68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1st Dep't 1979)
Samuel Porter and Express Packaging, Inc. owned the Maurice Utrillo painting entitled Chateau de Lion-sur-Mer.1 Porter purchased the painting in 1969.2 During 1972 and 1973, Porter conducted several art transactions with Harold Von Maker, who used the name Peter Wertz among others.3 In the spring of 1973, Porter sold Von Maker a Childe Hassam painting for one hundred fifty thousand dollars.4 The sale was financed with a fifty thousand dollar deposit and ten notes for ten thousand dollars each.5 Around the same time, Porter permitted Von Maker to take the Utrillo temporarily to hang in his home pending a purchase decision.6 In May 1973, Porter saw the painting hanging in Von Maker's Westchester home.7
The first note was returned dishonored in early July 1973.8 Porter then investigated and learned through Bishop reports dated July 10 and July 17, 1973, that Von Maker had an arrest record.9 Von Maker had been convicted of crimes including transmitting a forged cable in a scheme to defraud the Chase Manhattan Bank.10 Porter notified the FBI about the financial transactions concerning the notes.11 On August 13, 1973, Porter's attorney executed a detailed agreement with Von Maker's attorney.12 Under the agreement, Von Maker acknowledged receiving the Utrillo from Porter on consignment.13 The painting belonged to Porter. Von Maker agreed to return the painting and book or pay thirty thousand dollars within ninety days.14 A Cranach painting was held in escrow by Von Maker's attorney as security.15
At the time of the agreement, Von Maker had already used the real Peter Wertz to sell the Utrillo for twenty thousand dollars to the Feigen gallery.16 Feigen's employee Mrs. Drew-Bear handled the transaction.17 She found a buyer in defendant Brenner.18 After the sale, the painting was resold and shipped to Venezuela.19 After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint.20 The court sustained the defense of equitable estoppel while finding statutory estoppel inapplicable.21 Plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department.22
Whether the defense of statutory estoppel bars recovery against Feigen?23
The provisions of statutory estoppel are found in section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code.24 Subdivision (2) thereof provides that any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.25 Subdivision (9) of section 1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code defines a buyer in the ordinary course of business as a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind.26 Section 2-103 (subd [1], par [b]) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines good faith in the case of a merchant as honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.27
No. To determine whether the defense of statutory estoppel is available to Feigen, the court ascertained whether Feigen fits the definition of a buyer in the ordinary course of business.28 Feigen does not fit that definition for two reasons.29 First, Wertz, from whom Feigen bought the Utrillo, was not an art dealer.30 Wertz was not a person in the business of selling goods of that kind.31
If anything, he was a delicatessen employee.32 Second, Feigen was not a person in good faith in the transaction with Wertz.33 Neither Ms. Drew-Bear nor her employer Feigen made any investigation to determine the status of Wertz.34 Had Ms. Drew-Bear done so much as call either of the telephone numbers Wertz had left, she would have learned that Wertz was employed by a delicatessen and was not an art dealer.35
Nor did Ms. Drew-Bear or Feigen make an effort to verify whether Wertz was the owner or authorized by the owner to sell the painting he was offering.36
The defense of statutory estoppel does not bar recovery against Feigen.37
Whether the defense of equitable estoppel bars recovery against Feigen?38
Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the principle by which a party is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon such words or conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in such a way that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed.39 An owner may be estopped from setting up his own title and the lack of title in the vendor as against a bona fide purchaser for value where the owner has clothed the vendor with possession and other indicia of title.40
No. Porter's conduct was not blameworthy.41 When the first promissory note was dishonored, he retained Bishop's investigative service and informed the FBI of the financial transactions concerning the series of notes.42 His attorney obtained a comprehensive agreement covering several paintings, within which was the assurance by Von Maker that he still controlled the Utrillo.43 Although Porter had permitted Von Maker to possess the painting, he conferred upon Von Maker no other indicia of ownership.44
Possession without more is insufficient to create an estoppel.45 In purchasing the Utrillo, Feigen did not rely on any indicia of ownership in Von Maker.46 Feigen dealt with Wertz, who did not have the legal right to possession of the painting.47 Neither Ms. Drew-Bear nor Feigen made, or attempted to make, the inquiry which the circumstances demanded.48
The defense of equitable estoppel does not bar recovery against Feigen.49