726 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1987)
In July 1974, Richard W. Johnson purchased 348 acres of land in Shelby County for $125,000 with his grantor reserving a vendor’s lien on the property.1 Johnson moved onto the property and made improvements. In 1981 Johnson and his wife divorced, and Johnson purchased his wife’s community interest in the property which was evidenced by a note.2 Later that same year, Johnson began to experience financial difficulties; his debts and obligations totaled nearly $120,000.3
Johnson fell behind in payments on the note to his former wife and in payments on the 348 acres and Johnson's grantor posted the land for foreclosure. At all times, Johnson claimed 200 acres of the 348 acres as his homestead.4 During this period of financial straits, Johnson attempted to secure loans to help ease his indebtedness. Johnson was unable to obtain financing because of the property’s homestead status.5 Johnson was introduced to F.G. Cherry who originally told Johnson that the Texas State Bank of Tatum could not lend him the necessary funds.6
Johnson again contacted Cherry as the foreclosure date neared.7 The following documents were executed by Johnson and Cherry in October 1981. A general warranty deed from Johnson to Cherry and the Bank covered 348 acres in Shelby County. A one-year lease agreement on the land ran from Cherry and the Bank to Johnson. An option from Cherry to Johnson allowed repurchase of the land.8 In return for the general warranty deed Johnson received $120,000 from Cherry, and Cherry assumed the $38,000 balance on the note to Johnson’s former wife.9 The lease provided for two semi-annual payments of $12,510 each. Johnson could exercise his option on the acreage for $132,000 and reassumption of the note to his ex-wife.10
Johnson failed to make the second lease payment in October 1982 as required. In November 1982, Cherry and the Bank initiated eviction proceedings against Johnson.11 Johnson sued Cherry and the Bank, claiming that the transaction was a loan disguised as a sale and alleging usurious interest charges on the alleged loan. Cherry and the Bank claimed that the transaction was a sale.12 At trial, Johnson testified he understood and intended the transaction to be a loan even though it was written as a sale. He stated that he was indebted to creditors for $118,516.84 of the $120,000 loaned.13
A licensed real estate appraiser testified that Johnson’s acreage with improvements was worth approximately $320,000 when Johnson conveyed the property to Cherry and that a lease on the property was worth at most $4,500 a year.14 The jury found that (1) the instrument was a mortgage; (2) $12,000 of the $132,000 repurchase price was a charge for lending money; (3) $20,000 of the $25,020 lease payment was a charge for lending money; and (4) attorney’s fees should be awarded to Johnson.15 The trial court rendered judgment that title to the 348 acres was vested in Johnson and awarded Johnson $9,612 with interest.16 The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment that Johnson take nothing.17
Johnson appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.18 He contended that his testimony that he and Cherry agreed the transaction was actually a mortgage is some evidence the transaction was a loan.19 He further asserted that the law should impute the existence of a debt when there is some evidence of a loan or indebtedness combined with a finding of fact that the transaction was intended as a loan.20
Whether the October 1981 warranty deed from Johnson to Cherry and the Bank was actually a mortgage on Johnson's homestead?21
The question of whether an instrument written as a deed is actually a deed or is in fact a mortgage is a question of fact.22 The true nature of the instrument is resolved by ascertaining the intent of the parties as disclosed by the contract or attending circumstances or both.23 Even when the instrument appears on its face to be a deed absolute, parol evidence is admissible to show that the parties actually intended the instrument as a mortgage.24 When there is a fact finding that the parties intended the transaction to be a loan, and that finding is supported by probative evidence, the law will impute the existence of a debt.25 A mortgage of a homestead not expressly permitted by the Constitution is invalid.26
Yes. Johnson testified at trial that he understood and intended the transaction to be a loan even though it was written as a sale, and he stated that he was indebted to creditors for $118,516.84 of the $120,000 received.27 The jury found that the instrument was a mortgage.28 In addition to Johnson’s testimony regarding his intentions, the evidence was that the repurchase price was exactly 10% more than the original price; the land was worth almost twice as much as the original “sale” price; the lease price equaled exactly 9% interest on the balance of the note to Johnson’s ex-wife assumed by Cherry and 18% interest on the $120,000 loan; Johnson was indebted to other creditors for approximately $119,000 of the $120,000 he received from Cherry; Johnson was within one week of losing the land entirely; and Johnson had told a real estate agent he was not interested in listing his property for sale.
These facts establish that the transaction was intended as a mortgage on the homestead.29
The October 1981 warranty deed was actually a mortgage on Johnson's homestead and is invalid under the Texas Constitution.30
Whether parol evidence is admissible to show that a deed absolute on its face was intended as a mortgage?31
Even when the instrument appears on its face to be a deed absolute, parol evidence is admissible to show that the parties actually intended the instrument as a mortgage. The true nature of the instrument is resolved by ascertaining the intent of the parties as disclosed by the contract or attending circumstances or both.
Yes. Johnson testified that he understood and intended the transaction to be a loan, and the jury credited this testimony along with surrounding circumstances such as the option to repurchase, the depressed sale price relative to appraised value, and the lease payments structured as interest.32 The court of appeals had erred by refusing to consider such evidence and by relying on disapproved precedent that barred parol evidence.33
Parol evidence is admissible to show that a deed absolute on its face was intended as a mortgage.34
Whether a jury finding supported by probative evidence that the transaction was intended as a loan requires the law to impute the existence of a debt?35
When there is a fact finding that the parties intended the transaction to be a loan, and that finding is supported by probative evidence, the law will impute the existence of a debt, thereby creating the debtor/creditor relationship necessary to every mortgage.36
Yes. The jury found that the instrument was a mortgage, and this finding rests on probative evidence including Johnson's testimony about his intent and the financial circumstances, the exact 10% markup in the repurchase price, the appraiser's valuation showing the land was worth nearly twice the amount advanced, and the lease payments matching interest calculations.37 The law therefore imputes an enforceable debt despite the documents appearing as a sale.38
A jury finding supported by probative evidence that the transaction was intended as a loan requires the law to impute the existence of a debt.39
Whether Cherry and the Bank are entitled to an equitable money judgment for the amounts advanced to Johnson even though they did not plead for such relief?40
Restoration or an offer to restore consideration received by one seeking to cancel a deed is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit for cancellation of an instrument.41 The equitable power of the court exists to do fairness and is flexible and adaptable to particular exigencies, so that relief will be granted when, in view of all the circumstances, to deny it would permit one party to suffer a gross wrong at the hands of the other.42 Equity regards that which should be done as done.43
Yes. Johnson admitted at trial that he was indebted to Cherry and the Bank for the $120,000 loan and the $38,000 note Cherry paid, and Johnson's attorney stated at oral argument that Johnson was willing to acknowledge a lien.44 Although Cherry and the Bank did not plead for a money judgment, the court exercises its equitable powers to award judgment equal to the amount owed because Johnson sought cancellation and cannot retain the benefits without restoration.45 The cause is remanded for determination of the reimbursement amount with a lien created on the non-homestead acres.46
Cherry and the Bank are entitled to an equitable money judgment for the amounts advanced to Johnson even though they did not plead for such relief.47