441 Mass. 131, 804 N.E.2d 324 (2004)
The Shantigar Foundation owned a nineteenth-century barn in Rowe, Massachusetts, which it was renovating for use as a spiritual learning center at a cost of just under one million dollars over two and one-half years.1 Shantigar contracted with Bear Mountain Builders, a sole proprietorship operated by Joseph Kayan, to perform renovation work on the barn, and Kayan subcontracted some work to Cove Building Company, run by Jeffrey Stone; approximately one year before the fire, Shantigar began contracting directly with Cove while Kayan appeared on site every ten to fourteen days.2
On the evening of January 26, 2000, a fire destroyed the barn.3 Workers had applied a linseed oil-based product called BioShield to approximately 2,500 square feet of floors that day using rags, a lamb's wool mop, and paint brushes; an earlier incident in August 1999 had shown smoke curling from a pile of such rags that were warm to the touch, after which Kayan discussed safe disposal with the workers.4 Shantigar's expert determined the fire started due to spontaneous combustion of the linseed oil rags and other materials left in the hallway, though he acknowledged on cross-examination that fires could have ignited simultaneously on different floors.5
Shantigar filed suit against both Bear Mountain and Cove for negligence and breach of contract.6 In December 2001, Shantigar settled with Cove for $300,000, after which Cove filed an unopposed motion to dismiss Bear Mountain's cross-claim for contribution that was allowed, and the claims against Bear Mountain proceeded to trial before a jury in May 2002.7 The jury found Bear Mountain negligent in the supervision of others on the project and Shantigar negligent, allocating sixty percent fault to Shantigar and forty percent to Bear Mountain, resulting in judgment for Bear Mountain.8
Shantigar filed a motion to amend the judgment, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial, which the judge denied; Shantigar appealed from both the judgment and the denial of the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.9
Whether G. L. c. 231, § 85 requires a jury to include a settling tortfeasor in its apportionment of negligence among the parties?10
General Laws c. 231, § 85 directs that the plaintiff's negligence shall be compared to the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought.11 The combined total of the plaintiff's negligence taken together with all of the negligence of all defendants shall equal one hundred per cent.12 The statute applies only to named parties who participate in the trial at the time the case is submitted to the fact finder.13
No. Shantigar settled its claim against Cove for $300,000 in December 2001, after which Cove obtained dismissal of Bear Mountain's cross claim for contribution.14 The claims against Bear Mountain proceeded to trial in May 2002.15 At the time the case was submitted to the jury, Cove was no longer a defendant against whom recovery was sought.16 The jury found Bear Mountain negligent in the supervision of others on the project and Shantigar negligent, allocating sixty per cent fault to Shantigar and forty per cent to Bear Mountain.
The plain language of the statute supports comparison only with active participants at trial rather than all possible tortfeasors.17 Shantigar's argument that the jury implicitly found Cove negligent assumes Cove remained a defendant after the settlement, which it did not.18 Allocating negligence to a non-participant does not provide a sound basis for the allocation under the statute.19
G. L. c. 231, § 85 does not require inclusion of a settling tortfeasor in the jury's apportionment of negligence.20
Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence concerning the plaintiff's decision not to install a sprinkler system in the barn?21
In the absence of a statutory duty to install sprinklers or other specialized fire apparatus, a jury could find such a duty when the owner knows of a particular danger of fire.22
No. Van Itallie acknowledged that the ancient wooden barn was a fire hazard and that his architect had advised him to install sprinklers because the barn was a tinderbox.23 The jury reasonably could conclude that van Itallie was aware of a particular danger of fire from the evidence presented at trial.24 There was no error in the admission of evidence concerning his decision not to install a fire suppression system.25
The trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence concerning the decision not to install a sprinkler system.26