520 U.S. 385 (1997)
On December 31, 1991, police officers in Madison, Wisconsin, obtained a warrant to search Steiney Richards' motel room for drugs and related paraphernalia.1 The search warrant was the culmination of an investigation that had uncovered substantial evidence that Richards was one of several individuals dealing drugs out of hotel rooms in Madison.2 The police requested a warrant that would have given advance authorization for a no-knock entry into the motel room, but the Magistrate explicitly deleted those portions of the warrant.34
The officers arrived at the motel room at 3:40 a.m.5 Officer Pharo, dressed as a maintenance man, led the team along with several plainclothes officers and at least one man in uniform.6 Officer Pharo knocked on Richards' door and, responding to the query from inside the room, stated that he was a maintenance man.7 With the chain still on the door, Richards cracked it open and saw the man in uniform standing behind Officer Pharo before he quickly slammed the door closed.8
After waiting two or three seconds, the officers began kicking and ramming the door to gain entry to the locked room.910 At trial, the officers testified that they identified themselves as police while they were kicking the door in.11 When they finally broke into the room, the officers caught Richards trying to escape through the window and found cash and cocaine hidden in plastic bags above the bathroom ceiling tiles.12
Richards sought to have the evidence from his motel room suppressed on the ground that the officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to forcing entry into the room.13 The trial court denied the motion.14 Richards appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which affirmed.15
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the facts that on December 31, 1991, police executed a search warrant for the motel room of the defendant seeking evidence of the felonious crime of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1m) (1991-92) and that they did not knock and announce prior to their entry.1617
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations?18
The Fourth Amendment incorporates the common-law requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry.19 This flexible requirement of reasonableness can give way under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence or where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.20 The reasonableness of any no-knock entry must be evaluated on the facts and circumstances of the particular case rather than through per se exceptions for entire categories of criminal activity.21
No.22 The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a per se rule that exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are always present in felony drug cases due to the risks of violence and evidence destruction.23 This approach contains considerable overgeneralization because not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree, such as when only individuals with no connection to the drug activity are present or when the drugs being searched for are of a type or in a location that makes them impossible to destroy quickly.24 The court impermissibly insulates these cases from judicial review by creating a blanket exception based on the category of crime rather than the particular circumstances of each entry.25
Facts of the Case: On December 31, 1991, police officers in Madison, Wisconsin, obtained a warrant to search Steiney Richards' motel room for drugs and related paraphernalia. The search warrant was the culmination of an investigation that had uncovered substantial evidence that Richards was one of several individuals dealing drugs out of hotel rooms in Madison. The police requested a warrant that would have given advance authorization for a no-knock entry into the motel room, but the Magistrate explicitly deleted those portions of the warrant.
Upon arrival at the motel room at 3:40 a.m., Officer Pharo, dressed as a maintenance man, led the team along with several plainclothes officers and at least one man in uniform.26 Officer Pharo knocked on Richards' door and, responding to the query from inside the room, stated that he was a maintenance man. With the chain still on the door, Richards cracked it open and saw the man in uniform standing behind Officer Pharo before he quickly slammed the door closed.
After waiting two or three seconds, the officers began kicking and ramming the door to gain entry to the locked room. At trial, the officers testified that they identified themselves as police while they were kicking the door in. When they finally broke into the room, the officers caught Richards trying to escape through the window and found cash and cocaine hidden in plastic bags above the bathroom ceiling tiles. Richards sought to have the evidence from his motel room suppressed on the ground that the officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to forcing entry into the room. The trial court denied the motion. Richards appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which affirmed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the facts that on December 31, 1991, police executed a search warrant for the motel room of the defendant seeking evidence of the felonious crime of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1m) (1991-92) and that they did not knock and announce prior to their entry. The court concluded that nothing in Wilson would prohibit application of a per se exception to the knock-and-announce requirement in a category of cases.27
The Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations.28
Whether the officers' no-knock entry into Richards' motel room was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?29
In order to justify a no-knock entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.30 This standard strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries.
Yes.31 The officers had a reasonable suspicion that Richards might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so.32 The judge who heard testimony at Richards' suppression hearing concluded that it was reasonable for the officers executing the warrant to believe that Richards knew, after opening the door to his motel room the first time, that the men seeking entry to his room were the police.33 Once the officers reasonably believed that Richards knew who they were, it was reasonable for them to force entry immediately given the disposable nature of the drugs.34
The magistrate's deletion of the no-knock provision from the warrant does not alter the reasonableness of the officers' decision, which must be evaluated as of the time they entered the motel room.35 The actual circumstances of petitioner's apparent recognition of the officers combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs justified the officers' ultimate decision to enter without first announcing their presence and authority.36
The officers' no-knock entry into Richards' motel room was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.37