547 U.S. 843 (2006)
Donald Curtis Samson was on state parole in California in September 2002 following his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.1 On September 6, 2002, Officer Alex Rohleder of the San Bruno Police Department observed Samson walking down a street with a woman and a child.2 The officer, aware from a prior contact that Samson was on parole and believing he faced an at-large warrant, stopped him and asked whether he had an outstanding parole warrant.3
Samson responded that there was no outstanding warrant and that he was in good standing with his parole agent.4 Officer Rohleder confirmed by radio dispatch that Samson was on parole and had no outstanding warrant.5 Pursuant to California Penal Code section 3067(a) and based solely on Samson's status as a parolee, the officer searched him and found a cigarette box in his left breast pocket containing a plastic baggie with methamphetamine.6
The State charged Samson with possession of methamphetamine under California Health and Safety Code section 11377(a).7 The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence after finding the search authorized by the statute and not arbitrary or capricious.8 A jury convicted Samson, and the trial court sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment.9
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, relying on state precedent that suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful if not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing, and concluding that the search here satisfied that standard.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2005 to decide whether the suspicionless search violated the Constitution.11
Whether a suspicionless search of a parolee, conducted under the authority of a state statute requiring every eligible prisoner to agree in writing to searches or seizures by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time with or without a search warrant and with or without cause, violates the Fourth Amendment?12
Under the Fourth Amendment, reasonableness of a search is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.13 The assessment weighs on one hand the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual's privacy and on the other the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.14 Parolees occupy a position on the continuum of punishments with fewer expectations of privacy than probationers because parole is more akin to imprisonment.15 The state possesses substantial interests in supervising parolees to reduce recidivism and promote reintegration.16
No. The totality of the circumstances test applied to the established facts shows that Samson's parole status under the California statute requiring written agreement to suspicionless searches by any peace officer at any time significantly diminished his expectation of privacy.17 The parole search condition was clearly expressed to petitioner.18 He signed an order submitting to the condition and thus was unambiguously aware of it.19 Officer Rohleder's search, conducted solely on the basis of that status after confirming parole but without individualized suspicion, served the state's substantial interest in supervising a parolee population with a 68- to 70-percent recidivism rate.20
That interest outweighs the diminished privacy expectation and renders the intrusion reasonable.21
The suspicionless search of Samson did not violate the Fourth Amendment.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the majority's approval of suspicionless searches of parolees by ordinary law enforcement officers without individualized suspicion or special needs marks an unprecedented departure from Fourth Amendment precedent.23
He maintained that parolees retain legitimate expectations of privacy greater than those of prisoners.24 Prior cases such as Knights and Griffin permitted warrantless searches only upon reasonable suspicion or under special needs tied to supervisory relationships, neither of which justified the blanket discretion exercised here.25
Stevens further argued that the majority's reasoning was circular in deriving diminished privacy expectations from the very search condition under challenge.26 The absence of programmatic safeguards left parolees exposed to arbitrary and harassing intrusions that undermine reintegration.27