review existed under Alabama law, Shuttlesworth could take the officials at their word, treat the statute as void, and exercise his fundamental right of peaceful political demonstration without first obtaining a permit that could not be secured in time.23
Harlan further noted that the absence of speedy procedures created a serious dilemma for the marchers, as invoking full administrative and judicial remedies would almost certainly have prevented any effective relief by Good Friday.24
Whether the Alabama Supreme Court's subsequent narrowing construction of the ordinance restored constitutional validity to the 1963 conviction?25
The inquiry in every case must be whether control of the use of the streets for a parade or procession was, in fact, exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.26 A narrowing construction placed upon an ordinance years after the events in question does not necessarily restore constitutional validity to a conviction that occurred under the ordinance as it was written and applied at the time.27
No. The Supreme Court of Alabama performed a remarkable job of narrowing the ordinance more than four years after the march.28 It construed the ordinance to require permits whenever public convenience in the use of streets would not be unduly disturbed and to forbid arbitrary or unfettered discretion.29 Applied to the established facts, however, the ordinance in April 1963 was administered exactly as written when Commissioner Connor flatly refused the permit requests without any investigation into traffic impact or public convenience.30 This made it indisputably clear that city authorities thought the ordinance meant what it said at the time of the Good Friday march.31
The Alabama Supreme Court's subsequent narrowing construction of the ordinance did not restore constitutional validity to the 1963 conviction.32