481 U.S. 200 (1987)
Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with assaulting Cynthia Knighton and murdering her 4-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott.1 Marsh and Williams were tried jointly over Marsh’s objection after Martin became a fugitive.2
On the evening of October 29, 1978, Knighton and her son were at Scott’s home when Marsh and Martin visited.3 Martin pulled out a gun, pointed it at Scott and the Knightons, and said that someone had gotten killed and Scott knew something about it.4 The doorbell rang, respondent opened the door, and Williams walked in, carrying a gun.5 Knighton and her son attempted to flee, but respondent grabbed Knighton and held her until Williams returned.6 Martin and Williams then forced Scott and the Knightons into the basement, where Martin shot them.7 Only Knighton survived.8
The State introduced Williams’ redacted confession that omitted all reference to respondent and any third participant.9 The confession described a conversation Williams had with Martin as they drove to the Scott home, during which Martin said that he would have to kill the victims after the robbery.10 The confession was admitted with an instruction that the jury not use it against Marsh, and Williams did not testify.11
Marsh testified that during the drive she was sitting in the backseat.12 She knew that Martin and Williams were talking but could not hear the conversation because the radio was on and the speaker was right in her ear.13 She insisted that she had possessed no prior knowledge that Martin and Williams were armed, had heard no conversation about anyone’s being harmed, and had not intended to rob or kill anyone.14 During closing argument the prosecutor linked Marsh to the portion of Williams’ confession describing his conversation with Martin in the car.15
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions for two counts of felony murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder.16 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.17 The federal district court denied Marsh’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.18 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
Whether the Confrontation Clause is violated by admission at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession redacted to omit any reference to the defendant when other evidence admitted at trial links the defendant to the confession?21
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, extended against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against him.22 Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness against a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.23 In Bruton v. United States, the Court recognized a narrow exception to this principle.24 The Court held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant.25
No. The redacted confession of Williams omitted all reference to Marsh and any third participant.26 The confession was not incriminating on its face and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.27 Marsh's own testimony placed her in the backseat of the car during the drive.28 The jury received proper limiting instructions not to use the confession against Marsh.29
Therefore, the Bruton exception does not apply, and the admission with the limiting instruction did not violate the Confrontation Clause.30
The Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of the redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented.32 He argued that the rationale of Bruton applies without exception to all inadmissible confessions that are powerfully incriminating.33 Stevens maintained that the distinction drawn by the majority between confessions that directly identify the defendant and those that rely for their inculpatory effect on the factual and legal relationships of their contents to other evidence before the jury is of constitutional magnitude.34
He observed that at the time Williams’ confession was introduced, the evidence already had established that respondent and two men committed an armed robbery in the course of which the two men killed two persons and shot a third.35 Williams’ confession was the only evidence directly linking respondent with the specific intent to kill the victims afterwards.36 Stevens concluded that the limiting instruction failed to guarantee the level of certainty required by the Confrontation Clause.37 The risk that the jury relied on impermissible evidence when resolving a critical issue against Marsh was constitutionally unacceptable.38
He further noted that considerations of fairness normally outweigh administrative concerns about joint trials.39